Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 316 › Conversation 316-013
Nixon alone in his EOB office on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Talks
Tuesday, January 25, 1972 · 4:36 PM–5:30 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building
AI Summary
President Nixon held this session to rehearse his upcoming nationally televised address detailing a comprehensive peace plan for the Vietnam War. By disclosing the details of previously secret negotiations conducted by Henry Kissinger, the President aimed to demonstrate that the United States had made significant, ignored overtures to North Vietnam. This strategic public disclosure was intended to break the deadlock in Paris and clarify to the American public that the administration had pursued every viable diplomatic channel to achieve an honorable peace.
Audio
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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 02:22:45 into the tape and ends around 02:37:22.
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.
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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
2:21:47It has not been rejected, but it has been ignored.
2:21:51I reiterate that peace offer is not, it can no longer be ignored.
2:21:56The only thing this plan does not do is to join our enemy, to overthrow our ally, the United States of America will never do that.
2:22:02If the enemy wants peace, it will have to recognize the important difference between settlement and surrender.
2:22:09This has been a long and agonizing struggle, but it is difficult to see how anyone, regardless of his past position on the board, could not now say that we have gone the extra mile in offering a settlement to this failure to make everybody concerned.
2:22:22For the steadiness of our withdrawal of troops, America has proved its resolution to end its involvement in the war.
2:22:29By our readiness to act in the spirit of reconciliation, we have proved our desire to be involved in the building of a permanent peace throughout its time.
2:22:38And we're ready to negotiate peace immediately.
2:22:39If the enemy rejects our offer to negotiate, we shall continue our program of ending American involvement in the war by withdrawing our remaining forces to solve the Vietnamese development capability of the Pentagon itself.
2:22:52If the enemy's answer to our peace offer is to step up their attacks, I shall fully meet my responsibility as commander-in-chief of our forces to protect the remaining troops.
2:23:01In this course of action, we want to end the war not only for America, but for all the people in the region.
2:23:11The plan I have proposed tonight can accomplish that goal.
2:23:15Some of our citizens have become accustomed to thinking that whatever our government says must be false, and whatever our enemies say must be true.
2:23:24The record I reveal tonight proves the contrary.
2:23:27We can now demonstrate publicly, but we have long been demonstrating privately, that America has taken the initiative not only to end our participation in this war, but to end the war itself for all the people of China.
2:23:40This has been the longest and most difficult war in our history.
2:23:43Honest and patriotic Americans disagreed for whether we should have been involved at all nine years ago, and there had been disagreement on the comment we made.
2:23:52Although I have made the nine as one on which we can all agree, let us unite now in our search for peace, a peace that is fair to both sides, a peace that can last.
2:24:56I have asked for this tolerated time tonight to make public a plan for peace which can end the war in Vietnam.
2:25:03The offer that I shall now present on behalf of the government of the United States and the government of South Vietnam, with the full knowledge and approval of President Pugh, is both generous and far-reaching.
2:25:13It is a plan to end the war now.
2:25:16It includes an offer to draw up American forces within six months of an agreement.
2:25:20Its acceptance would mean the speedy return of all prisoners of war to their homes.
2:25:26Three years ago, I took office, and there were 550,000 American fighting men in Vietnam.
2:25:31The number killed in action was running as high as 300 a week.
2:25:33There were no plans to bring any Americans home.
2:25:35The only thing that had settled in Paris was the shape of the bargaining table.
2:25:41I immediately moved to go for a pledge I had made to the American people, to bring about a peace that could last, not only for the United States, but for all of the long-suffering people in the China.
2:25:51There were two honorable paths open to us.
2:25:53The path of negotiation was and is the path we prefer, but it takes two to negotiate.
2:26:00There had to be another way in case the other side refused to negotiate.
2:26:04That path we called Vietnamization.
2:26:06This meant training and equipping South Vietnamese to defend themselves, and steadily withdrawing America as they developed a pass to Jerusalem.
2:26:15The path to Vietnamization has been successful.
2:26:17A few weeks ago, I announced that by May 1st, American forces in Vietnam would be down to 69,000.
2:26:22That means almost one-half million Americans will have been withdrawn to Vietnam over the past three years.
2:26:29And in terms of American lives, the losses of 300 a week have been reduced by 95%, to less than 10%.
2:26:34But the path to Vietnamization has been a long voyage home, strains of patience, and testing perseverance of the American people.
2:26:44What are the shortcuts on the path of negotiation?
2:26:46Progress here has been disappointing.
2:26:49The American people deserve an accounting of why it has been disappointing.
2:26:52Tonight, I plan to give you that accounting, and in so doing, to try to break the deadlock in the negotiations.
2:27:01We have made a series of public polls designed to reconnect with the conflict.
2:27:05But early in this administration, after ten months of no progress from the public talks in Paris,
2:27:10I became convinced that it was necessary to explore the possibility of negotiating on private channels to see whether it would be possible to end the public deadlock.
