Conversation 018-047

TapeTape 18StartMonday, January 10, 1972 at 4:12 PMEndMonday, January 10, 1972 at 4:27 PMTape start time01:34:23Tape end time01:49:46ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Laird, Melvin R.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone

On January 10, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Melvin R. Laird talked on the telephone from 4:12 pm to 4:27 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 018-047 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 18-47

Date: January 10, 1972
Time: 4:12 pm - 4:27 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Melvin R. Laird.

[See Conversation No. 313-21H]

     Appointments
         -[David] Kenneth Rush
              -Talk with the President
                    -Forthcoming talk with Laird
                          -Conflict of interest
              -Knowledge
                    -Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions [MBFR]
                    -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
                    -Government
              -Respect for Laird
              -Laird’s forthcoming talk with Rush
              -John N. Mitchell
              -Business background
                    -Union Carbide
              -Work with the Department of Defense
                    -Procurement
                          -Robert C. Moot
              -Laird's conversation about Rush, William J. Porter
              -Work on Germany
              -Relationship
              -Talk with David Packard
              -Intelligence
              -Jane (Smith) Rush
                    -Barbara Laird
              -Desire to stay in Bonn
                    -Mitchell
              -Trustworthiness
              -Forthcoming meeting with Laird
              -Conflict of interest
                    -Mitchell
                    -Forced sale of assets

                       -Capital gains tax
                       -Packard
            -Financial holdings
                 -Stocks
                       -Union Carbide
                 -Disposal
                       -John C. Stennis
                 -Union Carbide
                       -Defense contracts

Vietnam
     -Troop withdrawals
           -Henry A. Kissinger’s talk with Laird
           -Numbers
                 -Forthcoming announcement
                       -Timing
                 -Statement in April
           -Vietnamization
           -Number
                 -Change in monthly rate
           -Laird's briefing
     -Laird's briefing
           -North Vietnamese offensive
                 -Tet
                 -South Vietnamese counter-offensive
                       -Cambodia, Laos
                 -US responses
                       -Air power
           -Tone
                 -Congress
                 -Confidence
                 -Vietnamization
           -North Vietnamese actions
                 -South Vietnam
                 -Laos
                 -Cambodia

Laos
       -Bombing
           -Tonnage
                -B’52s
           -Effectiveness

                 -Reports

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-012. Segment declassified on 10/17/2017. Archivist: AY]
[National Security]
[018-047-w001]
[Duration: 4s]

      Laos
               -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]
                      -Quality of reports

******************************************************************************

     Laos
            -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]
                 -Quality of reports
                        -G. McMurtrie Godley
                 -Psychological impact

     Troop withdrawal announcement
          -The President’s instructions to Gerald L. Warren
          -Laird's briefing
                -Meeting with the President
                -The President's role
                      -Possible diplomatic efforts
                            -Prisoners of war [POWs]
                -Taping for TV

     Rush

     Leak
            -Laird’s and Mitchell’s possible meeting with the President
            -[Yeoman Charles E. Radford]
            -Damage
            -Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]
            -The President’s view

              -Previous administrations
          -Admiral Robert O. Welander

     Laird's briefing
           -Meeting with the President
           -Subject
                 -POWs
                      -Deadline
                 -North Vietnamese positions in Paris
                      -George S. McGovern
                      -Nguyen Van Thieu
                      -Bombing
                      -Aid to South Vietnam
                 - North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
                      -Meetings with Porter

