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I first want to say that I regret that we could get

notice on this meeting, so I'm late.

And the interpreters are all, the interpreters are all in a very great role.

But they, because of the nature of the announcement, that I will, of course, thank you and have a great day.

And as you will see, if you're in a tough situation,

They were brokering this announcement in order to influence the voting staff.

I, for that reason, as you will see, I felt that we, I deliberately waited, and I informed Michael this, that until after all votes were filled, that after all votes were over, we would invite the leaders to this meeting.

We would have given them a little bark, a little speech, a little introduction about what we are as a matter of fact, because that's the time we have now.

It's a very brief statement, and the meeting was here brief, too.

As all of you know, the nuclear arms talks have been stale for over a year.

The basic point of

is that the Soviet Union's purpose and what they have urged is that we agree on a limitation of defensive weapons only.

Our purpose is that we should negotiate a limitation on both defensive and offensive lines.

Early in January, after we had discussed this in our highest levels of discovery, I determined individually that an iniquity should be undertaken at the highest level to break the deadline.

And I undertook such an initiative.

Today, I will read a statement which, at 12 o'clock Washington time, it will be read simultaneously, or issued simultaneously at 7 o'clock Moscow time, which represents a step in the progress in breaking this deadline.

I'll read the statement now, which will speak for itself.

The governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic garments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.

They have also agreed that together with concluding an agreement to limit CBS, they will agree on certain measures with respect

strategic weapons.

The two sides are taking this course in the condition that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms.

These negotiations will be actually pursued.

Now, this statement today, as you can see, a joint statement, is the major step in breaking the sale

It should be said, however, that

Very intensive negotiations must now be undertaken first in Vienna and then in Helsinki in the summer to carry out the objective which is set forth in this statement.

This statement indicates the commitment of the highest levels in both Moscow and Washington toward achieving that objective.

As far as the matters that will be negotiated beyond this general statement is concerned, no useful purpose insofar as achieving the goal was disturbed by this machine.

I will simply say that the leadership, that here in our government and all others, myself, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the rest of the Archipelago agency and the rest,

will actively pursue the objectives set forth in this statement.

And by until an agreement actually is reached, of course, no one can be sure.

We at least can say that because of the involvement

as indicated in the strength statement that we are hopeful that an agreement covering defensive weapons

It should be said, however, that very intensive negotiations must now be undertaken, first in Vienna and then in Helsinki in the summer, to carry out the objective which is set forth in this statement.

This statement indicates the commitment of the highest levels in both Moscow and Washington toward achieving that objective.

As far as the matters that will be negotiated beyond this general statement is concerned,

No useful purpose insofar as achieving the goal was disturbed by the situation.

I will simply say that the leaders should know that here in our government and all others, myself, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense,

we will actively pursue the objectives set forth in this statement.

And while until an agreement actually is reached, of course, no one can be sure.

We at least can say that because of the involvement

As indicated in the statement, that we are hopeful that covering defensive weapons and offensive weapons can be reached in the months ahead.

Beyond that,

I think it's important for all of us in our government to let these negotiations continue and have them handled by the negotiators.

We have tremendous temptation in this country

I want to know everything, what's going on, and nothing to serve to kill the prospects.

And other than that, I mean, I'll let Iraq build on that point.

It'll be all right as far as we're concerned, but it'll kill the Soviets.

With that, we have found that they are extremely sensitive about public disclosure of the progress of negotiations.

I'm sure this will be assessed and analyzed and so forth.

These words were very carefully worked out.

is that there's considerable hope now.

And we can't kill that hope by a lot of speculation.

So we would hope that it's construed that way.

We're going to try not to answer questions.

We think that there is now a real prospect for success in the talks.

We think the President is

By taking this initiative, and I'm here again, I think we want to be careful not to try to claim any credit for it because it was sort of a joint action.

If it looks at it, it's just a U.S. position, nothing.

It's power of the Russians.

But actually, it's the President's initiative.