2:27:18Under consultation of Secretary Rogers, our ambassador to Saigon, our chief negotiator in Paris, and with the full knowledge and approval of President Pugh, I sent Dr. Kissinger to Paris as my personal representative on August 4, 1869, to begin these secret peace negotiations.
2:27:36Since that time, Dr. Kissinger has traveled to Paris several times on these secret missions.
2:27:42He has met seven times with Lee Doctole, one of Hanoi's top political leaders, and Ministers Wang Hui, head of the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris office.
2:27:50He has met with Ministers Wang Hui alone five times.
2:27:52I would like to take this opportunity this evening to thank President Pompidou of France for his personal assistance in facilitating the arrangements for these talks.
2:28:00This is why I am interested in these private negotiations.
2:28:06Privately, both sides can be more flexible in offering .
2:28:10Also, private discussions allow both sides to talk frankly to take positions free from the pressures of public debate.
2:28:17In seeking peace in Vietnam, with so many lives at stake, I felt we could not afford to let any opportunity go by, private or public, to negotiate .
2:28:26So I have stated a number of .
2:28:30As I was prepared, and I remain prepared, to explore the aisle, public or private, to speed negotiations in the world.
2:28:39For 30 months, whenever Secretary Rogers, my petitioner, or I were asked about secret negotiations, we would only say we were pursuing every possible channel in our search for peace.
2:28:49There was never a leak, but we were determined not to jeopardize the secret negotiations.
2:28:54Until recently, this course showed some signs of yielding progress.
2:28:58Now, however, it is my judgment that the purposes of peace will best be served by breaking out publicly the proposal of the United Nations.
2:29:04Nothing is served by silence.
2:29:08On the other side, it exploits our good faith to divide America and to avoid the conflict.
2:29:13Nothing is served by silence, but it misleads some Americans into accusing their government of failing to do what it has already done.
2:29:21And nothing to serve by silence but enables the other side to imply possible solutions publicly that it already has rejected privately.
2:29:29Time has come to lay the record of our secret negotiations on the table.
2:29:34Just as secret negotiations can sometimes break a public deadline, public disclosure may help to break a secret deadline.
2:29:41Some Americans who believe in North Vietnamese medicine believe and charge that the United States has not pursued negotiations intensively.
2:29:50And the record will show just the opposite is true.
2:29:53Questions have been raised as to why we have not proposed a deadline to withdraw all American ports in exchange for a ceasefire and return of prisoners of war, why we have not discussed the seven-point proposal made by the Viet Cong last July in Paris, why we have not off-submitted a new plan of our own to move the negotiations off dead center.
2:30:11As the private record will show, we have taken all these steps and more, and we have had them flatly rejected or ignored the other side.
2:30:20May 31, 1971, eight months ago, at one of the secret meetings in Paris, we offered specifically to agree to a headline for the withdrawal of all American forces in exchange for the release of all prisoners of war and ceasefire.
2:30:35At the next private meeting in June 26, the North Indian community rejected our offer.
2:30:40They privately proposed instead their own nine-point plan which insisted that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam.
2:30:47Five days later, July 1st, the enemy publicly presented a different package of proposals.
2:30:50The seventh one would be a common plan.
2:30:54That was to go out which package would respond to the public plan or the private plan.
2:30:59July 12th, another private meeting in Paris, Mr. Kissinger put that question to the North Vietnamese directly.
2:31:06They said we should deal with their nine-point secret plan, because they covered all of Indochina, including Laos and Cambodia, while the Viet Cong's seven-point public proposal was limited to Vietnam.
2:31:17And so that's what we did.
2:31:19We went beyond that.
2:31:20Dealing with some of the White's public plan were not covered in the secret plan.
2:31:25On August 16, in another private meeting, we went further and offered a complete withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces within nine months after agreeing on an overall settlement.
2:31:37On September 13, North Vietnamese rejected this proposal.
2:31:39They continued to insist that we overthrow this opposition government.
2:31:42What has been the result of these five attacks?
2:31:48For months, North Vietnamese have been deregulating us from public sessions for not responding to their side's public presented seven-point plan.
2:31:55The truth is, we did respond to the enemy's plan, and the man that they asked us to respond, secretly.
2:32:02Full possession of our complete response, the North Vietnamese publicly denounced us for not having responded at all.
2:32:07They disinduced many Americans from the press and the Congress, and defected their propaganda.
2:32:13Americans who could not have known they were being falsely used by the enemy to stir up the business in this country.
2:32:19I decided in October that we should make another attempt to break the deadline.
2:32:24I consulted with President Q, who concurred fully in a new plan.
2:32:28On October 11, I sent a private communication to the North Vietnamese that contained new elements that could move negotiations forward, and urged a meeting on November 1 between Dr. Kissinger and Special Advisory Dr. To, or some other appropriate official, now.
2:32:43On October 25, North Vietnamese agreed to meet, suggested November 20.
2:32:49About November 17, just three days before the scheduled meeting, they said that Dr. Ho was ill. We offered to meet as soon as he recovered, either with him or immediately with any other authorized leader who could come from Anaheim.
