Nixon White House TapesTape 332 › Conversation 332-022

Nixon, Kissinger & Haig on Vietnam War and US-Soviet Relations

Tuesday, April 25, 1972 · 8:53 AM–10:05 AM ET · Old Executive Office Building

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.;  Butterfield, Alexander P.;  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  [Unknown person(s)];  Woods, Rose Mary;  Andrews, John K., Jr.;  Lord, Winston;  Bull, Stephen B.Conversation332-022 onTape 332 (tape position 01:34:16–02:52:09)StartTuesday, April 25, 1972 at 8:53 AMEndTuesday, April 25, 1972 at 10:05 AMRecording deviceOld Executive Office BuildingSourceNixon Library record for 332-022 ↗

President Nixon met with Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, and other staff members to finalize the strategy for an upcoming televised address regarding the worsening military situation in Vietnam. The President emphasized his desire for a simple, direct speech that would frame the North Vietnamese invasion as a clear act of aggression while preparing the public for potential military losses. A significant portion of the conversation focused on the necessity of matching tough rhetoric with decisive air and naval strikes, as well as the importance of maintaining diplomatic credibility ahead of the upcoming Soviet summit. Nixon also instructed his team to improve their public relations efforts, expressing deep frustration with the lack of aggressive messaging from the State Department and the Pentagon regarding the conflict.

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1:34:03Minimum press.
1:34:21We don't want to release this guest list, I shouldn't think.
1:34:26We don't want to release this guest list to the press, I shouldn't think.
1:34:28We don't have Fred Harris.
1:34:30No.
1:34:31No, no, no.
1:34:32So no press at all?
1:34:33Yeah.
1:34:35And after your toast, no one should respond to this?
1:34:39No, and we're not going to release you from the press.
1:34:41No.
1:34:42Yeah, no, on the toast, I would like to select, have McGregor select out about the senior ranking Republicans that there are, and the senior men, and Cookers come, they, they could, uh,
1:35:04To speak for a minute, Burge, let me explain.
1:35:08Burge is a ranking Republican.
1:35:11Colmer is a chairman.
1:35:13Bo is a ranking Republican.
1:35:14In other words, you've got to draw the line someplace.
1:35:17So have the ranking people speak, and Cooper will speak, under the one-minute rule at the end of the sale word.
1:35:27One more question.
1:35:28Mr.
1:35:28Colonel.
1:35:29Shulker, who leads that Marine family, is retiring after 30 years.
1:35:32Do you want to verbally recognize the Indonesians, the Italians?
1:35:38Yeah.
1:35:40Yeah.
1:35:41He's quite a big man now.
1:35:45Yeah.
1:35:45You can call him into the State Department.
1:35:47I will.
1:35:48I'll call him into the State Department.
1:35:50I'll put it down.
1:35:51You having the Army Corps?
1:35:54Yes, I'm with the Army Corps.
1:35:57We will not go into the other rooms for coffee.
1:36:04At the end, we'll just sit there and have the ironing course.
1:36:12All got a lot of work to do.
1:36:14Start at 7 or 7.30?
1:36:167.30.
1:36:16Black tie.
1:36:17How many?
1:36:18112.
1:36:18112.
1:36:18Fine.
1:36:19Now, at my, what?
1:36:20An E-shaped paper.
1:36:20That's fine.
1:36:22I don't have round papers.
1:36:24Oh, I make round tables.
1:36:26Oh, by all means.
1:36:28Absolutely, absolutely.
1:36:30They love it.
1:36:31They like it better than they can sit around and gas and laugh and all that kind of thing.
1:36:36Make it round tables and have more.
1:36:39Did somebody get, did I say E-shaped or somebody get that right?
1:36:43Well, you know, it should be round tables by all means.
1:36:47Unless they've already got it set up.
1:36:48I think they should.
1:36:53The round tables would be better.
1:36:57And then the tables put both of the ranking, the various people around, put the oldest, I think, put the oldest guys.
1:37:13You'd have to have Booker and Palmer.
1:37:25And as I said, Cooper should be one of the ones going to speak.
1:37:29Yes, sir.
1:37:30That's fine.
1:37:31The main thing is to put one of our, the lightest guy should be at each, should be not sitting by each other, should be at the table, and put a ranking guy, a retiree at each table.
