Conversation 077-007

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Thank you.

Thank you so much.

I understand the Secretary of State has had the opportunity of meeting the President, but I felt that it was important that I hear directly from the President of the Organization Act, a young man that he is, and of course the other attorneys here with regard to your decisions.

I know that you have had the opportunity to meet the Secretary of State, Mr. President, gentlemen, but I assumed that it was important that I receive myself, the President of the IAEA, that I hear myself, him and the representatives who accompany him concerning the positions of this organization.

I would therefore be happy to hear any observation, any comment that you may have.

First of all, we wish to express to the President of the United States our deep gratitude that he is so fit to devote to us some of his very busy time.

Indeed, Mr. President, we have presented our problems to the Secretary of State, and therefore we shall not wait to be safe at this meeting.

This reason is that the current preoccupation, or one of the current preoccupations of the African United Nations, concerns the decolonization, or exactly the liberation, of the southern part of our continent, which remains a port under the Portuguese, South African or Euro-Dutch domination.

You know, one of the prime concerns of the EU today concerns the process of colonization, or rather the liberation of the southern part of Africa, which remains under domination of Portugal, or South Africa, or either the Euro-Indian rule.

In this matter, we do not have a completely new element, especially as it is the President of the United States who has been asking this question for a very long time.

To be true, in this matter, we bring you nothing new, Mr. President, for you have been following this situation closely for a long time.

I can assure the President that not only the Secretary of State, but the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of the Constitution are constantly bringing their positions to mind.

I think we've discussed it often in this room.

As the President is aware, there is no question about our general policy.

The problem is how they implement it and how to implement it without

of engaging in force, which I know is a concern of the OEU as well.

And as you know, Mr. President, there is absolutely no doubt about this case and this general policy.

The problem is a problem of implementation, and implementation without resorting to force, which I know is also a concern of the OEU.

So, the delegation of the UIA, which is in charge of directing, comes in different titles to see Mr. President of the United States to talk to him briefly about our priorities.

Therefore, the delegation of the EOU, which I have the honor to chair, comes to see you, Mr. President, for a variety of reasons and to express briefly to you our concerns.

As Amis, we see in the Amis continent a great power that has not only passed from colonialism to colonization, but that is also the result of colonization, so it is necessary to understand our preoccupations in our liberation.

We also come to see the Excellency President of the United States

And we come to see you, Mr. President and so in your capacity as the Chief of State of the country hosting the United Nations.

an organization which holds the keys to many problems for the future of mankind.

And finally, we come to you, sir, as chief of state and leader of the Western world in general and of the Atlantic Alliance in particular.

We know that we come to preach to a convert because it is for us to preach for a cause that we consider just and which is a sacred cause, the cause of freedom, of the liberation of the people.

I cannot come to you, Mr. President, to ask for the impossible.

We know that you are already convinced of the justness of our positions.

We are convinced that we are upholding a just and a sacred cause, that of freedom and the liberation of the peoples.

The United States, as a Western leader, as a great power,

As a country that has always been interested in decolonization, this is an opportunity for me, in the name of Africa, to thank them for what they have done to help us in our fight against the dictatorship.

So, our reasons for asking the United States, not to say impossible, but asking the United States to say about their moral, diplomatic, economic authority,

and military, not in the sense of aggressor, but in the sense that they can help militarily in certain countries, we ask them to put all their weight in the balance to obtain the application of the decisions they have voted

The United States, as the leader of the Western world and a great power,

but has always been interested in the process of decolonization.

And may I see this opportunity, Mr. President, to thank you in the name of Africa for the cost and the help you have given to us in our effort towards decolonization.

We do not ask for what is impossible, but we ask you to use your authority, the moral, diplomatic, economic, and the military authority of the United States, the latter not in any aggressive sense,

but in the sense to which you can militarily aid some countries, so that you will put all your weight in support of the implementation of the decisions for which you have voted in the UN, for which the UN itself has voted concerning Namibia, concerning South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies.

And regarding this question of Namibia, which is the current one for us, I would like, as I did this morning, Mr. Secretary of State, Prime Minister, Mr. President of the United States, for the very effective support they have given us at all levels of the procedure, including the vote of the American judge,

Concerning Namibia, which is the most timely of all these issues, I would like to say to you, Mr. President, as I said earlier today to the Secretary, how thankful we are for the assistance you have given to us throughout all the stages of that particular procedure, including the role of the American judge and the International Court of Justice.

