On September 24, 1971, Manolo Sanchez [?] and unknown person(s) met in the Cabinet Room of the White House at an unknown time between 9:53 am and 3:15 pm. The Cabinet Room taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 077-006 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Yeah, man.
They just want to read it.
They can't go.
I have to look it up.
You know the thing about it is, you're deaf, and I'm just jacked, and there's no way to talk to you about it.
I don't have a chance.
I can't use your good money to see you, it's pretty good.
I can't.
I understand you and I are both the president and the lead of Palo Alto City.
Yeah, yeah.
Where and when?
A few seconds ago or something.
It was in San Francisco.
Any reason to accept it?
No.
I'm here to address the police chief's confession.
Oh, yeah, yeah.
So I figured I'll lay out a couple of others.
Well, it's hometown.
It's a city.
Yes.
Well, it's a group of gentlemen because it's a whole band of city council, fire chiefs, police chiefs, city managers, auditors, and so on.
Very large and very influential group.
Did you see the full page ad in the Times just wondering about it?
Oh, I had it.
You see?
We will avenge them.
That's the big thing.
We'll avenge them.
Nobody seems to recall that these guys are there by definition because they're a bunch of convicts.
It's unbelievable that they have their mind to that.
That particular thing has been crazy.
Overwhelmed.
It's kind of beautiful today.
I was thinking the other day about a modern-day steward.
Guess what it is?
A long-time page-handler, but modern.
That's very good.
You have more plans, troubles,
I mean, where are they this time?
Connecticut and someplace else.
Arizona.
So the thing is now that in both states, the courts, the circuit courts of appeals have, I think it's named, our rulings in the states where it applies itself.
But the states appear not to be about to do anything about it.
As I feel it, the Supreme Court in Connecticut has been talking about doing so on a serious day.
We call this meeting this morning for a special purpose, and it will be a brief meeting, but a very important one.
Next week, you know that many of you members of the staff will be present with various affairs that are labeled, referenced, and forecasted.
to say, I know everybody will be extremely careful about what we're going to do about the surcharge, what we're going to do about the international monetary situation, our attitudes on all these things.
Generally, we need to be careful for two reasons.
One, because it's why it's essential to us to trade, to us to think about it.
But the other point is that
It's very important to have a united front.
Now, that doesn't mean that with any of the councils in the administration, we are not having very, very extended discussions.
with regard to what moves, positives, may, for example, at this meeting, John and Mark and I are going to meet to talk a little about some of these things.
But in terms of the present situation with all these tourists that's coming in here,
And also they're going to be trying very hard to find any way
We don't want to give them that opportunity in order to find that connection to before
But we were very stubborn because we didn't make a deal.
uh it's very easy to go abroad and then of course they call that a success uh right at this point we are being delivered for a very very good reason we don't want to get rid of what is a temporary surcharge
We don't want to do that and go back to another temporary system with a breakdown just like the old temporary system.
The old system, which was supposed to be temporary, turned out to be temporary and did break down.
This is a time now that we have taken.
They accept that we have taken.
not to be belligerent, to be conciliatory, to be forthcoming, but to be extremely firm, just as firm as we expect our foreign friends to be, the Japanese are being tough as they can be.
They want to make the best possible bargain they can.
There was a time, 25 years ago, 15 years ago, even 10 years ago, in the United States for the Corps to get us started with.
We can't anymore.
At this time, we've got to make the best possible deal we can for our ends.
And for that reason, I see last week's exercise as a necessary first step
and setting the tone for what must now come, meetings at the IMF level, meeting with the group of 10, and then the negotiations over a period of time, out of which we trust will develop some changes in their approach to us,
not only the monetary front, the trade front, even the furniture front.
And as they change, so will we change.
So, having given my own general feeling, I'd like to have John take over here and express any views that he has on that.
And then if Mark or others would like to follow up.
Well, Mr. President, I think it's important to emphasize one further point that you've made so clear to me.
We have to be outgoing as far as our trade partners are concerned, but at the same time realize that the two most important single things that we're appealing to the American public
in the announcement of August 15th, was number one, the 10% cut in foreign aid and the imposition of 10% in the import surcharge.
So that obviously gives back to the international monetary policy.
as the President pointed out, to please your domestic constituents.
But at the same time, this import surcharge is indeed a symbolic thing, as far as the American people are concerned.
They're trying to be sure that they get a fair shake in the future, and trade things they don't think they have.
The American views are one thing, perhaps their views are something else, but nevertheless, they hold very strongly those views.
And to get back to the situation which we found ourselves in London and which we'll find ourselves here, Mr. President, the smart trading partners are understandably aligned against us in solving the problem.
Uh, not, there is not many Americans, but the actors are not.
Uh, they, uh, they're just trying to, uh, to keep them giving more than they have to give.
Uh, so they're all on one side and we're on the other side.
Now that's going to be true when we get 120 nations here with, uh, 1,500, 2,000 people, uh, all over this town.
Their attitude is going to be the same for different reasons.
The Latin Americans, uh,
take a decision that they'll not have the import surcharge applied to them at all, because they're less developed.
So they're univited.
For that reason, what they like to say, they abolish their protest to the government and send foreign aid.
They think this is in their country.
So we'll get that in the less developed countries from the principal trading partners.
We'll obviously get to you.
That's all in front of opposition.
Now, our trading partners are going to want to take us back to fixing change rates just as soon as they can, with as little realignment of rates as they can.
But in our judgment, now, this is not in our interest to do that.
Now, this is not to say that we want others to go back to fixing change rates.
But we obviously can't go back until you decide, Mr. President, what you want to do.
But as you indicated here before, you don't want to go back to the same system.
You're not going to go back to the same system.
I don't want anybody here that thinks we can go back to the same system of convertibility of the dollars and gold as we had and make it work.
There's basically four points.
that we're going to be concerning ourselves with.
And there are many, many variations of those four.
But the other nations are going to insist in a solid and single voice that we
We remove the 10% import surcharge immediately.
This is a condition preceding the beginning of realignment.
Secondly, they question the extent of the realignment that we say we have to have.
uh they say the united states has to participate it has to contribute to the solution of this problem and the only way we can do it is to defaz the dollar by changing the price of gold so at least the european community is solid on that the germans think that's less really they don't really care about gold they don't they've never held them they're asking some gold dollars but nevertheless
to keep peace and harmony in the European community, they joined in best demand that we maintain the price of gold.
Now, the fourth critical item is the spending realignment.
How much realignment is there between the dollar and the various currencies?
Who gives?
Who makes up this $13 billion swing that we think we have to have in order to have any trading factor at all in our balance of payments?
