Nixon White House TapesTape 58 › Conversation 058-005

Nixon, Agnew & Rogers on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and ABM

Thursday, May 20, 1971 · 10:15 AM–11:05 AM ET · Cabinet Room

President Nixon met with Vice President Agnew and a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders to announce a significant diplomatic breakthrough in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Nixon informed the attendees of a forthcoming joint statement with the Soviet Union pledging to focus on limiting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and certain offensive strategic weapons. While some lawmakers advocated for immediate unilateral U.S. defense cuts to demonstrate good faith, the President and his advisors successfully urged the leaders to maintain existing defense programs during the negotiations to avoid losing vital bargaining leverage.

Download MP3 (part 1) · 110.7 MB ·Download MP3 (part 2) · 112.4 MB ·Download MP3 (part 3) · 48.5 MB

This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

Download transcript (.txt) ·JSON data · Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.

3:56:35I first want to say that I regret that we could get
3:57:02notice on this meeting, so I'm late.
3:57:04And the interpreters are all, the interpreters are all in a very great role.
3:57:12But they, because of the nature of the announcement, that I will, of course, thank you and have a great day.
3:57:23And as you will see, if you're in a tough situation,
3:57:34They were brokering this announcement in order to influence the voting staff.
3:57:54I, for that reason, as you will see, I felt that we, I deliberately waited, and I informed Michael this, that until after all votes were filled, that after all votes were over, we would invite the leaders to this meeting.
3:58:08We would have given them a little bark, a little speech, a little introduction about what we are as a matter of fact, because that's the time we have now.
3:58:21It's a very brief statement, and the meeting was here brief, too.
3:58:31As all of you know, the nuclear arms talks have been stale for over a year.
3:58:39The basic point of
3:58:43is that the Soviet Union's purpose and what they have urged is that we agree on a limitation of defensive weapons only.
3:58:57Our purpose is that we should negotiate a limitation on both defensive and offensive lines.
3:59:15Early in January, after we had discussed this in our highest levels of discovery, I determined individually that an iniquity should be undertaken at the highest level to break the deadline.
3:59:35And I undertook such an initiative.
3:59:44Today, I will read a statement which, at 12 o'clock Washington time, it will be read simultaneously, or issued simultaneously at 7 o'clock Moscow time, which represents a step in the progress in breaking this deadline.
4:00:08I'll read the statement now, which will speak for itself.
4:00:16The governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic garments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.
4:00:33They have also agreed that together with concluding an agreement to limit CBS, they will agree on certain measures with respect
4:00:45strategic weapons.
4:00:47The two sides are taking this course in the condition that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms.
4:00:59These negotiations will be actually pursued.
4:01:05Now, this statement today, as you can see, a joint statement, is the major step in breaking the sale
4:01:13It should be said, however, that
4:01:17Very intensive negotiations must now be undertaken first in Vienna and then in Helsinki in the summer to carry out the objective which is set forth in this statement.
4:01:33This statement indicates the commitment of the highest levels in both Moscow and Washington toward achieving that objective.
4:01:46As far as the matters that will be negotiated beyond this general statement is concerned, no useful purpose insofar as achieving the goal was disturbed by this machine.
4:02:08I will simply say that the leadership, that here in our government and all others, myself, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the rest of the Archipelago agency and the rest,
4:02:35will actively pursue the objectives set forth in this statement.
4:02:43And by until an agreement actually is reached, of course, no one can be sure.
4:02:52We at least can say that because of the involvement
4:03:00as indicated in the strength statement that we are hopeful that an agreement covering defensive weapons
4:03:51It should be said, however, that very intensive negotiations must now be undertaken, first in Vienna and then in Helsinki in the summer, to carry out the objective which is set forth in this statement.
4:04:10This statement indicates the commitment of the highest levels in both Moscow and Washington toward achieving that objective.
4:04:24As far as the matters that will be negotiated beyond this general statement is concerned,
4:04:38No useful purpose insofar as achieving the goal was disturbed by the situation.
4:04:45I will simply say that the leaders should know that here in our government and all others, myself, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense,
4:05:07we will actively pursue the objectives set forth in this statement.
4:05:13And while until an agreement actually is reached, of course, no one can be sure.
4:05:25We at least can say that because of the involvement
4:05:37As indicated in the statement, that we are hopeful that covering defensive weapons and offensive weapons can be reached in the months ahead.
4:06:03Beyond that,
4:06:09I think it's important for all of us in our government to let these negotiations continue and have them handled by the negotiators.
4:06:31We have tremendous temptation in this country