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I had a good talk with Rush, and he said he
And I think you will find that in terms of our immediate problems and so forth, if he can work out the conflict of interest thing, that he would work very well.
Here's the point.
There are two or three things that I don't want to talk about in any large forum that I particularly was in.
First of all,
He knows MBFR, which of course is an area where you've got to fight like hell, you know, to drag your feet.
He knows salt due to where he has been, where he also will represent a very strong point of view.
And third, he is a man who knows the government.
In other words, he knows how to operate.
He's a man, he's a great, you know, having worked with you in Europe on two or three things,
great respect for you and he says he just wants to be a team player and he has no ambition to do anything more which is another good thing and I really feel that I want you to have a very good talk with him and if you feel that he could do it and if you can work up to I think Mitchell of course is the expert in conflict of interest he thinks he can he and Mitchell have been
friends in New York for years.
As you know, or as probably you maybe don't know, he has the business background because he was the Chief Executive Officer of Union Carbide, so he knows the business types extremely well.
What he does not know, of course,
is the intricacies of procurement and all that sort of thing, but there you'd have to rely on Mood and your service secretaries, in other words, the team you've already gotten, which actually is what anybody else would have to do.
Well, we've got a good man in Mood, and he'll be very helpful, too.
Right.
I really am very delighted.
You know, I talked earlier with your people over there in the White House about either Porter or Rush Beck seven or eight months ago.
Yeah.
And I kind of got shot down on it.
Yeah.
Well, I think the reason that they shot down Rush was that then we had the German thing.
Yeah, I'm sure.
They couldn't spare him.
But now, the German thing, he's done everything he can in Germany.
We've got to find a good man.
And he's been a terrific combatant.
Well, hasn't he been?
But he told me, I said, because I don't want to.
I don't want to have any situation where in a position that important working with you, you've got some guy you think is not compatible.
He said that he had a totally good relationship with you
And that's what he said.
So if you feel the same way, then I think we could go on it.
But you have a good talk with him tomorrow.
I will.
And I thought it would be all right with you, Mr. President.
I'd have him talk.
I asked Dave to stay over and spend a little time with him tomorrow, too.
I thought it would be well for him to talk to Dave, too.
Oh, of course, of course, to the extent that Dave would be willing.
And so he knows what to do and so forth and so on.
But I think you'll find him totally smart, too, you know.
Well, I like him very much.
I like his wife.
Barbara and I have gotten to know both of them, and we like them very much.
I've only met his wife once, but she seemed to be very nice.
Yes, she's a very good gal.
And when Mitchell checked it out with him, he just asked whether he would be available
Well, Rush says, well, to be perfectly frank with you, he says, I'd a hell of a lot rather stay in Bonn than to be in Washington.
But he says, I will also have to say that my wife would much rather be in Washington than be in Bonn.
So that would be a... Oh, that's a fine solution, Mr. President.
I was only trying to get somebody.
I'll tell you, you really need the help over here.
I know, I know.
And another thing, too, he told me that you had mentioned to him that you wanted to take a...
There wasn't somebody there, so you wouldn't have to keep every nose to the grindstone, and I'm all for that, too, because you haven't gotten away.
And with him, you have a man who's totally trustworthy, who would not make a mistake.
You know what I mean?
He's just too damn smart.
I mean, he's a lawyer, of course, and very cautious in that respect, and he isn't going to go running off.
off the track.
So I think you take a look.
He's seeing you tomorrow, I understand.
Yes, he's coming in here.
That's what I asked him to do.
And so you can talk very frankly with him and straight from the shoulder.
He's that kind of a guy.
And if you can close the deal, fine.
On the conflict of interest thing, you can check with Mitchell to see, or, well, your people will know, too.
But I think Rush is willing to sell whatever he has.
That's too bad.
You know, I wish we could get that capital gains thing fixed so that they wouldn't have to pay capital gains on this for sale.
That's the only problem.
Is that
I don't think, Mel, that Rush, well, maybe this is a bigger problem.
He doesn't have a hell of a lot of money.
But on the other hand, I suppose it's harder for him to lose it than a fellow like Packard.
While a guy like Packard loses more, it hurts him less.
But when a guy's got, say, maybe, well, it sounds like a lot to me, but maybe he's only got $2 or $3 million, it hurts him a lot more to lose a quarter of it than when he's got $300 million.
You know, I went through his holdings with him when I talked back, oh, this was seven or eight months ago.
I talked with him.
He's got 42,000 shares of Union Carbide.
I've got the list of his shares.
I see.
What do you think?
You think you can work them out?
If I can get Stennis to agree to give them six months, that would help them an awful lot.
Oh.
Well, you might be able to do that.
I think I could.
I'm going to try.
There sure isn't a...
Does Union Carbide...
I wouldn't think... That's a big... All of our batteries in all of our tanks, we've got all sorts of business with them.
So that would be... And...
Our contractors are big with them.
I see.
I see.
Well, that's the thing.
But we'll work that out, Mr. President.
You shouldn't have to worry about that.
If we can get them to come aboard.
Now, the other thing is this that I wanted to talk to you about.
I understand Henry's talked to you, but I wanted to do it directly in terms of the
on this withdrawal thing now i think we've got to go just a little above what we've done previously and i know it's a tough time but uh it seems to me that uh that uh that the 70 000 number uh and the way i was thinking i wanted to do it was to was that i would just announce 70 000
by May 1st, and then have you brief on it, you see.
And my tentative thinking was to do it Thursday at the White House so that you catch the 11 o'clock.
My feeling is that 70,000 is about 1,000 to 1,500
above the other number.
But then in April, then we have to make the Fisher cut date statement, depending upon that.
But I didn't talk to Henry, but I understand that you've had some doubts about whether we go that high.
I always wonder whether we can go at high at all, because I know they're mounting, you know, they've got all these new people and everything there.
But the way things are now, there isn't a hell of a lot that that many can do anyway.