Well, the Japanese obviously don't want to take up all the slack, and the Germans sure don't, and the French don't, and the British don't, so they've all got trade among themselves.
Yet they all want to talk about doing it on a multilateral, national basis.
They were wondering that this has been their song from the outset.
They want to talk about it on a bilateral basis like this.
Yet it is significant.
that the breakup of the London meetings, we began to get some conversation on a bilateral basis.
It is suggested that the deputies,
all over the Los Angeles group all here this morning.
And the deputy ministers of the G10 group will meet on Saturday to try to prepare an agenda, a work program for the ministers, the ministers and governors of the G10 meeting on Sunday.
I don't anticipate much will come of this, but to me, we're holding bilateral meetings with our principal
the Treasury Department for Japan, Germany, and Italy.
And Italy is important in this particular case because the finance minister is chairman of the Group of States.
He's kind of the spokesman for the hard core of the European community.
We're also going to meet with Brazil.
The British are taking the line, and it's a very hard line, that the European community wants them to take.
They're more outspoken, they're more demanding than any other country in the conference.
And I think that's going to be true until they get into that European community.
They're not going to take any position that shows any difference with France or the other countries that could possibly stop them.
So I don't anticipate that we're going to achieve a great deal, but it is important that we realize that even among the less developed countries,
that this town is going to be as good as the president pointed out for the next week.
And they're going to try to pick up every point of difference, every indicator of being within our ranks to see really how strong we are in our party in position.
And we're going to continue to be under great pressure.
The president alluded to Tom Madu's statements this morning.
Mr. Trudeau had a statement that was equally
critical of us, and this is going to happen.
Every one of them is critical of the United States.
Trudeau said, we don't care about the Canadians.
We just disregard them.
We give all we want and leave them with their raw material.
It's a pure, demagogic, political statement for home consumption.
So we're going to get that from every country in the world.
And I don't know what we can do about it.
We're going to get blamed for being intransigent.
but if we really want to reshape the system,
international monetary structure, which I think we have to do, and I don't believe anybody doesn't think we have to do it, then we're going to have to be fairly tough in our claims.
And as the President said, we have to be, we don't have to be nasty or mean.
We have to be firm, and we have to be solid in our views and clear differences.
There are moments we have to fight out in our own ranks and present a solid front to the other nations of the world now.
We're trying to keep everybody informed.
Pete Peterson's been having meetings the last two or three days almost on the hour.
Paul Volcker Group has been speaking.
We're doing our utmost to keep everybody informed about what is going on because, and I would hope during this next eight days, that in the contacts that you have with people that you realize that we also need intelligence.
And we ought to get it to Bill Rogers.
We ought to get it to me.
We ought to get it to Arthur Barnes or somebody who's in these negotiations.
They need to pick up anything, either from the principal trading countries or the less developed countries.
Because as Bill knows so much better than I,
It's frequently what do these countries pick up at cocktail parties or dinners, a little whisper to size, and do they put more weight behind or pay more attention to food than a 30-minute speech?
Because they think they really get, and they may well be part of that, but they think they're really getting the inside note, and they don't think they're going to get it.
Prayer text.
That's right.
I thought it was somewhat helpful, he said at the monetary front, he said we ought to make a legally search, and I'm going to have lunch with Schumann today, and I'm going to point that out.
We agree with him.
He used that word.
He used that word, and I thought it was quite helpful.
Our position has such a different view today.
I mean, we have different points of view, but our attitudes on monetary situations are the same.
Don't, the main thing is for us not to become concerned about all the rifle fire and so forth that comes on now about the fact that the United States is being too stubborn and that we lose our leadership on the ground and so forth and so on.
Bill, you'll remember these cases.
I remember the fellowships, also the combat trips.
The crisis of the New York Times and Washington Post has been a terrible failure.
Terrible failure.
That was an invader.
Elvis just didn't give the point away.
And eventually, of course, it came out pretty well.
It made pretty good deals.
We have a situation right now where it will be contended that because we don't quickly
to not only what our European and Japanese friends want, but what their supporters in the New York financial community want.
That we are failing.
That is right.
We may be failing for doing what they want, but we're succeeding in doing what our interests dictate and what they demand.
And John could not be more right in another respect.
He says there is a strong feeling in this country which could grow into a rather better destructive isolationist if they are not convinced that we are going to end American interests.
appealing for quotas, appealing for territory, appealing for cutting off aid, appealing for requiring others to, particularly the Japanese and the Germans, to assume the major burden for their own defense.
I mean, we do what they pay.
This is something that you find out in the country among great numbers of people.
You won't see it in your D.C. papers, because basically they're a far area of the other way.
And actually, to see a fellow like George Ball racing out on this plane wouldn't be, God, he recommends the Japanese government, or Japanese interest, should I say.
and so consequently comes to me as a former Undersecretary of State, he says, oh, isn't that terrible what we've done to the Japanese?
Well, he goddamn O'Berry won't get a $100,000 fee.
Whatever he's getting.
So what I mean is that there are great interests running beneath it here.
I've had several of the New York bankers come down and pitifully, oh, you've got to do this, you've got to do that.
And of course, they want to go back to the same system, which they've made a lot of money on before.
And they don't like this uneasiness.
They don't like this feeling of instability, this uncertainty.
It's all just too much.
We don't ask for it.
We don't want it.
But we have to realize that right now, we're going to have to take some peace.
And we're going to have to take our time.
And let me say, we're not going to be in a purely defensive position.
We will make some positive moves.
Those moves must be made centrally.
For example, at the IMF, I am going to...
address them, I'm going to give a reception for the major participants.
John will make a statement, but they will do the speech.
Probably, if you don't speak first, I'll probably speak on Tuesday.
I'll speak early.
If you do speak, I'll speak probably on Thursday.
But if you don't, I'll speak Tuesday.
You just say that.
Right.
I don't want to get out there and I think it's best to float one out at this point to make sure it's better quality.
I am not pessimistic about how it's going to come out in the end.
I think it's going to take some time.
But I think in the end, we can well come out with a much more healthy situation than we've had previously because our memories are very short.
Let us not forget that the international monetary system that we found when we came here produced, while we've been here, four international prices and an average of about one every quarter.
about twice a year.
Now, that kind of a situation is not one that we can continue to live with.
And it's one that we have to face up to.
It's one that we have to face up to.
It's one that we're prepared to deal with.
And to deal with this absolute
certainly fairness, fair, free trade, but on the other hand, an absolute purpose to the bargaining position.
