Conversation 103-005

Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

General Higgins, I'm preaching to you that I want to express our appreciation, my appreciation personally for the support from various organizations.

Don't mention defense policy, which is vitally important at this point, for a reason that I don't mention.

Also for the

a policy of ending the war in Vietnam.

that will contribute to a very peaceful and lasting peace in the world.

These are two goals that I think are above partisanship.

There are two of which we have an understanding on the part of, I think, the majority of Americans, but particularly among

people in veterans groups who security.

I'm thinking about them and think of them in a very hard-headed way.

Let me perhaps summarize some of the things that General Haig probably has already told you about the nation's stance today in terms of its national defense vis-a-vis those who might threaten the Ireland security.

As a result of the trips to Beijing and Moscow, we have a situation today which I described when I returned from Moscow as being one in which we had time and we had more reason for hope and less reason for complacency.

Now that seems to be contradictory, but I...

They hope, for reasons that have been so broadly expounded upon in the nation's press, that the economy needs very little attention here.

People see the United States being one of the leaders of the most populous nation in the world, one which presently has nuclear power, but which with a billion people in 20 years will be a major

I see the President of the United States meeting in Moscow with the leaders of the Soviet Union.

They're entering into a number of agreements, many in the non-military field, two in the military field, one...

a limitation of defensive nuclear weapons to carry offensive weapons, certain types of offensive weapons.

There is actually an immediate reaction on the part of people who are somewhat unsophisticated, somewhat along these lines.

They sort of start with the proposition, well, maybe it's all in a bad dream.

We've kind of misjudged some of this.

and that they really aren't all that bad, and that we just have a chance to get to know each other, that the deeper defenses against potential Soviet aggression or, for that matter, the world, some way go away, and that really,

The fact that we have had, since World War II, a crisis after crisis, including a war in Korea and then a war in Vietnam, including flare-ups in the Mideast, let alone such incidences as what, in San Diego,

the situation in such areas as China, Slovakia, Hungary, etc.

The idea would be that if all of these things could have been avoided, had the American leaders and the Soviet leaders, and of course later on the American leaders and the Chinese leaders, if they were that way, I can assure you that

to go before a group of Americans, and particularly young Americans, and say, look, kids, I can assure you that there's no reason for any kind of differences.

Just provided that we understand each other.

Everybody would say, thank God, because that's what we like to think, that this is the best of all possible worlds.

And then with understanding and all that sort of thing.

The only difficulty with that is it's not true.

And so we can't say that.

In fact, we must make sure that there is no euphoria.

That doesn't mean that you're pessimistic about it.

Because what we come down to here is this situation.

The communist system of the Soviet Union and the communist system of the people from all over China stands for a philosophy of government and for a foreign policy that is different from ours and generally very antagonistic to ours.

Basically, they need to believe in the expansion of that system.

What has changed to an extent is that each, for its own reason, may not feel that resort to force for the purpose of effecting the expansion of communism may be too dangerous a policy for their own purposes.

Out of certain senses, we have a unique opportunity in the world today.

If we're very pragmatic about an opportunity, the United States, at a time when the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have very deep differences between themselves, even though they share the same

political and social and economic philosophy, that the United States, by developing a better relationship with each, or at least a communication with each, can contribute to what is really a more peaceful world.

That's really what's happening here.

Perhaps in another way, the situation with regard to the people in public, kind of put yourself in the position of their leaders, they look around, they see the Soviet Union on the east, with more divisions aligned against China than there are against Western Europe.

They see the Indians to the south with 500 million people with an antagonistic attitude toward them.

They see in the northeast the Japanese, this third most powerful economic nation in the world today, soon to become the second.

with no military capability, whatever, but the Chinese have a long memory.

The Japanese have invaded and settled them up, and they've been a militaristic nation in power.

This is with the Chinese, not the way the Japanese might feel.

And so they wondered about their future there.

And then they see the United States.

And so here the United States,

according to their ideology, should be their major enemy in the world, turns out to be a nation with whom a policy of non-enmity, at the very least, and possible in some areas cooperation, is indispensable to their survival.

