Nixon, Finch & Haldeman on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Talks

0:45Why don't you talk to him about it?
0:50Well...
1:01Anyway...
1:01This tells the story a little better.
1:08I've asked for this television time tonight to make public a plan for peace which can bring to an end the war in Vietnam.
1:33The operation offers, on behalf of the government of the United States and the government of South Vietnam, a full model of improvement for President Chu, which is both generous and far-reaching.
1:42It is a plan to end the war now.
1:45It includes an offer to withdraw all American forces within six months of an agreement.
1:49Its acceptance would mean the speedy return of all prisoners of war at their homes.
1:54Three years ago, when I took office, there were 515,000 Americans fighting in India now.
1:59The number killed in action was running as high as 300 weeks.
2:02There were no plans to bring any Americans home.
2:05The only thing that had been settled in Paris was the shape of the conference table.
2:09My immediate mood fulfilled the courage I had made the American people to bring about a peace that could last not only for the United States, but for the long-suffering people of Southeast Asia.
2:19There were two honorable paths open to us.
2:22The path of negotiation was and is the path we preferred.
2:26But it takes two to negotiate.
2:27There had to be another way in case the other side refused to negotiate.
2:32That path was called Vietnamization.
2:34This meant training and equipping South Vietnamese to defend themselves and withdrawing Americans as they developed the capability to do so.
2:41The path of Vietnamization had been successful.
2:45Two weeks ago, I announced that by May 1st, American forces would be around to be down to 69,000.
2:51That means only that almost a half a million Americans will have been withdrawn from Vietnam over the past three years.
2:58In terms of American lives, the losses of 300 a week have been reduced by over 95%, now less than 10%.
3:05But the path of vietnamization has been the long voyage home, straining the patients, testing the perseverance of the American people.
3:12What are the shortcomings of the path of negotiations?
3:16The progress there is the discipline.
3:17The American people deserve an accounting of quality.
3:21And I intend to give you that accounting, and so do I, to try to break the deadlock in negotiations.
3:26We have made a series of public proposals designed to bring an end to the conflict.
3:31But early in this administration, after ten months of no progress from the public Paris promise, I became convinced that it was necessary to explore the possibility of negotiating on private channels to see whether it would be possible to get the public deadline.
3:44After consultation with Secretary of State Rogers, our ambassador to Siam, and my chief negotiator in Paris with the full knowledge and approval of President Pugh, I sent Dr. Kissinger to Paris as my personal representative on August 4, 1969, to begin the secret peace negotiations.
4:00Since that time, Dr. Kissinger has traveled to Paris 12 times on these secret missions.
4:07He has met seven times with Lee Doctoe, one of Hanoi's top political leaders.
4:12He has met with Juan Cui alone five times.
4:15That is, this is why I initiated these private negotiations.
4:19Privately, both sides can be more flexible in offering new approaches.
4:23Also, private discussions allow both sides to talk frankly and to take positions free from the pressures of public debate.
4:30Seeking peace in Vietnam and so many lives to save, I felt we could not afford to let any opportunity go by prior to public negotiations.
4:38As I've stated on a number of occasions, I was prepared, remained prepared, to explore any habit of public and private to speed negotiations and end the war.
4:47For 30 months, when I was at Trey Rogers, Dr. Kinser, I were asked about secret negotiations.
4:51We would only say we were pursuing every possible channel, I say to the police.
4:55There was never a leak because we were determined not to jeopardize the negotiation.
4:59Until recently, discourse showed signs of yielding to progress.
5:01Now, however, it is my judgment that the purposeless speech will best be served by bringing out publicly the revolutions we have been making in the past.
5:11Nothing is served by silence on the other side which points our good faith to divide America and to avoid the conquest of it.
5:17Nothing is served by silence that misleads some Americans in accusing their government of failing to do what is already done.
5:25and nothing is served by salvage, and enables the other side to apply possible solutions publicly that it has already rejected privately.
5:33The time has come to lay the record of our secret negotiations on the table.
5:38Just as secret negotiations can sometimes break a public deadline, public disclosure may help to break a secret deadline.