It is also an opportunity to negotiate the successive votes of the government of the United States concerning the ban on the sale of weapons in South Africa, concerning the boycott of the regime of Rhodesia.

It is also an opportunity for me to thank you, Mr. President, for the votes that successive American administrations have cast regarding the prohibition of the sale of arms to South Africa and the boycott of the Rhodesian regime.

The United States has done a lot to help Africa to be liberated, to be decolonized.

So the United States has done much to help Africa

but Africa is saying to the United States, we still need you.

Because today, 10% of the population of Africa, approximately 30 million Africans, continue to live in the systems based upon poverty and racial discrimination.

But

I have the honor to preside over the six countries in addition to the United States, but I shall not address myself to the chiefs of state of the other six countries in the same terms as I address you today, Mr. President, and I shall tell you why.

J'ai oublié de préciser que les six États que nous visitons sont tous membres de l'OTAN.

Et à propos de l'OTAN, comme je l'ai dit ce matin, M. l'Excellence, M. le Secrétaire d'État, nous ne sommes pas contre l'organisation de l'OTAN.

Nous savons que chaque pays, chaque groupe de pays,

can and must organize its defense as it tries.

But what we are trying to accomplish is the use of equal forces, the support of their sides, direct support or indirect support.

to continue these colonial wars, not only against these actual colonies, but also against the exploitation of these colonies, like the Senegal, like the Nassau, and so on.

Controlling NATO, as I was telling the Secretary earlier, we are certainly not opposed to NATO or to the concept that any country or any group of countries can and must organize its defense on the Sea of Sweden.

But we do deplore the use that Portugal is making of the direct or indirect support it receives from NATO in pursuing its colonial war, and not only in waging acts against, and so on and so forth, but against neighboring countries as well, such as Senegal, Belgium, and others.

And the most specific, the gay, which was the victim of a very specific aggression.

So I said that I wouldn't keep my language here.

Why?

Because of the fact that the leadership that the United States holds

The United States plays a more important role, and I would say a moral responsibility,

I said I would not speak to the other leaders as I speak here today.

This is because of the leadership.

of the United States because of the role the United States plays as a great power and as a keeper of the peace throughout the world.

The United States has an important role to play, we feel.

The United States, we feel, has a great role and responsibility.

And Africa, for one,

hopes very much for the United States aid and influence from Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia so that that part of our continent will finally become free and decolonized.

I would like to conclude on this point that the United States should use their influence, all their influence, so that the international court of justice, concerning the Amnesty,

A life that is only good to sign the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, that this evidence be applied as soon as possible, and that South Africa can withdraw by the best means of the hand of life and leave the hand of the people to self-determine freely.

On this point, we would like to see the interest of the United States exerted so that the recent advisory of the International Court of Justice on Namibia, which has merely confirmed the decision of the Security Council and the UN General Assembly, be implemented as soon as possible, and so that South Africa would withdraw as expeditiously as possible from Namibia and leave the Namibians free to determine their own future.

In the field of specific points, I would also like to mention one that I would like to talk about in the next few minutes, namely the current discussion in progress in the US Parliament, including in the US, concerning the sale of chrome, or rather the purchase of chrome in Rhodesia.

Let's think, as I explained this morning, that if this decision was confirmed, not only would the regime take a step back on the economic plan, but it would also take a step back on the moral plan.

To tell you a little specific, if you wondered, I had the pleasure to take up with the Secretary

Africa would withdraw as expeditiously as possible from Namibia and leave the Namibians free to determine their own future.

In the area of particular points, I would also like to mention one of which I have decided to talk about earlier.

That is, the current discussion in progress in the US Parliament, in particular in the US, concerning the sale of chrome, or rather the purchase of chrome,

of Rhodesia.

We think, as I explained this morning, that if this decision is confirmed, not only will the regime of Rhodesia take advantage of the economic plan, but it will also take advantage of the moral plan.

To talk about a specific issue, one that I had the pleasure to take up with the Secretary earlier, and concerning the present discussion within the Congress of the United States concerning the purchase of problems from Malaysia.

As I said earlier, we believe that if this were to be confirmed,

The Rhodesian regime would not only derive economic benefits from it, but also would gain greatly from Laura's standpoint, also.

a friendly country.

Moreover, if my Jewish memories are exact, when I did my law studies, it seemed to me that there was a disposition in the American system

which meant that a law voted by the Parliament would only become definitive if it was promoted by the President of the United States.