I think the thing that both our European and Japanese friends do not recognize is that the game has changed as far as we're concerned.
It has changed very drastically.
The time in the United States could afford to be, I repeat,
as generous as it once was, is past.
And it is not going to return again.
This is something to cry about.
And we're still doing very well internally.
But in terms of our international relationship, they're all grown up.
They're big boys now.
And we've got to deal with them on that new basis.
And they must deal with us on that new basis.
Now, having said all that, that's got to be our focus must you let us also recognize in this room
that the United States is the only country in the free world that still has the capacity to lead.
None of the others have.
And no matter how rich the Japanese become, or the Germans become, or the United Europe becomes, they will not lead.
The United Europe will be united economically and be a political people in terms of ability to lead and get together and everything.
They have to get together.
And so here's where the foreign policy comes in.
One of the reasons we're going to have to pay, and we will, some price in terms of helping to work on the system is that it is essential that we not allow these economic differences
fragmentize and shatter the whole free world political alliance.
That could happen.
I don't think it will.
And as far as they're concerned, I think we can put it this way.
We've all been to these international meetings, particularly where the Europeans are concerned.
We can say it to a certain extent about the Japanese.
And over and over again, a crime minister, or a foreign minister, or a defense minister, Dave, will say, oh, gee, we're all with you.
We believe that we ought to strengthen NATO, for example.
We believe that we ought to take a strong line with regard to future balance of our direction.
Or we believe that we ought to do this and that.
But we can't do it because of our domestic political situation.
Now, of course, we have a domestic political situation here, too.
But at least the United States still is strong enough that we can exert some leadership.
And as long as we have that position, we have the responsibility to do it, because we know nobody else is going to do it if we don't.
That's why we can't.
We can't, frankly, let's put it quite bluntly, be as irresponsible as they have been and are going to be.
We have to be responsible.
But having put that as our first line and our last line of defense, within that area of responsibility, we in the same boat have to recognize that if only in the United States a sound and strong economic can continue to lead,
a United States that becomes weak economically, or vulnerable economically, will not leave.
The American people will turn inward quicker than to make their heads spin.
And that's the reason why these steps, these steps, which have been rather traumatic for our friends abroad, and for that matter, for us, the people of the International Center, these steps are actually going to be essential
in terms of our long-range goal of the United States continuing to lead the free world both economically and politically.
Because only as we strengthen our own political situation and economic situation
Are we going to be able to develop a sound base in which any American president will be able to lead the American people in a posture of being forthcoming in terms of reducing trade barriers, forthcoming with regard to meeting commitments with regard to free work and so forth down the line?
It's a delicate line because I would just emphasize the conclusions.
Running beneath the surface at the present time in this country, growing out of a number of factors, the frustration over the Vietnam War, the frustration over some of the problems in the embassy, et cetera, the situation with regard to the economic problems we've had, the fact that some American engineers have become non-profits,
We've got to get dropped out of the race now in terms of commercial air transport.
And we no longer, we still don't, we'll be second to steel rather than first.
So I'm down the line.
For these reasons and others, there is a, there is,
a very dangerous and significant economic and political isolation is growing in this country.
And the way that we have to deal with that is not to get up and preach about it.
Preach just so long.
It's not going to do any good.
Everybody's going to go out and sit again.
But the point is, what we have to do is to get at the heart of the problem.
And the heart of the problem at the moment
Is this economic problem that great numbers of Americans are concerned about, concerned about not only in the business community, but in the business community as well?
because they don't want to compete with what they deal with.
So I say these things only to indicate that our position has not taken any sense of anger or any sense of defeatism, any sense of frustration, but it's taken because of our long-range view
that we've got to take this patient, the American child, which is so strong that it has some kind of temporary viral infection.
We've got to cure it so that it can be strong enough that it can still support an outgoing leadership position in the foreign policy.
I think I agree with what you just said.
I realize that this
put a small three for showing sympathy for Latin America.
They really, by and large, I think probably suffered the most.
And they've, by and large, they've been very cooperative.
And the first thing we can do is put them up.
And I think we want to sort of pat them on the back and generally understand their plight.
I think one thing that should be quite out of order, if you don't mind,
With regard to the third tax, it cannot be made selective.
In other words, the Latin Americans raised the point, they said, well, why don't you take us out and take Canada out and so forth.
It would be very nice if we did make it selective, because I understand that, John, that's a direct violation of GAAP, correct?
Yes, sir, it would create real problems, real criticism for ourselves and for the world.
Well, depending on what progress we make, you know, that's the road that's open to me.
I wouldn't open it up to them right now, no.
I'm just talking about explaining the fact that we understand how difficult it is for them.
And actually, in many cases, it doesn't have that.
But actually, probably the commercial impact isn't too great in most Latin American countries, but it's the psychological impact and the things that we've promised and we've just haven't done.
Well, in Mexico, they are hurting.
Well, in Mexico, we promised them, you know, we made a preference, and we said, we have a central legislature, and we promised that a full program would happen.
Now, they've been pretty good about it, they've been pretty understanding, but they're hurt more than anything else, and we can just talk to them.
in a friendly way, so if there's nothing we can do now, we hope we can later.
It's something just to give them a little feeling that they're our friends and like our group.
Because I think that's the point.
You know, I'm very tired of her making that speech to me.
And I'm very impressed with what she did.
I promise I'll listen to you.
Years ago, I can give an adaption about it.
I went to the last meeting last year, and I didn't say anything.
But they said the legislation, they said it was made back.
They didn't say anything.
They didn't say anything.
It wasn't part of their logic.
I think we should recognize that time is going to become a very big lever for us as we move ahead.
And it may be that if we just play this carefully, it takes more time.
The time will build up some economic pressures that will give you some more flexibility.
You might be able to do something like a surcharge or aid or something.
But time is going to be a real lever because I believe that, on our side, it's money.
So it will cause some pressures that are going to build up economically in Europe and in Japan.
And if we just start to do less of a hurry,
We've got a big lever on our side to get all the way on the end.
Would you explain for us why the leverage is more on our side than theirs?
I don't have a specific question, but I think it's good for us to know.
It probably does give us a good answer to it.
No, it's not the same.
I mean...
There's a good many of our friends in Europe, and in particular, are much more dependent upon international trade than we are.
And it's going to begin to have an impact on their economy in a larger, more significant way.
And I think the trade is a far bigger proportion of their GNP than trade bigger dollars.
And this is the leverage we have.
So if we just take a little time on this, then I've got a couple of rounds of almost anything within the week that might be
I'll take automobile because Sturtex hasn't even hit imports yet.