4:06:37I want to know everything, what's going on, and nothing to serve to kill the prospects.
4:06:45And other than that, I mean, I'll let Iraq build on that point.
4:06:49It'll be all right as far as we're concerned, but it'll kill the Soviets.
4:06:54With that, we have found that they are extremely sensitive about public disclosure of the progress of negotiations.
4:07:09I'm sure this will be assessed and analyzed and so forth.
4:07:18These words were very carefully worked out.
4:07:22is that there's considerable hope now.
4:07:26And we can't kill that hope by a lot of speculation.
4:07:30So we would hope that it's construed that way.
4:07:34We're going to try not to answer questions.
4:07:37We think that there is now a real prospect for success in the talks.
4:07:44We think the President is
4:07:47By taking this initiative, and I'm here again, I think we want to be careful not to try to claim any credit for it because it was sort of a joint action.
4:07:54If it looks at it, it's just a U.S. position, nothing.
4:07:57It's power of the Russians.
4:08:01But actually, it's the President's initiative.
4:08:04And it has resulted, and obviously this is a very significant statement because it's carefully worked out between our two governments at the highest level.
4:08:13And we just think it has great potential.
4:08:18Always recognizing that you don't have an agreement until you finally have one.
4:08:24We don't actually have an agreement on defensive or offensive missile systems until it's worked out.
4:08:33And that's going to be the difficult problem that Jerry Smith and his colleagues have.
4:08:39indicate for the first time that we have real hope that it can be achieved.
4:08:44And the point, too, that now, for the first time, both the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed in parallel and simultaneously
4:08:55negotiate on both ends.
4:08:57That is the new element that's involved here.
4:09:00Jerry, would you like to, Jerry is not going to eat out there, but tell us, tell the leaders what you feel, what guidance you think they ought to have in regard to your operation.
4:09:14First, I would stress what Bill said.
4:09:17We're a long way from home.
4:09:19There is still a
4:09:22a tremendous amount of complex bargaining between the actors.
4:09:25And the problem with what I consider a wonderful political thrust from both governments, which inevitably is going to make our problems somewhat easier.
4:09:40The problem once you have that sort of political thrust is how not to have lost any bargaining power and the cost of taking it and grasping it.
4:09:52And I would stress to all of you, ladies and gentlemen, the fact that there are these very difficult problems that are going to have to be brought about on the basis of mutual concessions.
4:10:04And we don't yet have a clear picture of where this is going to come out.
4:10:12But I'm very strangely encouraged by what this council is going to do.
4:10:17It could be said that, and in fairness to Jerry and also to those in this government that worked on it, and to the Soviet government, however, that if this statement had been made before any discussions had ever taken place, there wouldn't be any chance for anything this year.
4:10:35But at least the various issues on which we, which you say are very difficult, have all
4:10:42thoroughly discussed, but not agreed upon.
4:10:46So you at least have positions now.
4:10:48A lot of the work has been done, but now the tough bargaining comes in working out the differences.
4:10:53Would that be a fair statement?
4:10:54I can't answer that.
4:11:00And what more are you, well, they don't know.
4:11:03Mel, I thought you left.
4:11:05Go ahead.
4:11:06Well, Mr. President, I think Bill handled it very well.
4:11:09This is a negotiating framework which is being announced by the heads of both governments.
4:11:13And this framework does give the possibility of an agreement in both the intensive and the defensive area.
4:11:20And I think that this is the major precedent that it is a negotiating framework that's being announced at the highest level of our governments.
4:11:29This is significant, so this statement.
4:11:35It doesn't mean that we can change our course here, because we don't have an agreement.
4:11:45And it will be necessary for me, as far as the Secretary of Defense, to push our program so that we don't take no matter what action before there is an agreement.
4:12:04It's vitally important for us to recognize that while this statement represents a commitment on the part of the leaders at the highest level to work toward agreement, and that commitment has a great meaning for the negotiators, on the other hand, it does not mean on the part of the Soviets, and therefore it does not mean on our part.
4:12:29that they are in any way changing their programs in regard to offensive weapons and so forth.
4:12:40Consequently, until agreement is finally reached, it would be very detrimental to the possibility of reaching agreement for us to change ours because any incentive for them to agree would be totally taken away
4:12:59we were to change our programs.
4:13:03I know, incidentally, let me say, I say this without wanting to question the very, very sincere concerns that many have with regard to some of our programs in the defense period.
4:13:19But I do know this, that as far as our negotiators in Vienna and Helsinki are concerned now, with this statement,
4:13:29Fourth, it is vitally important that we not take away a card that they have been negotiating or they're not going to get the result that you need.
4:13:38That's really what your, I think your situation is now at the church.
4:13:43Certainly is, Mr. President.
