Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 316 › Conversation 316-012
Nixon & Sanchez on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Talks
Tuesday, January 25, 1972 · 4:36 PM–5:30 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building
AI Summary
President Nixon utilized this session in the Old Executive Office Building to rehearse his televised 'Address to the Nation Making Public a Plan for Peace in Vietnam.' Accompanied at various points by Manolo Sanchez and an unidentified woman, Nixon refined the delivery of his speech, which sought to disclose previously secret negotiations with North Vietnam. The rehearsal focused on presenting the administration's comprehensive peace plan, including the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the release of prisoners of war, and proposals for new presidential elections in South Vietnam.
Audio
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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 02:06:48 into the tape and ends around 02:22:45.
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.
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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
2:08:57After this election time tonight, we make public a plan for peace.
2:08:59We can bring the war to an end in Vietnam.
2:09:02We can bring to an end, we can end the war in Vietnam.
2:09:11Vietnam, we love you.
2:09:16Vietnam, present.
2:09:18We have the government of the United States and the government itself in Vietnam.
2:09:21The full amount of in-approval from President Pugh was both generous and far-reaching.
2:09:27It is a plan to end the war now.
2:09:29It includes an offer to withdraw all American forces within six months of the agreement.
2:09:34Its acceptance would mean the speedy return of all the prisoners of war to their homes.
2:09:40Three years ago, the rank would compensate.
2:09:42There were 550,000 men fighting in the community now.
2:09:46The number killed in action was running as high as 300 a week.
2:09:51There were no plans to bring any Americans home.
2:09:52The only thing that had been settled in Paris was the shape of the conference room.
2:09:57I immediately moved to fulfill a pledge I had made in the campaign.
2:09:59Made to the American people.
2:10:02To bring about a peace that could last, not only for the United States, but for the long-suffering people of all of Southeast Asia.
2:10:11There were two honorable paths holding to us.
2:10:14The path of negotiation was and is the path we prefer, but it takes two to negotiate.
2:10:20There had to be another way in case the other side refused to negotiate.
2:10:24That plan was called Vietnamization.
2:10:27This meant training and equipping the South Vietnamese to defend themselves and steadily withdrawing America as a developed country in the matter to do so.
2:10:37The path of Vietnamization has been successful.
2:10:42Two weeks ago, I announced that by May 1st, American forces in Vietnam will be down to 69,000.
2:10:47That means almost one-half million Americans will have been withdrawn from Vietnam over the past three years.
2:10:54In terms of American lives, the losses of 300 a week have been reduced by over 95% to less than 10%.
2:11:02The path of vehicleization has been the long voyage home, straining of patience and testing the perseverance of the American people.
2:11:09What are the shortcuts?
2:11:11The path of negotiation.
2:11:13Progress here has been disciplined.
2:11:15The American people deserve an accounting as to why it has been disciplined.
2:11:19Tonight I intend to give you that accounting and in so doing to try to break the deadlock of negotiations.
2:11:25We've made a series of public proposals designed to bring an end to the conflict.
2:11:31After 10 months of no progress in the talks in Paris, I became convinced that it was necessary to explore the possibility of negotiating in private channels to see whether it would be possible to have a public deadline.
2:11:46At the consultation with Secretary Rogers, Ambassador Sison, and Chief Negotiator in Paris, with full knowledge and approval of President Pugh, I sent Dr. Kissinger to Paris as my personal representative on August 4, 1959, to begin a secret peace and peace mission.
2:11:59At that time, Dr. Kissinger has traveled to Paris 12 times on these secret missions.
2:12:09He has met seven times in Ligue Octo, one of Hanoi's top political leaders, and Minister Nam Thuy, head of an R.V.L.M.I.F.
2:12:15delegation in Paris, France.
2:12:17He has met with Minister Zwan Thuy along with five times.
2:12:21I would like to take this opportunity to thank President Pompidou of France for his personal assistance in facilitating the arrangement for these talks.
2:12:34This is why I initiated these private negotiations.
2:12:38Privately, both sides can be more flexible in offering new approaches.
2:12:43Also, private discussions allow both sides to talk frankly and take decisions free from the pressures of public debate.
2:12:48In seeking peace in Vietnam, not enough.
2:12:52So many lives have stayed.
2:12:55Thank you.