1:37:47And put at my table, the ranking guy is George Maynard,
1:37:54You know, people that really matter.
1:37:56You know, that really matter to me.
1:38:01Go ahead, right up to the hill, will you?
1:38:11Let me just start with the usual subject first.
1:38:14Who in the hell puts this one out?
1:38:19Frankly, I haven't read it in ages.
1:38:23That was done right at the beginning.
1:38:27It was done partly for psychotherapeutic purposes that we can claim.
1:38:33We've got all the pieces that were still in place at the time that this thing went off.
1:38:38Fundy was still in state.
1:38:40I understand.
1:38:42I'm not complaining, and I don't think it's a goddamn thing.
1:38:45I don't like belief, that's all.
1:38:47I think it was the paper that was leaked to Ellsberg as part of it, and also part of it.
1:38:55I'm not even going to get a kiss on it.
1:38:57It was the paper that was prepared for the President to promise.
1:39:02I'm sorry if it doesn't make it look so bad, but it says that the world was lost before it came in.
1:39:07Okay, I'm sorry about that.
1:39:10That's really what it is.
1:39:11I know.
1:39:11That's what state defense was saying.
1:39:15The basic argument of missing funds is that you inherited a total unmitigated match.
1:39:23It was.
1:39:24It was.
1:39:24I'm asking the state.
1:39:26It's got to read it right now.
1:39:31Thank you.
1:39:38Well, anyway, I was, I don't think that's going to, I want to ask one question that would be, I did some dictating in this little talk last night.
1:39:49I'm trying to get it down.
1:39:51And I dictated that only an extreme rough block could be.
1:39:58And I, whoever I decided to make it work on it.
1:40:06I'm going to sit down and look and think over and over at the other.
1:40:13For example, I want to put it in four sentences regarding the report from Abrams.
1:40:20I'm just being very brief about my point out there.
1:40:24So now, Henry, maybe quite frankly too.
1:40:32All the rights closest to my rhythm and the rest over here is a young fellow named Anderson.
1:40:46He's done.
1:40:50He did the Newport speech and the rest.
1:40:54Everybody else, including Sapphire, of course.
1:40:58being more senior people, have to write with their data.
1:41:01They cannot write except for getting there already, and it takes more time.
1:41:06On the other hand, Sapphire is a hell of a lot more privy to everything, and it works very well with you.
1:41:16Query, if I give this damn thing to Andrews, I don't care whether it would work all right or not.
1:41:21I don't know Andrews, but we can do it.
1:41:24No, it's better because he knows my thinking 100% on a beat on every trip.
1:41:28You see, for example, they've got...
1:41:35The less of his own ideas the fellow has, the better off you are.
1:41:38That's the beauty of this.
1:41:39This fellow will not have any ideas.
1:41:42But the reason that other sapphire tribe afforded it was a bad time to make this bitch any taller than you'll be.
1:41:52Well, it wasn't sapphire, Spalding.
1:41:55I didn't believe it.
1:41:56But that's the goal.
1:41:57That's what I mean.
1:41:58He had too much of a goal.
1:41:59Andrews will believe what we have.
1:42:03Now, second point on before Holland gets here.
1:42:08Don't worry about missing one.
1:42:09I figured prior to Ellsworth, I'm going to get one shit about it.
1:42:13Do you have...
1:42:15I guess what I was concerned about was that some son of a bitch was leaking it now.
1:42:20If anybody started leaking stuff, now I'll fire the Secretary of Defense and I won't.
1:42:24Mr. President, we knew they had that for a long time.
1:42:28It's a hell of a thing for them to put out because it really doesn't prove their case because it proves that you inherited the total mess.
1:42:35And whatever you did, whatever it is now, is better than it was then.
1:42:38Now the second thing is...
1:42:45Bob, go out and have Andrews come over here right away with you, and Lord.
1:42:49John Andrews.
1:42:50John Andrews and Lord.
1:42:52Thanks, Lord.
1:42:54Lord.
1:42:54Yeah.
1:42:54I don't know how there is a word, so I'm going to put Andrews, put his ass into a...
1:43:06I think it will.
1:43:07The main...
1:43:10I'll talk to you about the content of the other two ideas.
1:43:17With regard to this sort of thing, if they would put it out now, the first would be putting it out .
