Conversation 068-007

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Here it is.

You're doing work there, there.

Sorry, I'm moving very quickly.

You're not the same height, are you?

There's not any difference.

These are too low, I think.

These, these are too low.

I need you all to.

I do it this way, though.

See how that works.

It's pretty long, though.

Well, we'll say you're all set, right?

Yes, sir.

Thank you very much.

Let's try the others.

12.

Hello.

Yes, sir.

Twelve will be last and then ten.

Ten.

And eleven.

And nine.

Eight.

Four.

Okay.

And then one.

Okay, we got it.

Eight, nine, eleven, ten, twelve.

Nine, eleven, ten, twelve.

Here you go.

He wants you covered up.

That way.

This way.

He wants it all covered.

This is one.

That's four right side up.

That's one.

That's four.

Here we go.

One.

Four.

Five.

Four.

Eight.

Nine.

Ten.

Twelve.

Okay.

Okay, good.

Okay, I'm going back and I'll look at it.

I don't know how much I have here.

Yes, I have Commander Francis.

Huh?

Yes, sir.

I think what we'll do, because the way this thing's set up is put the chiefs all here, the president, the vice president on the other side, and you can talk to them.

And if you need to work with them, then I think I'll ask the chairman to move with the chiefs.

Thank you.

Big Charles.

Yes, sir.

How are you?

Good to see you.

Thank you.

Oh, that was sick.

All right, let's go.

I see by the morning papers that the Vice President's going to be here, they all of a sudden knew what we were going to talk about.

He knew what we were going to talk about.

He had the morning papers that he was going to be President for $83 billion.

Oh really?

Yeah.

That's an awful little bit in their number, but...

It's fantastic how you're fixing your job.

If I'm desperate to keep up with what's really going on, it's great to watch your coat.

I don't think that.

What?

Right here.

So we're going to put the chiefs over on this side.

Sit there.

Clear.

How are you?

.

Sir, does anyone want to work across the table to the president?

So you have just one set of eight.

You've got a set for each and a set for each.

I'm going to hand it across to you.

And then we'll have the president and the vice president on his right.

And we'll have Mr. O'Hare, Mr. Packard, and Henry.

And I thought if someone felt that they had to be over here, we could ask the chairman to move out when their presentation started, and they could go to the agency.

I just don't want to stay here.

I want to speak out of position here.

I'll be back in Seattle.

Jack, we've got one slide.

It's all over the presentation.

Yeah, that's right.

I want it back.

There you go.

Let's get it away from him.

Good.

Oh, good.

There you go.

.

Chairman, sir, I'd like to know if the shape's in my seat.

Yes, ma'am.

It's in my seat.

It's cold in here.

Well, very good actions have started.

I'm going to kick it off.

One time, we've got a captain and a lieutenant there, every one of our class, with their wives.

And we're giving them a week or two.

Well, he's a pretty dedicated young fellow.

They're all regular officers.

I should have wrapped up and let you look at it.

It's fantastic.

It does give a good voice.

It's pretty important.

Well, I think Jim in a lot of ways is fine, but I'm sure he doesn't believe in the session,

They started abusing their privileges of having that voice.

I'm afraid some of my commanders have sort of flipped over that.

I just don't believe in all sorts of subjecting themselves to these rhapsodies where they're casting AT systems.

Well, those are dissidents that do that.

These young folks are not dissidents.

They're first class and dedicated.

Well, I certainly don't agree with that.

We've got a simple solution for this.

We just throw it all out in the cold.

How long does it take to catch?

It doesn't take very long.

What do you think, 30 days?

Not more than 30 days sometimes.

It's taking us too damn long.

We've got a terrible shortage of lawyers.

Did that cause you a problem?

Keep my position?

No, because unless we've got something on the guy, we just give it a little discharge and we're out of the position.

You don't have to have a lawyer for that.

I mean, you just revoke it and say, let's go.

Throw it out.

If you've got something on him, so you want to be more punitive about it, then take it along and start again.

Why don't you tell them?

I don't have a lawyer.

I've got to see where the other side of the table appears.

Tell them.

Okay, thank you.

Good morning.

And I'm going to give you a copy of my charts and facts.

I'll make this even now, so it's on the same time.

I have all my gold.

Why don't you put that Air Force one under the Navy.

We'll go to the Navy after the Army gets through.

Then we'll let them end up with our anchorman.

We'll go to the Air Force and then we'll go to the Marine Corps.

I'd like to end with Chappie.

That would have been no problem.

I had to go up to 3%.

All right, why don't we do it that way?

That would be all right.

Because I think Chappie would fit in a little better with me.

They are companions.

Sometimes you just pick one.

Would you give me one of those?

Captain, I agree on everything, including not interfering with each other's hair standards.

Well, he has a check.

He's appealing to a different percentage.

Oh, yeah.

Well, you just want to appeal to that 7%.

I just want a few of them.

But no roses.

No roses.

Dinner time.

All right.

They did pretty good professionally overall.

They had a lot of night duty.

That's what I'm saying.

They had a number of bulls.

The Bears had a hell of a game.

Yeah.

Tune it up.

Well, sir, you been hurt?

Can I tell you a little, sir?

Where I was hurt?

I was hurt.

Well, the quarterback killed him, or he?

Yeah, but he couldn't get any.

And they had that routine, tossing it over them.

Well, they're very good at that.

That's what I'm doing three times a day.

How many for your life?

I was at the end of life.

That's pretty dog.

You ever play that music nice and softly yesterday?

All day?

Tell me if you've got one.

They had it on one of the beds.

You've got those fellows on the other side, huh?

Yes, sir.

You can see all the heating now.

Put one on the other side.

That's it, right?

Go ahead.

This is a meeting, as you know.

I guess it was last year, but it's perhaps more so this year.

And it's rather a lot.

I know that some of those, I'll tell you what, it's all serious.

the United States .

It's also interesting to note that context .

I understand .

They've already added to the $7,205 and $4,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000.

The point that I'm trying to make with all this is that we are, at the present time, confronting in the Congress is a very, very bad issue about the Defense General.

Now, I say it in Congress, when I say it in the Congress, I'm not referring to them.

The entire Congress, thank God, there are a lot of good people in the Armed Services Committee, maybe one or two, in foreign affairs and foreign relations, and we've got a number of people in the Committee, one or two, on the defense issue, I mean.

And there are some out there who will understand it and understand the needs.

On the other hand, it's been, it's all you know, since we met a year ago, in the breakfast of the year,

and also the whole office.

There has been really a diabolical attack on the armed forces.

It's everything from the sufficient conduct of American troops to the waste

And it's just a fashionable thing to, one, say that we have too much defense for what our needs are.

And second, that those that are in defense are a pretty old form of life.

That's just the way you run into it.

You aren't an Air Force.

and all of us have been trying our own way to try to turn this around.

What you have is the Congress

It reflects public attitudes.

There used to be a time in this country, maybe 25 years ago, when the Congress never tried to lead the public, now they follow it.

They think the public goes this way, and they may be right if you put it in terms of, if you put defense in terms of, well, would you like to see that we spend more money on defense and give more money to us, and people stay out and take the dough?

If you put it in terms of you want to see the United States to be the second most horrible nation in the world, they'd say no.

And you put it in blue because it's that.

That is an issue that's not being, that's not being, it's just what, it gets blurred pretty quickly over the course of time.

And it's one that is trying to be drawn very clearly as time goes on.

What I'm really trying to indicate here is very simple.

This was the case last year and also the year before when we went through the gory battles on EDM and tried to maintain decent posture and defense.

We confront now quite a serious problem in terms of getting the Congress to give Stephen

what we think are the minimum appropriations that we've asked for.

And we're gonna fight for them.

I think we can get them.

But it's, the Congress is playing a very, very rough game in that respect.

Yet again, it's our job, or at least in this room,

to lay out, and that's what we expect you all to do this morning, to lay out what we need.

And then, knowing what we need, we can go out and see what we can do with it and so on.

And these great tides sometimes change.

Well, they, when I say sometimes, they always change.

I mean, they run one way for a time and then turn it around.

Some of that will change.

At some point in the future, the American people may decide to start cutting our defense in relation to those who might be our opponents in the world.

when, if that happens, then we'll have the tide with us rather than against us.

And the president has to tide us against us very strongly, for instance.

And we therefore have to develop

the most effective presentation you've ever made, the most effective lobbying you've ever done, or whatever we finally decide will be our defense option.

Everybody's got to get in on it.

You can't expect it to be done just the White House.

You can't expect it just to be done by speaking to the President.

In cases like that, you all try.

But it's got to be a real job, playing every line that we possibly can.

And I'm

I feel myself a certain uneasiness about our defense posture, not because of what it is today, but because of what I think it may become in the event that this gray tide of anti-military continues to run in this country.