And it has resulted, and obviously this is a very significant statement because it's carefully worked out between our two governments at the highest level.

And we just think it has great potential.

Always recognizing that you don't have an agreement until you finally have one.

We don't actually have an agreement on defensive or offensive missile systems until it's worked out.

And that's going to be the difficult problem that Jerry Smith and his colleagues have.

indicate for the first time that we have real hope that it can be achieved.

And the point, too, that now, for the first time, both the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed in parallel and simultaneously

negotiate on both ends.

That is the new element that's involved here.

Jerry, would you like to, Jerry is not going to eat out there, but tell us, tell the leaders what you feel, what guidance you think they ought to have in regard to your operation.

First, I would stress what Bill said.

We're a long way from home.

There is still a

a tremendous amount of complex bargaining between the actors.

And the problem with what I consider a wonderful political thrust from both governments, which inevitably is going to make our problems somewhat easier.

The problem once you have that sort of political thrust is how not to have lost any bargaining power and the cost of taking it and grasping it.

And I would stress to all of you, ladies and gentlemen, the fact that there are these very difficult problems that are going to have to be brought about on the basis of mutual concessions.

And we don't yet have a clear picture of where this is going to come out.

But I'm very strangely encouraged by what this council is going to do.

It could be said that, and in fairness to Jerry and also to those in this government that worked on it, and to the Soviet government, however, that if this statement had been made before any discussions had ever taken place, there wouldn't be any chance for anything this year.

But at least the various issues on which we, which you say are very difficult, have all

thoroughly discussed, but not agreed upon.

So you at least have positions now.

A lot of the work has been done, but now the tough bargaining comes in working out the differences.

Would that be a fair statement?

I can't answer that.

And what more are you, well, they don't know.

Mel, I thought you left.

Go ahead.

Well, Mr. President, I think Bill handled it very well.

This is a negotiating framework which is being announced by the heads of both governments.

And this framework does give the possibility of an agreement in both the intensive and the defensive area.

And I think that this is the major precedent that it is a negotiating framework that's being announced at the highest level of our governments.

This is significant, so this statement.

It doesn't mean that we can change our course here, because we don't have an agreement.

And it will be necessary for me, as far as the Secretary of Defense, to push our program so that we don't take no matter what action before there is an agreement.

It's vitally important for us to recognize that while this statement represents a commitment on the part of the leaders at the highest level to work toward agreement, and that commitment has a great meaning for the negotiators, on the other hand, it does not mean on the part of the Soviets, and therefore it does not mean on our part.

that they are in any way changing their programs in regard to offensive weapons and so forth.

Consequently, until agreement is finally reached, it would be very detrimental to the possibility of reaching agreement for us to change ours because any incentive for them to agree would be totally taken away

we were to change our programs.

I know, incidentally, let me say, I say this without wanting to question the very, very sincere concerns that many have with regard to some of our programs in the defense period.

But I do know this, that as far as our negotiators in Vienna and Helsinki are concerned now, with this statement,

Fourth, it is vitally important that we not take away a card that they have been negotiating or they're not going to get the result that you need.

That's really what your, I think your situation is now at the church.

Certainly is, Mr. President.

I think that you ought to be recognized that something significant has happened in the Soviet mind in the last four or five months.

And it hasn't happened just by chance.

They had a flat commitment to getting the Americans to limit their defensive weapons, but also their offensive weapons were not limited.

And they've changed that position.

And the reason why they've changed ours, of course, is that they saw that they were not going to mock us off our position.

There had to be some pace.

They saw and get something from us that we're going to have to pay for it.

And they're going to pay for it now with a coin of offensive control.

And they're going to pay for it only if they see they're not going to get it for free in the form of something around the strength of the Department of the United States.

So I feel very strongly that we should make the slightest change in our defense programs because of this.

Where are you going?

I think we'll also keep in mind that we're not making a plea for the foreseeable future.

We would be inclined to think that this is not a long-term proposition.