1:43:29But the one thing that's in this paper is that not only does it do any good, but it doesn't do any good.
1:43:37And that was the orthodox .
1:43:38Oh, sure, because he'd given up the bombing for nothing.
1:43:41On the other hand, that's another, that's a double-edged argument for them, because if not, it would have been to his health.
1:43:47And they've also put out that bombing doesn't do any good, that somebody must have done it, it must have been the army.
1:43:52So they're sort of going, the liberals are going right now.
1:43:55On the one hand, they say, except for our bombing, the army couldn't hold, but the bombing isn't any good.
1:44:05Because without the bomb, we would never have gotten this over the bench.
1:44:08Yeah.
1:44:16Well, I have marked both of these tapes to be done simultaneously, Mark.
1:44:30This one here.
1:44:33This webinar should be brought back to me.
1:44:39There are random notes and conclusions and other things that get run and bring them back to me and have been on the farm.
1:44:48That will be the double space that I can work on.
1:44:52Now this one here is a memorandum that at the very end says deliver it to Sasson and Sapphire.
1:44:56I should be changing our signal.
1:44:58We're going to give it to Andrews.
1:44:59As soon as you finish it, I don't want to see it.
1:45:03It's just rough, basically sort of rough, a very rough outline for the purpose of his making up a draft for what he's going to work out with Lauren.
1:45:12So you look it over.
1:45:14I'm getting him in now to instruct him on what to do.
1:45:17As soon as you get that one over, you send it over, right over to him.
1:45:21Where the hell do you think Kissinger was over the weekend when I was trying to call him?
1:45:41Probably out at some base.
1:45:44I hope so.
1:45:46It wasn't through lack of office.
1:45:49Oh, my word.
1:45:50No, no, it's got nothing to do with modesty.
1:45:58The head of the state security general, I don't know.
1:46:02He greeted me at the airport and said he had a whole bunch of girls, all 25 years and younger.
1:46:06You might remember, that's how the guys go out for.
1:46:15Girls?
1:46:15Not girls.
1:46:16The rudeness of these guys is not to be believed.
1:46:21Then I said, I want to take a swim.
1:46:23And that's also under the state security.
1:46:28So again, they said, do I want to do this?
1:46:32Nurse?
1:46:33Masseuses.
1:46:34Masseuses?
1:46:35Oh, they use those for that purpose?
1:46:38Yeah.
1:46:39Oh, God, if they said any hair color or...
1:46:44But they did it.
1:46:44Jesus Christ.
1:46:45It was so revolting.
1:46:47You know, they took so much fun out of it.
1:46:51You know, it's...
1:46:53I don't know.
1:46:54It was just absolutely revolting.
1:46:57And they brought it up on every occasion.
1:47:00Oh, wow.
1:47:01General Antonio was riding in the shotgun in the car all the time, and he's had the music due to be due, which was a bad moment.
1:47:12And we went past the Moscow film studios, and I said, I know a lot of actresses in Hollywood.
1:47:20He said, try my dudes.
1:47:21We had a lot more experience.
1:47:25And at the end,
1:47:27When we left, there's a Russian, half of the parents, they sent a deputy foreign, a good deputy foreign minister to say good-bye to me because I could be quite a good person.
1:47:41And he said, would you wait outside until the Lord arrives and then you and he come in together because I'm talking to you all.
1:47:52And of course, that's what I said on behalf of the Soviet government and the Soviet people.
1:47:57I would like to thank you and drink to friendship.
1:48:03Antonov spoke up.
1:48:04He said, I don't think I have Soviet state security.
1:48:08Kuznetsov said, you are not saying state security is separate from the government.
1:48:13Antonov said, I maintain that I don't think I have Soviet state security.
1:48:20That KGB is nothing to me.
1:48:26Well, I remember that the year, the year I went, I went there, one year by business.
1:48:35Two translators.
1:48:45And boy, they had a lot of money.
1:48:51I got a totally wrong about the kitchen today because
1:48:55President basically said, yes, what President was trying to say, because he said to me explicitly, he said, I want to assure the President no such thing will happen while I'm in charge here.
1:49:06He will be put under no public embarrassment.
1:49:08That was what he was trying to do.
1:49:10Look, the hope that you know, he said, I didn't want to mention it, but those two can come in when I want to take it.