In other words, if my memories are correct and if the texts have not changed, the President of the United States had the right to veto the texts studied by the Parliament.

If I say this, Mr. President, in the name of Africa, it is not that we choose to interfere in the internal affairs of the United States, but we ask this of you as friends.

We ask this more particularly because if memory serves, when I was a law student studying the legal system of the United States, there was a provision in the legal system of the United States that a vote passed by Congress

only becomes in effect a law if it is so promulgated by the President.

That in other words, if the text has not changed, then the President has the right to veto on any legislation that has been passed by his Congress.

The difficulty, if I could interrupt the President for a moment, with that approach, and the President is absolutely correct in his

is attached to a bill, an appropriations bill, for example, which we have to have.

There is no right to veto any part of it.

There is no right to veto.

Every president has asked for that right, but the Congress never gets it to him.

So sometimes, sometimes, we have to take something bad in order to get something we absolutely have to have.

In this instance, I should point out, as the Secretary has already informed you, that we have opposed the amendment.

It, however, has strong support because of

reasons that have much less to do with African problems than it has to do with the problems of the Soviet Union, where the only source of supply would be in Tokyo.

But I can assure the President that we are, and all of you, we are well aware of this issue.

But it comes to our desk.

in a general bill, which we have to have.

The problem that arises, Mr. President, and you are perfectly right, your memory is not very confident on this point, is that if such an amendment is annexed to a project of people on the credits,

dont nous avons besoin.

Le veto du Président ne peut pas être particularisé.

Il ne peut pas rester uniquement sur une portion ou sur un amendement.

Donc, parfois, nous sommes...

Et c'est un droit, ce veto particularisé.

C'est un droit que tous les Présidents ont demandé, mais qui ne l'aura jamais été accordé par l'Union européenne.

Donc, nous sommes parfois obligés d'accepter, dans l'ensemble,

which we need and to accept this opportunity.

We can leave, but we will not leave.

But as you said to the Secretary, we are opposed to this amendment, as you know.

Unfortunately, he has collected a treasure hunt.

There are reasons that really have nothing to do with Africa.

but which relates much more to the fact that the Soviet Union would be the only source of possibility.

So, I can assure you that we are fully aware of this problem, but that if this question comes to our office, annexed to a general law project, we cannot only move this situation.

Most Senator McGee and Congressman Dix were out of line, so we had an opportunity to discuss this in depth.

and the President and his colleagues had a good opportunity to express their views, which I'm sure made a very favorable impression on the members of Congress.

Mr. President, I would like to thank Mr. McGee and Mr. Dix.

Mr. and Mrs. President, we had the opportunity to discuss these issues in advance.

Mr. President and his colleagues have already made their opinions, and I am convinced that this will have made a very favorable impression on the Senate and Mr. Congress.

This is the very brief summary, referring to a number of stages of care, to name the details.

Mr. President, I know that you have changed a lot, so this is the essence of what we want to say today.

on the part of the decolonization in Africa that is the object of our mission.

There is another point that I would not like to interrupt here since it does not fit into my position on this subject, but which I touched on earlier with the Secretary of State and which is also relevant to Africa, it is the problem of the Middle East.

The OIA has taken a decision, has designated a commission that is using this problem for the same purposes as the one targeted by the United States, to know how to apply the decision of Ivan Lebrun in 1967 and make him take and succeed the mission that has come.

So this in which, Mr. President, and in all the outline, because the Secretary of State Bush can do it in detail, we know how busy you are, this is a part of our mission dealing with the decolonization process in Africa.

There is another point which I hesitate to take up because it's not really part of our mission, but it is also of racial fear in Africa, and it is a question of the Middle East.

The ONU has appointed a commission to study this matter.

It is motivated by the same focus as the United States, seeking the implementation of the resolution of November 22, 1967, and the successful completion of the Yari mission.

In a word, the IAEA, despite the difficulties, is trying to do everything it can to address African problems.

The IAEA believes it can help the international community

to maintain peace and where there is a desire to cooperate not only with the United Nations but also with the US government.

And I would like to finish by renewing my sincere thanks to Mr. President, Mr. Secretary of State,

the kindness they have shown by accepting to receive us and by devoting the time they devote to us and by receiving us as a friend, I would say almost as a brother, and by allowing us to talk to them as openly as we do to each other.