2:13:19His personal assistance is still available.
2:13:24The position is free from the pressures of public debate.
2:13:28Seeking peace in Vietnam, so many lives have been saved.
2:13:31I felt we could not afford to let any opportunity go by, private or public, to negotiate a settlement.
2:13:35As I stated on a number of occasions, I was prepared and remain prepared to explore any evidence, public or private, to speed negotiations to end the war and bring peace.
2:13:45For 30 months, whenever Secretary Rogers, Dr. Kirchner, or I were asked about secret negotiations, we would only say we were pursuing every possible channel in our search for peace.
2:13:53It was never a leap, because we were determined not to jeopardize the secret negotiations.
2:13:58Until recently, discourse showed signs of yield in some projects.
2:14:03Now, however, it is my judgment that the purposes of peace will best be served by bringing out publicly the proposals we have been making in these projects.
2:14:12Nothing is served by silence.
2:14:15when the other side exploits other faith to divide America, to avoid the consciousness.
2:14:18And nothing is served by silence which misleads some Americans who are accusing their government of failing to do what it has already done.
2:14:26Nothing is served by silence when it enables the other side to apply possible solutions publicly that it has already rejected privately.
2:14:34The time has come to lay the record of our secret negotiations on the table.
2:14:38Just as secret negotiations can sometimes break a public deadline, public disclosure may help to break a secret deadline.
2:14:46Some Americans believe that the market is what the market ought to be able to be, so let them believe.
2:14:51The charge of the United States is not to pursue negotiations intensively.
2:14:57As the record will show, just the opposite is true.
2:15:00Questions have been raised as to why we have not proposed a deadline for the withdrawal of all American forces in exchange for a ceasefire and the return of our prisoners of war, why we have not discussed the seven-point proposal made by the Viet Cong last July in Paris, why we have not submitted a new plan of our own to move negotiations off dead center.
2:15:20And as the private record will show, we have taken all these steps and more and have been flatly rejected or ignored on the other side.
2:15:29On May 31, 1971, eight months ago, at one of the secret meetings in Paris, we offered specifically to agree to a deadline to withdraw all American forces in exchange for the release of all prisoners of war and cease-fire.
2:15:47On June 26, the North Vietnamese rejected our offer.
2:15:50They privately proposed instead their own nine-point plan which insisted that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam.
2:15:57Five days later, July 1st, the enemy publicly presented a different package.
2:16:00The seventh might be a conflict.
2:16:03This told them about the line.
2:16:05Which package should we respond to, the public plan or the secret plan?
2:16:10July 12th, another private meeting in Paris.
2:16:12Dr. Kissinger put that question to the law to be able to meet the record.
2:16:15They said we should deal with their nine-point secret plan because it covered all of Indochina, including Laos and the Middle East.
2:16:22Well, the Viet Cong's seven-point public proposal was limited to eight-nine, and that's what we did.
2:16:28We went even one beyond that, dealing with some of the points in the public plan that were not covered in the secret plan.
2:16:34On August 16, on another Friday, we went further and offered a complete withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces within nine months after an agreement on an overall settlement.
2:16:46agreement, after an agreement on an overall settlement.
2:16:49On September 13th, North Vietnamese rejected this post, and they continued to insist that we overthrow the South Vietnamese government.
2:16:54Now, what has been the result of these private efforts?
2:17:00For months, the North Vietnamese have been berating us in the public sessions for not responding to their side's public treatment of the seven-point plan.
2:17:08The truth is that we did respond to the other's plan, and the man who wanted us to respond secretly.
2:17:14In full possession of our complete response, the North Vietnamese publicly denounced us for not having responded at all.
2:17:21They induced many Americans in the press and the Congress into accepting their propaganda.
2:17:26Americans who could not know they were being falsely used by the enemy to stir up the busyness in this country.
2:17:32I decided in October that we should make another attempt to break the deadline.
2:17:36I consulted with President Chu and heard polling renewed by him.
2:17:40On October 11th, I sent a private communication to North Vietnamese that contained new elements that could move negotiations forward and urged the meeting on November 1st between Dr. Kissinger and Special Advisor Neelat Koh or some other appropriate official.
2:17:57On October 25th, North Vietnamese agreed to meet and suggested November 20th.