4:13:45I think that you ought to be recognized that something significant has happened in the Soviet mind in the last four or five months.
4:13:56And it hasn't happened just by chance.
4:13:59They had a flat commitment to getting the Americans to limit their defensive weapons, but also their offensive weapons were not limited.
4:14:10And they've changed that position.
4:14:14And the reason why they've changed ours, of course, is that they saw that they were not going to mock us off our position.
4:14:20There had to be some pace.
4:14:23They saw and get something from us that we're going to have to pay for it.
4:14:27And they're going to pay for it now with a coin of offensive control.
4:14:31And they're going to pay for it only if they see they're not going to get it for free in the form of something around the strength of the Department of the United States.
4:14:43So I feel very strongly that we should make the slightest change in our defense programs because of this.
4:14:51Where are you going?
4:15:04I think we'll also keep in mind that we're not making a plea for the foreseeable future.
4:15:08We would be inclined to think that this is not a long-term proposition.
4:15:13We think that now this is a statement that we should see it in action.
4:15:21If I may interrupt you, Bill.
4:15:24And this statement, of course, will be given to the press.
4:15:29Thank you.
4:15:33The words have agreed to concentrate this year.
4:15:36That, of course, is a curve of art.
4:15:40It means that exactly.
4:15:42So I think what we're saying is we hope there'll be moderation and comments about it, not too euphoric about it, hopeful, but not anything else.
4:15:52And we hope that there'll not be a lot of trolling about what does each word mean.
4:15:57It means that the two governments have agreed on this statement.
4:16:00It holds our hope for the future, and it now has to be done quietly by Jerry Smith and his negotiators at the negotiating table.
4:16:09Now, it's a question, can a democracy do it that way?
4:16:12We hope so.
4:16:13It's a supreme test.
4:16:15Can we negotiate a very difficult agreement, and both sides want it successfully, and do it in a way that serves our nation?
4:16:27It's also significant to note the point that Bill had made earlier, that a lot rides on this, because should we succeed even in this limited area, then
4:16:50having succeeded in this limited area, the possibility of making progress in other areas where there are differences if the Soviet Union increases.
4:17:01This is something that is true.
4:17:03Henry, would you like to say anything on this?
4:17:08No, Mr. President.
4:17:09I think that the Secretary of the United States has
4:17:16I should say at this moment, this meeting will be over shortly.
4:17:23It is a parody, but nothing will be said until 12 o'clock, not because of officers and any concern.
4:17:33But the Soviet are extremely sensitive, since they agreed to a joint statement that would be issued.
4:17:41They're issuing it on Moscow.
4:17:45the Moscow radio, television, whatever, at 7 o'clock Moscow time, which is 12 o'clock Washington time.
4:17:52And we have indicated to them that until 12 o'clock Washington time, we will say nothing.
4:17:58So, except, of course, they understand the consultation or information, which is what we're talking about, should take place.
4:18:06So, that's one of the reasons we haven't circulated broadly, because we would hope that after this meeting, we would simply wait until 12, and of course, comment and
4:18:15The governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitations of strategic armies, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, ATMs.
4:18:36They have also agreed
4:18:38that together with concluding and agreeing to limit ATMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.
4:18:50That's the operative sentence.
4:18:53The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms.
4:19:03These negotiations will be active in pursuit.
4:19:06Now, that last
4:19:08paragraph is also very important because when we look at all strategic arms, that goes then to the comprehensive agreement which we first asked for and which seems far away, but once this initial agreement is reached, then we move on to the more comprehensive agreement.
4:19:28That's the, I think the negotiation behind that is,
4:19:35But what we're trying to do here is to fight off a very significant part of the problem.
4:19:41First with the Satan, then with the dream.
4:19:46And then go from there to some of the more problems, difficult problems that lie ahead in the total field of strategic lessons.
4:20:04And this question, we're going to be asked questions, and we can go out of this room before we have a talk.
4:20:12What would you make our response to be?
4:20:18I would suggest, Mike, that, and I would like to be
4:20:23guidance than any others here on it.
4:20:25But I would suggest that what would be most appropriate would be if all of you could say we have had a briefing by the President on
4:20:38foreign policy development.
4:20:39A statement will be made by the president in 12 o'clock today.
4:20:46And after that, we will have no comment until he makes that statement.
4:20:50If that's not all right, it's fine.
4:20:54I'd be glad to know.
4:20:56That's the most significant form of policy development.
4:20:59A statement will be issued to the press by the president at 12 o'clock in the middle of the day.
4:21:05In fact, my statement at noon today is going to be one minute.
4:21:09It's just what I'm having to read this and put a sentence in the beginning and a sentence afterwards, and that's it.
4:21:15There's a reason for that, too.
4:21:18It's very important.
4:21:22to let the statements stand for what it means.
4:21:25Not to say, well, this is something where they gave in.