It just goes down and down.

And then we're going to see not doing the same thing.

So I gave you that to give you my own feeling and my own sense of the situation.

I know you must be quite frustrated to see some of the numbers that we had to present to you in the first instance.

It feels strongly that the United States needs to maintain a position called the

Overall, the first nation of military power is strongly that the United States should have its military posture in terms of the future and in terms of what we've done in the past.

And this is an agonizing re-appraisal of some of our present forces, to see whether they are up to what they need for the future.

But I'm also, as a pragmatist, keenly aware of the fact that all of you know that the battle becomes more difficult each year.

The case we have to make, therefore, has to be that much more effective.

So with that, I'm going to put on the show.

Thank you.

I'd just like to make one comment.

And that is that we are not going to do too badly as far as our 1972 budget is concerned.

I look to Congress approving all but about 1.5% of the total request which we made to the Congress.

with the pay increase that they've gone above the budget that we recommended.

That will be restored, although it won't be in the areas we asked for, but it will be a total cut of about 1.5% as far as 72 is concerned.

And I'd just like to say, there's been no sanctuary defense, and I think no commander in chief of our forces that has had better support

from the Chairman and from the Joint Chiefs.

These gentlemen have worked hard and they've priced out what they think our total foreign policy commitments are as far as our treaty obligations are concerned.

as far as our other defense arrangements.

And the JSOC, when they come up with a price of some $94 billion, now this in itself is a step in the right direction because it was $117 billion that JSOC drove the course of the funding.

Now we have fiscal guidance of 79.6% of the Department of Defense.

And the chiefs today will be addressing

their exceptions to that fiscal guidance rather than the so-called JSOC.

And they will be giving their recommendations as to improvements they think are needed and necessary over and above the current fiscal guidance which is tentatively assigned to them.

We have a tentative strategic guidance which differs from the JSOC and the tentative strategic guidance pricing out at some $83 billion.

But I do think this presentation will give you some idea of some of their thinking in regard to these matters.

Mr. President, first I want to say that we do appreciate your support very much.

We've never had better support than we received from you, sir.

And we appreciate also that you've taken the time to

to discuss these problems with us.

I must say, too, that we are very mindful of the problems you have with respect to the fiscal problems and the domestic problems in our country today, some of which you related a short time ago.

But we do believe it's our responsibility to set forth for you the military factors that are involved in this total national policy equation.

Now, since we believe that the Soviet

build-up could be taken into consideration since we believe that the strategic balance is really the basis for our security.

I thought I would give you quickly some of the information that Mel and I gave the Congress with respect to the trends in the Soviet build-up of their strategic forces.

And first you have the ICBM launches.

You can see how from the Cuban days the

Our buildup has moved ahead rapidly.

You're aware of the fact that today we have some 90 prospective silos, 33 of which are the large SS9, could be the large SS9 type, and 66 could be the SS11 type.

but this will give you just a quick look at the buildup projected out five years ahead.

I have the same thing here for the submarines.

They have initiated a very aggressive submarine program, and today they have 22 of these submarines operational building about eight per year.

But you can see our missiles have remained constant at 656 now since 1968, whereas they've had to build up like that.

And of course, we don't know exactly how far they're going to carry in the out years, and that is why we show this untapped again.

This shows the bombers, the intercontinental bombers, the way the U.S. forces have been reduced down to 458.

And second, it shows that the Soviets have kept essentially a constant force here of approximately 200.

They are, as you know, building now a new twin-winged bomber.

We, as a matter of fact, have photographs of it taken by satellite, and it is flying now.

in quite an active way.

This depicts the meeting models that the Soviets have, which I have not included in this overall picture, but they could make the one-way flights, recovering in Cuba, if the Soviets chose to use them in that fashion.

This, then, shows the total intercontinental delivery vehicles that are available to the United States, including the ICBMs and submarines and bombers, and the total that we expect to be available to the Soviet Union in the out years.

You can see that, including the bombers, we do still have a slight edge on them in the year 1971.

There are other factors associated with the institution's balance, mainly the number of warheads.

You can see that this is an area in which we have significant security because of the program, known as Headman 3 and the other side.

Injection to this projection, the possibility that the Soviets might have married, in which case their numbers would move up rapidly, particularly in view of the fact that the throwaway of their big missiles would have led them to tap foot, as many as six or as many missiles by strength.

Looking at the manganese, you can see that they have a higher superiority in the manganese field.

This is an area which is not subject to absolute and precise estimates, but nevertheless, they do have a lot of weapons overall, whereas when we shift it to bird, this in effect reduces the manganese.

And this is what would happen to the Soviet manufacturing if they choose to shift to the American system.

And just one final look at the Strategic Defense System.

I think it's interesting to see how much effort the Soviets put into this in terms of the Northern Warning and Surveillance Radar Sites.

They have 1,000 out of 133.

Command and control facilities, some $200 to $220.27.

Service stand launches, we have 700, they have 10,000.

NSF aircraft, 500, about 3,300.

And of course, this is the famous Moscow AGM site with the 64 launches.

And I'll say the guard is not yet in operation.

I'm addressing now 1971.

And so you can see that the balance, the superiority we have has now moved to parent and we do not have the flexibility we had previously.

It takes places in Lebanon and Cuba, and so on.

Now I would like to point out that the budget that Mel Mason will, doesn't give a significant capability, but the overall result is that we have less manpower than we had in the 50s.

It was just in the late 30s.

and a few aircraft were being purchased in any time before World War II.

Now we have had difficulties stemming from the policies of the previous administration.

The guidance for the development of the budget in 67 and 68 was to fight for attrition and not for modernization.

And consequently, there was a period of time when we not only did not modernize, but also we drew down on the Atlantic side of the United States, namely the Atlantic Fleet and the NATO forces, in order to support the war in Vietnam.

And that, of course, forced us to draw down on our

stage power, and supply backup.

Mela has taken very significant actions to reverse this trend and correct it.

We today have some very excellent programs in the modernization field, and in addition to that, building up the weaponry for the particular core, and for the Atlantic fleet, so this is being corrected, but this does take a box.

In addition, of course, the Soviets have built up their conventional forces.

I won't go into detail, but by and large, the trend is the same with respect to their conventional air forces, the Army, and particularly, and you're well aware, their naval forces.

Now, let me turn to the chart of the world and just go across quickly to show you what I'm really trying to show you is the difference in posture

that we face today and in the future as opposed to what we have been facing in the 1960s.

This shows what's happened in the 1970s.

In the first place, the Soviets now for the first time are permanently deploying these 1,300-mile missile-firing submarines.

They have one now.

potentially between the United States and Hawaii can reuse the place.

They have a three-year idea, use of Florida, which can reach out to this area.

They have a very large number of attack submarines, which bring into question our ability to supply at the adequate rate without unacceptable losses, operations we conduct in Europe.

to speak to that.

We have a situation in Cuba, which you're well aware of, down here in Chile, and consequently that in this hemisphere causes some difficulties in the sense that it reduces our flexibility.

Moving over into the Mediterranean, we're having a problem right now with Malta.

The congressional attitude towards Greece reduces our, could reduce our

A utility of the facilities there.

The soldiers have moved into Egypt with very modern equipment.

They are overflying the Sinai now with the Potsdam.

They are at 70,000 feet about Mach 2.5.

just along the fringes, but they have also given the Egyptians the very latest in their search to air missiles in the Indian Ocean.

They have credits of the soviets in terms of ship days that is much higher than that of the United States.

As you know, they've just made a treaty in the last 20 while, I think, with India.

And when one moves on into the city, you see the situation changing, too.

We have the reversion of open auto, which has reduced our prices somewhat in terms of the...

We have a question as to what accessibility we have to Taiwan in the future.

The Philippines also could cause a problem, the old problem down in Viet Nam, and the major problem is to just keep going.

and they overlook what's taking place now.

They're a very large nation economically.

They have essentially no military power, and so they will undoubtedly cast a very solid eye on what we do before they make up their minds as to what they're going to do.

So the real point, yes, sir, as I see it, is really what these people think we're going to do and what they think we can do.

In other words, deterrence to those who may have pulled us and an impartation of confidence to those that are our friends.

That's what we are really looking for.

And so we are concerned that these relative changes in terms of the posture, in terms of the military balance, in terms of the expansion of the Soviets tend to reduce the options you have in supporting Europe.

foreign policy, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully endorse.

Now, before calling on General Westmoreland to brief the Army budget, I'd like to speak briefly to the budget itself.

As a matter of fact, we are addressing a 79.6%

And we have examined all aspects of it, but it is a very complex problem, as you are aware, and we have looked at reductions such as endothelial

to generate a little investment out of that, or certainly just a little manipulation, I guess, with respect to pay raises, with respect to the volunteer boards, which might provide some additional funds.