We think that now this is a statement that we should see it in action.

If I may interrupt you, Bill.

And this statement, of course, will be given to the press.

Thank you.

The words have agreed to concentrate this year.

That, of course, is a curve of art.

It means that exactly.

So I think what we're saying is we hope there'll be moderation and comments about it, not too euphoric about it, hopeful, but not anything else.

And we hope that there'll not be a lot of trolling about what does each word mean.

It means that the two governments have agreed on this statement.

It holds our hope for the future, and it now has to be done quietly by Jerry Smith and his negotiators at the negotiating table.

Now, it's a question, can a democracy do it that way?

We hope so.

It's a supreme test.

Can we negotiate a very difficult agreement, and both sides want it successfully, and do it in a way that serves our nation?

It's also significant to note the point that Bill had made earlier, that a lot rides on this, because should we succeed even in this limited area, then

having succeeded in this limited area, the possibility of making progress in other areas where there are differences if the Soviet Union increases.

This is something that is true.

Henry, would you like to say anything on this?

No, Mr. President.

I think that the Secretary of the United States has

I should say at this moment, this meeting will be over shortly.

It is a parody, but nothing will be said until 12 o'clock, not because of officers and any concern.

But the Soviet are extremely sensitive, since they agreed to a joint statement that would be issued.

They're issuing it on Moscow.

the Moscow radio, television, whatever, at 7 o'clock Moscow time, which is 12 o'clock Washington time.

And we have indicated to them that until 12 o'clock Washington time, we will say nothing.

So, except, of course, they understand the consultation or information, which is what we're talking about, should take place.

So, that's one of the reasons we haven't circulated broadly, because we would hope that after this meeting, we would simply wait until 12, and of course, comment and

The governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitations of strategic armies, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, ATMs.

They have also agreed

that together with concluding and agreeing to limit ATMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

That's the operative sentence.

The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms.

These negotiations will be active in pursuit.

Now, that last

paragraph is also very important because when we look at all strategic arms, that goes then to the comprehensive agreement which we first asked for and which seems far away, but once this initial agreement is reached, then we move on to the more comprehensive agreement.

That's the, I think the negotiation behind that is,

But what we're trying to do here is to fight off a very significant part of the problem.

First with the Satan, then with the dream.

And then go from there to some of the more problems, difficult problems that lie ahead in the total field of strategic lessons.

And this question, we're going to be asked questions, and we can go out of this room before we have a talk.

What would you make our response to be?

I would suggest, Mike, that, and I would like to be

guidance than any others here on it.

But I would suggest that what would be most appropriate would be if all of you could say we have had a briefing by the President on

foreign policy development.

A statement will be made by the president in 12 o'clock today.

And after that, we will have no comment until he makes that statement.

If that's not all right, it's fine.

I'd be glad to know.

That's the most significant form of policy development.

A statement will be issued to the press by the president at 12 o'clock in the middle of the day.

In fact, my statement at noon today is going to be one minute.

It's just what I'm having to read this and put a sentence in the beginning and a sentence afterwards, and that's it.

There's a reason for that, too.

It's very important.

to let the statements stand for what it means.

Not to say, well, this is something where they gave in.

We're not going to say anything like that.

Or to claim that this is more than it really is.

It may be, it may be, I hope it is, that we all around this table can look back to this day and say, well, that was the time when a new era began, in which all nations turned more of their resources away from weapons of war and toward the pursuits of peace.

We hope so.

this gives some hope in that direction.

But at this point, in terms of accomplishing our goal and dealing with very hard-headed and tough negotiators whose interests are quite different from ours, because after all, putting it in terms of the weapons, we have something in the way of building a defensive system that they want.

They have something in the building, in a very substantial build-up of offensive weapons that we want to control.

So that's why there's their differences.

Now, to resolve that difference is of enormous importance because it affects the vital security of both countries.

If this can be done, all of you can see that it can have enormous effects for the future.