No, we can do it.
But can you handle the 70?
We can handle it.
And also, I think it would put us in a very bad position, because both you and I have indicated that the atomization is working, that we're able to
go up a little.
What is 70,000?
That would be three and a what?
That's 20... Well, it's about 20...
It's less than 25.
It's 23.
23.
And our number before, it's 23 and a half.
So we're up 1,000.
About 1,000 a month more or something.
And that's a damn good number.
That's down to 69.
And then April 15th, we will take another look.
And this is, we're gonna have some, I think in the briefing when I get in, I think I should,
The people know that they're going to, South Vietnamese are going to take a few bumps in the night.
Yes.
I think you could, when you come over, we'll talk a little about it, too, and then you can give me an indication.
But what I had in mind was that you would indicate that there will be, that the present indications are that the North Vietnamese are
are, as is the custom at this time of year, building up for their usual tele-offensive.
But this year, the South Vietnamese are going to have to meet the responsibility of meeting that offensive.
That is, that they will also launch an offensive in Cambodia, just as they have already launched one in Laos.
and that our efforts in this respect will be concentrated by the use of our air, that we will continue to, you know what I mean?
But I think you should prepare for that.
But on the other hand,
I think it's very important to give, as the Congress comes back, and with all the possibility of resolutions and with deadlines and the rest, to give a feeling of confidence.
I can do that.
Because, goddammit, we've done a hell of a job here, as you well know.
And this Vietnamization program, nobody thought we'd be this far along.
And if they come back to say, well, why did you have the airstrike?
We can certainly see why now, can't we?
Yeah.
Well, I am confident, and I have no problems at all on that, Mr. President.
I'm sure the North Vietnamese will try one or two spectaculars, but that's all.
And I think you should say that.
We should expect them, and that all battles are not won, but that the South Vietnamese will prevail.
They are now strong enough to defend themselves, you should say.
On the other hand, as you well know,
What happens in Laos and Cambodia is a tough one.
Well, it's important and also questionable.
But let's just hope to God that I would think, I don't know what you think, that what the South Vietnamese can do in the Cambodian area should be able to keep that from going under.
Would you not think so or not?
Yes, I do.
Laos is another thing.
Laos is pretty tough.
You know, we put 2,000 tons of B-52s in there in the last two weeks of bombs.
And I'm not sure... Did any good?
I'm not sure, Mr. President.
I hope it did, but, you know, I'm... Where did they land?
I don't know.
They must have... See, we're bombing.
We can't get the reports from our pilots, and I'm trying to get reports from...
But you have to get that out.
Isn't the reason that we just don't have people around that can see it?
Right.
And I suppose they've got them well camouflaged, controlled, and so forth.
The psychological impact of that must be worth something.
2,000?
Jesus, that's a lot of stuff.
Jesus.
Those are just P-52s in Alaska.
Is that right?
Yeah.
Mm-hmm.
Well, okay.
My feeling now, my feeling is that we will, I told Warren today to just say we would have another announcement before the end of the month.
That's why I'm leaving it.
But for your information, I think if you could come over, let's figure it for the 11 o'clock briefing here.
which mean that you and i should get together say 10 30 all right and we'll have a meeting and then i will walk out with you and make a one sentence statement that we are we're reducing to 69 000 ceiling by may 1st and that the
and that the Secretary of Defense will brief you now on the details, and I'll walk out and then let you do the thing.
See, the reason I don't want to do it, one reason is that I've got to be in a position to say something on the diplomatic front maybe in the near future, and I don't want to talk about the...
prisoners for deadline, all that sort of thing, and what you can handle, you've been handling it, and I think you can handle it again.
Does that sound all right to you as a game plan?
Right.
Now, we'll do this on, we'll do this live.
This will be, not live, but we'll do it taped for television.
Right.
So it'll be, it'll
be a way to get our story off on Thursday.
All right.
Okay.
I hope Rush works out.
Oh, I'm sure he'll work out.
There's one thing that I hope that John Mitchell and I sometime can sit out and visit with you about the political problem that might come up.
on this other matter that I've been talking with the Attorney General about.
Oh, yeah.
We've got to have a game plan on that, Mr. President.
You mean this leak?
Yeah.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
But that's something...
I guess the fellow they think did it is gone now, but we don't know how far along.
But that just bothers me knowing the kind of things that we're going through.
A hell of a thing, yeah.
A hell of a thing, yeah.
You can imagine sort of the pain it causes us because of me, because I, you know, it's really unconscionable, but we can't do anything because you can't blow that, we can't hurt the chiefs, that's the point, you know what I mean?
Oh, I understand.
It'd be a terrible thing.
I mean, what we did, Mel, here, I think is just inherit a situation that,
that they just continued.
They'd been doing it with the previous administration.
They just continued with this one.
Don't you think that's it?
Yeah, well, and they got a little, they carried a little further in the last 10 months since this Wellander Admiral was over there, I'm sure.
Wellander?
I don't know him.
They've gone a little too far.
Yeah, well, but you and John and I will have a talk about it at some point.
We ought to.
In the meantime, if you could prepare your Q&A and discuss it with me at 1030 so that...
We can say you discussed to him, you know, and all that sort of thing.
And then the toughest one is the prisoner for deadline in one sense, but in another sense not, because the North Vietnamese...
have withdrawn.
I mean, they have flatly said that they will accept nothing.
No, I think that was taken care of last week.
But I think you should emphasize that point.
Sure.
Emphasize the point that not only last week, but back in October when that screwball McGovern is over there, the next day in their conference they said, no, you've got to overthrow Q and stop the bombing and stop all aid to South Vietnam.
which is an entirely different thing than prisoners for deadline.
Well, every time I've gone to NATO, I've met with Porter and before that with the other representatives, and I've followed that closely, and that record is very clear.
So I don't think I have to back away from that one bit.
All right.
Well, we'll see you Thursday at 10.30 then, unless something comes up.
All right.
Thank you.
Thank you.