2:18:02On November 17, just three days before the scheduled meeting, they said the doctor was ill. We offered to meet as soon as the doctor recovered, with him or immediately with any other authorized leader who had come from Africa.
2:18:16Two months had passed since they called on that meeting.
2:18:19The only reply to our plan has been an increase in Cuban infiltration from North Vietnam, and communist military defenses in Laos and Cambodia.
2:18:27Our proposal for peace was answered by a step up in the world, and that's where matters stand today.
2:18:34We are being asked publicly to respond to proposals that we answered, and in some respects accepted months ago, prior.
2:18:41We are being asked publicly to set a terminal date for our withdrawal, but we've already offered one in practice.
2:18:47And the most comprehensive peace plan of this country lies ignored in the secret channel while they only trace again the military data.
2:18:55That is why I have instructed Ambassador Porter to present our plan publicly at this Thursday's session of the Paris Peace Talks, along with alternatives to make it even more flexible.
2:19:06We are publishing the full details of our plan tonight.
2:19:09It will prove beyond doubt which side has made every effort to make these negotiations succeed.
2:19:15It will show unmistakably that Hanover and not Washington's sidearm has made the war go on.
2:19:21Now here is the essence of our peace plan.
2:19:23Public disclosure may get the attention it deserves in Hanover.
2:19:28Within six months of an agreement, we shall withdraw all U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam.
2:19:33We shall exchange all prisoners of war.
2:19:40All prisoners of war were ever held in China.
2:19:42There will be a ceasefire throughout India-China.
2:19:46There shall be a new presidential election in South Vietnam.
2:19:50President Chu will announce the elements of this election.
2:19:53These include international supervision and an independent body to organize and run the election, representing all political forces in South Vietnam, including the Communist National Liberation Front.
2:20:05Furthermore, President Chu has informed me that in the framework of the agreement outlined above, he makes the following offer.
2:20:13He and Vice President Huang would be ready to resign one month before the new election.
2:20:17The chairman of the Senate as caretaker head of the government would assume administrative responsibility, but the election would be the sole responsibility of the independent election body.
2:20:26Thank you.
2:20:33For example, as we offered privately in July 26 of last year, we remain prepared to undertake a major reconstruction program throughout Indochina, including North Vietnam, to help all those peoples recover from the ravages of the generation of war.
2:20:48We will pursue any approach that will speed negotiations.
2:20:56We're ready to negotiate the plan I've outlined tonight and conclude a comprehensive agreement on all military and political issues.
2:21:02Or, as we proposed last May, we remain willing to settle on
2:21:12our issues and leave the political issues to the Vietnamese alone.
2:21:15Under this approach, we withdraw all U.S. and allied forces within six months in exchange for an end of China's ceasefire and the release of all prisoners.
2:21:23The choice is up to the United States.
2:21:25This is a settlement which is fair to North Vietnam and fair to South Vietnam.
2:21:29It deserves the light of public scrutiny by these nations and by other nations as well.
2:21:33It deserves a united support of the United States.
2:21:42privately over three months ago.
NARA Description
On January 25, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, unknown person(s), and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 316-012 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 316-12
Date: January 25, 1972
Time: Unknown between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm
Location: Executive Office Building
The President rehearsed his "Address to the Nation Making Public a Plan for Peace in Vietnam".
[A transcript of the speech in its final form appears in Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard
M. Nixon, 1972, pp. 100-105]
An unknown woman entered at an unknown time during the rehearsal.
Speech draft [?]
The unknown woman left at an unknown time.
The President resumed rehearsing his speech.
Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time during the rehearsal.
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[Duration: 4s ]
END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
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The President resumed rehearsing his speech.
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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 3s ]
END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
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Sanchez left at an unknown time.
The President resumed rehearsing his speech.Also recorded on January 25, 1972
- 316-010 4:35 PM · 44 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 4:35 pm to 4:36 pm.
- 019-059 4:36 PM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 316-011 4:36 PM · 53 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 316-013 4:36 PM · 15 min — President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 316-014 4:36 PM · 15 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 019-060 5:30 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox talked on the telephone from 5:30 pm to 5:32 pm.
- 316-015 5:30 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 5:30 pm to 5:32 pm.
- 316-016 5:32 PM · 16 min — President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 5:32 pm and 6:32 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 316-012, January 25, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/316-012 (accessed September 26, 2026).