Now, that's putting it,

That is what I'm going to say when I go out and speak to the press.

Others can categorize it the way they want, but we're going to just say it in rather simple terms of what it is that Jerry Smith is going to take and do his best to be on.

They do go out tomorrow for my meeting with the delegation.

What I would like to say in this connection,

It would not have been possible without the emergency, the preparation on the part of, within our own government, of the National Security Council verification panel, which Dr. Kissinger, his staff, Bill Rogers, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense.

I mean, you have a position in an area like this, as well as you particularly are in services.

There's a great deal of work going on on the part of those.

And also, a great deal of credit goes to the very, very dedicated negotiating that has been done by Jerry Senn and his colleagues, saying that ours and ours and ours seem to be a ghost apart.

All I can say is that we built one into the bridge, and now you have to build the other.

Mr. President, may I make a suggestion, sir?

I've been to Russia five different times, and it strikes me that in order to show our good faith in entering these agreements, that we ought to suspend, for the time being, the construction of this ABM, just to show our good faith, so that we can finally do something.

And I think if we do that and take a leave then, with some respect, we must take the leave.

And I talked to Mr. Gissing some time ago, and I told him I thought that in order to get any results from these negotiations, that we ought to lean backwards.

And just by suspending it, it occurred to me that we're willing to start now and not next year.

Well, let me say this, that I, I mean, as you know and everybody around this table knows, I couldn't have greater respect for your views and also your field negotiator.

I know that.

And the views of others, of what I think maybe in this room and in the Senate and the House make that same view.

And frankly, it's a judgment call.

I believe, however, that that would be an enormous mistake.

I believe it's an enormous mistake.

I think we are showing ourselves well by this statement of the decision today.

The Russians know that the moment that we have an agreement, we will suspend it.

We're ready.

The second point is, I also believe that looking at them and their interests,

that if we were to suspend our ADN, there would be no agreement on offensive weapons.

We can destroy the weapons, but why do you say that?

Because, now, they're gonna get something that,

But it doesn't mean that we're not going to continue if the agreement doesn't go to the principal.

What I'm saying is merely that he's saying, which is not very much, that's all.

Well, at least we're ready to continue.

Well, all right, but you need the money in the case of that.

You could waste the money.

You could spend it for three or four months.

then the negotiations will be on ice for three or four months.

I'd rather have those negotiations go forward for three or four months so that at the end of that three or four months, rather than having to start rebuilding at the end, we have an agreement limiting the events, an agreement on offensive weapons.

That's really what I'm saying.

President, may I?

Yes, sir.

I don't think anybody will realize it more than Alan himself, that dear friend of his.

Well, but I...

I know what Alan and I discussed is we've totally disagreed, and I'm going to have to be one of those who's going to carry the plate on the floor of that house.

And I'm glad Alan brought the subject up to get the expressions of yourself and others around the table.

It's going to be incumbent upon us, unless and I don't have to carry that fight, and it gets tougher every day in our committee.

And to take the approach of let's do something to satisfy them would be disastrous.

You know, we've seen it happen.

It's not tough enough time getting by with the men that we're getting by with.

We've had fights and committing limitations.

We're now meeting the market for the procurement bill.

I'll go down fighting as far as I can to protect that APM.

I'm going to go to the president.

We aren't going to go over the border with ADM or any other system.

Once we get it created, I can assure you of that.

But it's the agreement that's essential.

Of course the agreement is essential.

And in fact, it's...

I'll keep my pilot dry.

I'll talk to him on the doomsday, but I'll always be ready to shoot.

And the minute that I stop being ready to shoot, I'm whipped.

And as far as I'm personally concerned, and I think I can't speak for the whole committee, but I think Les would agree with me that we can, as far as we're concerned, in the House we could do our bit, but we think so less.

And that's the plan.

It's going to be a plan.

Mr. President, I think we all know what we have to create in order to finish the Black Lives Matters.