It won't hit imports in automobile until around the first of the year.
Because the pipeline's full of stuff that can't go through.
But it's the uncertainty of the driving situation that's going to be a very important factor.
So I know if we go a little too fast then we can be careful about what we're doing.
The other point that should be borne in mind, which is extremely interesting to me,
We have in mind the fact that 30% of all Japan's exports are sold in the United States.
And the United States is the biggest market in the world.
Everybody wants to get into the United States.
Now that's the important factor.
We talk about where do they want to sell.
I'm sure they'd like to sell to mainland China or Czechoslovakia or Romania or...
Latin America, this is the market, this is the place.
I think that's the, it's not that they're actually what they want.
And also the uncertainty in exchange rate is going to hold back transactions.
People are not going to make commitments until they see where they come out.
And so this is going to provide a short-term impact.
There's going to be businesses in trouble in the United States soon.
So last night, I was in Italy when the steel industry was almost at a halt already for this very reason.
Well, to prove your point, Dave, 26% of the Japanese, I mean, the Canadian GDP is actually Irish-born.
We take 66 to 30% of all of the Canadian exports.
We take 70% of Mexico.
We take 30% of Japan, and so on.
They have to have this market.
So when you hear all this talk about trade war, we're gonna precipitate a trade war, I don't believe that.
I just don't believe that the key to have a trade war with us, they have to have this market.
And our export finishes, as I say, 4% of our total GNP.
This is the lowest mid-industrialized nation in the world.
They can't compete on that basis.
They can't have a trade war with us unless they just lose their senses completely.
Now that would mean that we lose our equilibrium and we're a total hazard.
We're over the demand.
But nevertheless, the only point I make is that we are basically a medium of choice.
We're in a position to get a lot of things because we have a long time.
We'll have to go ahead and build off two or three years to get rid of those temporary restrictions that they put on when we entered that automobile agreement six years ago.
But now I think we can.
By tomorrow night, we want it.
We have to realize one other thing incidentally.
We're now speaking of the international political situation.
Incidentally, this is true of almost every nation in the world.
Again, it shows the luxury of being the responsibility.
Virtually every nation in the world is highly popular amongst very few to take on the United States.
I mean, it doesn't mean that it can control the situation.
more people before the United States than against it.
But on the other hand, when Pompeo speaks to the United States, he appeals to a certain jingoistic solidness of the country.
And actually,
in the situation in other countries where the Canadians certainly are going through such a period.
Trudeau and even his predecessors in the other party, time and time would lash out in the United States because while a majority of Canadians probably did not support that, it did appeal to the whole minority.
Now this country,
Of course, the danger is now that, as I said earlier, it is true that a great number of Americans are being appealed to about these fires.
Particularly, this is true being seen with regard to Japanese.
And also, with regard to the Europeans on the ground, those ungrateful people, after all we did for them, now they're kicking us around.
It's not easy for us to be as responsible as we want to be.
on the other side, satisfying our own constituents.
But at least because of the development of data, because when we look at our exports, while they are important, and they're an effect on our market compared with other countries, we can afford to be somewhat more responsible than some of the other countries.
And certainly we will in all of our rhetoric for a very reason that is, as I said,
Not that we wanted it, but most Americans probably didn't.
There just doesn't have to be any other nation in the free world that's current.
We've got to, and that's why we've got to, all of our apartments in the rest of this time, we've got to always put it in the concept of saying, look, we're very firm, but we just want to make a fair deal.
And we have fair trade, and that's what it is.
Fair trade in the world is fair.
It's total sense of it.
full access for American products abroad, they have the ability to compete here at home.
That's all that we're asking for.
And that requires action on the monetary front, action on the tariff and non-tariff barrier front, maybe action for the charity market front in some kind of situation.
Mr. President, I'd like to say one word about the other political front.
I think that
that we ought to do all the things that you suggested and tell us to do.
At the same time, keep in mind that we don't really have to convince them they're wrong about a lot of these things.
They know it.
And we don't have to fight to get into their face.
We, there's no question of speaking something against itself.
We wield it.
And they know it.
And they know that what you did was the best thing you could do.
Well, I'm really suggesting because we could, we could.
I think we're a little restrained about that.
They know what's convincing.
And we can't convince them.
All you do is make them mad.
And if we just convince them that we're going to stay where we are, point out the confidence that we need to have.
with these illegal research solutions, and we understand this creates problems for them.
As the President said, we've had these problems for a long time, and we had to take some action to deal with our problems, and we're sure they understand our position, and we certainly want to try to understand their position.
We don't do anything.
We're better off.
The temptation is going to be to tell them, damn it,
Another good way to handle it, and this is a very great element of truth in it, is that apart from the substantive factors, which are quite real, there is a very, very significant political factor here.
You could say this, that within this country, and they follow the American press, there has been a very significant and, in the view of the present, a very ominous change in the attitudes of Americans toward their role in the world.
There is a growing sentiment for
trade barriers among groups like organized labor that she used to support free trade.
And also from some business groups, there's a growing sentiment for America to reduce its conventions abroad with the Manseal Resolution with regard to Europe and also resolutions to cut our defenses below anything that would allow us to play around.
And there's a very great sentiment for the United States to
call on other nations in the free world, but now we carry the burden for 25 years, and now that there is no day off, we carry the burden.
As a matter of fact, it could be said that a demagogue at this time in this country might make a pretty much headway by saying, well, it's time for the United States, you know, to be reacting to the Congress, and I said, it's time for us to do good things, but let's do it for our own end.
Yeah, yeah, you know.
Well, that's there.
Many men go on to say that, and this is true, everybody around this table knows this, that there isn't anybody who feels more strongly than I do that the United States is in the interest of trading on the rest.
I know it's only 40%, but in the United States, in the interest of...
of a world order, both from the standpoint of avoiding military conflict and also from the standpoint of some sort of economic stability, that the United States, to build that kind of world order, must leave.
This is where it's got to come from.
And I don't want the United States, and our policy is not directed for the United States to withdraw.
I want us to continue to meet our commitments.
We don't want to have a unilateral reduction, for example, in our role in Europe.
We want to be in something that we all do together.
We want to keep the American people interested in the world, and we want to also see that the American people will support a policy, a policy in which we continue not only our military strength, but continue our foreign assistance programs,
and also a program, a policy where we continue to work toward a system of reducing trade barriers rather than racism.
That's been the predicament in the United States for 25 years.
It was mine when I came to the Congress 25 years ago.
It was my day when I spoke out there to that timeline thing.
Do you remember that conference in 1956?
No, right at the Sputnik.
At the Sputnik thing, I remember.