And the United States, of course, is perfectly willing to have this kind of a policy provided they are interested in and confine their efforts to the development of their system within their own country and not to expansion of their own desires.

uh, as their neighbors might have, you know, you know, what they may rather certainly now begin to realize that the United States has no, has no desire to impose its system on any Asian country, and least of all, of course, on the Chinese in the day.

The U.S. is in a position where the situation they were in at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis has been substantially changed.

At the time, the American advantage in nuclear weapons was so overwhelming, it was about at least 10 to 1, that there was no way that they could react.

They couldn't possibly do it.

So they determined immediately after that at a time when the United States

proves its own weapons development.

As a matter of fact, as you know, there have been new weapons developed in the United States since 1966, and the lead advantage is no even, public speaking.

There's some areas in land-based missiles where they may be ahead.

There could be some where we don't use the lead for other reasons.

General Haig is probably a purely substantial advantage the United States has as weapons.

Well, according to the rest of the warheads, where we're

because of our ability to curve aside from the rest, we have a very substantial advantage.

Perhaps, again, put yourself in the position of Soviet Union, quite aware of the same facts that I'm aware of, that at this time, with the two superpowers relatively equal in terms of their capacity to attack or defend in the event of a nuclear confrontation,

They know very well that it would be a conflict which needed to be dealt with.

Now, for example, the Soviet leader would know that just to pick a number out of a hat, that if he were decided on a preemptive strike against the United States and on a prisoner of war policy, they might kill 70 million Americans.

but it also killed 70 million Russians.

We know exactly the same thing.

So what kind of a policy is that?

That's why the very thought of a policy now has simply relied alone on nuclear capability on the ground, although we have enough to impose unacceptable damage upon the Soviet Union, and that's all you need.

That's why that's no foreign policy at all, because it means that without the option, the option of, say, the sixth fleet in the Mediterranean, which the insurers that are moving into that area, which is very, very important, which to the communications assignment and its office to charge the prices, what most recently happened.

uh, and later on, we, uh, I mean, uh, others, which, for example, it shows the necessity to maintain a strong navy.

It shows the necessity to maintain not forces of the magnitude we had to have during the Korean conflict, but it is the forces to, throughout the entire world, the United States can keep the commitments without necessarily

having to resort to the nuclear alternative.

Let me put it another way.

If the United States, if the United States

with all the commitments we have around the world, had only been the weird alternative.

I think Davis would not be able to keep his commitments to his allies around the world, but very, very coldly, what president of the United States is going to risk New York, Washington, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, etc.,

in order to save some other country?

That's a very critical question.

It's a question that we trust we do not have to answer, but it is one of the reasons why, that in this period of time, in order to have incredible foreign policy,

The United States needs a mix.

We need adequate professional forces.

And we need a nuclear deterrent.

Because we must not be in a position where the United States is the only nation in the free world with the capacity to deter the other superpower.

Where the United States is ever behind

I say this not simply because we always must be number one, but I say it because if the United States is the second most powerful nation in the world, it would have the effect.

of frightening terror in the hearts of many of our allies around the world.

That is why the United States needs to maintain, in this particular time, the strength necessary to keep its commitments.

It needs to maintain it, because that is the way to keep the peace of the world.

I'm not suggesting by this that the Soviet leaders, Chinese leaders, are ready to embark on some

a completely reckless policy of starting a nuclear combination.

They are not, because they're pragmatic about everything else.

And they're not going to start anything if the cost is too great, if the risk is too great.

But it's our job to make the risk too great.

Because one thing we can say for ourselves, we may have many false foreign policy eyes, but there is no nation in the world, I've talked to Tito, to Chescu, and all the small nation leaders, and the leaders, and so forth, in the world, critically speaking, may be a policy in the United States that thinks that the United States wants to impose its system on anybody else.

I've said we maintain our strength, regardless of keeping the peace,

rather than breaking it and defending it, destroying it.

With all this in mind, therefore, we have to maintain this strength.

Maintain it if we want peace in the world.

Maintain it also if we want security for America.

And then, of course, there's another fundamental reason.

The first step in the field of arms control is a very important step.

You raise concerns about it as to whether or not you want this one or that one, whether this is dangerous or not.

General Hayden has any questions on that.

What we bear in mind is that the limitation on defensive nuclear weapons and the limitation that we have agreed to on offensive weapons

is first, only a limitation, it does not reduce them.