This, I believe, is a good method because

I believe that in human relationships, as well at the level of individuals as at the level of society, states, if there is something very bad, it is misunderstandings, misunderstandings.

And we can avoid misunderstandings and misunderstandings when we meet.

When it is explained, it does not mean that it is true.

I would like to say that, beyond Europe, ambassadors and ambassadors, I believe that every time that high officials meet and explain themselves very frankly,

In the meantime, they manage to exercise situations that could have taken a lot of time and paper if the solution had been made safely.

And in any case, the U.S. delegation is extremely sensitive and grateful to the United States government.

And that's all for the way in which we are welcomed.

Because there are still French people who say that the way of giving is better than what we give.

But we Africans are sensitive to the human aspect of the subject, to the human warmth.

We need to feel ourselves.

In spite of the difficulties it experienced at its beginning, the organization of African Unity wants to help Africa solve its own problems in an African context.

We also want to help the other nations of the world and the world community to keep peace in the world.

The young, disabled community wants to cooperate with the United Nations, but it also wants to cooperate with the government of the United States.

In conclusion, Mr. President, we are renewing our thanks to you.

and to the Secretary for the great kindness with which you have received us today and for devoting so much of your time and doing so in such a spirit of friendship, in such a brotherly spirit, may I say,

in allowing us to speak to you as openly as we have.

We believe that this is a very good method for inhuman relations, be it from person to person or from society to society, and I make a stand can be very detrimental.

This can only be remedied by face-to-face meetings, not that I should wish for a moment to play down the importance of ambassadors or their embassies.

But when leaders can meet and talk, in a short time they can clear up situations which might require more time and paper were they to be solved in other channels.

The organization of African Unity and its mission is

very sensitive and grateful to the welcome that has been extended to us by the government of the United States.

And even more than the reception itself, we are grateful for the manner in which we have been received, or as the French say, the manner of the gift matters more than the gift itself.

We Africans are sensitive to this climate.

We need to feel at home.

And that is why when we have friends coming to see us, we endeavor to make them feel at home also.

I want to say to the President that I was glad to hear his remarks on bastards.

I was very happy, Mr. President, to hear your words, making an important statement, Mr. President

We believe that the ambassador plays an extremely important role.

Sometimes, it is the only way to send us direct information about the situation in a given country.

In fact, I would like to emphasize that I wish that there were more time for meetings with the President and his colleagues.

The difficulty is that in arranging official visits and statements, because of the number of countries involved, it is very hard to do more than, say, a few in a year, and then have time to do the other things.

I would also like to say, Mr. President, that, of course, there is a delay because there is not enough time available for this kind of meeting with you, Mr. President, and your colleagues.

In relation to the large number of countries, when we organize visits of this kind, it is impossible to organize more than a few visits a year and to continue to realize, in addition, the other things that we prefer.

Ah, that's a great question.

The interest that we have in this administration is demonstrated first by the fact that the Secretary of State was the first Secretary of State to travel extensively to Africa on an official visit.

And I am the first one occupying this chair to have visited Africa in official capacity as Vice President in 1957 and twice unofficially in 1963.

in 1967 when I visited your office, the office of the OAU in Addis Ababa.

I wish that the President would convey to his colleagues at their next meeting and that the ambassadors would convey to the Presidents

this thought that at this time in the world when the United States has major matters under negotiation and consideration involving superpowers, Western Europe, etc., that we have, that does not mean that we

both personally and as a nation, do not have a great interest and concern for the future of Africa.

And because these personal reasons that I mentioned underlie that concern.

I would like, Mr. President, for you to convey to your colleagues, heads of state during your next meeting, and yourself, Mr. Prime Minister, to your governments, that the fact that, at this time, the United States is confronted with so many issues of considerable importance

And we look forward to a continually frank discussion of these problems.

your recommendations with regard to our policy.

They will receive more than simply an official interest, because our interest, as I've indicated, is personal and part of both the Secretary of State and myself, because we feel we know you personally.

And we are waiting for the future to bring us more of these discussions, of these frank conversations, and we will gladly accept all the recommendations that you may well make concerning our politics.

It is clear that these recommendations will receive from us more than a simple official consideration,

Because our interest, as I said to the Secretary of State, is personal because we think that we know you personally and that we know your country.

Well, you're uh, I think I'll start you.

No need, I don't know what to do.

I'll see you in a little while.

Oh, yeah.