5:45Many Americans who believe what the North Vietnamese led them to believe and charge, the United States has not pursued negotiations extensively.
5:53as the record will show, just the opposite is true.
5:56Questions have been raised as to why we have not proposed the deadline for withdrawing all American forces in exchange for ceasefire and return of our people to war, why we have not discussed the seven-point proposal made by the Viet Cong last July, and why we have not submitted a new plan of our own to move the negotiations off dead silence.
6:14As the private record will show, we have taken all these steps and more, and have been flatly rejected or opposed or ignored by the other side.
6:24On May 31, 1971, eight months ago, at one of the secret meetings in Paris, we offered specifically to agree to a deadline that would draw all American voters in exchange for the release of all persons employed since then.
6:36At the next private meeting, June 26, the North Vietnamese rejected their offer.
6:41They privately proposed instead their own nine-point plan, which insisted that he overthrow the government of South Vietnam.
6:48Five days later, July 1st, the enemy publicly presented a different seven-point, seven-point Vietnam plan.
6:52That was the dilemma.
6:55Which package should we respond to, the public or the secret plan?
7:00July 12th, at another private meeting in Paris, Dr. Kissinger put that question right here in the newsroom.
7:06They said we should deal with their nine-point secret plan because it covered all of China, while the Viet Cong's seven-point public proposal was limited to Vietnam, and that's what we did.
7:16We went beyond that, dealing with some of the points in the public plan that were not covered in secret plan.
7:22On August 16, at another private meeting, we went further and offered a complete withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces within nine months after the agreement.
7:32On September the 13th, the North Vietnamese rejected this proposal.
7:34They continued to insist that we overthrow the South Vietnamese government.
7:38Now, what has been the result of these private efforts?
7:43For months, the North Vietnamese have been derating us at the public sessions for not responding to their side's publicly presented seven points plan.
7:50The truth is, we did respond to them in this plan in a manner they wanted us to respond to.
7:56The full possession of our state response brought the Vietnamese publicly a denouncement for not having responded at all.
8:04They induced many Americans in the press and the Congress to re-equate their propaganda into echoing their propaganda.
8:10Americans who could not know they were being falsely used by the enemy to stir up the business in this country.
8:16I decided in October we should make another attempt to break the deadline.
8:20I consulted with President Chu who concurred fully in a new plan.
8:24On October 11, I sent a private communication to the North Vietnamese that contained new elements that could move negotiations forward and urged the meeting on November 1 between Dr. Kissinger and Special Advisor Lee Doctoe or some other appropriate officials in the town.
8:40On October 25, the North Vietnamese agreed to meet and suggested a memory plan.
8:45On November 17, just three days before the meeting,
8:48schedule, they said we got told so.
8:51We offered to meet as soon as he recovered.
8:53With him, or immediately with any other authorized leader.
8:57Not now.
9:00Two months had passed since they called off that meeting.
9:03The only response to our plan has been an increase in troop infiltration from North Vietnam and Communist military messaging from Laos and Cambodia.
9:11Our proposal for peace was answered by a step-up in the war.
9:15That's where matters stand today.
9:17We are being asked publicly to respond to proposals that we answered, and in some respects, we're set with one zero in practice.
9:24We are being asked publicly to set a terminal date for our withdrawal, and we have already offered one in practice.
9:29And the most comprehensive police plan, a peace plan, is confident lies ignored in a secret channel, while an enemy tries to get from one area to another.
9:39That is why I have instructed Ambassador Porter to present our plan publicly at this Thursday's session of the Paris Peace Talk, along with alternatives to make it even more flexible.
9:49We are publishing a whole detailed draft of the plan.
9:51It will prove beyond doubt which side has made every effort to make this a real issue.
9:56It will show unmistakably the hand-on-out Russian presiding on the Canadian border.
10:01Here is the essence of our peace plan.
10:04Public disclosure may gain its attention, but it certainly will not.
10:08Within six months of an agreement, we will withdraw all U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam.
10:14We shall exchange all prisoners.
10:16There shall be a ceasefire throughout every China.
10:18There shall be a new presidential election in South Vietnam.