4:21:29We're not going to say anything like that.
4:21:34Or to claim that this is more than it really is.
4:21:42It may be, it may be, I hope it is, that we all around this table can look back to this day and say, well, that was the time when a new era began, in which all nations turned more of their resources away from weapons of war and toward the pursuits of peace.
4:22:01We hope so.
4:22:02this gives some hope in that direction.
4:22:06But at this point, in terms of accomplishing our goal and dealing with very hard-headed and tough negotiators whose interests are quite different from ours, because after all, putting it in terms of the weapons, we have something in the way of building a defensive system that they want.
4:22:28They have something in the building, in a very substantial build-up of offensive weapons that we want to control.
4:22:35So that's why there's their differences.
4:22:38Now, to resolve that difference is of enormous importance because it affects the vital security of both countries.
4:22:45If this can be done, all of you can see that it can have enormous effects for the future.
4:22:51Now, that's putting it,
4:22:56That is what I'm going to say when I go out and speak to the press.
4:22:59Others can categorize it the way they want, but we're going to just say it in rather simple terms of what it is that Jerry Smith is going to take and do his best to be on.
4:23:14They do go out tomorrow for my meeting with the delegation.
4:23:20What I would like to say in this connection,
4:23:24It would not have been possible without the emergency, the preparation on the part of, within our own government, of the National Security Council verification panel, which Dr. Kissinger, his staff, Bill Rogers, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense.
4:23:45I mean, you have a position in an area like this, as well as you particularly are in services.
4:23:50There's a great deal of work going on on the part of those.
4:23:54And also, a great deal of credit goes to the very, very dedicated negotiating that has been done by Jerry Senn and his colleagues, saying that ours and ours and ours seem to be a ghost apart.
4:24:14All I can say is that we built one into the bridge, and now you have to build the other.
4:24:19Mr. President, may I make a suggestion, sir?
4:24:21I've been to Russia five different times, and it strikes me that in order to show our good faith in entering these agreements, that we ought to suspend, for the time being, the construction of this ABM, just to show our good faith, so that we can finally do something.
4:24:43And I think if we do that and take a leave then, with some respect, we must take the leave.
4:24:49And I talked to Mr. Gissing some time ago, and I told him I thought that in order to get any results from these negotiations, that we ought to lean backwards.
4:25:05And just by suspending it, it occurred to me that we're willing to start now and not next year.
4:25:15Well, let me say this, that I, I mean, as you know and everybody around this table knows, I couldn't have greater respect for your views and also your field negotiator.
4:25:28I know that.
4:25:29And the views of others, of what I think maybe in this room and in the Senate and the House make that same view.
4:25:39And frankly, it's a judgment call.
4:25:41I believe, however, that that would be an enormous mistake.
4:25:44I believe it's an enormous mistake.
4:25:47I think we are showing ourselves well by this statement of the decision today.
4:25:54The Russians know that the moment that we have an agreement, we will suspend it.
4:25:59We're ready.
4:26:00The second point is, I also believe that looking at them and their interests,
4:26:07that if we were to suspend our ADN, there would be no agreement on offensive weapons.
4:26:17We can destroy the weapons, but why do you say that?
4:26:20Because, now, they're gonna get something that,
4:26:23But it doesn't mean that we're not going to continue if the agreement doesn't go to the principal.
4:26:30What I'm saying is merely that he's saying, which is not very much, that's all.
4:26:38Well, at least we're ready to continue.
4:26:39Well, all right, but you need the money in the case of that.
4:26:42You could waste the money.
4:26:43You could spend it for three or four months.
4:26:46then the negotiations will be on ice for three or four months.
4:26:48I'd rather have those negotiations go forward for three or four months so that at the end of that three or four months, rather than having to start rebuilding at the end, we have an agreement limiting the events, an agreement on offensive weapons.
4:26:58That's really what I'm saying.
4:26:59President, may I?
4:27:00Yes, sir.
4:27:00I don't think anybody will realize it more than Alan himself, that dear friend of his.
4:27:13Well, but I...
4:27:14I know what Alan and I discussed is we've totally disagreed, and I'm going to have to be one of those who's going to carry the plate on the floor of that house.
4:27:21And I'm glad Alan brought the subject up to get the expressions of yourself and others around the table.
4:27:26It's going to be incumbent upon us, unless and I don't have to carry that fight, and it gets tougher every day in our committee.
4:27:33And to take the approach of let's do something to satisfy them would be disastrous.
4:27:39You know, we've seen it happen.
4:27:41It's not tough enough time getting by with the men that we're getting by with.
4:27:47We've had fights and committing limitations.
4:27:50We're now meeting the market for the procurement bill.
4:27:54I'll go down fighting as far as I can to protect that APM.
4:28:12I'm going to go to the president.
4:28:21We aren't going to go over the border with ADM or any other system.
4:28:27Once we get it created, I can assure you of that.