And you were there as chairman of that Stanford, what do you say?
Right.
Very good.
Now, that is the position that we take.
And we have played.
We've had some close votes in the Congress on some of these things.
We're going to continue to fight.
But now, truly to this point, it's for us to make some progress on what is a very sensitive issue, the breadbasket issue.
It's an issue where it isn't going to destroy them.
It's going to ruin them.
It's an issue where there is unfairness, which they very well know.
It's an issue where the United States has given away too much, which they very well know, at a time we can afford to.
But here is a case where in order for the United States to continue to play its role, it's necessary for us to make some progress here.
But this isn't a case of our moving out on our own without regard to the situation here in this country.
The situation in this country would have us move much further.
much faster and in a much more detrimental way than there is.
And frankly, we're holding it back.
We're trying to do the right thing.
We're trying to be good neighbors.
We're trying to play a useful, instructive role in the world.
That is our, that's what we believe we should do for the future.
But today,
We develop a situation, if we were to go into this and find an intransigent attitude on their part, if we then fail to achieve any significant change as a result of this step, there could be a very strong reaction here in this Senate, but not only in this chamber, but in all chambers.
That's the fundamental point that we have to address.
There's a, one thing I, a little story I told at the NSC was on your media about this anti-American thing that's rather curious around the world.
It, we shouldn't be, we shouldn't be as concerned about it.
As I said, it's a, it would make a lot of points being anti-American in this country to turn around and make a few speeches about that.
On the other hand, the Vesper involves
is the one out of the Philippines, and I was talking to Mark Saisei back in 1993.
He, of course, was a great pro-American president of the Philippines, a great hero.
I remember he was killed in the airplane crash.
Mark Saisei was talking about one of his bitter enemies, a Philippine senator, who was not only his enemy, but forever was a dog's hind leg.
He said, oh, he said, not many dollars.
But anyway, he came, this followed him, and this followed him.
I said, well, how does he win?
He said, well, I had noted that he'd been very anti-American, this senator, who was extremely rich, who was making a great deal of money out of the Americans, legal government, and so forth and so on.
And he had just hidden this all the time.
And I'm sorry to say, he just laughed.
He said, just let me tell you, Mr. Vice President, Vice President of the United States,
Let me tell you the secrets to success, the sure way to success in running for any office is to vote against.
He says, give the Americans hell, and don't drive them away.
And that's the attitude of Kennedy and Mark Branson.
Give the Americans hell, but don't drive them away.
They want us.
They need us to, you know, the very standard point, and an economic standard point, too.
But we've got to take a little hell with the Trumps after he gets out.
So, you know, that's what I was going to say.
The radio said, I want to tell you a story.
I was out there the other day, and Fulbright was in a sad mood, and everything was going down in the handbasket, and he had a list of things he felt were in terrible shape.
And all the other members of the committee were on, and I was saying, and I thought things were going great, and we had some problems, and the first deal was successful.
Oh, he said things are terrible.
He said things he had been able to do.
And then he said, furthermore, he said, I heard the radio this morning.
He says, the Dow is way down.
They get way down.
Well, I said, Bill, that's the whole point of this.
This is what we've been trying to do.
I said, don't you realize that's a good development?
Well, we're going to have an off-the-record discussion about what's going on.
He doesn't have an idea of what we're talking about, so he'd like to start.
We're just going to hit the hash box.
We did it with the Finance Committee yesterday, and we're going to have a very excellent discussion.
It's supposed to be a discussion about what we're doing and why we're doing it.
All right.
I think with this unified position and so on, we shouldn't be too discouraged in this.
Because behind the scenes, these men look to know they're working for the first time now.
for the first time, are taking a very careful look to see what should be done.
Now some real thoughts are being given to us.
One day, time has worked in our favor, and it's working in our favor, and they're now thinking about it.
And our reaction here, probably when they're here talking individually, I think is to say, well, what are the solutions?
When you get right down to it, they don't have a time frame, and they can't make numbers now.
Just remember, they're all here.
Smiles don't cost us anything, and that's all we get.
Well, I'll talk to you guys.
I've got to go.
Uh, first, if we could, there's some other way to do it other than bending the anti-axe, but a lot of lawyers are looking at every area, and there are only two or three, one of them.
Okay.
You said it right.
It will be made here in a year and we don't know how long it's going to be.
Our own people .
.
.
. .
I want to say that it's a beautiful day for some of the nice things.
But there's a lot of work to be done.
And we've got to tell you to be in time.
We've got to tell you.
We've got to tell you.
We've got to tell you.
We've got to tell you.
We've got to tell you.
in special relations with .
This is America, where we .
We've been talking about .
So I should do that .
And they built their base .
And so I said, I should build .
So you protect your base .
But I just wanted to have this back-up, because the key to that is that, for sure, you know, uh, it's an honor to have the, uh, this is the first time this has happened.
I'll be talking about it in a few hours.
I'm actually going to have to do that in a few weeks.
I'm going to have to do that in a few weeks.
I'll be talking about it in a few weeks.
Yeah, later that, it's spooky.
Then it's, yeah, and it's a big, big, big, big, big, big, big,
A very plain story.
It was an unsolved problem that had to be straightened out.
His answer was, politically, the government could not do anything.
And I said to him, Mr. Minister, you are saying to us that the only course the United States can take is the unilateral one.
And he began to crawl back on that, and he said he thought it was a horrible thing for us to do.
That's where the conversation went.
And it was a questioner.
And it was a questioner.
And it was a questioner.
Well, no, I live with this too long, Dave, to get soft on it at this point.
I know you, I want to be sure you have, as I asked the direct speech you sent me, to give a little number on the points that you've given over to you before the meeting, so you just have it back.
Oh, good.
Now, on the, on the October 15th action, I hope the President does it on October 15th, and I hope he doesn't give me the time to do it.
I'd like to see him do it as part of his own authorship.
Well, if he doesn't, then it is.
I mentioned Bill, I mentioned the L.A. community group, and he didn't take the bill, he didn't take the list there.
But the thing of it is, we have the President's direction.
This is it now.
I think we're done.
I will have you in the service.
Yeah.
Yeah.
There ain't no other floor over there with bare wood.
Here.
Like this.
See this?
You can see it off to here.
Something like that.
It's going to take a long day.
We'll say this is what we were checking on.
We know there isn't any security problem.
We're going to find out if the president has scheduled.
What kind of odor will there be?
A lot of odor.
Okay, just hold up a second.
A lot of odor.
Maybe I'll wait until the weekend.
Yeah, maybe so.
We better find out.