10:22President Chu will announce the office of this election.
10:25These include international supervision, an independent body to organize and run the election, representing all political forces in South Vietnam, including the Communist National Operation Front.
10:36Furthermore, President Chu has informed me that within the framework of the Green Water Agreement, he makes the following law.
10:45He and Vice President Huang would be ready to resign one month before the new election.
10:50Chairman of the Senate, as character of the head of the government, with some administrative responsibility, allow the election, all of the election, to be the sole responsibility of an independent election body.
11:02There are several other proposals under the U.S. plan.
11:04For example, as we offered privately on July 26th of last year, we remain prepared to undertake a major reconstruction project throughout the whole China to help all those people recover from the ravages of the generational war.
11:17We will pursue any approach to this peace negotiation.
11:21We are ready to negotiate the plan I have outlined tonight and conclude a comprehensive agreement on all military and political issues.
11:27Or, as we proposed privately last May, we remain willing to settle only the military issues and leave the political issues to the Vietnamese people.
11:34Under this approach, we withdraw all U.S. and allied forces within six months in exchange for Indochina's ceasefire and the release of all prisoners.
11:43The choice is up to the enemy.
11:45This is a settlement offered which is fair to North Vietnam and fair to South Vietnam.
11:49It deserves the widest scrutiny by this and these nations and by other nations as well.
11:53And it deserves the united support of the American people.
11:57We made a substance of this generous offering prior to him over three years, three months ago.
12:02It has not been rejected, but it has been done.
12:05I reiterate that peace offering not given no longer be ignored.
12:07The only thing this plan does not do is to join our enemy to overthrow our ally, which the United States of America will never do.
12:15If the enemy wants peace, it will have to recognize the important difference between settlement and surrender.
12:22This has been a long and agonizing struggle, but it is difficult to see how anyone, regardless of his past position in the war, could not say, if we have not gone the extra mile, our own settlement has scared everybody concerned.
12:35By the steadiness of our withdrawal of troops, America has proven its resolution to end its involvement in the war.
12:40By our readiness to act in the spirit of conciliation, America has proved its desire to be involved in the building of a permanent peace throughout Indochina.
12:48We are ready to negotiate peace immediately.
12:51If the enemy rejects our offer to negotiate, we shall continue our program of ending American involvement in the war by withdrawing our remaining forces to the south in the opportunity of those defending themselves.
13:02If the enemy's answer to our peace offer is to step up their attacks, I shall fully meet my responsibility to command a few of our armed forces to protect our remaining forces.
13:11We do not prefer this course of action.
13:14We want to end the war, not only for America, but for all the people in China.
13:18The plan I approached was proposed tonight and accomplished that goal.
13:22Some of our citizens have become accustomed to thinking that whatever our government says must be false, whatever our enemies say must be true.
13:30The record I revealed tonight proved the contrary.
13:33We can now demonstrate publicly that we have long been demonstrating privately that America has taken the initiative not only to end our participation in this war, but to end the war itself.
13:44This has been the longest and most difficult war in our history.
13:47Honest and patriotic Americans have disagreed as to whether we should have become involved at all nine years ago.
13:53There has been disagreement as to the conduct of the war.
13:56The hold I have made tonight is one on which we can all agree.
13:58Let us unite now in our search for peace, a peace that is fair to both sides, a peace that can last.
14:03That's the reason.
14:04That's the hell of a point.
14:11What he did was a dead end.
14:12What's this one?
14:13I wouldn't give those bastards any credit for saying some of our people believe what we...
14:23I'd say a few, goddammit.
14:27Some is too many.
14:28In your last page, there was an explanation.
14:32Some believe the other side, but they won't believe us.
14:38I'd say a few.
14:41to say some is because I'm too unsure.
14:45Yeah, I get your point.
14:46The only other thing that confuses me, say the nine point versus seven point, say into a China.
14:56People understand we've got food laws in Cambodia.
14:59That's just what China has.
15:01See, the nine point program they offer includes
15:05into Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
15:07The seven-point public program under Viet Cong moves on to Vietnam.
15:14That's what they asked us to negotiate the money for.