4:28:30But it's the agreement that's essential.
4:28:32Of course the agreement is essential.
4:28:34And in fact, it's...
4:28:36I'll keep my pilot dry.
4:28:37I'll talk to him on the doomsday, but I'll always be ready to shoot.
4:28:45And the minute that I stop being ready to shoot, I'm whipped.
4:28:51And as far as I'm personally concerned, and I think I can't speak for the whole committee, but I think Les would agree with me that we can, as far as we're concerned, in the House we could do our bit, but we think so less.
4:29:03And that's the plan.
4:29:04It's going to be a plan.
4:29:06Mr. President, I think we all know what we have to create in order to finish the Black Lives Matters.
4:29:13Where do we start to build the Black Lives Matters?
4:29:17saying we're ready to do any idea of that.
4:29:22I think Jordan over at us was crying.
4:29:24Jordan, obviously weapons are extremely complex.
4:29:28And you meet along the Defense Committees of Appropriations.
4:29:34We know this better than anybody else.
4:29:37We're talking about everything from submarine to airplanes to missiles.
4:29:44It was landed now.
4:29:46The best thing on that, and I'd like to be more responsive, but it would not be in the interest agreement, is to say that we can simply not discuss where to start.
4:29:59That is, these are matters for negotiation, and these are matters that will develop during the course of negotiations.
4:30:08A lot of state work has been done, a lot of positions have been drawn, but we have to leave it now to the negotiators to work it out.
4:30:20If we start saying that, you see, George, then that just takes one card away that says the needs to...
4:30:30negotiate with, is that good, or do you have a different position?
4:30:33No sir, I think we should be very careful about what we talk about as well.
4:30:40Our wall is, you know.
4:30:44Mr. President, if I may say a word.
4:30:47You have confronted this demonstration, and those who agree with it, I want all of us to fully agree, confronted with the situation in which the strength of those of us who belong to the strong defense program, those who agree with Greece, is going to be jeopardized
4:31:07And if the people begin to say in the Congress, well, it's like there's a bridge right around the corner, and let's drastically slash defense and spend it on the environment or something.
4:31:17Of course, the unilateral regard.
4:31:23The Russians are never going to agree if we have a unilateral deduction.
4:31:27So it seems to me that the four people in the House and the Senate went too far in saying, well, everything looks like it's a real wonderful time.
4:31:38We've cut back sharply.
4:31:39It seems to me that an effort must be made...
4:31:42I don't understand.
4:31:48I know you're right, but I have to fully understand the rationale.
4:31:55We pursued a policy in the past that's led up to very significant developments.
4:32:11I can see why, in the past, the arguments were made that maybe we shouldn't have done what we did.
4:32:17But now we pursue this policy, and it appears to work, and to have worked, not only in this field, but at force levels here.
4:32:27Very significant changes are occurring.
4:32:31Now, why we at that point should say, let's change our policy, let's give them something before we get an agreement, I don't understand.
4:32:40If there's anything that's illogical, it is to say, now we're just about ready to succeed with the policy that we've been pursuing.
4:32:48Now let's change it.
4:32:49The point is, let's pursue our policy.
4:32:51We're not asking for a long delay.
4:32:54We think that the developments will move along really quickly.
4:32:58And obviously the policy that the President has pursued has succeeded.
4:33:01So as you can tell, let's continue it.
4:33:04Give us a chance.
4:33:05Give us a chance to negotiate it.
4:33:07Obviously we can't make an agreement without consultation at the right time, but now is not the right time.
4:33:16And this is a very significant break, too, and it's a great tribute to the policies of the past.
4:33:20Why we should think about changing it now, it is beyond me.
4:33:25Mr. Secretary, I'd like to get your point of report.
4:33:28Are you serious?
4:33:29Did you challenge him, George?
4:33:31No, George, no, I didn't.
4:33:32That's what I'm saying.
4:33:33George said that he thought that a lot of what you addressed is true.
4:33:36No, I think that's true.
4:33:37George said that he thought that he was a lot of people.
4:33:41Otherwise, the Secretary agrees with George.
4:33:42He has a vote.
4:33:43He's a lot on the ground.
4:33:44It's a bunch of quarrel, basically.
4:33:46Well, now that we have this understanding, and why should we go forward with this defense and other things and so forth, let me say...
4:33:57Let me say that I repeat, it is vital and important, if we want an agreement, and believe me, an agreement with the Soviet would be a massive step forward, an agreement in any significant area.
4:34:14If we want an agreement, we're only going to get it, in my opinion, and here I respectfully disagree with many of my colleagues around here, but we're only going to get it if
4:34:25We've got something that they want to stop or get and in order to exchange for something that we want to get.
4:34:33Now that's the way agreements are made.
4:34:36They're made with us and they're made with them.
4:34:39That's been their history at least.
4:34:41Jerry, would you?
4:34:44I couldn't agree more.
4:34:48I think it would be tragic on the authorization, on the appropriation for us to pull the rug out from underneath the progress that's been made and the progress that I hope can be made in the months ahead.