But the budget that we have before you, the 790.6, we feel that by and large we do have parity in the UK.

It meets most of the criteria that we have in 2016 for efficiency.

However, we feel that we should improve command and control, and there's some things that we can do with respect to approving the weapons incentives, such as accuracy and so forth.

And generally speaking, as I said before, the $79.6 billion provides very significant modernization in many areas for all the services.

So I don't want to think that it is as legal as many people thought it all, but on the other hand, there are limitations in the material support and the state power and the ability to meet national commitments.

And particularly, it relies heavily on reserves.

And General Westmoreland will speak to that, I'm sure.

Now, we have examined increases of the budget.

They said 9.6 to about 81 billion.

The five-year plan, I think, adds up to about $81.7 billion.

This is a second increase with considered alternatives, which would increase staff capability levels and enhance our capability for using naval and marine forces, such as we did in the Jordanian crisis last year.

and increase the readiness of the Army and Marine Corps.

We've also looked at an increase of about 82.5, and we think that that increase will provide the levels of modernization and readiness, greatly improve capabilities that you need to sustain our defense requirements.

But here the significant feature is that it signals the intent.

of the United States to really hand in support our interests worldwide because it then will be a clear indication that we would be providing the capabilities for that purpose.

So as I say, sir,

I don't want to leave you with the impression that the 79.6 does not give us as many votes as it does, but it presents us with an either-or situation with respect to NATO on one hand and Asia on the other.

In other words, we can't do both.

We'd have difficulty holding our ground in the Pacific if we had to meet the full commitments.

And I would point out too that the Soviet Union is a Pacific power as well as an Atlantic power.

And if we become involved in a NATO conflict, we're going to be fighting in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic.

Today, for instance, they have 94 packed submarines here, plus several of the Yankee packed submarines.

And as you know, we have two states now, Hawaii and Alaska, that border on the Pacific Ocean, and we will certainly have to provide some support for them.

We feel that $79.6 billion, although it provides a significant dose, is immorally pledged and introduces risks and does not provide the options that I think it might be necessary in addition.

And so what we recommend to her is that we view our military capability in terms of the real world.

By that I mean that if we cannot afford the necessary military capability, then we feel we should reduce some of the commitments and bring them forward.

that we should not continue ahead with significant cuts on one hand and maintaining the commitments on the other.

I think otherwise we will not be able to support the Nixon Doctrine the way that you would want to support it.

So that's about all I have, sir.

If you have any questions, I would ask them.

You know, what more than that can you do to specificate with the Army?

I have avoided lying out into the budget and spoken in terms of generalities, just to try to give you a general picture of what the situation worldwide is as we see it.

Mr. President, I have several charts to facilitate my presentation.

Mr. President, the United States must be capable of a strong and credible initial defense.

Now, Senator Joe Goodpaster and the JCS have stated the requirement of not less than 17 army divisions for deployment in the Central Region of NATO by human plus 90 days, mobilization plus three months.

The chart in front of you shows the buildup in Western Europe.

involving reinforcement of troops deployed to Europe following localization day.

Because of dollar and manpower constraints, the Army cannot meet their own good pastures requirement, as I will show you later.

Now, the next chart indicates how rapidly the Army is being reduced in size.

I've shown the selected years from 1948 to

73 of the 70-time period.

Note that I've indicated the crisis periods of Korea, Berlin, and Vietnam.

You'll notice the green portions of the bars to the top indicate mobilization reserves took place in the 52, 62, and 68.

You'll note a decreasing use of reserves during crisis periods.

Note the percentage decline in Army strength since 1968.

From 1968 to June of 1972, the Army will be reduced by 670,000 men.

This year, the Army will be decreased by 220,000 men.

At 13 or 11 divisions, we will be at the lowest number of active divisions since the beginning of the year.

Fiscal 1873, at the $79.6 billion Department of Defense fiscal guidance level, 11 divisions will be all that we can muster, considering the balance between readiness, modernization, and manpower.

In 1972, we were passing through the crossover of 13 divisions, a minimum of minimum divisions, which I believe is not the two-day critical charge.

The next chart displays the 11 division force against the NATO requirements.

You will note the shortfall of four divisions from mobilization plus 60 days onward.

The total of only 13 divisions, against the requirement of 17 divisions, requires that all active divisions, those stationed in Oaxaca, Korea, as well as in the United States, be moved to Europe in three months.

Therefore, the 11-division force projected under the $79.6 billion fiscal guidance entails, in my opinion, significant risks.

And it appears to be a party.

This situation raises several questions.

First, how would a potential enemy perceive a warfighting capability?

And second, how would our allies perceive a will or resolve to meet our commitments?

On the other hand, Mr. President, a 13 Division IV allows us to markedly improve our capability to meet the NATO requirement as the next Charter of the Straits.

13 divisions, and this chart shows the availability of the United States Army divisions toward meeting general capacity requirements.

You'll note that all of our active forces go to NATO from Korea, Hawaii, as well as the United States to arrive in three months.

It feels like 90 days.

There's a greater dependence on reserves.

You will notice the Reservoir Compound Brigades, which is the equivalent of two divisions.

Now, even with these forces, we still have a shortfall of two divisions, but I consider this a magical risk.

Now, with respect to the reserves, Mr. President, the next chart shows an increased dependence on reserves.

And by reserves, I mean the National Guard and organized federal reserves.

With an active army of 13 divisions, we will have 295,000 reserves in units and replacements, with a total of 15 divisions in NATO by mobilization day plus 90 days.

The legislative division force, as opposed to the 13 which is reflected here, will require 350,000 reserves in Europe in three months following mobilization.

Therefore, you can see that this situation will require an early decision to mobilize.

This plan involves faster reps and deployments than ever before achieved.

As an example, you remember in World War II, the best time for National Guard divisions from activation to deployment was seven months.

Two National Guard divisions entered combat in Korea over 15 months after they were called to federal service.

During the Berlin crisis, the divisions were ready for deployment, but were not deployed nine months after fall.

Our reliance on reserves has shifted toward greater reliance in the last decade, as you can see on the next chart.

It is noteworthy that reliance is increased at a time when reserves are beginning to have recruiting difficulties because of reduced draft pressures.

You'll note the shift in manpower toward the reserves.

Even with the 13 active divisions,

You can see the reserves must now provide 69% of our support structure, shown in the rectangles at the bottom of the chart.

We maintain much of our active army forces in the division and combat forces to keep their visibility high.

Such visibility, in my opinion, is the essence of deterrence and confidence in us by our allies.

The next chart illustrates the status of a 11 division force, which is compatible with the 79.6 fiscal guidance.

And this is the size force that will be supported by that guidance, 11 divisions.

You will note that our

Our divisions in support of NATO are held constant, four and one-thirds stationed in Europe.

You'll note that two and two-thirds division forces are held in the United States for immediate deployment to NATO.

Now these are heavy divisions, either armored or mechanized divisions.

In the Pacific area, one division is deployed forward.

Our Pacific reserve consists of only one-third division and a one.

Now, if we were to reduce the one division in Korea, we would be able to increase the size of our reserve in Hawaii.

Now, this leaves a residual force of only one and two-thirds divisions.

This will be an airborne division and two-thirds of an air mobile division.

And that will be all that will remain in the United States to meet worldwide contingencies.

This, Mr. President, will leave you with little flexibility for options without motivation.

The National Strategy, sir, as I see it, requires NATO commitments with adequate forward deployments and a modest capability of maintaining credibility in the Pacific Asian area.

The Army's immediate needs are reflected on the final charter.

As I pointed out, I feel we should maintain a minimum of 13 active positions.

The 79.6 Department of Defense fiscal guidance level for the Army will provide only 11 in 1973.

I therefore strongly recommend, sir, that the hourly funding of the Army be increased by $500 million, which will provide 13 divisions, adequate modernization, and readiness of forces.

This will give the United States conventional land forces to support a strategy of realistic deterrence compared to nuclear parity, sufficient forces to make credible our resolve to stand by our allies,

sufficient strength to maintain for you, sir, options without mobilization in the event of minor contingencies, such as in Berlin, the Middle East, and in the 40s.

On this presence, this concludes my presentation.

How can you get to divisions for $500 million?

Why do $500 million make the difference of two divisions?

In order to maintain our balance in our program with appropriate modernization and to improve a lot of our troops with appropriate construction funds, we would add all of that $500 million to our personnel account and to our operations and maintenance account.

That's all going into personnel?

That's all going into personnel.

I understand that the pay raise and all that stuff goes in, right?

As soon as the pay raise that has been quoted becomes law.

And that's tied into the draft bill.

Yeah.

And what they've done there, Mr. President, is they took our 72 program and 73 program and put it all in 72.