15:16The question that raised in my mind, I think, was the following that I got suggested about in the pretext.
15:21The question was whether to work out through stupid management without adding or to accounts which were to be asked.
15:34You mean all other China peace countries?
15:38Well, yeah.
15:38But you add Laos and Cambodia to that.
15:43Yeah.
15:46But you mean the word into China doesn't mean Laos and Cambodia?
15:50Well, I think people will be confused.
15:52They'll say, well, if that's the case, then why?
15:55What about Manchuria's proposal?
15:56Or what happens in Laos and Cambodia?
15:58Things aren't the same there and there in Vietnam.
16:02That's the question.
16:04And to the extent that that is a reason to question, we may want to sharpen it so that it doesn't come in and prove by virtue of the nine-point program.
16:11That's just a...
16:12I'll have to answer that.
16:13But I think that's going to come up because they'll say, well, I think the nine-point program is well-considered, and what do you do about that?
16:20Here, we just need to get that question.
16:24We would say that's what we want to negotiate, a total Indochina peace fire, which includes Laos and Cambodia.
16:34I'm not suggesting you change the text there, but I think you'll have to treat that.
16:55Well, you know, we've been taking such a go-ahead meeting on this, and we've been spacing the line this year, although we're not trying to break the secret channel.
17:02But we've known that we were offering all these things, and God damn it, the communists returned them down.
17:07But now that they have followed it up enough, and they're starting their last, which is their last gasp of defense, we think the time to do it is to lay it all out on the table.
17:19It is going to be effective one quick time.
17:22except that I think it will tend, first, to take our field up, then they have an answer.
17:27We walk, in exchange for field up, we cease fire, we walk, we turn it down, take our, take the people that want us to set a deadline.
17:38We walk through the deadline.
17:39Of course, we've always, you've got to cease fire, which is essential.
17:42You can never have a deadline without a cease fire.
17:46They get their ash down, you know.
17:48And what about aid to all ends of China?
17:51We've offered to help North Vietnam as well as South Vietnam.
17:55What about to respond to the 7.0 program?
17:58We've not responded to it, but we have responded to the 9.0 program.
18:01And what about a new peace proposal?
18:04What about Pew?
18:04This is a real function.
18:07What about Pew?
18:08He's offered to resign a month before the election.
18:11That's the one that's going to be the first initiative that we have.
18:18I don't know.
18:36We've done this.
18:37We've made this so clear all the way through.
18:42I could be a public regress, but I mean, of course, the price we took on the weapon of Christ, I don't know how many of these we've made, but the fact is we've never ever changed.
19:01And when the whole record comes out, I say, look, all right, I'm excited.
19:05My people are sort of checking out the number of times you've made that mistake.
19:10I mean, I'm talking about the background folks.
19:15And I tell you what I feel.
19:17I'm trying to get my greatest job before you have it.
19:28Christ, you said all the time.
19:32It doesn't because they say, oh, we just stopped this stuff on Friday, Sunday morning and called the House of Commons.
19:41They're actually going to tell you what to do.
19:43They're actually going to tell you what to do.
19:46They're going to tell you what to do.
19:55I think this has to be done, don't you?
19:58They'll piss off, I suppose, for all we've done.
20:00But I think at least we're also against another environment.
20:03We have to be in a position that when their offensive begins, and they're going to have one.
20:11We can take some very strong, we can kind of use a few air guns.
20:15We've got to use our air guns.
20:16We're not going to have to.
20:17We have got to amend them.
20:19We're not going to get involved that way.
20:21We're not going to have this kind of contagion, but we've got to bomb the hell out of them.
20:26We will.
20:26I don't think we're going to do that.
20:28But it's not just the guy in the back that presides.
20:31You're saying they're an international division.
20:34All of us are national.
20:34With the communists participating, that's the crown, of course.
20:42They're going to have all the time.
20:44It doesn't matter.
20:47They will.
20:49You see, they crack at it, but they won't.
20:52They don't.
20:53Well, anyway, but don't you agree it's probably a good idea to do this?
20:57We haven't.
20:57I'll tell you one other reason why we do it.