4:35:03And from our point of view, I mean, as far as I can have any influence, we will do everything we can to help Eddie and George and Frank and Les
4:35:17Two legislative matters come before the House.
4:35:21John, do you have a second?
4:35:24Well, Mr. President, I feel quite good about what you're going to announce.
4:35:29I think your first blush will be to increase the problem as to the legislation that is continuing ADM.
4:35:38I believe the second thought of the American people is whether the membership of the Congress and the American people
4:35:48Well, this is not deadness.
4:35:52This is a step.
4:35:53And we've got to keep pushing.
4:35:59And just take out the mules.
4:36:01Hang up the hornets to feed the oxen.
4:36:05It ain't bad for us in the house.
4:36:08That's just what it's all about.
4:36:10We don't have the balance in the Senate.
4:36:13I know that.
4:36:16But I think great caution about dismeaning the pride of this institution and pointing in the direction of possible pride in this institution.
4:36:26We just have to keep it so that he pushes it the same way.
4:36:28Let me say, let me say it, and that is the theme of this.
4:36:32Everybody around this table wants to reduce the rate of the danger of war.
4:36:37We want to reduce the burden of arms.
4:36:40The question is how, and there is no answer to this question.
4:36:45I respect the differences, but I am convinced that the course we're on at this time is the right course.
4:36:54I think that it is bringing some results.
4:36:58It may prove later to be the wrong course.
4:37:00If it does, then we have to change.
4:37:06But, uh, I don't know.
4:37:08I don't know.
4:37:10That's right.
4:37:11And Mr. President, somebody's got to break the ice.
4:37:15We've been trying this for a long time now, and we haven't reached any conclusion.
4:37:23And I'm not saying you shouldn't.
4:37:28I believe they'll go far towards having them to come to quick agreement.
4:37:34That's my vision.
4:37:45Mr. President, I don't want to impose myself on you, but I'd like to spend with you and Mr. Kissinger 30 minutes, or an hour if you want.
4:37:58Sure.
4:37:58I've been in the Soviet Union for five times now, and I've got some ideas that I think would be productive.
4:38:07And even Mr. Smith, I'd like to talk to him.
4:38:12All I want is just
4:38:13put my views before you, and I believe that the cause of things we've done in the past, that we ought to be the ones to break the ice.
4:38:24That's what I'm suggesting.
4:38:25It's a guess, not to cut it out at all, but just to expand it.
4:38:30Mr. President, could I make one point in a matter of timing?
4:38:36It may be a little confusing, but I've already pretty much agreed to adjourn these Vienna talks at the end of this month and go to Helsinki very quickly thereafter.
4:38:49So when we say that shortly after this announcement,
4:38:53We're recessing.
4:38:54There's something new that's happening.
4:38:56This has already been planned ahead.
4:38:58We've got a lot of homework to do back in Washington.
4:39:03There will be preliminary discussions from all of you.
4:39:06And your tough bargaining will take place in Helsinki starting the 1st of July.
4:39:12That's very important.
4:39:18We can have this bill in the House the week after we come back.
4:39:48Well, you know, the week after that, the week after that, we waited for the second week.
4:39:53We were any time you want to go, we'd vote the second week.
4:39:55The second week, you told me.
4:39:58But anyway, it was the second week.
4:39:59We were in that week, but we didn't cross the dial with the negotiations going on by your group.
4:40:06And the same today as the next week, since 9 to 8 p.m., I said to each other, I said,
4:40:13that it would have a disastrous impact on what you were trying to do before.
4:40:19And I'm too out of control about suspending something.
4:40:22It is that once you suspend it, you really have to get it going again.
4:40:24And of course, 20 hours, you have to be able to return the money.
4:40:27And it would change the idea that we'd have a disastrous impact in the country if we hadn't worked back yet and said, well, we failed.
4:40:33Now we only start building the stadium all over again.
4:40:36Of course, we needed more of that to continue.
4:40:40I would certainly assume that we are advancing thoughts to the other side.
4:41:09That we will, of course, suspend what we are doing, and they will suspend what they are doing.
4:41:17And I don't see any other way to negotiate.
4:41:20It does seem to me, what Hale has said here, what Eddie has said, is the only way we can proceed.
4:41:28We can't stop and rely on them to pick up and say, all right, we'll go ahead now, and we'll agree with you.
4:41:35But if we say we are willing to suspend certain things,
4:41:39We are showing the greatest good faith in the world.
4:41:43The Russians know that we are a reluctant cause, that we are only continuing our armament pending this agreement.
4:41:55I think the question we're on is right.
4:41:57To make a point, I would disagree with what you get on foreign policy in 1967.
4:42:05Mr. President, I think it might be well to make the point here
4:42:10The Soviets are progressing, not only underneath it, it's a system of this type that they've started construction on two more sites in their Moscow complex.
4:42:20And they are going ahead with substantial buildup in there.
4:42:26big missile systems as well as the medium missile force.
4:42:30This time that construction is going on and the submarine construction goes forward of the medium range as well as the SS-11 type and the SS-9 type is going forward at this time.
4:42:47And I certainly will report to the
4:42:52congressional committees, as I've always had, and there's been a change in that situation.