Where do we start to build the Black Lives Matters?

saying we're ready to do any idea of that.

I think Jordan over at us was crying.

Jordan, obviously weapons are extremely complex.

And you meet along the Defense Committees of Appropriations.

We know this better than anybody else.

We're talking about everything from submarine to airplanes to missiles.

It was landed now.

The best thing on that, and I'd like to be more responsive, but it would not be in the interest agreement, is to say that we can simply not discuss where to start.

That is, these are matters for negotiation, and these are matters that will develop during the course of negotiations.

A lot of state work has been done, a lot of positions have been drawn, but we have to leave it now to the negotiators to work it out.

If we start saying that, you see, George, then that just takes one card away that says the needs to...

negotiate with, is that good, or do you have a different position?

No sir, I think we should be very careful about what we talk about as well.

Our wall is, you know.

Mr. President, if I may say a word.

You have confronted this demonstration, and those who agree with it, I want all of us to fully agree, confronted with the situation in which the strength of those of us who belong to the strong defense program, those who agree with Greece, is going to be jeopardized

And if the people begin to say in the Congress, well, it's like there's a bridge right around the corner, and let's drastically slash defense and spend it on the environment or something.

Of course, the unilateral regard.

The Russians are never going to agree if we have a unilateral deduction.

So it seems to me that the four people in the House and the Senate went too far in saying, well, everything looks like it's a real wonderful time.

We've cut back sharply.

It seems to me that an effort must be made...

I don't understand.

I know you're right, but I have to fully understand the rationale.

We pursued a policy in the past that's led up to very significant developments.

I can see why, in the past, the arguments were made that maybe we shouldn't have done what we did.

But now we pursue this policy, and it appears to work, and to have worked, not only in this field, but at force levels here.

Very significant changes are occurring.

Now, why we at that point should say, let's change our policy, let's give them something before we get an agreement, I don't understand.

If there's anything that's illogical, it is to say, now we're just about ready to succeed with the policy that we've been pursuing.

Now let's change it.

The point is, let's pursue our policy.

We're not asking for a long delay.

We think that the developments will move along really quickly.

And obviously the policy that the President has pursued has succeeded.

So as you can tell, let's continue it.

Give us a chance.

Give us a chance to negotiate it.

Obviously we can't make an agreement without consultation at the right time, but now is not the right time.

And this is a very significant break, too, and it's a great tribute to the policies of the past.

Why we should think about changing it now, it is beyond me.

Mr. Secretary, I'd like to get your point of report.

Are you serious?

Did you challenge him, George?

No, George, no, I didn't.

That's what I'm saying.

George said that he thought that a lot of what you addressed is true.

No, I think that's true.

George said that he thought that he was a lot of people.

Otherwise, the Secretary agrees with George.

He has a vote.

He's a lot on the ground.

It's a bunch of quarrel, basically.

Well, now that we have this understanding, and why should we go forward with this defense and other things and so forth, let me say...

Let me say that I repeat, it is vital and important, if we want an agreement, and believe me, an agreement with the Soviet would be a massive step forward, an agreement in any significant area.

If we want an agreement, we're only going to get it, in my opinion, and here I respectfully disagree with many of my colleagues around here, but we're only going to get it if

We've got something that they want to stop or get and in order to exchange for something that we want to get.

Now that's the way agreements are made.

They're made with us and they're made with them.

That's been their history at least.

Jerry, would you?

I couldn't agree more.

I think it would be tragic on the authorization, on the appropriation for us to pull the rug out from underneath the progress that's been made and the progress that I hope can be made in the months ahead.

And from our point of view, I mean, as far as I can have any influence, we will do everything we can to help Eddie and George and Frank and Les

Two legislative matters come before the House.

John, do you have a second?

Well, Mr. President, I feel quite good about what you're going to announce.

I think your first blush will be to increase the problem as to the legislation that is continuing ADM.

I believe the second thought of the American people is whether the membership of the Congress and the American people

Well, this is not deadness.