1:49:19So Buck's got it totally, absolutely right.
1:49:23This is just mainly for your type of stuff.
1:49:25We're already starting to have people working to help you out.
1:49:35Now they also want to help you out with cases and so forth.
1:49:53He probably doesn't know about the .
1:50:04Well, anyway, tomorrow, today at noon, we're going to announce that Dr. Kissinger has been in Moscow in the last four days meeting with Chairman .
1:50:22But at 7, 7 o'clock tonight, 7.30 tonight, we'll be announcing.
1:50:24Now, tomorrow night, what time?
1:50:29We don't know what time right now.
1:50:39Yeah, I think it'll be 10.
1:50:42At 10 o'clock, I'm going to go on for 10 minutes to briefly to
1:50:48who have given a praise for the state of the blood in Vietnam.
1:50:57Now, what I want you to do, and I have dictated a rough outline, and it's more than an outline in some respects, but there's some sense thereof that I don't know briefly.
1:51:13The main thing is I want you to prepare working with
1:51:15or who is familiar with all of the factual things.
1:51:22So I, it doesn't matter if you just, after you get this out, this draft of what you sit down and put it into some sort of form, following the outline very carefully, and trying not to deviate.
1:51:48the rhythm, the phrases by each one.
1:51:53And certainly not from the order that I have presented it.
1:51:57That was something that has to be said very much on my own.
1:52:02Avoiding, too, your own ideas, whatever they may be.
1:52:05But, of course, suggesting a side note or something like that.
1:52:17What you were to do is true.
1:52:44Ignore the fact that it has no conclusion.
1:52:47Just bring it up to the end.
1:52:49Let me have a word so that you get the feel of where you're going to have to get in.
1:52:55How do you feel?
1:52:56Are you tired?
1:52:57No, no.
1:52:57These old men like history get tired.
1:53:02It's so incredible.
1:53:03Let's stay away from that.
1:53:07Are you kidding?
1:53:07Why the hell do you have to look around his office?
1:53:14In a nutshell, like in a nutshell, what we are saying is that we were 49 in a military situation.
1:53:23The situation is not the one role you would have to play.
1:53:42And it's a very beautiful brief review, as I always do, and I must always do, of what the situation is, whatever it is you're talking about.
1:53:53You know, it's very important.
1:53:57It's important to have a casual treatment.
1:54:00That's why our programs and so forth, this is done very, very quickly, and it must be lectured to you.
1:54:03I'm not going to go into how they all do it.
1:54:07You know what I mean?
1:54:09I mean, what are they listening to, you know?
1:54:12He said he was going to ask, well, he told me about the helicopter that was shot yesterday.
1:54:16Yeah, I know.
1:54:19That'll be next week.
1:54:20That'll be next week.
1:54:23Yeah, and then, that's where you made the most important comments.
1:54:28peace offers and the history of the negotiation and so forth.
1:54:32I deliberately hear when I don't want to go in and make a mouth shut about trying to make it too accurate, you know, and too rounded.
1:54:41In other words, we've offered a ceasefire in exchange for all prisoners of war to withdraw from all of our forces in the elections.
1:54:49It's been actually supervised.
1:54:50That was just a kind of a thing so that people will be reminded what it was and so forth and so on.
1:54:58That was in January 25th.
1:55:00This is all in the alphabet.
1:55:01I'm trying to give you the feel of it.
1:55:03Then what was their answer?
1:55:07They had a massive building.
1:55:09We knew there was a massive building.
1:55:11I showed restraint because our hope was to negotiate something.
1:55:15And finally, on Easter weekend, they launched a massive invasion of South Vietnam with, and here, Al will have a picture for you, which is very hard to get out of my goddamn car for the thing, but where 500, 5,000, or 50,000, whatever it is, not two or three divisions or 18 regiments or something like that, invaded South Vietnam.
1:55:38Is he my client?
1:55:42No.
1:55:42Uh...
1:55:45And then they struck for the past three and a half weeks.
1:55:51And as far as U.S. action is concerned, there's no ground for it.
1:56:01There will be none.
1:56:02That's all.
1:56:03Incidentally, the U.S.
1:56:12And then we go into, and now I want to give you a situation, give you an up-to-date report.
1:56:19I am performing a report from General Abrams.
