Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 220 › Conversation 220-018
Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Peace negotiations
Sunday, October 15, 1972 · 12:00 PM–12:14 PM ET · Camp David Hard Wire · 9 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the ongoing negotiations to end the Vietnam War, emphasizing the necessity of securing a settlement based on its merits rather than political expediency. Nixon explicitly instructed Kissinger to avoid any language suggesting the formation of a coalition government, which he feared would be politically damaging. The two agreed that the primary goal was to bring the conflict to a close, provided the agreement did not result in a collapse of the South Vietnamese government before the upcoming election.
- Vietnam War
- Peace negotiations
- Coalition government
- 1972 election
- Henry Kissinger
Audio
Transcript (AI-generated)
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Oh, yeah.
All right.
I don't want to hear a reading.
Maybe first.
Don't look like you're... Yeah, all right.
I don't know about the political side.
What you see there, from our standpoint, which I want to make sure we're adequately warned on, is the use of the word coalition in any form, shape, whatever.
Oh, I know it isn't in that, but I meant in terms of what the press says, what the public, what is said by either side and so forth.
The point being, the point being, I don't mean what that other side says, but we say the point being that once that is said, then the indication will be by our critics as well.
We've gotten this four years ago.
It's a coalition business.
That's why the coalition thing...
This has got to be, it's got to be in your own briefing.
If you come to a briefing, it's got to be very, very tough.
This is not a coalition government under any circumstances.
Understand that there is a council, a national concourse, and they are going to be, right?
And basically, that is not a government either.
That's quite it, right?
Yeah, but the point that I make is that if you can see, that is the point.
You have to be very careful.
You've got to be straight-arming on that issue so that we don't run into any problems there.
The question you raised earlier with Bob, let me just run over the region, as I did.
first keep it all respectively consideration should be
the year the making of the song the making of a settlement is not going to hurt the election and it's going to help us you know who can tell but the main point is what could hurt really is is to go down the road and then and then fail that is why i think even before going to saigon i would i think we have to be fairly
I'm fairly sure that we have a pretty good chance of making it go.
If you go to Saigon and it doesn't go, of course, then, I mean, you can't really consider going to Hawaii because if you do, then that's going to lead to a point where we just couldn't, we just couldn't spend it.
But if you could go to, and I don't know what, do you think Abrams can do a little softening up before you get there?
I think that's the point.
What does Hugh about whether, well he doesn't know the political thing, but what does Hugh about Hugh's reaction to this?
I don't mean bonkers, I don't mean that, I meant Abrams' view.
That high, because otherwise, that's the fire, and then there's the Jews, the people, the person, you know, being a bit, you know, defensively.
On the other side, there need to be no concern about the political effect.
We just can't think in terms of the fact, well, gee whiz, it would be better not to have this politically.
Sure, it's risky.
We don't need it.
We're going to live without it very heavily.
But the point is that you've got to take a risk to get the damn war over.
And if there's more...
If this is the best settlement we can get, which I think it is, and if this is the best time when the forces will be the strongest to get it, then the thing to do is push it and get it.
That's my attitude.
You see, we're in that situation where we just got it.
So what it really comes down to, Henry, is the merit of the settlement.
If it's the right settlement, then this is the best time to do it now.
If it's the right settlement, we should do it at a later time, put it off as far as the election is concerned.
Don't be bothered with it either way.
There's only one thing on the election that I say, and it would not be fatal, and that would be to have either Q or the North Vietnamese vote.
I agree with that.
That's why I mean, I'm not sure how far you can really insist on the reminders.
So you do the best you can.
We know that, just like you did in Shanghai.
Always.
Sure does.
Well, any event.
Also, you're not too sure what the North Vietnamese are doing.
Look, the main factor is that they, from everything I can see and from what you have said, the North Vietnamese are under great, great pressure to silence it.
Like we do, basically.
Same restraints.
All right.
All right.
It's irrelevant what you settle.
People have to see it.
He decided to relieve in the end, believe me.
He decided to relieve.
The damn thing's got to be brought to an end.
That's what we really come down to.
And so I know that in all these political considerations, you just don't think of those.
Except for the one point saying not to think about it.
Don't let political considerations delay it.
The only thing is, remember that we have no...
We have no pressures to push it.
Either way.
Either way.
We have no pressures to make a settlement.
And so we can do it on the merits, which is a pretty good position for you to be in.
We can do it on the merits.
And the other point is that one pucker, of course, is that we cannot have a collapse of Vietnam prior to the election.
That would be harmful.
It would be harmful.
I don't think it would be harmful.
Q is going to blow it that highly.
We do run the risk, too, that they might decide to go public and say Q is at fault.
However, that's dangerous for them, too, because even with that, we're not going to lose.
Okay.
All right.
Cool.
That has some advantages, but on the other hand, you just do whatever.
You can make the deal, do it now.
If you can't, do the next best thing.
And it's going to be tough today.
Don't even think about it.
Let me say, either has an advantage.
Doing it a little earlier doesn't, uh, it doesn't help either way.
Politically, politically, it would have an advantage only in the sense of the merits.
Because between October 1st and November 7th, there isn't so much time left for it to blow.
That's the only point that I see there.
But that's on the merits again.
So just do it on the merits.
Everything's on the merits.
The hell with politics.
Right.
I understand that.
You should have that flexibility and just keeping it all in terms of just discussing that.
But I think I really feel that we've just got to push this now for all it's worth and think that we can.
Good deal.
All right.
Good luck.
Goodbye.
NARA Description
On October 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 12:00 pm to 12:14 pm. The Camp David Hard Wire taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 220-018 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 220-018
Date: October 15, 1972
Time: 12:00 pm - 12:14 pm
Location: Camp David Hard Wire
The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.
[See Conversation No. 149-14]
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, NARA Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 597542Also recorded on October 15, 1972
- 149-011 11:24 AM · 8 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at 11:24 am.
- 149-012 11:24 AM · 14 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 11:24 am and 11:35 am.
- 149-013 11:24 AM · 12 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 11:24 am and 12:00 pm.
- 220-015 11:24 AM · 5 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at 11:24 am.
- 220-016 11:24 AM · 10 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 11:24 am and 11:35 am.
- 149-014 12:00 PM · 14 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone at Camp David from 12:00 pm to 12:14 pm.
- 220-019 12:14 PM · 17 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 12:14 pm and 7:53 pm.
- 220-020 12:14 PM · 9 min — President Richard M. Nixon met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 12:14 pm and 7:53 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 220-018, October 15, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/220-018 (accessed October 10, 2026).