So that's...

and it assumes, can that be turned around?

But it's tied up with a draft extension.

We've delayed it.

We've got a delay now until October 1st and that's causing some problems in the Congress because both houses voted July 1 and then we got a conference committee on October 1 effective date.

And so I think that's the best we can do on that part, Mr. President.

Uh, Mr. President, there is the Air Force chart, okay?

I'll be referring to the chart in that book.

It'll be the current staff line.

But then, the design and defense budget has already been discussed.

And of course the Air Force has said we've gone down with the budget.

We're at rock bottom in 72, and we'll be even lower in 73.

Now we have used 64, fiscal year 64, as a baseline because that was our last pre-CATOM budget.

Turning to tab 2, you can see the effect on manpower.

Both our military and civilian strengths are down.

However, on tab three, the next chart demonstrates that the fewer people cost more money.

On tab three, the top line shows the change in personnel since 64.

The bottom line depicts the increasing share of the budget that those people cost us.

And over 40% in fiscal year 73 goes to provide paying allowances for the military and civilian personnel.

This percentage is expected to continue to rise.

On the next tab, on tab four, we'll have about 32% fewer squadrons in 1973 than we had in 1964.

Now this is a total of all kinds of squadrons, but it's a good indication of the reductions that have taken place in the airports over the years.

On tab 5, although we have fewer people and less forces, we see here that they cost more to maintain, and this would be fewer and fewer dollars for procurement and modernization.

The result shown on tab 6.

This is our aircraft procurement.

And with so few new aircraft or equipment, it's 18.

More than half of our combat aircraft are over 10 years old.

As you can see, in fiscal year 73 at Reddington Lake, we are procuring 41 aircraft.

Admiral Moore has covered our strategic forces, so let's go on to our air defense forces on Tab 9.

And this is on U.S. Air Defense.

Our radar coverage has holes in it, as you saw on Admiral Moore's chart of reduction in the surveillance radars over the years.

And this map shows the low-altitude picture.

And on TAM, you can see that we have reduced the number of fighter interceptor squadrons.

Two-thirds of our interceptor port will be in the reserve in 1973.

That is the National Guard.

We reduced from a unit equivalent of some 1,387 aircraft in 1964 to 450 in 1973.

On Tat 11, we have been constantly faced with the choice of reducing forces or keeping forces and reducing capability by reducing crews and support manpower.

The new therapy sources provide the deterrent for warfighting capability.

A link to conventional fire attack forces on path 12.

We see the fiscal year 73 fire attack wartime sorting per day available to fight.

The bar on the left is the KGS recommended.

The middle bar is our currently programmed capability.

And the one on the right is what we will have with a budget reduction in 73.

Our commitment to NATO is the most important part of the next endowment.

And on the next slide, I want to show you what this reduced overall capability on chart 13.

We show the results of one of many analyses.

of the NATO versus a packed conventional war in Central Europe.

The graph shows that the aircraft losses over 90 days.

And just after 10 days of the war, and this is at any plus 30, in other words, we have mobilized 30 days after mobilization, the war starts.

We have many fewer aircraft remaining than the packed forces.

Now you notice on that chart that we have aircraft and shelters.

And we have found in our studies that the shelter program in Europe can be pretty good at it.

We believe that we need a $50 game piece in the fiscal year 73 budget.

And this would allow us to restore our sorting capability.

It would also help us in our modernization.

but also help us in increasing our strategic forces by merging, going from minute man three on more of the minute man two than presently twice.

Now what does this do for us?

Well taking the NATO situation on tab 15, with the improvements indicated,

in H.O.

versus a packed 90-80-90-75 that produced the results here.

And this is certainly a reversal of an art picture under current programs.

Mr. President, I believe that with the forces available in the traffic fiscal year 73 budget,

The United States, as Negro allies, have less than a 50% probability of successfully fighting an air war in Europe of any sustained duration.

Thank you.

On the first chart, I show what I want to talk about today.

Summarize some of the things that I've already discussed to you during the three meetings that I've had in my 13 months in office and seek to place them in broader context.

It asks what we have our military forces for, what kinds of forces are relevant to the problems we may face, and planning how our plans and programs match these needs.

Now, if you turn to chart two, sir,

The Nixon Doctrine, as formulated in your Foreign Policy Statement, provides the basis for my planning.

The key aspects of it are summarized here.

I find these very workable guidelines.

In my judgment, the problem yet to be resolved is to reorient the military forces to enable us to implement this doctrine.

On chart number three, I show you how I perceive your program and your many new initiatives.

I'll just ask you a glance at those.

With regard to the last one, I might make the point that Malta and Iceland are very much in the process of fluidity at the present time, and they represent the break-each that's going on on the planks of NATO.

On chart five, I give you my perception of your domestic constraints, and they ask the military to reorient our forces to support your program within that.

On chart number five, I show you how I believe we can provide the kind of power that can help you.

I'd like to talk about it.

There's nuclear standoff, as Admiral Moore has discussed, and we hope it will continue into the future, preferably through a successful solve, but if not, then through increased expenditures and strategic weaponry.

A nuclear handoff means that a nuclear power is not a useful instrument, but just a necessary umbrella.

And assuming the balance holds, the power which resolves issues will be appropriate to conventional capability.

I noticed something in Smith.

Now I understand, the chiefs are all focused on you.

a change to zero ABM, a zero ABM deal, period.

Is that right?

That's what we're looking at.

But what Smith wants to do is to slide in zero ABM for what?

For the ABM portion of the May 20th agreement.

Right.

And without changing any of the offensive understandings that we reach.

And that is what the chiefs are opposed to.

We are opposed, and the defense are opposed, Mr. President.

If you go to zero, then you've got to change the offensive mix that we've already offered.

I'm going to spend a second on that.

I mean, when I say second, that's the first letter we're going to need.

I didn't mean to interrupt.

Let's talk about it.

Let's see what we're talking about.

Why, what is the argument?

Why is zero going to be worse than one?

from a military standpoint it is difficult to defend the two-site proposal.

The two-site proposal can be defended on the basis that it can be expanded for a 12-site program.

We have enabled a proposition in SALT which gives the Soviets certainly an advantage as far as the long-term is concerned on the offensive weapon systems.

If we were to give up the capability which we have to go into a defensive system on down the road by going to zero at this time without opening up the offensive proposition that we put on the table in the SALT box, I believe it would be

to endanger our security planning.

And so the position of the Chiefs and the position that I've taken is that

No, do not table the zero at this time, unless you're willing also at the same time to make the reduction as far as the offensive limitations are concerned.

Then if you do that, you are the May 20th and you're down the drain.

And we arrive back to where we started from last January with a comprehensive negotiation.

Henry, it depends on what date you attach to the May 20th operation.

And whether or not, in the offensive side, you put into it an automatic date by which you have freedom to mix if they have trouble or problems.

Right.

But then, what this will lead us to, if it's a possible way of going, is towards the comprehensive agreement in which all the offensive and defensive weapons are included.

What we had intended to do on May 20th was to make

an ABM limitation and a temporary offensive limitation which would act as a bridge to a more comprehensive one.

So what Mel is proposing could be incorporated in the second stage of the negotiation.

That is to say, we could then keep the zero ABM for the second stage of the negotiation, couple it with offensive reductions.

I agree with the Chiefs and with Mel.

I think, however, that if we want to wrap it up, we've got a signal to make, and it's trying to work.

You agree with me?

Yes.

I had some problems, Mr. President, with the date that's been used in the Dec. 17 and Dec. 20 because it does give the Soviet Union, if this becomes the only agreement we have and we have to look at it from the standpoint we might not get anything else,

It gives them an opportunity of having a superior force in 74 and 75, and I don't want to be around it.

See, the Soviet Union never be in a position of superiority.

I can accept parity, but I think that this particular proposition, if we don't follow through on something else, gives them the opportunity for superiority.

I think that position achieves, too.

That's right.

That's what will happen if the interim agreement turns out to be the final one.

But there is a provision, which is that if there is no permanent agreement, the whole thing becomes subject to abrogation after the interim agreement.

My problem is this, that I think it's going to be most difficult for the United States to set aside the agreement.

I think it's easier for the Soviet Union to set aside the agreement.

Because of the manner, our whole system of government is so much, it's much more difficult for us to set aside the agreement that it is for the Soviet Union.

Well, the difficulty was zero ABM.

Zero ABM plus a freeze, basically.

And that's what it is on their offensive.

That means that we freeze ourselves into an inferior position both ways.

That's correct.

That's why I'm saying.

That's right.

So that is why we can under no circumstance let's sit and continue to carry on that line.

That's clear.

That was never the understanding.

We have to about freeze ourselves because all we can do is say, all right, we won't have any EDM.