1:56:24And General Abrams says, inside Southgate, at the maze, over the country, they're fighting courageously.
1:56:29They're self-inflicted, they're picking and flicking enormous casualties.
1:56:34Two, with the airstrikes and legal orders.
1:56:36have been essential in protecting the RMA and preventing the Congress from opposing the Congress government.
1:56:47We have another month.
1:56:48We can expect another month of continued enemy offenses.
1:56:52There will be hard-fought battles.
1:56:55There will be some losses.
1:56:56There will be some errors.
1:56:58There will be some errors again.
1:57:00But it is a judgment.
1:57:03that the South Vietnamese lines, that the South Vietnamese on the ground, will be able to contain.
1:57:10Now this is very good, this is the same plane which went away.
1:57:15I don't want to go too far, just about it here, but we want to prepare the people in effect for the fact that there will be losses, but preparing for the fact also
1:57:24Which, despite orders I gave over the weekend, not a goddamn thing in the president's morning about any of the positive things.
1:57:36And I can't find what happened to them on Earth or anything.
1:57:41Not in the goddamn Washington Post, but you'll get it in a little bit.
1:57:44Okay, I'll read it next time.
1:57:47All right, now, then we come to the critical point.
1:57:53based on General, after reading General Ray's report, based on his report, based on his advice, based on advice that I've had from the, from Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Porter, the, and my other, and my senior advisors here, also my senior advisors here,
1:58:19that I have made the following decisions with regard to our future actions.
1:58:23And then I go right into it.
1:58:27I have ordered that I order the reduction of the troop ceiling to 20,000 by July 1.
1:58:35This will reduce the ceiling to 49,000, which is a reduction of over 1.5 million.
1:58:47Two, I have ordered that directly- The idea that this is made possible because of the .
1:58:52Yeah, well, I've covered that.
1:58:54I've also said in there that with President Chu's pleaded parents and so forth and so on, it's all in there.
1:59:03This is a long time.
1:59:04You can check this out.
1:59:06Second, I directed the best reporter for the purpose of .
1:59:14Third,
1:59:15I have ordered that during this period, while we were in the military, we would maintain military strikes, air and naval strikes on military targets north of Vietnam and in the battle area south of Vietnam.
1:59:33So, those are the two of them.
1:59:35Then, at the last, we spent a little time about why, what our choice was, and so forth.
1:59:43and why we had to do the bombing.
1:59:44And we did it for every one of them.
1:59:50And of course, protection of American forces, too, that we're going to comment and take over.
1:59:58And so forth.
2:00:04And Detroit, on the other hand, .
2:00:06That's all you need.
2:00:06That's all.
2:00:07That's basically the basic outline.
2:00:09All of that, we should be able to get in.
2:00:13Less than ten times.
2:00:16Mr. President, if I may drop one suggestion.
2:00:20I would recommend strongly that when you base all these things on what you're doing, that there be two or three ominous phrases to be interpreted in the direction that you might do a hell of a lot more.
2:00:34I believe that.
2:00:35I believe that.
2:00:36That's the one thing.
2:00:38Once, if there isn't a stake, that's all you're going to do.
2:00:41They do this because they don't mind having you bought down.
2:00:44They mind having you make money.
2:00:45Well, let me take you down the path just a little, including you, because I know that I'm trying to do the right thing.
2:01:03But be that as it may,
2:01:31If you want to develop, the only thing that is not covered, if you want to develop, is to provide the bonding.
2:01:42But the main thing is get it done as quickly as you can.
2:01:48You will get it from roads, I would suppose, by 20, 25 minutes.
2:01:52You sit down and work it over.
2:01:54There's no pride or mothership in terms of the, I mean, some of this,
2:01:58It's very, very rough.
2:01:59It is sometimes repetitious in the rest.
2:02:02Then you go over to Winston-Laurent, and you sit down with him, and you go over to him, and be sure that it's all right for substance use, as quick as you can.
2:02:11Don't bother Henry with it at this point.
2:02:13Don't bother Hayward with it, except to get the stuff you bring back to me.
2:02:17Then I'll come back, and I'll know that this or that won't fit, and I'll make it and take another cut at it.
2:02:24I will expect a copy back to see if you're going to get it by 10.
2:02:27You've got to get a copy back if you're going to call 30.
2:02:29That's all you need.