There's got to be a lot of odor.
A lot of noxious odor, too.
Okay.
Because they won't be able to sit in there with that order and they won't be able to eat.
They're coming back in two hours.
You know they're going to take all I get.
We should have done it.
I've told you before we should have done that one over there.
Yeah.
Back over there.
Yeah.
When we was doing these two.
Oh, these.
Oh, they're all good, man.
Oh, that needs to work.
Yeah, they know.
They're seeing the mark.
I know.
I'll tell you.
We got a little bit down there, too, at the fireplace, I don't know.
I suppose there's some scratches down here.
There's scratches here in front of those doors.
Yeah, I'm doing it.
And it's all waxed up.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah, that's stained, isn't it?
It's shiny.
Well, if you didn't stain it, it wouldn't get all the wax.
Yeah, that might do it.
Yeah.
There's nothing over on that side of it.
It makes scratches.
Yeah.
That's what I said before.
I don't know why they passed it down.
Because, oh, we was at it.
We should have gone along with it.
It was great at that.
It was good.
It was good.
It was good.
It was good.
It was good.
It was good.
It was good.
Yeah, it's all right.
Yeah, it looks good.
It makes you stand out.
Yeah, it makes you stand out and still not enough.
It makes it look like it's actually laid on there.
Yeah, like it's supposed to.
Yeah.
Can it be done?
Can we sleep?
Tomorrow?
We've got a long weekend.
He's here today.
The President's here today.
Right.
I think that's long.
No, we've got to put it off until Monday.
It has to be done today.
Well, it doesn't have to be.
You know, the president comes first.
Right.
We prefer to do this on Monday.
At least he will not be here on Monday.
We can't.
We won't be here on Monday.
He's going to be here on Monday.
We can't do it tomorrow.
I'd rather not do it today.
It's going to be obnoxious.
Let's put it off.
It's because other people don't like it.
I know they won't like it.
Okay.
Okay, sir.
Take care of that.
Yeah, tomorrow or Monday, huh?
Okay, sir.
We thought he had left last night.
So we got the wrong...
I know we started it with that stinking stuff and it ain't like...
We don't know.
We don't know.
We don't know.
Okay, we'll come back.
We'll come back tomorrow night.
Sometimes he's going to be here tomorrow night.
Okay, so okay then.
I wish we could do that before you guys started talking over there.
Yeah.
Thank you.
Thank you so much.
I understand the Secretary of State has had the opportunity of meeting the President, but I felt that it was important that I hear directly from the President of the Organization Act, a young man that he is, and of course the other attorneys here with regard to your decisions.
I know that you have had the opportunity to meet the Secretary of State, Mr. President, gentlemen, but I assumed that it was important that I receive myself, the President of the IAEA, that I hear myself, him and the representatives who accompany him concerning the positions of this organization.
I would therefore be happy to hear any observation, any comment that you may have.
First of all, we wish to express to the President of the United States our deep gratitude that he is so fit to devote to us some of his very busy time.
Indeed, Mr. President, we have presented our problems to the Secretary of State, and therefore we shall not wait to be safe at this meeting.
This reason is that the current preoccupation, or one of the current preoccupations of the African United Nations, concerns the decolonization, or exactly the liberation, of the southern part of our continent, which remains a port under the Portuguese, South African or Euro-Dutch domination.
You know, one of the prime concerns of the EU today concerns the process of colonization, or rather the liberation of the southern part of Africa, which remains under domination of Portugal, or South Africa, or either the Euro-Indian rule.
In this matter, we do not have a completely new element, especially as it is the President of the United States who has been asking this question for a very long time.
To be true, in this matter, we bring you nothing new, Mr. President, for you have been following this situation closely for a long time.
I can assure the President that not only the Secretary of State, but the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of the Constitution are constantly bringing their positions to mind.
I think we've discussed it often in this room.
As the President is aware, there is no question about our general policy.
The problem is how they implement it and how to implement it without
of engaging in force, which I know is a concern of the OEU as well.
And as you know, Mr. President, there is absolutely no doubt about this case and this general policy.
The problem is a problem of implementation, and implementation without resorting to force, which I know is also a concern of the OEU.
So, the delegation of the UIA, which is in charge of directing, comes in different titles to see Mr. President of the United States to talk to him briefly about our priorities.
Therefore, the delegation of the EOU, which I have the honor to chair, comes to see you, Mr. President, for a variety of reasons and to express briefly to you our concerns.
As Amis, we see in the Amis continent a great power that has not only passed from colonialism to colonization, but that is also the result of colonization, so it is necessary to understand our preoccupations in our liberation.
We also come to see the Excellency President of the United States
And we come to see you, Mr. President and so in your capacity as the Chief of State of the country hosting the United Nations.
an organization which holds the keys to many problems for the future of mankind.
And finally, we come to you, sir, as chief of state and leader of the Western world in general and of the Atlantic Alliance in particular.
We know that we come to preach to a convert because it is for us to preach for a cause that we consider just and which is a sacred cause, the cause of freedom, of the liberation of the people.
I cannot come to you, Mr. President, to ask for the impossible.
We know that you are already convinced of the justness of our positions.
We are convinced that we are upholding a just and a sacred cause, that of freedom and the liberation of the peoples.
The United States, as a Western leader, as a great power,
As a country that has always been interested in decolonization, this is an opportunity for me, in the name of Africa, to thank them for what they have done to help us in our fight against the dictatorship.
So, our reasons for asking the United States, not to say impossible, but asking the United States to say about their moral, diplomatic, economic authority,
and military, not in the sense of aggressor, but in the sense that they can help militarily in certain countries, we ask them to put all their weight in the balance to obtain the application of the decisions they have voted
The United States, as the leader of the Western world and a great power,
but has always been interested in the process of decolonization.
And may I see this opportunity, Mr. President, to thank you in the name of Africa for the cost and the help you have given to us in our effort towards decolonization.
We do not ask for what is impossible, but we ask you to use your authority, the moral, diplomatic, economic, and the military authority of the United States, the latter not in any aggressive sense,
but in the sense to which you can militarily aid some countries, so that you will put all your weight in support of the implementation of the decisions for which you have voted in the UN, for which the UN itself has voted concerning Namibia, concerning South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies.
And regarding this question of Namibia, which is the current one for us, I would like, as I did this morning, Mr. Secretary of State, Prime Minister, Mr. President of the United States, for the very effective support they have given us at all levels of the procedure, including the vote of the American judge,
Concerning Namibia, which is the most timely of all these issues, I would like to say to you, Mr. President, as I said earlier today to the Secretary, how thankful we are for the assistance you have given to us throughout all the stages of that particular procedure, including the role of the American judge and the International Court of Justice.