And second, as far as offensive weapons are concerned, it covers only some categories of weapons, and it's only temporary for five years.

Fortunately, as far as we're concerned, it does not limit us in any field that we're building in.

It doesn't when the Soviets are building in, because we have no new offensive weapons coming off the line for the next years.

Under these circumstances, therefore, if we are going to go to another step, as we hope to do, and negotiate with the Soviet Union, and overhaul limitation on all Nazi weapons, there is no way that the Soviet Union will negotiate such a limitation unless we have something to give and they have something to get.

I'll put it another way.

If we had not started the APM, there would be no agreement with the Soviet Union today.

Because we were doing something there that they wanted to stop and limit.

And so consequently, they were willing to negotiate another area.

If on the other hand, at the present time, the United States

uh, decides, well, because we've had this first step on women in weapons, uh, we're now in this phenomenon of freeing all our other programs and hope for the goodwill of the Soviet Union, and they're not going to go ahead.

If we do that, then, we then, by that very action, will have, can be consigning the United States to second place behind the Soviet Union, with the gap growing and growing.

Because there was no question about what Mr. Greshner said when I talked to him hour after hour after hour.

We made the agreements.

They were tough, hard-headed deals.

He argued for what I wanted.

But he also left no question that in those areas that were not covered, they were going to continue to build.

And I left no question but that we would.

Having in mind, in fact, that that provided an incentive for both of us

if it is possible or feasible to do so and have implementation in the future.

I would put it as this way.

It is for the United States to have a credible foreign policy for us to be able to maintain the role of which is ours because of the action of history to maintain of aggression around the world.

It is essential that we have an adequate defense.

It is essential also in another sense if we want our exploitation and

if we want to build what we have begun on this trip to Moscow, if we want a further agreement, it is essential that the United States not go there with no bargaining session, because it's like anything else.

And if you've been in labor negotiations or in business negotiations or anything else, you don't get anything from the other side, even when you're dealing as friends, unless you've got something that he wants from you.

And when you're dealing with a potential address center, that's the way it works.

It's just a cold turkey proposition.

Let me say one word about Vietnam and the conclusion.

It's been a very difficult war for all Americans.

I just gave a West Portland answer.

Third O.P.

Buster, he's retired today.

I agree.

I was reminded of the fact, as I gave it to him, I thought of the fact that I had met him in 1964, the first year I arrived in Vietnam.

And in that time, in 1964, so much was recorded.

why, whether it was worth it or not.

The only thing that I can tell you is that at this particular time, in this war, in which we are in the United States, as we now are in a position, and this is the case, where militarily the enemy clearly cannot win.

Where, from all other standpoints, there's any question that that would be a successful outcome of the ability of the salary and the agency to maintain our assistance in sight at this particular time, and should there

all the advice of some who say, just get out and let the Congress take over.

The consequences for South Vietnam are well known, as you were saying.

But just leave that out of the picture.

Many of you, we've got enough already.

There's something I can leave with South Vietnam.

Consequences for peace, world, and possessions.

We've got to talk to our allies, our friends, all over the world.

And what we have here, for example, is a situation created by the United States, or refuses to lead to a successful conclusion.

Difficult as it is, a struggle to

and a communist conquest of a nation as well.

It will encourage that activity a little bit more because we provide the arms there and the works there.

They'll try it next on an accelerated basis in a very good place on committees where possibly we would not be able

Under these circumstances, therefore, we believe that we now are coming to the end of a long, difficult road.

Our policies at this time will bring success.

provided we have the support from the American people.

And I respect, however, that as we come to this particular create, this circulated election year, we'd like to find perhaps an easy way

and bring them to a conclusion.

And you have to be sure we would like to be in your office, not having been here when the war began, not having made the decisions which would have got us involved and so forth.

Of course, that is the worst thing in the world for me to have done, was to say, break the boy's home, blame it on my predecessors, and be a hero.

Well, it isn't worth it being a hero at the expense of losing the country.

It's all when I ordered the mining of Haipa on May 8th.

I heard from every one of the radio and news figures.

It's all came out.

I think about 90% of them would call and say, terrible mistake, all that sort of thing.

Won't work.