2:02:34That's all.
2:02:35That's basically the basic outline.
2:02:37All of that, you should be able to get in in less than 10 minutes.
2:02:43The president is on a job like this.
2:02:46I would recommend strongly that when you're based on all these things that what you're doing, that there be two or three ominous phrases that can be interpreted in the direction that you might do a hell of a lot more.
2:03:00Because that's what we believe.
2:03:03Because that's what we, that's the one thing
2:03:06Once, if there isn't a stake, that's all you're going to do.
2:03:09They do this because they don't mind that you bought down.
2:03:12They mind having to make this work.
2:03:14Well, let me take you down the path a little, including, because I know that I'm trying to make this work.
2:03:31But be that as it may,
2:03:59If you want to develop, the only thing that is not covered, if you want to develop, is to why get the bombing in.
2:04:08But the main thing is get it done as quickly as you can.
2:04:16You will get it from Rhodes, I would suppose, by 20, 25 minutes.
2:04:20You sit down and work it over.
2:04:22There's no pride or mothership in terms of this.
2:04:25I mean, some of this is very, very rough.
2:04:27It is sometimes repetitious in the rest.
2:04:30If you go over with Winston Lord, and you sit down with him, and you go over with him, then be sure that it's all right for substance use.
2:04:39Don't bother Henry with it at this point.
2:04:40Don't bother Haywood with it, except to get the stuff that you're bringing back to me.
2:04:45And I'll come back, and I'll know that this or that won't fit, and I'll make it and take another cut at it.
2:04:51I will expect a copy back, you know, see if you're going to get it by the 10th.
2:04:56You've got to get a copy back here by 1230.
2:04:58You've got two and a half hours.
2:05:01Now, it's pretty, uh, I mean, it won't be difficult for you to do this, but remember that you don't have to look at the guy, or anybody there, but you will get to work.
2:05:11I would hope that, uh,
2:05:16What could happen is, if you want Rose to do it, she could make a copy of my rough draft for the win right away, and then he could be in touch with you and say, look, I think maybe we've got to change this, or this doesn't work, or this doesn't work, or that, or the other.
2:05:32In other words, my figures may be wrong.
2:05:36Just a couple of points.
2:05:38First, there has to be in here the fact, for example, one fact, that it's terribly important whether this is a vacation or not.
2:05:47Let's, let's, let's stop all the man-towns.
2:05:50There are 120,000 or 150,000 North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam.
2:05:55There are no South Vietnamese troops in North Vietnam.
2:06:02Don't confuse it with Laos and Cambodia this time.
2:06:08I don't want to get into that this time.
2:06:11But I know that.
2:06:13But I just don't want to get back into this.
2:06:16So basically, this is a clear...
2:06:20in case of the most brutal, blatant aggression in which one country invades another.
2:06:29You get my point?
2:06:33Sir?
2:06:34That has to be a, and I think in the draft, by implication, if it isn't getting bigger from now, there are so many so forth in South Vietnam, there are none in North Vietnam.
2:06:46There's also one other phrase, our bomb.
2:06:52Our bombing of military targets in North Vietnam will continue until the North Vietnamese stop their invasion of South Vietnam.
2:07:05There's another way to put that.
2:07:06Our bombing of military targets in North Vietnam will continue until the North Vietnamese stop killing South Vietnamese and Americans in South Vietnam.
2:07:21I'll look at both.
2:07:22I mean, I put it down on the alternative there, and I'll look at both.
2:07:25I'll determine which way I want to do it.
2:07:27But we're mainly interested in getting this.
2:07:31And we say, finally, we don't give a goddamn much about this, except for what Laura told you we have to have for accuracy in the port policy area.
2:07:43We're looking for very simple, oversimplified, very direct,
2:07:48reassuring, yet also quite candid.
2:07:51Now, you don't put in such craftily effective.
2:07:55I want to be very candid.
2:07:58I want to give you the bad news and the good news and the rest.
2:08:02Just do it.
2:08:03Just say it.
2:08:03Just do it the way that I have it put and leave your own ideas out.
2:08:07Okay?
2:08:07Okay, fine.
2:08:10that you work together and try to go over in some room here.
2:08:15Can you take the morning off?
2:08:16Well, I think you're very essential to this because you would do the writing yourself, but I want him to know my style very well now.