This is a step.

And we've got to keep pushing.

And just take out the mules.

Hang up the hornets to feed the oxen.

It ain't bad for us in the house.

That's just what it's all about.

We don't have the balance in the Senate.

I know that.

But I think great caution about dismeaning the pride of this institution and pointing in the direction of possible pride in this institution.

We just have to keep it so that he pushes it the same way.

Let me say, let me say it, and that is the theme of this.

Everybody around this table wants to reduce the rate of the danger of war.

We want to reduce the burden of arms.

The question is how, and there is no answer to this question.

I respect the differences, but I am convinced that the course we're on at this time is the right course.

I think that it is bringing some results.

It may prove later to be the wrong course.

If it does, then we have to change.

But, uh, I don't know.

I don't know.

That's right.

And Mr. President, somebody's got to break the ice.

We've been trying this for a long time now, and we haven't reached any conclusion.

And I'm not saying you shouldn't.

I believe they'll go far towards having them to come to quick agreement.

That's my vision.

Mr. President, I don't want to impose myself on you, but I'd like to spend with you and Mr. Kissinger 30 minutes, or an hour if you want.

Sure.

I've been in the Soviet Union for five times now, and I've got some ideas that I think would be productive.

And even Mr. Smith, I'd like to talk to him.

All I want is just

put my views before you, and I believe that the cause of things we've done in the past, that we ought to be the ones to break the ice.

That's what I'm suggesting.

It's a guess, not to cut it out at all, but just to expand it.

Mr. President, could I make one point in a matter of timing?

It may be a little confusing, but I've already pretty much agreed to adjourn these Vienna talks at the end of this month and go to Helsinki very quickly thereafter.

So when we say that shortly after this announcement,

We're recessing.

There's something new that's happening.

This has already been planned ahead.

We've got a lot of homework to do back in Washington.

There will be preliminary discussions from all of you.

And your tough bargaining will take place in Helsinki starting the 1st of July.

That's very important.

We can have this bill in the House the week after we come back.

Well, you know, the week after that, the week after that, we waited for the second week.

We were any time you want to go, we'd vote the second week.

The second week, you told me.

But anyway, it was the second week.

We were in that week, but we didn't cross the dial with the negotiations going on by your group.

And the same today as the next week, since 9 to 8 p.m., I said to each other, I said,

that it would have a disastrous impact on what you were trying to do before.

And I'm too out of control about suspending something.

It is that once you suspend it, you really have to get it going again.

And of course, 20 hours, you have to be able to return the money.

And it would change the idea that we'd have a disastrous impact in the country if we hadn't worked back yet and said, well, we failed.

Now we only start building the stadium all over again.

Of course, we needed more of that to continue.

I would certainly assume that we are advancing thoughts to the other side.

That we will, of course, suspend what we are doing, and they will suspend what they are doing.

And I don't see any other way to negotiate.

It does seem to me, what Hale has said here, what Eddie has said, is the only way we can proceed.

We can't stop and rely on them to pick up and say, all right, we'll go ahead now, and we'll agree with you.

But if we say we are willing to suspend certain things,

We are showing the greatest good faith in the world.

The Russians know that we are a reluctant cause, that we are only continuing our armament pending this agreement.

I think the question we're on is right.

To make a point, I would disagree with what you get on foreign policy in 1967.

Mr. President, I think it might be well to make the point here

The Soviets are progressing, not only underneath it, it's a system of this type that they've started construction on two more sites in their Moscow complex.

And they are going ahead with substantial buildup in there.

big missile systems as well as the medium missile force.

This time that construction is going on and the submarine construction goes forward of the medium range as well as the SS-11 type and the SS-9 type is going forward at this time.

And I certainly will report to the

congressional committees, as I've always had, and there's been a change in that situation.

The logistic office is the case today, and I think that we would be making a very great error if we would react to the chairman's statement and the president's statement today by taking the kind of action that my president and chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee recommend, and I think that this would be

It would be a great error today for us to take that kind of an action as the response to the chairman and the president's statement, which is that it relates to 12-day.