Of course, it has worked for me.

That's part of the math.

They all said it.

This blows us up.

And we've done it simply because of the President's stubborn desire to see to it that the war in Vietnam is brought to a successful conclusion.

I suppose that instead of doing what we did, it was a hard decision.

A hard decision, too.

Let us suppose that instead of doing it, we had done nothing.

And let us suppose that in the three weeks between May 8th, the time I took off to Moscow and arrived in the Kremlin, that the North Vietnamese station, which was rolling along at a rapid pace on May 7th, had continued to roll.

I suppose anarchy of the consortium have been sweeping through Kuwait and moving towards Saigon at that time.

And Russia, no way.

What we have to realize is that the only reason, and I emphasize this point, that the Chinese want to talk to us, and the only reason the Russians want to talk to us, is that they consider that where we're talking to

Now, in considering us, we're talking to us in a Chinese way.

The Chinese would not consider us what we're talking to at a time when basically they are seeking a relationship with us because of their fear of some of their other neighbors.

They'd consider even talking to us if they thought we were unreliable.

And so, even though they may object, as they do publicly, to our alliance with Japan, to our support of South Korea, and to our support of South Vietnam, if the United States were to run out of its commitments in other parts of the world, you'd be quite sure that the desire of the Chinese leaders and who came to talk to us would be substantially down.

Listen to the Russians.

As far as the Soviets are concerned, they want to talk to us for their own reasons.

Perhaps they're concerned about the future of what a million Chinese or a billion Chinese on our border are concerned with.

We're concerned about the hopelessness of a race in which no one can win, where we just build and build and build, but nobody's going to get an advantage.

It's a danger that eventually it could explode.

through some act of madness, one Catholic or another, in a nuclear destruction.

But again, if the Soviet leader is ever defined by the President of the United States, represents a nation that is weaker than theirs, or represents a nation, even though it is as strong as theirs,

does not have the will to use its strength to keep its commitments around the world, the chance of making an agreement is kind of a legal support policy in my opinion.

So what I would simply say in conclusion here is that as leaders of veterans organizations,

must sometimes take a lot of heat for the country.

But I can only assure you that there was never a time in this country

The cause, not a war, but a peace, needed a stronger defense form.

We are, we are doing as nations, doing everything we can to bring a war to a conclusion on the most generous terms, in my opinion, ever granted in the history of war.

We are on both sides, and we have a purpose for it.

we can, I think too, we're in a position where as far as our strength is concerned, we're maintaining it, maintaining it, only on the basis of keeping the peace, and with a total willingness to talk to our adversaries wherever they are in the world, and on a mutually agreed basis, to limit our strength, to limit strength, and eventually to reduce it, provided it's mutual.

But the other side of the coin is that we must remember that since World War II, due to the fact that as a result of World War II, the British had had it, the French had had it, the Germans had had it, the Japanese had had it as great powers.

I don't mean that they couldn't become great powers, but the Japanese can't be allowed under their treaty, the Germans can't be allowed under theirs, the French and the British, two generations, twice destroyed, one in World War I, one in World War II.

So all the action's here.

And so we have one of those situations where if the United States does not maintain its current, then the chance for a peaceful world, many generations from now, is really blown altogether.

And so my main responsibility in this chair is to be sure that in the years ahead, that whoever is the President of the United States does not preside over a country that is not as strong as any other nation in the world, and that is not respected by other nations in the world.

That's why whoever is President of the Democratic Republic must unite to wait in respect for this office, to believe in the strength of the United States of America.

That's really what we're talking about.

Thank you.

Well, gentlemen, we always give a little gift to the fellows that come down here.

This is not much, but it's a non-partisan gift.

And no name on it.

These are the presidential seal of the company.

It's done in living color.

So we're just going to make it.

I thought it was gold or something like that.

Good luck to you.

Thank you.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, sir.

Great wine, sir.

I appreciate it.

Great wine.

Well, we, uh, we're trying to get it all out there.

We, uh...

The press is so dynamic.

Thank you.

Thank you for all your help.

That press is so dynamic, dynamically against us, solidly.

We're going to have a problem, I'm afraid.

But I hope it works.

Yeah, no, no, I can't do it.

What worries me is we're going to have no problem with it.