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Conversation 181-002

TapeTape 181StartSunday, October 15, 1972 at 9:30 AMEndSunday, October 15, 1972 at 10:55 AMParticipantsHaldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  Camp David Operator;  [Unknown person(s)];  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceCamp David Study Desk
AudioNARA Description

On October 15, 1972, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Camp David operator, unknown person(s), and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 9:30 am and 10:55 am. The Camp David Study Desk taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 181-002 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 181-2

Date: October 15, 1972
Time: Unknown between 9:30 am and 10:55 am
Location: Camp David Study Desk

H.R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked with the Camp David operator.

[See Conversation No. 220-12A]

         Request for a call to Henry A. Kissinger

An unknown person talked with Haldeman at an unknown time between 9:30 am and 10:55 am.

         Kissinger

Haldeman talked with Kissinger at an unknown time between 9:30 am and 10:55 am.

         The President's request for a meeting with Kissinger at Camp David
             -Haldeman's location
             -Necessity
             -Possible telephone call
    -Kissinger's schedule
    -Necessity
    -Possible alternative

Vietnam negotiations
    -Status
         -Nguyen Van Thieu's situation
         -Kissinger's role
             -Itinerary
                  -Trip to Saigon
                       -Return to Washington, DC
                             -Delay
                  -Thieu's situation
                       -Military action in South Vietnam
                  -Timing
                       -Effect on negotiations
                             -The President's possible speech
                                 -October 31, 1972
                                      -October 25, 1972
                             -1972 election
         -Exchanges
             -Text of possible agreement
    -Soviet Union
         -Kissinger's letter to Leonid I. Brezhnev
    -Kissinger's schedule
         -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
         -Robert S. McNamara
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Southern Solomon, would you get me Dr. Kissinger please?
Thank you, sir.
Okay, thanks.
Hello?
Bob Henry.
Yes.
I'm over at the President's house, and he was wondering if you could come up and chat with him for a bit sometime today.
It's almost.
Well, you know, if he tells me to, I have no choice.
Well...
If it's a problem, why don't you just have a talk on the phone, and I'll suggest that.
Because, you know, I'm in the office with a hundred things to go over.
Yeah.
Okay.
And between you and me, I wanted to rest for a couple of hours, too.
Yeah.
Okay, well, let me see if you can't just do it on the phone.
Try that anyway.
He just thought, you know, you ought to talk over this whole thing, part of what we were talking about last night in the
Yeah, how about first thing in the morning, you know, it doesn't matter when I go.
Oh, okay.
Well, I'll make that point and we'll see what works out.
I'll get back to you.
And I've had yet another idea, which would be an intermediate idea, to keep you from blowing.
I'm pretty persuaded that we should install it beyond the way the momentum is going now.
That's right.
I'd have to put brakes on it in a way that would be transparent.
But one thing that I have thought of doing is go to Saga, come back here,
And then take the same route again next week and just add the final destination.
That would push the whole thing back by six days.
What good does that do?
Well, what it does is save two days.
You know, he wouldn't have been blackjacked into it.
It gives him a few more days to clean up the security area around Saigon.
And it prevents an absolute confrontation next week.
Because you don't know if you're going to have one.
That could be a fallback position, too.
That's what I mean.
No, if he goes along enthusiastically, we stick to the schedule.
If he stonewalls, we have no choice except to break off anyway.
But this would be an intermediate to that.
This would be an intermediate to that, that I'd come back and Saturday night I'd be back and go on the road again Tuesday with the same itinerary.
The only thing is, the president would then speak on the 31st rather than on the 25th.
Now...
It has the additional advantage, as I see it, politically.
Not that it's closer to the election, but that if anything gets unstuck, there's less time for it.
That's not valuable.
What?
I don't think that's...
I think there are more negatives to that than positives.
In weighing one side versus the other.
But that...
That's a better position than just dropping it at that point, probably.
That's what you're saying, yeah.
See, the problem is, Bob, I've reviewed all the exchanges.
We have used these time schedules really ruthlessly to get changes in the text that otherwise would take weeks to get.
Now I'm doing a letter to Brezhnev for the president today to get some indication of Soviet supplies.
Yeah.
You know, just to button up the agreement.
Yeah.
And, you know, the more time we can get, the better it is.
Okay.
Okay, but if you can spare me a trip up there, I'd really appreciate it, because I couldn't leave before two anyway.
Okay.
I've got Abrams and everyone else coming in.
Okay.
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