But you look at those charts, we're already inferior, except in numbers, of course, of the weapons, because, apparently, there would be, may have, maybe four or five years if somebody does knock that out.

So we don't want to freeze right now, right?

In this day and age, you know, you see that we don't want to do that deal again.

Exactly.

If you have zero ADM in the context of the May 20th deal, we are freezing ourselves into a specific position, an inferior position.

Right?

That's right.

And I might ask you, in the precinct, whether you have a lead in technology.

Go ahead.

Yes, sir.

So my shorthand term for this appropriate congressional power is relative power.

On chart six, I show you examples of where I believe power was held and used successfully or was relevant.

In the left-hand panel, those where it was successful, sea power includes the Marines, of course, with their three-division air wing teams.

We could add appreciably to the list on the left.

The list on the right is shorter because decision-makers normally calculate the expected outcome, and hence they find other paths or back down, and these three you have two here.

And any President's options will impart the general rhetoric, so that's the role of power.

Now in turn number seven, I'll show you how I think role of power is shifting.

In line one, for example, the terms threat, nuclear attack, and the X under the column that is strategic nuclear forces shows these forces were exclusively relevant in the 50s and 60s as discussed.

The nuclear violence now makes this threat unlikely.

Although in ending World War II and President Truman's threat to Stalin to get him out of Iran, they were relevant.

Lines two to four show Europe the shift in the threat from the NATO center in 1560, line two, to NATO northern and southern flanks, lines three and four.

The greater stability in the center is due to the perceived linkage of nuclear weapons to conventional forces, to unrest in the Warsaw Pact, to Russia's concern about the Chinese Communist border forces,

The instability on the NATO flanks is due to Soviet flanking movements, increased strength of the Soviet fleet.

I just come back from a southern country trip through central and northern Europe.

I found not only the Chiefs of Navy, but the Chiefs of Defense staff of all of those countries

had that perception, and in many cases the ministries of defense.

In essence, they see Finland becoming a Latvia, Sweden becoming a Finland, and Norway, within five years, becoming a Sweden.

Lines 5 and 6 show Asia, where the Nixon Doctrine implies a shift from the large-scale U.S. ground involvement in Asia of the 50s and 60s, Line 5, to a strategy, Line 6 of the 70s, in which we provide help to an ally, as in the case the countries listed.

Lines 7 through 12 show other types of situations in which the nature shifts from one in which strategic and land-based forces are relevant, such as Cuba, and perhaps Lebanon and Taiwan Straits, Lines 7 and 8.

to ones such as the Middle Eastern conflict, or countering Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean, or war at sea, or the resolution of conflicts growing out of the struggle for control of ocean resources, where the wealth of power, as in Europe and Asia for the 70s and 80s, shifts for a greater need for maritime power, including Marines.

On chart 8, I summarize the reasons for this shift to the right for a greater emphasis on maritime power.

You'll recall, Mr. President, with regard to that last one that when you visited the 6th Fleet, you commented on the great utility of the Navy and Marine task forces there.

And on slide 9, you'll recall being briefed by General Birchnell as to how General Goodpaster would have proposed to bring U.S. troops in to back up the Navy and Marines.

Since then, by congressional action, as I'm more educated, Greece is being offended.

And the net result is that in a non-natural crisis in the Mediterranean, land-based ground and air are increasingly not relevant.

Now, what is the military situation in chart 10?

I'll compare the U.S. and the Soviet forces and discuss how we've allocated them.

With regard to chart 11, Admiral Moore has discussed those, and I'll just point out that in the slide on the right, the graph on the right, a significant fraction of that MERV increase is due to the Polaris Poseidon.

Those forces, in essence, represent the pre-strike line-up.

Now on chart number 12, I show you a data.

I just want one question.

It's working well?

Yes, sir.

The first three have deployed.

They're highly reliable.

The test results look like they're really good.

In fact, the only positive thing on all these charts is to have more shows, which I was surprised, frankly, because it's the Oregon deal, but that's Merv.

At least none of the actors have been trying to get us to stop Merv, and that's where she stopped naming us, right?

No?

It is.

But that isn't interesting enough.

Henry, why is it that Sylvia isn't interested in stopping Merv?

They've got that huge SS9.

They have a lot of MIRVs up on top of it.

Just a matter of fact, it's like they wanted to go on the capability, too.

They figured that we...

They're already in the development program.

No doubt about it.

They've been in the MIRV already, you think?

No, we don't know for sure.

Well, we think they probably have multiple reentry vehicles, USS 9, but I don't like to get into the debate of whether they're independently targeted or not, but they will have that capability, Mr. President, in the 1972-73 time period.

That's a better question.

I was looking at this from a, you know, a scientist's point of view.

You know, we've been around the track on ABM and so forth, but...

It seems it's rather interesting that there's always these issues that stir the people up.

It's hard to realize.

About a year ago, 18 months ago, Merv, everybody was tweeting about Merv, you know, we've got to stop Merv.

What do you think of Merv's, would you say, almost indispensable view of the fact that we have so much to throw away, the advantage that we have, whatever the advantage that we have, has got to be maintained by the Mervians.

Unless it works.

Okay, Vice President, I think you've got some agreement to reduce the total number of delivery vehicles so that they're of equal.

Yeah.

The MIRV is the one significant advantage we have.

Let me just say a word for, uh, Angela Rice, what's the other man?

Three.

I just looked at that program.

That's the MIRV program that the Air Force had.

That force has federated us in the previous Minuteman, and the move accuracy gives each one of the Minuteman three warheads a concern three.

Each one of these warheads has as much probability of killing a hard target as one of the large MED-191 warheads.

So we have provided significant crew capabilities with that program, and that's the one advantage we have against them, the numbers and numbers.

And I look at this program as being one of the

The only balances we have, it was put in recently as a case against ADM, and I think it has to be looked at in terms of the balance against their piece of capability.

and also as giving us more flexibility in terms of targets we can cover as the Chinese kind of situation build up.

So I would consider that to be a very important program.

We should not give it up under any conditions.

Mr. President, I have a question.

Sure.

I read this question before.

I'm not sure I understood the answer.

If you had an offensive limitation of delivery vehicles based on the mega tonnage

further capability that they have, wouldn't, in time, through their technological improvement and their ability to merge, would they then far outstrip us to that volume degree?

It depends on how many merges they can put into the SS9.

We, for example, put 10 into the Polaris.

You put 10 into the Polaris?

We put 14.

We're only putting 10.

so that there's community capability there.

The Intelligent Testament says three for the SS9.

I believe they ought to be able to get 20 in if they get our technology.

Looking ahead at the technological development, no matter how proficient we become, we still have that question of throw weight.

eventually as silos become harder.

So that trowel weight is going to mean something to us and should we be thinking more about limiting trowel weights at delivery vehicles?

This is one of the reasons that we're concerned about this, but I also think that it should be kept in mind with our research and development program.

which is so important, I think we can still keep ahead of it.

There is a lot more we can even do with the Minuteman at the site, as far as getting it even more accurate.

And we can do it at a very small price.

Because we have the technological capability that far outstrips the Soviet Union.

This is important to maintain this leadership.

Let me say this, and I think this will see these four neighbors, of course, big-budget things will come up.

The one place that, again, because of your proficiency in this area, that I think we really got to pair the horses in improving our technological capability.

Now, within the May 20th deal, we had it allowed both times.

Now, this is one place where we ought to do better.

We have, again, in terms of a life, in terms of

and computers and all that sort of thing.

That's one of the reasons you're concerned.

We are veterans, are we not?

That's correct.

That's the place where research and development, R&D, not only R&D, but application and so forth, and technological breakthroughs may be the answer.

Increased accuracy?

No answer.

Increased accuracy is the answer to that exact one.

We talk about these huge weapons, but one that is the bang of 110.

One-tenth of a Polaris is a hell of a man, right?

That's right.

It's like hitting with a shotgun or a rifle.

A shotgun may scar a guy up pretty good, but the rifle pierces his heart.

But you run into the people that are playing, look, you're improving the accuracy, it gives you a first-strike capability.

Well, that's what I know.

We've had a hell of a lot of flak on that.

I know.

But you see the point that I'm making?

I think we have to make a real fight to be sure that on that area, we do not, at this time, be talking about any kind of assault or assault.

We go gung-ho on the actors' side, because that is one limit.

That's right.

And when we were discussing this with you two,

planning basically in China.

One problem we had is that we can't use the Minuteman against China, and that's because it would have to over-plan the Soviet Union.

So then if we want to use that against China, we do have a substantial preemptive capability for the next 10 to 15 years.

So with that, we had to use planes for polarity reasons.

How long do we have a preemptive capability for the Chinese?

We can say about 50 to 10, 50 years.

