Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 133 › Conversation 133-020
Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Japanese-American relations
Thursday, June 8, 1972 · 4:27 PM–4:31 PM ET · Camp David Study Table · 5 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss the strategic importance of Kissinger’s upcoming trip to Japan, focusing on reassuring the Japanese while leveraging the visit to influence Chinese and Soviet relations. They review recent diplomatic channels with the Soviet Union, specifically noting the establishment of a productive, high-level personal relationship with Leonid Brezhnev. Additionally, they critique a draft foreign policy speech for being overly idealistic, agreeing that it requires more realistic language to differentiate their administration’s stance from the perceived surrender-oriented policies of George McGovern.
- Japanese-American relations
- US-Soviet relations
- Foreign policy rhetoric
- George McGovern
- Diplomatic strategy
Audio
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.
Download transcript (.txt) · JSON data
· Click a timestamp to play from that point; the page address then links to that moment (e.g. #t=125).
Each line starts with a timestamp button; press it to play the audio from that point.
Yeah.
Mr. President?
Well, you're just about off, huh?
That's right.
I'm on the way.
Oh, good.
Well, sorry you have to do it, but you may find that the fact that you don't have the damn pressure on this trip won't be nearly as hard on you in a sense, you know.
I think the combination of a long trip and terrible pressure, you know, is very hard.
I know, for example, when I finish a political campaign, even though I've
It isn't the traveling.
It's the fact I've been under very, very heavy pressure.
And, you know, if you go on a vacation, take a long trip, you don't feel that bad, you know?
That's right.
And it will do some good.
Oh, of course it will.
What I meant is, though, you can handle it.
You don't have to prepare for it like you do the others, you know what I mean?
I mean, you know the Japanese situation like the back of your hand.
Right.
And you're not going to have those damned all-night sessions and all that sort of thing.
No, and nothing depends on it.
yeah well i mean then it's not going to be sure but what i meant is it's a kind of a thing where just the fact that you're going and being available and talking to them and holding their hands is a good thing and it's going to it's going to be good it'll worry the chinese and worry the russians and that's good that's right and reassure the japanese a little
Well, I tell you, that conversation with Sabrina was amazing.
Yeah, I was so interested in that.
He really felt that the personal relationship had been established.
That's right.
He said that is the key thing.
And now that's not what he thought.
That's what Bresnan is telling you, that the message from Bresnan.
Oh, I see.
Well, that's important.
That's important.
And also it's important that he feels that he has the same relation with you because that means you can take that next trip and it'll just be like...
You know, we really got to come down to it, Henry, that every time, you know, every time some torpedo boat moves into the Chienfuegos, I can't get into it.
And now we've got a relationship established where you can.
That's right.
See what I mean?
i mean you have before but now he knows and we need to do that because normally you'd have your secretary of state for that sort of thing but they know that that has no credibility that's right he told me off the record he said kosygin was appalled at how little ranches knew about the trade thing is that right yeah yeah because he knew everything about it and uh and uh
Well, one thing about it, Peterson will be well prepared.
He'll do a good job.
Oh, he'll be.
Incidentally, I was interested in your reaction to that speech thing.
I know that Bob told you, but I had told him, or I had read it, and I didn't want to bother you.
And I said, Bob, I just read this thing, and it's just too damn euphoric, I think.
But I should see what Henry's reaction is without telling you what mine is.
And yours is exactly the same.
Exactly, almost verbatim.
I said it to you first.
And the point that I'm concerned about is that
why it is that our speechwriters, after they have worked on speeches with me, you know, every one that I've made, and I keep thinking about why do they always come up with the same stuff, Henry?
I don't know, you know?
Well, that's their basic conviction, but it also supports the point we were discussing yesterday.
Yeah.
The degree to which you have pulled this government along.
In other words, if I were to just follow it, I could go off and read this.
That's what most people would do.
And it's another good speech, you know.
It's a happy speech.
It'll sound nice to the Rotarians.
That's right.
And it'll say, gee, things have all changed and the world was different.
For example, I would have thought that any speechwriter would have put in when they said how much the world would change.
Let's also remember, however, that the world has not changed in certain respects.
Our philosophies are very different.
We have very great differences.
You know what I mean?
You've got to put that in.
And there are realistic people on both sides who have a different view of the world.
And just getting to know each other isn't going to settle it.
These agreements isn't going to assure it.
Well, you know what I mean.
It's just one of those things that it's...
It just shows you, too, Henry, that on all that stuff, we just got, in the foreign policy, we just got to watch every word.
That's exactly right.
Because all of a sudden it'll slip by, and some jackass statement will be made that we shouldn't want to make.
Exactly.
As you say, this speech is practically one that McGovern could make.
That's right.
Huh?
Except for a few pages at the end.
Oh, yeah, yeah, where we threw in...
But we should start going after McGovern, Mr. President.
Yeah, I think so.
Yeah.
Because basically his whole attitude was the white flag and going to Hanoi.
Your line about that, good God, we could have gotten that in Paris.
But we don't have to go.
You don't have to go to Hanoi to surrender.
That's right.
To put up that flag and... Well, anyway, have a good trip.
All right, thank you.
Bye-bye.
NARA Description
On June 8, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone at Camp David from 4:27 pm to 4:31 pm. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 133-020 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 133-20
Date: June 8, 1972
Time: 4:27-4:31 pm
Location: Camp David Study Table (telephone)
The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.
[See Conversation No. 193-27]
Kissinger's forthcoming trip to Japan
-Pressure
-Nixon’s view
-Agenda
Japanese-American relations
-Importance of Kissinger's trip
-People's Republic of China [PRC]-US relations
-US-Soviet Union relations
Kissinger's talk with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-Leonid I. Brezhnev's message to President
-US-Soviet Union relations
-Kissinger
-Cienfuegos, Cuba
-William P. Rogers
-Alexei N. Kosygin
-Talk with Rogers
-Trade agreement
-Peter G. Peterson's trip to the Soviet Union
President's foreign policy speech
-The President’s view
-Kissinger's reaction
-Tone
-Speechwriters
-Kissinger’s view
-Nixon’s view
-Comparison with George S. McGovern statements
*****************************************************************
[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 12/19/2017.
Segment cleared for release.]
[Personal Returnable]
[133-020-w002]
[Duration: 28s]
1972 campaign
-George S. McGovern
-Trip to Hanoi
-Surrender
*****************************************************************Also recorded on June 8, 1972
- 193-023 3:31 PM · 12 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Thelma C. ("Pat") (Ryan) Nixon met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 3:31 pm and 4:25 pm.
- 193-024 3:31 PM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 3:31 pm and 4:25 pm.
- 133-018 4:25 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone at Camp David from 4:25 pm to 4:26 pm.
- 193-025 4:25 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 4:25 pm to 4:26 pm.
- 133-019 4:26 PM · 5 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 4:26 pm and 4:27 pm.
- 193-026 4:26 PM · 59 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 4:26 pm and 4:27 pm.
- 193-027 4:27 PM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 4:27 pm to 4:31 pm.
- 193-028 4:31 PM · 37 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 4:31 pm and 5:20 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 133-020, June 8, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/133-020 (accessed October 8, 2026).