21:03I think it's going to blow anyway.
21:05I mean, they've had too many.
21:07Henry did have to take a few of them, and others over and so on.
21:10I just figured that, you know, with everybody, everything's leaking at this point, this kind of thing will not hold.
21:16We've got Air Force pilots, we've got all sorts of people, and I thought we'd better do it rather than have that trouble.
21:22Anyway, we've got about 8.30 to 9.00.
21:24Watch those sunsets, but you can tell we're in downtown.
35:39What I'm saying is I got locked into a
36:07For example, on busting for Christ's sake.
36:11I took that position right at the beginning of the issue.
36:15I was never for busting.
36:16My record on that is, if you're going to give me a chance, as I say, where it counts to get the record clear, I'd love to have a price on that issue.
36:26So I'm not, I welcome that opportunity.
36:29Other than that, sure, I'm going to leave.
36:33I'm going to stand up and scream for the fact.
36:36You should.
36:37I'm going to stand up and scream for the fact.
36:40I'm going to scream for the fact.
36:47But you know, really, honestly, Bob, you realize that that 15,000-word message, the concept that I developed, you know, I developed it at the time, but I didn't intend to do it in the States in person at all.
36:55I was going to go on television at night and make a 20-minute speech and say, now, I've delivered to the Congress a 15,000-word message tomorrow, and so much has gotten in place, but then I find it's under the banning of demand, and it didn't seem to...
37:13But that 15,000 word thing is a hell of a document in Syria for anybody, don't you agree?
37:19For anybody running.
37:20I mean, there's something in it for everybody.
37:22And you know, if they want to talk about programs, you know, people don't get close and say, well, we didn't offer anything in the way of programs as long or everything.
37:33This is the most programmatic goddamn administration in history.
37:35Probably too much programs.
37:37We've got a program for every goddamn problem.
37:40Everything, right?
37:42And, you know, it's funny, I say Andrew Press, because they're here in Mansfield.
37:47It's funny, they now have it in their lives.
37:49There are 90 proposals, 80 proposals that the President has put forward, and they get an election vote from Senator Mansfield.
37:56There are 90 proposals, and who else?
37:59And so we've gotten that across.
38:01It's a good route to bring to 90, to turn 90.
38:03That's all.
38:07So...
38:08I don't need to dwell on this because it comes back to... Now, the other way is... Let me say this.
38:41There's a desperate need for a good Republican in the Senate.
38:43We haven't gotten any good Senators.
38:45Like for today, on this speech, we have to call on the support of Will Scott.
38:47He'll come down.
38:48And Griffin, of course, he's one of them.
38:51He's no tower of strength.
38:54But they still call him Goldwater.
38:55Now, for Christ's sakes, I mean, all of our guys, Cotton's too old.
39:00Curtis is too old.
39:02And, well, Brock isn't bad.
39:03Baker isn't bad.
39:04I mean, he's not too gutsy.
39:06But boy, that Senate is a place, it's a place for a man.
40:57I'm just thinking of the opportunity for leadership in the United States Senate.
41:01Jesus Christ, it is terrible.
41:02The Senate is, it's a wasteland.
41:05It's a wasteland.
41:06You've got a few good men in the House, Bob.
41:09Can you name any good men in the Senate?
41:12You know, Baker, Brock, Percy, you know, they're not bad.
41:17Everybody's having his own canoe.
41:19Pat, you know, he's no great tower in the drink.
41:25Tower?
41:29It's a pretty, it's an amazing United States Senate.
41:34Goddamn, when I went to the Senate, there was a lot of competition.
41:36There was a lot of, you had your iPhone.
41:40Paul, you were here a few times.
1:04:58That's awful.
1:04:58There was just a word spelled wrong.
1:04:59It should be a lot easier for you to read it.
1:05:01Hello.
1:05:01It's saying everything, instead of saying there.
1:05:04The words you were having are still wrong.
1:05:08Try to get your spelling right.
1:05:11I thought they had proof that it can't be, but it doesn't work.
1:05:13No, they do, but they don't.
1:05:15You do know it's going to bother you.
1:05:18It's so easy for me to read that.