And that's something that we should have a preemptive capability that depends upon alaruses and flying aircraft too.

I don't believe, most people don't believe that the Poseidons are going to be very effective no matter how active it gets.

very hot Soviet silos, but they ought to be able to knock out any addictive Chinese that would be able to.

Well, if we get stellar inertial guidance, we can get down under a thousand feet and become highly compacted.

Your guidance there will go ahead, Admiral Lee.

The last thing I want to say about strategic systems, because I think that's part of the problem, is it starts so that using a surface force is planned in February of 71.

Over on the right, the cost, 22% of the strategic budget for the year 73-77 will provide ballistic missile forces with capabilities to deliver 43% of the equivalent megatons and 73% of the independently targeted weapons as a result of the very high capability of the society.

On chart 13,

I show you just four of 10 charts that I showed last year, which depicts a continuing change in conventional balance.

In the upper left, the 237% shows you that they continue over a five-year period to outbuild us at the rate of about 2.5 in most categories of ships.

In the upper right, their missile platforms have increased fourfold in 10 years.

In the lower left, they have overtaken us in numbers of merchant ships and will indebtedly tonnage shortly.

And over in the lower right, there.

There's the Numenar Grove.

This is all U.S. and not with the British and all the rest at the end.

That is first service.

All the rest is U.S.S.S.R.

However, we'll be showing the outcomes of the drive.

The most worrisome thing of all is their continued submarine force.

This shows you their attack boats without the missile boats.

a three-fold superiority.

They have more nuclear boats than we do, and in 1973 they will have more nuclear boats than the total number of diesel and attack boats that we have.

More ominous still, the lower graph shows you the paranoid levels are rapidly catching up with ours.

We reckon we could kill five to one in the 60s, it's down to something like two to one now, but they're building 12 per year, we're building five per year, so they're overtaken.

Parent number 15, I remind you of what I told you last year, that they have a greater presence in the Mediterranean than we do.

These unsatisfactory trends will worsen in the 73 budget.

On the next slide, number 16, I remind you of, again, the 10-year shift in influence in significant measure as a result of this maritime shift.

And three significant things have happened since you and I were in sixth fleet.

naval-based construction of Mersa Matruh, just next to the Libyan border, a Soviet base, totally under Soviet possession, 15-year base rights to air and sea bases, and then the most uncertainty.

Carat number 17 shows you the ship base and how any nation-country like the United States would allow us to make an election and all of it would be lost in Al-Islam.

One vote.

One member of parliament who apparently won about 10 votes.

We must have a great ambassador there.

Go ahead.

Chariot number 17, the strip days in the Indian Ocean continue to go up for the Soviets and level for us.

Chariot number 18 shows you my forecast of the picture 10 years from now.

Chariot number 18 shows you a situation in which we vary all the way from complete communist orientation in Yemen and Somalia and Egypt

Two.

One, where they've just begun their nibbling is in the Andaman and Nicobar Isles, and in Ceylon, where they just moved in to help with the insurgency, they've taken the first three of the Salami slices in Mauritius.

But in ten years, their medium bombers and their ships operating in those circles will control the Indian Ocean with present terms.

Chart number 19 is probably the most important chart in the book, Mr. President, because it shows you the situation for 1975 as it has been perceived each year since 1967.

Take column A, for example, missile-equipped ships.

In 1967, our intelligence community said that in 75, there would be 58 of them in Soviet possession.

By 1968, we had to revise it upward to 77, and so on.

So that by 71, as we had gotten closer to 75, we see that we had to increase our estimate by 57%.

In the case of the other categories, 26%, 24%.

And only in the case of conventional stuff,

Have we been overestimating?

Now, what has been our response to that, sir?

It's been just the reverse.

Here is our plan for 1975 during each of one of those years.

Let's take a look at one of great concerns of General Chapman, column B.

In 1967, our plan for 1975 in amphibious ships was 137 ships.

By 1968, we had reduced that plan for 1975 to 99 chips.

By 1971, the budget year being presented, we will be down to 41% of what our original plan was.

So in response to each perceived increase for the year 1975, we have reduced our forces

Now, that's made clear in terms of the impact on chart number 21, but to compare a pre-war year, 1965, on the left-hand side with what you will get in the 73 budget on the right-hand side, a 43% reduction in ships, a 21% reduction in aircraft squadrons,

a 15% reduction in military personnel, only in the case of the shore establishment civilian personnel that would fail to take a reduction.

In my judgment, we need to make major reductions there in order to pick up some of the badly needed money to keep ships and aircraft operating.

On chart number 22, I let you see the net effect of our new initiatives and the force reduction.

This shows you what the Navy can do for you.

This is looking at a $79.6 million defense budget.

With regard to that last problem, the one in five chance, before I tell you what we can't do, let me talk about those odds.

Over on page 23, I show you that I consider myself to be your Jimmy DeGreek.

Jimmy DeGreek, in the left-hand side, does these two things.

He makes an analysis of contestants' capabilities,

He looks at the past performance of their teams.

He looks at recent injuries or personnel changes.

And then he uses his relevant experience to integrate it in his mind.

And he comes up with Oz.

Before I relieved Tom Moore, I did the same thing.

And I had come up with Oz using my relevant experience.

And I showed them to you on the chart number 24.

The day I relieved him, I thought we had about a 55% confidence level.

And we proved our deterrence during the subsequent Jordanian crisis.

By this last June, we were down to 45%.

By the end of next June, we will be down to 35%.

I told you 30% a year ago, but you added some chips back in that kicked us back up.

Deterrence is hazarded at that level.

With the budget you're being presented, 20%, 1 in 5, great risk of deterrence.

If they recuded $76 billion budget that comes across, I say don't gamble at all.

Now, in part 25, I show you what we could do in a NATO conflict at various points in time.

In 1970, with the forces you had, you could have met the NATO commitments, provided with your Navy tactical air assistance in Central Europe, supported the NATO flanks with Navy air and amphibious forces, and we could have kept the sea lanes open with losses.

By 1971, it was marginal.

By 1972, it was still worse, as listed in the five criteria there.

And by 1973, with the budget represented, I believe we cannot resist Soviet power in the Pacific.

We cannot control the Med.

We cannot provide any tactical air to NATO because we've got to concentrate our remaining carriers on controlling the sea lines in the center of the Atlantic and Pacific.

And we cannot guarantee the outcome.

Now, what are your Navy capabilities in the early 70s for a non-NATO war at sea with the Soviet Union, such as might eventuate over South Korea or over Israel?

In 1970, we could have backed up the unilateral guarantee.

By 1971, largely blocked.

By 1972, we cannot, in my judgment, guarantee either of those or Japan.

By 1973, we can't come to the assistance of Japan.

I believe we have to abandon the Mediterranean and Western Pacific and concentrate on defense of the continental U.S., Alaska, and Hawaii.

Now, my recapitulation, then, I'll just ask you to read page 27.

Future contingency is more likely to be of the type of which naval power is relevant.

And that result, finally, is the relevant power is or soon will be held by the Soviet Union vote for war fighting and crisis management.

Now what should our relative military priorities be?

On part 28, I show you, obviously we have to have some in each category.

Your duty has to come first.

We've got to be able to control the sea to get into the game.

And the sea control forces, once you have control of the sea, can swing over to projecting their power inland, including the Marines, and then come to the support of our indigenous allies, land-based air and ground forces, or put U.S. forces in if required.

Quiet is priority ordering on chart number 29.

I'd like to emphasize the second point.

Even after the completion of the very fine T-5A aircraft procurement, 94% of the millions of tons that have to go to support our forces or our allies' forces have got to go on the surface of the sea.

Even the aviation gasoline necessary to bring those airlift aircraft home.

Now, sea control further guarantees the survivability of the most important part of our strategic deterrent.

In a conventional war, if we don't have the control of the sea, the Soviets can grind down on those missile submarines and then strike first.

Only at sea might we have to go completely alone.

Wherever else we're fighting overseas, per se, we've got allies with us.

On chart number 30, I summarized what our priorities I believe need to be, a minimum program, providing relevant power for the 70s.

Now I'll enlarge on each of those in the final three slides.

With regard to, for the future, chart number 31,

I am asking, Mr. President, that you add to the Navy share of the $79.6 million, $102 million outlays for new ships, $160 million in outlays for new aircraft.

Among other things, in addition to continuing our existing programs that will permit us to go for a nuclear carrier this year, which I think is terribly important in terms of the signal it's in,

and every three years to keep a minimal force of 12 for a 36-year life, one nuclear for every year, and 100 of these small crafts, which will reduce the average cost of our ships.

For the present, I'm asking that you add to the Navy's share of $79.6 billion enough money to retain

At least the 175th schedule to go out in the present budget.

