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Conversation 194-027

TapeTape 194StartSunday, June 25, 1972 at 10:30 AMEndSunday, June 25, 1972 at 6:10 PMTape start time04:01:22Tape end time04:11:34ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Colson, Charles W.Recording deviceCamp David Hard Wire
AudioNARA Description

On June 25, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 10:30 am and 6:10 pm. The Camp David Hard Wire taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 194-027 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 194-27

Date: June 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:30 am and 6:10 pm
Location: Camp David Hard Wire

The President dictated a memorandum to Charles W. Colson.

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[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 05/20/2019.
Segment cleared for release.]
[Personal Returnable]
[194-027-w001]
[Duration: 5m 56s]

       1972 election
              -George S. McGovern
                     -June 25, 1972 Washington Post article
                            -Identifying himself with Dwight D. Eisenhower
                                    -Military and foreign policy
                            -Media
                                    -Perceived left-wing bias
                     -Administration's response
                            -Alfred Gruenther
                                    -Political involvement
                                    -Bryce N. Harlow follow-up
                            -Arthur W. Radford
                                    -Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff
                                    -Containment
                                    -Massive retaliation

                                       (rev. Jan-02)

                     -Policy of massive retaliation
                            -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                            -Compared to Dwight D. Eisenhower’s policy
                            -John F. Kennedy administration
                            -Cuban Missile Crisis
                            -US military superiority
                                     -Deterred aggression
                            -Mutual suicide
                     -Containment of Communism
                            -Europe
                            -Quemoy and Matsu
                            -Crisis in the Middle East
                            -Vietnam
                                     -South Vietnam
                                     -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                            -George S. McGovern's policy
                                     -Unilateral disarmament
                                             -Surrender
                            -Communism
                            -Vietnam
                     -Potential letter from Arthur W. Radford to Washington Post
                            -Preparation
                            -Patrick J. Buchanan or William L. Safire
                            -Henry A. Kissinger
                                     -Check for substance not style
                     -Potential speech from Barry M. Goldwater, Sr.
                            -Dwight D. Eisenhower's memory

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Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

There was a piece of the Washington Post this morning, Sunday, but that were intended to associate himself with Eisenhower's military and foreign policy period.
To any sophisticated person, this is almost a
so ridiculous to be laughable, right?
On the other hand, we can be sure that the left-wing media will do their very best to try to find out that the governor's really following the line that tries to hardly prove very fair.
This idea of, you know, hurrying hard to entice somebody who is believable, right?
The main thing that comes to mind is Al Brunner.
He is highly respected as Eisenhower's chief of staff, but whether or not he would step up to a political issue this time remains to be seen.
At least he could be checked out, perhaps by somebody like Bryce Harlow, but since Bryce was gone by somebody else, we know his time is of the essence.
Another would be Arthur Radford, who was Eisenhower's chief of staff during the period of the containment policy and the massive retaliation policy.
In fact, period paragraph.
In any event, the lines should be along the following colon paragraph.
America tries to say that the United States should have a policy of massive retaliation at this time, but the Soviet Union would be substantially superior to us
in both the military and conventional forces.
This is totally different from the Eisenhardt concept of massive retaliation period.
In the 1950s, that actually robbed the Eisenhardt administration until, and through the period, even the Kennedy, even the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.
the advantage of the United States over the Soviet Union was so massive that a policy of massive retaliation totally deterred aggression.
In other words, a policy of massive retaliation will only work when you have a massive advantage over your opponent.
A policy of massive retaliation
ends up as a policy of mass, of mutual suicide, of, or of, uh, of mutual suicide, or putting it more bluntly, of national suicide for the United States.
Your, uh, your potential opponent, in this case is Soviet, has forces equal to, or even in some instances superior to your own career.
The other point that should be made is that Eisenhower's policy was one of containment of communism, a policy that was wrongly criticized by all of the MacGyver-type people in the press at that time, and which now they suddenly rediscovered as being something the type of thing that MacGyver and his party supported, period.
In a way, probably, Eisenhower's policy was one of containment of communism, whether it was in Europe, in P.Y.
Mansu, or in the crisis in the Mideast, in the intercession again in 1950 in Britain.
For that matter, it's not very important.
For that matter, in Vietnam, where Eisenhower stood firm
on the side of the South Vietnamese against the Russians that aren't great.
The McGovern policy on the other hand, instead of being a policy of containing communism, is one of surrendering to communism in at least Vietnam.
And if he goes forward with his program of unilateral disarmament, one of the inevitable surrender in the world, period.
How to handle these ideas?
It is the only question, period.
Perhaps the best thing to do is to have Rutger, if you can get him, or Raptor write a letter to the Post
of setting forth tough, hard terms.
Some of these ideas that I am trying to touch upon here have been written by one of our hardliners, Mike McKinnon, not by the softliners.
Henry looked over only for substance, not for style.
Another way to follow up on it is to have Goldwater or somebody of that kind in a strong, hard speech saying, my governor is liable in Eisenhardt and Eisenhardt's memory by attempting to reach out and associate his appeasement, unilateral disarmament policy with the Eisenhardt policy of a strong America and one of containing and stopping communism around the world.
That's the end of the memorandum and the end of the table.
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