1:05:19Never bothers me.
1:05:21Rose, did you get up to come to the office and put the plate in?
1:05:27I think that's going to put the drama, and it's going to have an impact, I think, on where it counts.
1:05:36Just as long as there's no question of what they try to say philosophically.
1:05:42Oh, yeah, that you left because you didn't like the fact that I was too conservative?
1:05:45No, no, no.
1:05:46Or that, well, they liked that you were liberal?
1:05:49No, that you wanted a power struggle.
1:05:52Oh, shit, no.
1:05:52It's going to be...
1:05:54The stuff that was in the evidence, no, but... Well, what did you... No, I know that.
1:05:58But I think you should say that Attorney General Mitchell, very directly, campaign committee last year to do it.
1:06:11I think we can clean that up pretty well.
1:06:15We could have Klein do a background on that.
1:06:26No, I mean, on that particular point, you should do a whole press conference on Hillary.
1:22:53Now, what should you do?
1:22:54Do you think, for example, the state of the union was too mild?
1:22:57Oh, somebody, for example, holds out, and they're going to call him, but I was too.
1:23:03It should have been rather involved.
1:23:06I'm on that program.
1:23:08That was not a majority opinion.
1:23:12Otherwise, it is quite a basic question.
1:23:15What should we do?
1:23:18Well, I can do both.
1:23:19All right.
1:23:24I have a proposition that your visceral reaction is going to move at some point.
1:23:30You're going to want to go in.
1:23:33It's like you might think you should.
1:23:35The question is going to time.
1:23:37Remember, the present time you have to stay.
1:23:39I have to think about how long the stay is going to be in.
1:23:42It's good.
1:23:44It's stable and resourceful.
1:23:45I mean, I'm getting ready to go to abroad and all that.
1:23:49You look at history.
1:23:51It's good.
1:23:54Roosevelt began to fight back hard.
1:23:57I think it was the fall of speech in 1940.
1:24:03That was about, I think it was the 36th of 1940.
1:24:08It was 40.
1:24:10The Wilkins.
1:24:12That was the turning point, and that's where he really started to fight back.
1:24:15It was rather late.
1:24:17Very late.
1:24:17Now, Truman, I think, started much earlier to build his case when he ran against the Congress.
1:24:21Well, he had to because he was about 30% of the poll.
1:24:23We're never going to go that far.
1:24:25I understand that.
1:24:26But my recommendation was that was right because he'd come right out of the convention.
1:24:31Right out of the convention and call the Congress in the special session.
1:24:34That's right.
1:24:35Put that on fucking 11.
1:24:38and outside the other side.
1:24:40Now, we might have to deal with that.
1:24:50It is that you stay on the high road through the convention and beyond the convention, and whether it's six weeks or less, you can't wait too long.
1:25:06I think you're going to fight for these things.
1:25:11And this is not to say you're snarling and snapping.
1:25:15But to be vigorous is to be more in sorrow than in anger.
1:25:18But you're taking them on.
1:25:19You don't have to take them on with no gloves.
1:25:24It's just a case of drawing a line and calling the spade a spade.
1:25:35So that paper thing you were telling me about, I was just wondering if you were able to find it.
1:25:44I'm sorry.
1:25:45I'm sorry about that.
1:25:47I'm sorry.
1:25:53I'm sorry.
1:25:54I'm sorry.
1:26:00Sure.
1:26:00I see one on the back.
1:26:02I don't think many people disagree, but that'd be crazy, I think.
1:26:04The one on the back is pretty good.
1:26:06Both are on the 3, 2, 6, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
1:26:26Yes, we have to do it.
1:26:32I agree.
1:26:58Anything else?
1:30:37My prediction of 71 would be a good year, correct, but I didn't say it was a good year, you know, after that fourth quarter and all that.
1:30:57Let's take a strike here.
1:30:58We're off the impressive inflation cut to even a half percent.
1:31:03It wasn't four years, but it's eight percent right now.
1:31:10I'll show you that now.
1:31:12Seventy-two is what all the people are doing.
1:31:14You might see it when you're in the morning.