4:42:58The logistic office is the case today, and I think that we would be making a very great error if we would react to the chairman's statement and the president's statement today by taking the kind of action that my president and chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee recommend, and I think that this would be
4:43:16It would be a great error today for us to take that kind of an action as the response to the chairman and the president's statement, which is that it relates to 12-day.
4:43:28Well, I'm going to apply it to B and O, Mr. President.
4:43:34A, B, and O times.
4:43:37Mr. President, let me reiterate what Mr. Hale said and what you have said.
4:43:43If we were to suspend tomorrow or next week or next month the ABN, it's an impractical thing to try and keep an organization together in a sophisticated weapons system such as this, holding them in limbo while the Soviet Union drags on and on in some negotiations that may be going on for three or four months.
4:44:09And secondly, if you lose the spend element,
4:44:13It's to their advantage to hold out the bait.
4:44:17And they get invaluable time in the interval that we can never catch up with in our AGM development system if all of a sudden they should fall apart.
4:44:30Well, if you come to agreement, all the work you're going to do in the meantime will come to naught.
4:44:35You're going to waste it.
4:44:37Let me say, Gary, if I could just...
4:44:46Having served in both the House and the Senate, and there's one thing that I came to the room today and I appreciate that.
4:45:03Who knows who it's from?
4:45:08So we discuss it, and there's a lot of system agreement here.
4:45:16We believe we're on the right track.
4:45:18As long as I'm here, I've got to call that signal.
4:45:23And then if the Congress won't go along with it, then we will have to go in another direction.
4:45:29But I believe this is the right thing.
4:45:31But I don't think anything is going to be served by simply going over the arguments about ADN and all the rest at this time.
4:45:40I imagine that will be thoroughly debated in the House.
4:45:46And more thoroughly debated in the Senate.
4:45:49When it arrives there, I would only hope and I would only say that, and I feel we should have this in mind, that sometimes the country gets the idea, I think it's the false idea,
4:46:06Some of us, if I remember, I mean, it's hawked up that some of us, we want war, we want to stand in order for the men, and so forth and so on, and other people for peace.
4:46:15That's what they told us.
4:46:16Every man in this room, every woman is for peace, we all know that.
4:46:24Every man in this room, every person in this room, we...
4:46:28We look at our tremendous problems around the country and say, God, if we could only cut down that defense budget and spend more in there.
4:46:35A lot of you have projects that you've talked about and so forth.
4:46:42The question is, how do we get it?
4:46:43What is the best way?
4:46:46We had an honest disagreement about the name of the forces.
4:46:50We now have, obviously, some disagreement on this one.
4:46:53All that I can say is that I can pledge to you, everyone, that our goal is peace.
4:47:01Our goal is a reduction of our enemies.
4:47:04But in my view, a reduction on our part in any area which is not reciprocated by an agreement or a reduction by those who might be our major opponents in the world in another area,
4:47:23would not serve the cause of these, I think it would increase the chances of conflict.
4:47:29Now, many disagree with that proposition.
4:47:32That's my conviction.
4:47:33That's why going against many of my friends, it's not partisan at all, but it's been very difficult for me to oppose Republicans sometimes.
4:47:44They're amused.
4:47:46Good friends.
4:47:50I think we want to say to the leaders here, I consider this announcement today to be significant.
4:48:11The follow up is vital.
4:48:16And all that I ask from you is that I would hope that you would think long and hard before doing anything, saying anything, or voting in any way that might jeopardize or destroy the chances for an agreement.
4:48:35Because if we get an agreement in this field, let me say, it could open the door to agreements not agreements.
4:48:41And the whole post-war world
4:48:45That's what's on the table here today.
4:48:47Now that's the spirit with which we approach this.
4:48:50Having said that, let me say I well understand that some will oppose this view.
4:48:56You do honestly think that we ought to stop ABM or limited or whatever you want to call it.
4:49:01And I understand that.
4:49:03We'll still have the same personal and mental relationship and respect.
4:49:07But I must tell you how strongly I feel that's my best judgment.
4:49:11And I would appreciate it if it wasn't.
4:49:16I believe that national defense is something that in a period of useful ways, it is learned to build and to stop, and to stop, and not be able to start again.
4:49:34I think there's no disagreement, but only a claim at stake that you will make at the end of the day.
4:49:43And as far as Ellen Ellinger is concerned, I don't think that he needs that right now, because this was then, and so it merits, but I would assume, without question in my mind, that at the right time and under the appropriate circumstances, consideration would be in favor of a motion like that, but the time is just up to me now.
4:50:07Thank you very much.
4:50:08Thank you very much.
4:50:09All right, we have to go to the market very quickly.
4:50:11All right, let's do that.
4:52:49We were hoping he wouldn't know.
4:52:54Bill.
4:53:09Okay. .
4:53:36Before they have to get out, before they get out, one of you must bring the fire across.
4:53:46Bill and Jerry.
4:53:47Jerry will lead you to the fire.
4:53:50Thank you sir.