Well, I'm going to apply it to B and O, Mr. President.

A, B, and O times.

Mr. President, let me reiterate what Mr. Hale said and what you have said.

If we were to suspend tomorrow or next week or next month the ABN, it's an impractical thing to try and keep an organization together in a sophisticated weapons system such as this, holding them in limbo while the Soviet Union drags on and on in some negotiations that may be going on for three or four months.

And secondly, if you lose the spend element,

It's to their advantage to hold out the bait.

And they get invaluable time in the interval that we can never catch up with in our AGM development system if all of a sudden they should fall apart.

Well, if you come to agreement, all the work you're going to do in the meantime will come to naught.

You're going to waste it.

Let me say, Gary, if I could just...

Having served in both the House and the Senate, and there's one thing that I came to the room today and I appreciate that.

Who knows who it's from?

So we discuss it, and there's a lot of system agreement here.

We believe we're on the right track.

As long as I'm here, I've got to call that signal.

And then if the Congress won't go along with it, then we will have to go in another direction.

But I believe this is the right thing.

But I don't think anything is going to be served by simply going over the arguments about ADN and all the rest at this time.

I imagine that will be thoroughly debated in the House.

And more thoroughly debated in the Senate.

When it arrives there, I would only hope and I would only say that, and I feel we should have this in mind, that sometimes the country gets the idea, I think it's the false idea,

Some of us, if I remember, I mean, it's hawked up that some of us, we want war, we want to stand in order for the men, and so forth and so on, and other people for peace.

That's what they told us.

Every man in this room, every woman is for peace, we all know that.

Every man in this room, every person in this room, we...

We look at our tremendous problems around the country and say, God, if we could only cut down that defense budget and spend more in there.

A lot of you have projects that you've talked about and so forth.

The question is, how do we get it?

What is the best way?

We had an honest disagreement about the name of the forces.

We now have, obviously, some disagreement on this one.

All that I can say is that I can pledge to you, everyone, that our goal is peace.

Our goal is a reduction of our enemies.

But in my view, a reduction on our part in any area which is not reciprocated by an agreement or a reduction by those who might be our major opponents in the world in another area,

would not serve the cause of these, I think it would increase the chances of conflict.

Now, many disagree with that proposition.

That's my conviction.

That's why going against many of my friends, it's not partisan at all, but it's been very difficult for me to oppose Republicans sometimes.

They're amused.

Good friends.

I think we want to say to the leaders here, I consider this announcement today to be significant.

The follow up is vital.

And all that I ask from you is that I would hope that you would think long and hard before doing anything, saying anything, or voting in any way that might jeopardize or destroy the chances for an agreement.

Because if we get an agreement in this field, let me say, it could open the door to agreements not agreements.

And the whole post-war world

That's what's on the table here today.

Now that's the spirit with which we approach this.

Having said that, let me say I well understand that some will oppose this view.

You do honestly think that we ought to stop ABM or limited or whatever you want to call it.

And I understand that.

We'll still have the same personal and mental relationship and respect.

But I must tell you how strongly I feel that's my best judgment.

And I would appreciate it if it wasn't.

I believe that national defense is something that in a period of useful ways, it is learned to build and to stop, and to stop, and not be able to start again.

I think there's no disagreement, but only a claim at stake that you will make at the end of the day.

And as far as Ellen Ellinger is concerned, I don't think that he needs that right now, because this was then, and so it merits, but I would assume, without question in my mind, that at the right time and under the appropriate circumstances, consideration would be in favor of a motion like that, but the time is just up to me now.

Thank you very much.

All right, we have to go to the market very quickly.

All right, let's do that.

We were hoping he wouldn't know.

Bill.

Okay. .

Before they have to get out, before they get out, one of you must bring the fire across.

Bill and Jerry.

Jerry will lead you to the fire.

Thank you sir.