1:31:18It's probably doing pretty well.
1:31:21It also runs through some landmines to help get off it and just die on it.
1:31:28It's a tough game to survive in shock.
1:31:33You just need to look back and try and leave it in pressure.
1:31:38It gives us you the courage to die, but they don't finish it.
1:31:41We have to continue to do this in the world.
1:31:43It's hard before they change horses and have them.
1:31:49Sewership thing, sure, that's a hell of a lot going for you.
1:31:51But that doesn't mean you don't fight to get those things done.
1:31:56You try to get them done.
1:31:57It's worth it, but it's not.
1:31:59The 90 things, exactly.
1:31:59Oh, well, let me say this, and I think we'll be all over the place.
1:32:03I think we probably are going to have to end up on the end of the tunnel.
1:32:08And I think we should try to be shocked to do that.
1:32:15We should go around.
1:32:18And this is another reason why .
1:32:23But if there's one branch they single out, it's that goddamn legislature or state legislature or Congress or whatever act.
1:32:35And it's in the right.
1:32:40And it's just a game.
1:32:43I'll share it with you all.
1:32:48They ought to have it up.
1:32:50Load it up right now.
1:32:51It's just the appropriation process.
1:32:52It's just the appropriation process.
1:32:53You can't let the government be.
1:32:55They're a half a year at nine months behind on the goddamned dollars all the time.
1:33:00I just need a police book.
1:33:06They're boring the way they stood on reapportioning.
1:33:19They haven't done their job in 47%, so you can assume it's a lousy job.
1:33:21Yeah.
1:33:23Of course, government can, you know, do things.
1:33:27The government doesn't want to do things against something high-spirited and from the money that goddamned made this thing and the government made this thing.
1:33:42And frankly, that's what the 60s did.
1:33:44It just revealed this elite function about the ability to show up in these things.
1:33:50I've been working, running against that title.
1:33:51I think it was, I don't know, we're getting fortunate to be covering around 50% of the totals in that program of Judaism.
1:33:59It hasn't, not really because, I don't know, we're in the sixth year.
1:34:07We've worked really good at managing a goddamn high in the years so far.
1:34:13It's been pretty solid.
1:34:25It's like a two-man race.
1:34:30Europe is really over here.
1:34:38It's that solid.
1:34:40It doesn't look like hell.
1:34:45All races were close.
1:34:46I was looking back over the years, and it was very close to Lane.
1:34:54It was after Grant.
1:34:57After Grant, you know, it wasn't Hayes.
1:35:04Cleveland killed him in Hayes.
1:35:09And then came Lane and Cleveland.
1:35:159,000 votes on it.
1:35:16That took Paris to eat food on the second time.
1:35:22I think we've had a popular majority of people get the funding for it.
1:35:32And then, uh, in my head, there's only half as many votes for it there.
1:35:44P.R., the first real landslide was P.R.
1:35:46's in 1994.
1:35:48He did very well.
1:35:50He passed it very well when he succeeded Wilson.
1:36:00And then it ended up the Republicans split Wilson.
1:36:03He was a minority for 40.
1:36:09Then came Wilson Hughes, which is close to
1:36:16...a landslide for... ...a landslide for Cooper.
1:36:34In other words, the Republicans were the majority party in the 19th century depression.
1:36:41In 1932, the land slid through.
1:36:42In 1936, the land slid through.
1:36:44In 1940, it closed.
1:36:45It was very close, 25 million to 22 million.
1:36:47In fact, New York lost to the same amount, 206 million to 229.
1:36:53There were close elections.
1:36:56Truman was close.
1:36:59It was a horror.
1:37:01But, after that, she was close again.
1:37:08The Johnson, Goldwater thing was an aberration, but it came to happen pretty next month.
1:37:19They missed the point.
1:37:22Still, with all of our problems, we had a half a million per hour.
1:37:28It should have been better than a goddamn bomb call.
1:37:39Well, he'll know and he'll appreciate it.
1:37:45When will you see him?
1:37:47Tomorrow.
1:37:48Thank you.

Nixon, Finch & Haldeman on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Talks

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on January 25, 1972

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