It is also an opportunity to negotiate the successive votes of the government of the United States concerning the ban on the sale of weapons in South Africa, concerning the boycott of the regime of Rhodesia.
It is also an opportunity for me to thank you, Mr. President, for the votes that successive American administrations have cast regarding the prohibition of the sale of arms to South Africa and the boycott of the Rhodesian regime.
The United States has done a lot to help Africa to be liberated, to be decolonized.
So the United States has done much to help Africa
but Africa is saying to the United States, we still need you.
Because today, 10% of the population of Africa, approximately 30 million Africans, continue to live in the systems based upon poverty and racial discrimination.
But
I have the honor to preside over the six countries in addition to the United States, but I shall not address myself to the chiefs of state of the other six countries in the same terms as I address you today, Mr. President, and I shall tell you why.
J'ai oublié de préciser que les six États que nous visitons sont tous membres de l'OTAN.
Et à propos de l'OTAN, comme je l'ai dit ce matin, M. l'Excellence, M. le Secrétaire d'État, nous ne sommes pas contre l'organisation de l'OTAN.
Nous savons que chaque pays, chaque groupe de pays,
can and must organize its defense as it tries.
But what we are trying to accomplish is the use of equal forces, the support of their sides, direct support or indirect support.
to continue these colonial wars, not only against these actual colonies, but also against the exploitation of these colonies, like the Senegal, like the Nassau, and so on.
Controlling NATO, as I was telling the Secretary earlier, we are certainly not opposed to NATO or to the concept that any country or any group of countries can and must organize its defense on the Sea of Sweden.
But we do deplore the use that Portugal is making of the direct or indirect support it receives from NATO in pursuing its colonial war, and not only in waging acts against, and so on and so forth, but against neighboring countries as well, such as Senegal, Belgium, and others.
And the most specific, the gay, which was the victim of a very specific aggression.
So I said that I wouldn't keep my language here.
Why?
Because of the fact that the leadership that the United States holds
The United States plays a more important role, and I would say a moral responsibility,
I said I would not speak to the other leaders as I speak here today.
This is because of the leadership.
of the United States because of the role the United States plays as a great power and as a keeper of the peace throughout the world.
The United States has an important role to play, we feel.
The United States, we feel, has a great role and responsibility.
And Africa, for one,
hopes very much for the United States aid and influence from Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia so that that part of our continent will finally become free and decolonized.
I would like to conclude on this point that the United States should use their influence, all their influence, so that the international court of justice, concerning the Amnesty,
A life that is only good to sign the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, that this evidence be applied as soon as possible, and that South Africa can withdraw by the best means of the hand of life and leave the hand of the people to self-determine freely.
On this point, we would like to see the interest of the United States exerted so that the recent advisory of the International Court of Justice on Namibia, which has merely confirmed the decision of the Security Council and the UN General Assembly, be implemented as soon as possible, and so that South Africa would withdraw as expeditiously as possible from Namibia and leave the Namibians free to determine their own future.
In the field of specific points, I would also like to mention one that I would like to talk about in the next few minutes, namely the current discussion in progress in the US Parliament, including in the US, concerning the sale of chrome, or rather the purchase of chrome in Rhodesia.
Let's think, as I explained this morning, that if this decision was confirmed, not only would the regime take a step back on the economic plan, but it would also take a step back on the moral plan.
To tell you a little specific, if you wondered, I had the pleasure to take up with the Secretary
Africa would withdraw as expeditiously as possible from Namibia and leave the Namibians free to determine their own future.
In the area of particular points, I would also like to mention one of which I have decided to talk about earlier.
That is, the current discussion in progress in the US Parliament, in particular in the US, concerning the sale of chrome, or rather the purchase of chrome,
of Rhodesia.
We think, as I explained this morning, that if this decision is confirmed, not only will the regime of Rhodesia take advantage of the economic plan, but it will also take advantage of the moral plan.
To talk about a specific issue, one that I had the pleasure to take up with the Secretary earlier, and concerning the present discussion within the Congress of the United States concerning the purchase of problems from Malaysia.
As I said earlier, we believe that if this were to be confirmed,
The Rhodesian regime would not only derive economic benefits from it, but also would gain greatly from Laura's standpoint, also.
a friendly country.
Moreover, if my Jewish memories are exact, when I did my law studies, it seemed to me that there was a disposition in the American system
which meant that a law voted by the Parliament would only become definitive if it was promoted by the President of the United States.
In other words, if my memories are correct and if the texts have not changed, the President of the United States had the right to veto the texts studied by the Parliament.
If I say this, Mr. President, in the name of Africa, it is not that we choose to interfere in the internal affairs of the United States, but we ask this of you as friends.
We ask this more particularly because if memory serves, when I was a law student studying the legal system of the United States, there was a provision in the legal system of the United States that a vote passed by Congress
only becomes in effect a law if it is so promulgated by the President.
That in other words, if the text has not changed, then the President has the right to veto on any legislation that has been passed by his Congress.
The difficulty, if I could interrupt the President for a moment, with that approach, and the President is absolutely correct in his
is attached to a bill, an appropriations bill, for example, which we have to have.
There is no right to veto any part of it.
There is no right to veto.
Every president has asked for that right, but the Congress never gets it to him.
So sometimes, sometimes, we have to take something bad in order to get something we absolutely have to have.
In this instance, I should point out, as the Secretary has already informed you, that we have opposed the amendment.
It, however, has strong support because of
reasons that have much less to do with African problems than it has to do with the problems of the Soviet Union, where the only source of supply would be in Tokyo.
But I can assure the President that we are, and all of you, we are well aware of this issue.
But it comes to our desk.
in a general bill, which we have to have.
The problem that arises, Mr. President, and you are perfectly right, your memory is not very confident on this point, is that if such an amendment is annexed to a project of people on the credits,
dont nous avons besoin.
Le veto du Président ne peut pas être particularisé.
Il ne peut pas rester uniquement sur une portion ou sur un amendement.
Donc, parfois, nous sommes...
Et c'est un droit, ce veto particularisé.
C'est un droit que tous les Présidents ont demandé, mais qui ne l'aura jamais été accordé par l'Union européenne.
Donc, nous sommes parfois obligés d'accepter, dans l'ensemble,
which we need and to accept this opportunity.
We can leave, but we will not leave.
But as you said to the Secretary, we are opposed to this amendment, as you know.
Unfortunately, he has collected a treasure hunt.