This will cost $905 million in operating and maintenance and $125 million in public procurement.

And I'm urging that we get base closure authority to pick up the additional money that we would need.

Now, if we got all that, the Navy fraction of the budget would go from 27.4% to 28.7%.

Part number 32, I talked about how we can increase our capability by employment of forces.

We need to hold port overseas, conventional carrier task forces.

This will let us do with a lesser number of carriers as we come down with mirrors what we're now doing with a larger number of carriers.

It improves our posture overseas and gives us the capability to reinforce with two more carriers than we could otherwise reinforce with if we hadn't come forward.

And it improves the retention of our personnel.

To back these conventional carrier task forces up, we need the two nuclear carrier task forces on the continental coast of the United States in each ocean.

The fourth nuclear carrier we're asking for this year would give us that capability.

On slide number 33, I try to sum all this up by correlating what I believe you are trying to do with what I believe to be the relevant maritime power required to do it.

I list in column A on the left your new initiatives.

I believe that in order for the outcome of these initiatives to be favorable to the United States,

There's a very high correlation between what happens there and the deteriorating probabilities of success over in the black column C, which I've plotted over a four-budget year period.

Now, these expectations of war outcomes mean far more than just a theoretical war with the Soviet Union.

Note the use of the word expectation.

The Kremlin is doing similar calculations.

The naval odds makers in NATO are doing similar calculations.

I spoke of my recent trip where the NATO nations, Spain and Sweden, are clearly doing these kinds of calculations.

What this means is that the whole ambiance here within which you're trying to accomplish your initiatives is being changed rapidly.

The temptation for the Soviets to hold out for a better and better deal on SALT and the pressures on you to settle for a lesser and lesser deal on SALT and MDFR and in the Mideast are getting greater.

There is a decreasing inclination on the part of Moscow and Peking with its 73 pledges.

to work with us to resolve the conflict in Southeast Asia, or to follow up on any initiatives you take after your trip to Communist China.

There will be continued erosion of the NATO flanks, which is where NATO is being broken up, one arm at a time.

If the 73 budget is not increased for the Navy, Mr. President, in my judgment, you'll find an increasing percentage of your time in the middle column, in the crisis management section.

Not only will you be in it more often, but the circumstances under which you will have to resolve it will be increasingly less favorable, because you will face the alternative of losing the war if you carry out beyond the bluff stage.

I urge, therefore, that the $1.3 billion in expenditures be added in order to drive us back up in that black, closer to the 50% line, in order that you will have the minimum capability to accomplish your new initiative and not spend your time in the crisis.

Now, the final slide, chart number 34, Mr. President, tells me that you have integrated all this very much, as Jimmy agreed, in your mind, because you gave this in an off-the-cuff press conference a year and a month ago.

This says to me that you're aware of the fact that the tremendous ground forces of China do represent a certain deterrent in NATO center.

And that that $1.3 billion that I'm asking for is more than just a linchpin to add force levels to the Navy or hold force levels to the Navy.

It is what will provide to our allies the reassurance that we will control the seas, that we can bring naval airstrikes up on the flanks.

that we will have the amphibious power to get there to help them, so that such countries as Turkey and Greece will continue to control the Dardanelles for us, such countries as Denmark will control the Baltic, and such countries as Norway and Iceland will continue to help us control the GIEK.

Thanks.

Now we go to the Marines.

I'll be very brief.

As of currently, we are out of Vietnam.

Oh, when we come back, we're out.

We deactivated the several temporary wartime units, and we're down very close to our full peacetime strength, which is 26,000.

That's enough to land the three-division wing teams in an excellent strength.

And the three divisions and wing are all back at their home bases, and we've resumed our traditional role of force and readiness.

We come out of Vietnam with new and modern equipment, both air and ground, and successfully re-equipping.

It was very modern.

Did we learn something from Vietnam?

Each war is supposed to teach us something.

I mean, in terms of the new and modern equipment, it was interesting to me.

The Army and the Air Force, we learned a few things.

The helicopter became a base.

We were able to introduce electronics on the battlefield.

Of course, it's a special kind of war, I suppose.

That's why you didn't learn a hell of a lot about the war with the Soviets, but you might have learned something.

We might have learned something about other things.

Well, I think a lot of lessons learned are transferable to, um... You knew one, Mr. Gerold?

Oh, yes, sir.

I have that one.

Which we made a little practice.

Yes, sir.

It's a foreign point.

combat experience.

One of the points I wanted to make is that we have come out of Vietnam, we have come out of Memphis, we have come out of that crisis in the region, combat experience.

Yes, sir.

And we all have.

With regard to the New and Modern Quilt, I might just say in passing that I think our biggest problem is not to learn how to use all this gear we have.

We've certainly got the very best air and ground.

We've got major efforts going on.

Currently, we have two-thirds of a division and two-thirds of a wing on Okinawa and even in Japan.

They're forward deployed and they're fully combat ready.

We have a division of wing on the east coast in the Carolinas, and they're ready.

Now, the division in Hamilton and the wing at El Toro and the other third of the Westpac out there, which is in Hawaii, they're not fully ready now.

They have all their supplies and equipment, but they just came out of Vietnam, and it's going to be another two, three months before we get them fully combat ready.

We've got all the necessary resources.

We've got another emergency that's a question of distributing it.

In an emergency between now and that point, we could strip the rest of the Marine Corps and go out in a few days and have that one third division wing team fully ready.

With regard to the reserve division wing and the reserve, they're fully ready.

They can mobilize as a portal combat in 60 days.

However, I might point out that we saw some panoramas on the wall in the month of July.

We made only 55% of our recruiting quarters.

I have a question.

Personally, 55% is very close.

During the month of July?

We made our active duty quarters very close.

a little hard, but to return.

He is the fool.

And, uh, there's no other else.

I've personally verified our state of residence during recent trips, particularly to the western Pacific.

So I can assure you that we're in good shape and ready to fight.

Our biggest problem is that the Navy doesn't have the amphibious ships.

It's been together since.

Only by pooling all the amphibious ships in one ocean is it sufficient for one big wing team to be put together.

Turning then to FY73, our portion of the $789.6 billion.

will require us to reduce about 20,000 frames from 206 to 186.

As a result, we will have to category 27 rifle companies.

That's one for the TAC.

And categories from 128 operational aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopters,

And these were redundant.

We've cut into our muscle.

And that's where, of course, where the fighting is done by the rifle companies who are supporting aircraft.

It'll cost $178 million to restore those 20,000 Marines and the 27 rifle companies in the aircraft.

That's relatively few dollars for a considerable amount of combat power.

But in any event, it's spread out.

I can assure you that we're ready.

Even though each battalion would be inside the three, under the 7.9.6, would be reduced by one company, and it's supporting Air France.

The three divisions and wings do constitute a powerful air-ground forces that are soon to be disposed.

These forces are and they will be fully prepared on short notice to go wherever the president requires with the Navy.

conducted full spectrum of operations were involved in the fight.

Mel, could I ask one thing?

If you don't mind hearing me.

Connelly is going off and going to Texas, I think, today.

In terms of the budget.

two that I'd like to have hear this briefing, just as they gave it here at the Navy briefing, Schultz and Harkin.

Could you arrange, well, it would have been, and I know it's hard to get this group together, but I think if, those two particularly, are there others that haven't received the film?

You have to sit and talk about that budget.

I mean, George also set the budget in the office of the treasurer, whether it be the open tax and so forth.

Could you arrange to have two of them get it, sit here and get the same briefing, two chapters?

Could you do that?

I do think we all get together to do it.

I think it's very important.

I'd like to have them have that before.

It's very important.

The Treasury's got to sit in on this basic decision.

You know, just as the Director of the Budget, the Vice President, myself, and that's about it, you know, in terms of the as well as the national events.

They don't have it.

Right.

I mean, Rogers.

Well, they haven't had much of this in the DP.

That's why he's got it in other ways.

All right.

So that he just doesn't approach us from the standpoint of the money.

Well, we work on it.

We work on it from time to time.

And I want them to be the same frame of reference as the rest of us, as the three of us.

I want all of them to have the same frame of reference when we talk about the defense budget.

Henry, do you see my point?

I'll be able to add to that if you can.

The other point that it needs to be made is two other points.

One, I'm referring to what Admiral Goodman said about

about the credibility of NATO and the credibility of the Soviets.

I think more importantly here, Rose, at this point, is the Soviets are about to jump us, any more than we're about to jump them.

more important than either of those is what it means to such jackass places as India, as frankly Japan, the mid-eastern area, Latin America, and the rest.

The real big question we've been facing here for the last three years since we've been here

is whether the United States can have an effective foreign policy.

Nixon doctrine and all that sort of thing.

Can we have an effective foreign policy and not have

what a credible defense posture.