On May 20, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, and bipartisan Congressional leaders and staffers, including William P. Rogers, Melvin R. Laird, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Gerard C. Smith, Henry A. Kissinger, Clark MacGregor, William E. Timmons, Ronald L. Ziegler, Herbert G. Klein, John A. Scali, Hugh Scott, Allen J. Ellender, J. William Fulbright, John C. Stennis, Margaret Chase Smith, George D. Aiken, Robert P. Griffin, Milton R. Young, Robert C. Byrd, Michael J. ("Mike") Mansfield, [Thomas] Hale Boggs, Leslie Arends, William S. Mailliard, Frank T. Bow, F. Edward Hébert, Gerald R. Ford, Dr. Thomas E. ("Doc") Morgan, Thomas P. ("Tip") O'Neill, Jr., and George H. Mahon, met in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 10:15 am to 11:05 am. The Cabinet Room taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 058-005 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 58-5

Date: May 20, 1971
Time: 10:15 am - 11:05 am
Location: Cabinet Room

The President met with Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, William P. Rogers, Melvin R. Laird,
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Gerard C. Smith, Henry A. Kissinger, Clark MacGregor, William
E. Timmons, Ronald L. Ziegler, Herbert G. Klein, John A. Scali, Hugh Scott, Allen J. Ellender,
J. William Fulbright, John C. Stennis, Margaret Chase Smith, George D. Aiken, Robert P.
Griffin, Milton R. Young, Robert C. Byrd, Michael J. (“Mike”) Mansfield, [Thomas] Hale
Boggs, Leslie C. Arends, William S. Mailliard, Frank T. Bow, F. Edward Hébert, Gerald R.
Ford, Dr. Thomas E. (“Doc”) Morgan, Thomas P. (“Tip”) O’Neill, Jr., and George H. Mahon

     [General conversation/Unintelligible]

     Ellender, Hébert, and Boggs

     US-Soviet relations
         -Strategic arms limitation
               -May 20,1971 announcement
                      -Senate’s schedule
                           -Mansfield

******************************************************************************

     Negotiations

[To listen to the segment (1m10s) declassified on 02/28/2002, please refer to RC# E-525.]

******************************************************************************

                -May 20, 1971 announcement
                    -Content and phraseology

******************************************************************************

     Forthcoming negotiations

[To listen to the segment (13m23s) declassified on 02/28/2002, please refer to RC# E-525.]

******************************************************************************

                -May 20, 1971 announcement
                    -Handling
                    -Content and phraseology

******************************************************************************

     Significance

[To listen to the segment (53s) declassified on 02/28/2002, please refer to RC# E-525.]

******************************************************************************

                -Possible public statements

******************************************************************************

     Negotiations

[To listen to the segment (23m43s) declassified on 02/28/2002, please refer to RC# E-525.]

******************************************************************************

                -US defense spending
                     -Public opinion
                     -Domestic problems
                     -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]

******************************************************************************

     Negotiations

[To listen to the segment (3m) declassified on 02/28/2002, please refer to RC# E-525, E-526.]

******************************************************************************

     [General conversation/Unintelligible]

     Rogers, MacGregor

     President’s call to John W. Byrnes

     Ellender, Rogers, Ford

The President, et al. left at 11:05 am
  • 502-006 8:38 AM · 21 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Stephen B. Bull, and Marjorie P. Acker met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:38 am to 9:02 am.
  • 058-004 9:02 AM — President Richard M. Nixon, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, and the Cabinet members, including William P. Rogers, John B. Connally, Melvin R. Laird, John N. Mitchell, Winton M. ("Red") Blount, Jr., William T. Pecora, Clifford M. Hardin, James T. Lynn, Laurence H. Silberman, Elliot L. Richardson, George W. Romney, James M. Beggs, George P. Shultz, Robert H. Finch, Donald H. Rumsfeld, George H. W. Bush, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, Henry A. Kissinger, Clark MacGregor, Peter M. Flanigan, Herbert G. Klein, Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., Raymond K. Price, Jr., Alexander P. Butterfield, Ronald L. Ziegler, William E. Timmons, Charles W. Colson, John A. Scali, Richard A. Moore, Harry S. Dent, Leonard Garment, John W. Dean, III, Frederic V. Malek, Robert J. Brown, Robert J. Dole, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Gerald C. Smith, Arthur J. Sohmer, Caspar W. ("Cap") Weinberger, Virginia H. Knauer, and Arnold R. Weber, met in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 9:02 am to 9:48 am.
  • 502-007 9:49 AM · 13 min — President Richard M. Nixon, William P. Rogers, Henry A. Kissinger, Ronald L. Ziegler, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:49 am to 10:03 am.
  • 502-008 10:03 AM · 21 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:03 am and 10:09 am.
  • 502-009 10:09 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:09 am to 10:12 am.
  • 502-010 11:10 AM · 15 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:10 am and 11:18 am.
  • 502-011 11:18 AM · 28 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Alexander P. Butterfield, Henry A. Kissinger, Stephen B. Bull, Gerald R. Ford, Rose Mary Woods, and Mark I. Goode met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:18 am to 11:59 am.
  • 003-080 11:50 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford talked on the telephone from 11:50 am to 11:53 am.

Conversation 058-005, May 20, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/058-005 (accessed September 18, 2026).