There are reasons that really have nothing to do with Africa.
but which relates much more to the fact that the Soviet Union would be the only source of possibility.
So, I can assure you that we are fully aware of this problem, but that if this question comes to our office, annexed to a general law project, we cannot only move this situation.
Most Senator McGee and Congressman Dix were out of line, so we had an opportunity to discuss this in depth.
and the President and his colleagues had a good opportunity to express their views, which I'm sure made a very favorable impression on the members of Congress.
Mr. President, I would like to thank Mr. McGee and Mr. Dix.
Mr. and Mrs. President, we had the opportunity to discuss these issues in advance.
Mr. President and his colleagues have already made their opinions, and I am convinced that this will have made a very favorable impression on the Senate and Mr. Congress.
This is the very brief summary, referring to a number of stages of care, to name the details.
Mr. President, I know that you have changed a lot, so this is the essence of what we want to say today.
on the part of the decolonization in Africa that is the object of our mission.
There is another point that I would not like to interrupt here since it does not fit into my position on this subject, but which I touched on earlier with the Secretary of State and which is also relevant to Africa, it is the problem of the Middle East.
The OIA has taken a decision, has designated a commission that is using this problem for the same purposes as the one targeted by the United States, to know how to apply the decision of Ivan Lebrun in 1967 and make him take and succeed the mission that has come.
So this in which, Mr. President, and in all the outline, because the Secretary of State Bush can do it in detail, we know how busy you are, this is a part of our mission dealing with the decolonization process in Africa.
There is another point which I hesitate to take up because it's not really part of our mission, but it is also of racial fear in Africa, and it is a question of the Middle East.
The ONU has appointed a commission to study this matter.
It is motivated by the same focus as the United States, seeking the implementation of the resolution of November 22, 1967, and the successful completion of the Yari mission.
In a word, the IAEA, despite the difficulties, is trying to do everything it can to address African problems.
The IAEA believes it can help the international community
to maintain peace and where there is a desire to cooperate not only with the United Nations but also with the US government.
And I would like to finish by renewing my sincere thanks to Mr. President, Mr. Secretary of State,
the kindness they have shown by accepting to receive us and by devoting the time they devote to us and by receiving us as a friend, I would say almost as a brother, and by allowing us to talk to them as openly as we do to each other.
This, I believe, is a good method because
I believe that in human relationships, as well at the level of individuals as at the level of society, states, if there is something very bad, it is misunderstandings, misunderstandings.
And we can avoid misunderstandings and misunderstandings when we meet.
When it is explained, it does not mean that it is true.
I would like to say that, beyond Europe, ambassadors and ambassadors, I believe that every time that high officials meet and explain themselves very frankly,
In the meantime, they manage to exercise situations that could have taken a lot of time and paper if the solution had been made safely.
And in any case, the U.S. delegation is extremely sensitive and grateful to the United States government.
And that's all for the way in which we are welcomed.
Because there are still French people who say that the way of giving is better than what we give.
But we Africans are sensitive to the human aspect of the subject, to the human warmth.
We need to feel ourselves.
In spite of the difficulties it experienced at its beginning, the organization of African Unity wants to help Africa solve its own problems in an African context.
We also want to help the other nations of the world and the world community to keep peace in the world.
The young, disabled community wants to cooperate with the United Nations, but it also wants to cooperate with the government of the United States.
In conclusion, Mr. President, we are renewing our thanks to you.
and to the Secretary for the great kindness with which you have received us today and for devoting so much of your time and doing so in such a spirit of friendship, in such a brotherly spirit, may I say,
in allowing us to speak to you as openly as we have.
We believe that this is a very good method for inhuman relations, be it from person to person or from society to society, and I make a stand can be very detrimental.
This can only be remedied by face-to-face meetings, not that I should wish for a moment to play down the importance of ambassadors or their embassies.
But when leaders can meet and talk, in a short time they can clear up situations which might require more time and paper were they to be solved in other channels.
The organization of African Unity and its mission is
very sensitive and grateful to the welcome that has been extended to us by the government of the United States.
And even more than the reception itself, we are grateful for the manner in which we have been received, or as the French say, the manner of the gift matters more than the gift itself.
We Africans are sensitive to this climate.
We need to feel at home.
And that is why when we have friends coming to see us, we endeavor to make them feel at home also.
I want to say to the President that I was glad to hear his remarks on bastards.
I was very happy, Mr. President, to hear your words, making an important statement, Mr. President
We believe that the ambassador plays an extremely important role.
Sometimes, it is the only way to send us direct information about the situation in a given country.
In fact, I would like to emphasize that I wish that there were more time for meetings with the President and his colleagues.
The difficulty is that in arranging official visits and statements, because of the number of countries involved, it is very hard to do more than, say, a few in a year, and then have time to do the other things.
I would also like to say, Mr. President, that, of course, there is a delay because there is not enough time available for this kind of meeting with you, Mr. President, and your colleagues.
In relation to the large number of countries, when we organize visits of this kind, it is impossible to organize more than a few visits a year and to continue to realize, in addition, the other things that we prefer.
Ah, that's a great question.
The interest that we have in this administration is demonstrated first by the fact that the Secretary of State was the first Secretary of State to travel extensively to Africa on an official visit.
And I am the first one occupying this chair to have visited Africa in official capacity as Vice President in 1957 and twice unofficially in 1963.
in 1967 when I visited your office, the office of the OAU in Addis Ababa.
I wish that the President would convey to his colleagues at their next meeting and that the ambassadors would convey to the Presidents
this thought that at this time in the world when the United States has major matters under negotiation and consideration involving superpowers, Western Europe, etc., that we have, that does not mean that we
both personally and as a nation, do not have a great interest and concern for the future of Africa.
And because these personal reasons that I mentioned underlie that concern.
I would like, Mr. President, for you to convey to your colleagues, heads of state during your next meeting, and yourself, Mr. Prime Minister, to your governments, that the fact that, at this time, the United States is confronted with so many issues of considerable importance
And we look forward to a continually frank discussion of these problems.
your recommendations with regard to our policy.
They will receive more than simply an official interest, because our interest, as I've indicated, is personal and part of both the Secretary of State and myself, because we feel we know you personally.
And we are waiting for the future to bring us more of these discussions, of these frank conversations, and we will gladly accept all the recommendations that you may well make concerning our politics.
It is clear that these recommendations will receive from us more than a simple official consideration,
Because our interest, as I said to the Secretary of State, is personal because we think that we know you personally and that we know your country.
Well, you're uh, I think I'll start you.
No need, I don't know what to do.
I'll see you in a little while.
Oh, yeah.