Now, there are many that think we can.

It's a great question in my mind as to whether we can.

I'm not referring to a credible defense posture regarding the Soviets.

that can be handled, although Henry, I would say that if it's Chinese, wouldn't about be interested in having talks with a power that they thought was not going to be around three, four years from now.

It's an incredible power against the Soviets.

Absolutely.

That's what...

We have to be present at the rest of the Pacific.

That's right.

In Japan, the same problem.

In Japanese, they're practically pathological at the moment, I would say.

Right?

So which way to turn?

I'm wondering, it isn't a question just to withdraw Vietnam, which is happening, withdrawing from Asia and so forth and others.

That's fine.

And this is where the presence, the appearance,

It's so important.

It's just, by the way, important.

I'd have to .

With regard to the Navy, I was, I've been reading some rather disturbing stuff when I was walking through the Navy, and it was out there in the sixth .

I don't really like it with regard to Navy, because our real problem is not the numbers of ships and so forth and so on, but the fact that the Soviet Navy is beating out the submarines and so forth.

Their services are modern, awesome, effective weapons.

And I'll give you that.

Like, there's cruisers with apparently some sort of, you know,

We have steps underway both

defensive capability and offensive capability to make up this difference.

And I think we have at the moment done an excellent job of putting this together.

And that is an important issue.

And it's, in my view, it's more important that we keep up that effort than we add additional ships or get some of these ships back.

But some of these ships are old World War II ships that are not capable in relation to the rest of modern ships.

It's extremely important that we keep the efforts that are now underway

to develop a defense against these surface-to-surface missiles that the Soviets have, and to develop our own ability with surface-to-surface missiles.

And this program, I'm satisfied, is going along about as well as it could be.

And we have a significant effort to include it in the 73 projects where that works.

Mr. President, as you know, I've been in the Pacific three times in the past few years.

And I've had a chance to talk to a lot of our friends there.

It's important to this point of diplomatic credibility that you've been so occupied with is underscored in importance over there.

And the real test of diplomatic credibility may not come with the larger and more potent nations because

What a Lee Kuan Yew does when he talks around the world, what Tai do, or some lesser country, often affects the intelligence evaluations of the great powers.

And I'm afraid I have to report to you based on my conversations that I've had over there.

feeling that we are losing diplomatic credibility.

I don't believe that these friends of ours really think that the path we're going can allow us to maintain a credible deterrent in their minds as they reflect this in their conversations around the world.

It has to be an ingredient in the intelligence evaluation of our potential enemies.

And this disturbs me greatly because

Some of these people look at you and say, well, we understand you're just getting out of this.

Prime Minister Lee is one of those very frank people who says, well, we know you're going in, but don't tell me you're going to stay around.

Mr. President, I got the same thing, almost the same comment you just made.

What time is it over?

Prime Minister Sato, when I was in Japan in January, and then for Frankel, when I was in Spain, I was in Japan.

What did the Prime President say about that?

I got it from Frank.

Thank you.

That is what we're doing, and I think we just might as well come right out and say it.

I know it's hard for some people to say it, but I just continue to say that we're going to maintain our presence in Asia, and you can get a lot of help for doing it, but you've got to be for maintaining it, and that's what mixed action is all about.

We're going to have to come back out of Asia.

If we put them at the budgetary levels, they don't believe it.

Peter, I'd like to ask you a question.

No, they wouldn't.

I don't think so.

No.

I answered the question right now.

I just don't think the Congress is about to vote any new taxes.

I don't think so.

I believe it will come within a year to 18 months.

I agree with you.

I'm afraid I don't agree with you.

I don't know.

I think our opponents have learned the value of erosion and not stirring the water.

It's not the same.

They've come to our rescue a number of times.

Mr. President, I think the presentation of the budget made it particularly applicable to Asia.

It's clear that people are going to have an appreciation about our presence.

The air presence is a difficult one to maintain.

We can maintain it, of course, in Taiwan.

We have it there.

We have it presently in Okinawa.

We have it presently in Thailand.

We may have trouble as far as maintaining the Taiwan presence and maintaining the Okinawa presence in Japan and Thailand.

Thailand looks like a pretty good spot for us for some time.

But the naval presence there is one that can be maintained.

And our ground force capability is really almost down to very little anyway as far as Asia is concerned.

We'll have one Marine division in Okinawa.

We'll have either a division and a third in the Army.

That's all we have.

That division will either be in Korea or in Hawaii.

So your presence as ground presence already is down to almost nothing.

We have the ground presence, which we will continue to have there in Hawaii, and the green division that will be in Okinawa.

That's about all we have.

But the Navy thing is coming down there.

And the Air Force, they will also have to come down.

Well, it's also the military that's going to be stuck in this map.

It's not only the situation there, it's the Indian Ocean.

You talk to those people, they're all very disturbed about the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean.

And, as we all know, I agree that it's disturbing.

But when you look at the Mideast, it's just...

You talk about the Jordanian crisis.

You can talk all we want, Mr. President.

I am a great believer in the importance of sea power and to demonstrate it, but if we move out all our visible ground presence out of the Pacific, we are not going to convince anybody that we are going to do it with sea power.

Well, we've already done that though.

Well, if we continue what we're doing, we cannot do it with mirrors.

If the Japanese see us getting out of Korea, if Korea forms it after, if all that stands between an aggressor is that we might or might not intervene or receive power, then in the judgment of the people, they will never probably get a chance to make the test because they're adjusted.

So I will take that.

We need a balance between some physical ground presence and all the sea lift and carrier presence that Bud is talking about.

But I don't think we can do it with the sea power alone.

Well, I think you have to have air power too, Henry.

But we've already made the decision on the land forces.

We're already down to one division as far as the Marines are concerned, forward deployed.

And we don't have the capability of more than one and a third as far as the Army is concerned right now.

That's all we have.

But this is an issue that's going to come out of the NGP.

But if we go down as soon as the division of Korea, some of these projections say... Well, if we go to a third of the division then, then you'd have to build up the full division in Hawaii.

We don't say that.

There's another factor in this, and that is what we can do in America.

We can keep some air power in Korea.

That will serve as getting to the Mediterranean.

Unless we can maintain either our friendship with the Greeks and the Turks or maintain some air power on that side of the Mediterranean, you're not going to be able to operate in there.

So I think we have to look at air power as an important complement to our sea power in these areas we're involved in.

And however, even to make our commitment now, as far as Europe is concerned, I personally believe we have to keep the 13th Division force.

That is related to our Asian requirement.

It's related to the commitment which we already presently have as far as your business is concerned.

Well, it's related to our ability to meet worldwide standards.

Mr. President, the discussion, particularly about the Western City, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, I think points out the importance of moving out as fast as we can with respect to the TTPI.

I know that I can be a favorite of Ambassador Lee and Ambassador Hummel.

I think they're very important because you might

My house has only two.

We've never needed a bread and egg docker.

That's very true.

No worries.

And we're getting those idiot meat store people out there.

Let me say, it's a very good presentation.

It's all good.

Because we have some encouraging questions.

We're not all on the same side.

It's a tough fight.

It's a tough fight in terms of where the bucket is.

And then we come down to the key question.

In order to get what we need, we need more connections.

American people are going to have to face up to that.

Who knows?

We may have to face up to that at some point.

Because what is happening, what's leading us to lie, it isn't just in the service, but in all through the government, it's personnel.

Personnel costs roar after.

And we get that little fork.

Mr. President, we had these other programs too, and I don't know whether we'll talk about this in the National Security Council, but we had to make a science

on other costs that I have to sign here that most people don't even understand.

Not only the NRO, which is our total settlement program, which is a very important program.

Some people have somehow or other, some other person's budget.

I have to sign the Air Force, and I have to sign the CIA budget, too.

And I don't get into that normally before the National Security Council, but as you know, all those things have to be buried in our budget.

And, uh, we haven't addressed those things that have been hidden in our budget today, but, uh, we don't normally, but the Air Force bears the greatest load on those assigned costs.

Well, that's probably what this does to me.

Another bow.

Now you're off to the ferry.

No, we've got to get down on this whole defense thing to a degree where the real question is how low American defense is.

and cut the mess in peacetime.

It would still be credible in foreign policy, but that's the real question.

And the other point that you have made is that we all are in the same place.

The other point is that you're, which I know you all have, and you're at about 55% of the truth.

I know that the services have money.

Terrible problem.

How do we maintain morale in armed services and peace?

That's a really big job.

I don't think we think about all these other things.

I think being able to maintain morale and getting good men to come in.

Take a look at it next, at the end of the week.

Thank you, sir.

Thank you.

Well, you've all been doing a lot of overtime on the rest of the...

I really like that thing about the description of one of these people.

I appreciate it.

Thank you.

Go ahead.

.