2:32:59Two months had passed since they called off that meeting.
2:33:05The only reply to our plan has been an increase in troop infiltration from North Vietnam and communist military offensive from Laos and Cambodia.
2:33:12Our proposal for peace was answered by a step-up in the war.
2:33:18And that's where matters stand today.
2:33:20We are being asked publicly to respond to proposals that we answered in some respects, except some months ago in private.
2:33:28We are being asked publicly to set a terminal date for our withdrawal, but we've already offered one in private.
2:33:34And the most comprehensive peace plan of this conflict lies ignoring the secret channel while the enemy tries again for military victory.
2:33:41That is why I have instructed Ambassador Porter to present our plan publicly at this Thursday's session of the Paris Peace Conference along with alternatives to make it even more classical.
2:33:51We are publishing the full details of our plan tonight.
2:33:54It will prove beyond doubt which side has made every effort to make these negotiations succeed.
2:33:59It will show unmistakably that Hanoi, not Washington or Saigon, has made the work go on.
2:34:04Now here is the essence of our peace plan, public disclosure.
2:34:08may be given the attention they deserve to have.
2:34:12Within six months of an agreement, we will withdraw all U.S. and L.A. forces from South Vietnam.
2:34:16We shall exchange all prisoners of war, wherever they are held in the battalion.
2:34:23There shall be a ceasefire through out of the battalion.
2:34:27There shall be a new presidential election in South Vietnam.
2:34:30President Chu will announce the office of this election.
2:34:38These include international supervision and independent bodies that organize and run the elections, representing all political forces in South Vietnam, including the Communist National Liberation Front.
2:34:49Pergamon President Chu has informed me that within the framework of the agreement outlined above, he is preparing, he makes the follow-up offer.
2:34:59He and Vice President Hong, Vice President Huang, would be ready to resign one month before the election.
2:35:06The chairman of the Senate is a caretaker head of the government, would assume administrative responsibility in South Vietnam, but the election would be the sole responsibility of the independent election body.
2:35:18There are several other proposals for our new peace plan.
2:35:22For example, as we offered privately on July 26 of last year, we remain prepared to undertake a major reconstruction program throughout China, including North Vietnam, to help all those people recover from the ravages of a generation of war.
2:35:36We will pursue any approach that will speed negotiations.
2:35:40We are ready to negotiate the plan I have outlined tonight through the Comprehensive Agreement on All Military and Political Issues.
2:35:46Or, as we proposed last May, we remain willing to set alone the military issues and leave the political issues to the Vietnamese along the way.
2:35:54Under this approach, we will withdraw all U.S. and allied forces in six months in exchange for an end-of-science cease-fire and release of all troops.
2:36:03The choice is up to you.
2:36:05This is a settlement which is fair to North Vietnam and fair to South Vietnam.
2:36:13The Republic's truth, by these nations and by the other nations as well, deserves the advice and support of the American people.
2:36:20We made the substance of this generous offer privately over three months ago.
2:36:24It has not been rejected, but it has been done.
2:36:27I reiterated that peace offer in the night.
2:36:30It can no longer be ignored.
2:36:32The only thing this plan does not do is to join our enemy to overthrow our ally, which the United States of America will never do.
2:36:39If the enemy wants peace, they will have to recognize the important difference between settlement and surrender.
2:36:45This has been a long and agonizing struggle for America.
2:36:49It is difficult to see how anyone, regardless of his past position in the war, can now say, we have not gone the extra mile.
2:36:55And all of a sudden, it is out of the fair to everyone concerned.
2:37:03It is for our withdrawal of troops.
2:37:05America has proved its resolution and its involvement in the war.
2:37:09By our readiness to act in the spirit of conciliation, America has proved its desire to be involved in the building of a permanent peace throughout a good time.
2:37:18We are ready to negotiate the peace immediately.
2:37:21If the enemy rejects our effort to negotiate, we will continue our program of ending American involvement in the war by withdrawing our remaining forces and solving the enemy's development capability of defending themselves.
NARA Description
On January 25, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 316-013 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 316-13 Date: January 25, 1972 Time: Unknown between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm Location: Executive Office Building The President rehearsed his "Address to the Nation Making Public a Plan for Peace in Vietnam". [A transcript of the speech in its final form appears in Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard M. Nixon, 1972, pp. 100-105]
Also recorded on January 25, 1972
- 316-010 4:35 PM · 44 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 4:35 pm to 4:36 pm.
- 019-059 4:36 PM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 316-011 4:36 PM · 53 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 316-012 4:36 PM · 16 min — President Richard M. Nixon, unknown person(s), and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 316-014 4:36 PM · 15 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 019-060 5:30 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox talked on the telephone from 5:30 pm to 5:32 pm.
- 316-015 5:30 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 5:30 pm to 5:32 pm.
- 316-016 5:32 PM · 16 min — President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 5:32 pm and 6:32 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 316-013, January 25, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/316-013 (accessed September 26, 2026).