2:08:24And he can take a crack at it.
2:08:27Maybe by 1 o'clock, everybody...
2:08:29How rigid are we in the time limit?
2:08:31That is, are we aiming for eight minutes to leave you two minutes complete?
2:08:34Don't worry about your time limit.
2:08:37I think it isn't going to make that time limit.
2:08:39What I'm just simply suggesting is this.
2:08:42Now, I've just got a couple of other things I'm going to finish.
2:08:48For example, they did some very good work over here, comparing from what you did, what you're reminding me about.
2:08:56Trust, honesty.
2:09:00that are just things that you don't need to put in.
2:09:06For example, on April 20th, they shelved the account of Adlon for $560.
2:09:14We had no time for that for anything else.
2:09:22And then the...
2:09:35What you can is that there is not going to be a private sanctuary, not as long as they are killing South Vietnamese and Americans and something, as long as they're Communist invaders.
2:09:52Now, one thing that's very, very important, I never want to see you again in anything ever presented to me that were the other side.
2:09:58It's the enemy, it's the Communists, and it's the invaders.
2:10:02Is that clear?
2:10:03Sir?
2:10:11By the way, don't you worry about the time.
2:10:13Just get the thing in here and I'll do the cutting.
2:10:17Because I've got quite a bit to add.
2:10:27And my own part.
2:10:28Okay.
2:10:28Now with regard to our tactics today.
2:10:31Oh, and obviously with regard to this pentagon paper thing.
2:10:36I think the best thing to do
2:10:41Just rather than getting into any debates about it and so forth, just trying to say, well, the president is that.
2:10:47The average American doesn't care for one goddamn, and I don't think it's going to get a hell of a lot of play.
2:10:51And I think that Ziegler should just coldly say, oh, well, I don't know.
2:10:55I don't know.
2:10:56I don't know.
2:10:56I don't know.
2:10:57I don't know.
2:10:59Fair enough.
2:11:01No comment.
2:11:03I don't get all the people are people that are .
2:11:07We don't give a shit.
2:11:12Is that clear?
2:11:17You have been, and now, having some success of getting neighbors and BIOs.
2:11:27to point out that, at least, you understand, I'm not trying to gussy up this thing to make a defeat look like a victory.
2:11:37Although, let me say, bad as Laos was, it was a hell of a lot better, and the press made out, and it did a hell of a lot of good.
2:11:45We agree.
2:11:47That's what I'm trying to get at about this at this critical time.
2:11:52But we're right up ahead, you know, of what we do have.
2:11:56There's some support.
2:12:01The President thought that even in the present time, with all the lousy goddamn press we get, that even Gallup, who wrote this question the other way, showed that we're under the pressure of the majority of people to favor the bomb, right?
2:12:14I think Gallup put the poll out today, they pulled it over the weekend, they're going to run it today, saying, they said, do you favor the resumption of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, which is about as bad a weight as you can lift in Washington?
2:12:28You can lift 47, say yes to 44, says no?
2:12:31Mr. President, again, we ought to keep the Central Island State in perspective.
2:12:40I think they have this unit misdeployed out there.
2:12:43That's what we're over to them.
2:12:46The first time the North Indian is attacked, now let's be true, the plane they drive, be true, and the DMZ, they're going to drive these people back.
2:12:56Then when they get on their...
2:12:57I don't want them to drive them back.
2:12:58I told Al to tell them to get their asses on at mass.
2:13:02And then show the bastards.
2:13:03Do what they're... Henry, did you... No, that was a mistake.
2:13:07Did you... You're a German scholar, a scholar of World War I. Jim Redd was recently...
2:13:15I had...
2:13:18You know how Hindenburg's looters started to kick the hell out of the Russians?
2:13:23The Russians thought they had a hell of a victory, remember?
2:13:27Remember the Germans with foreign courier forces, foreign courier forces on the other side of the moon, withdrew, and the Russians walked in, and the Germans put up pincers on them, and they killed them.
2:13:40Now, God damn it all, why in the fuck can't our military ever teach anything right?
2:13:45We have had more money out there.
2:13:47We've given them more arms.
2:13:49And Abrams, in his report, indicates, he says, the coordination...
2:13:54and the air, and the sea, and the infantry is excellent.
2:13:59Now, for Christ's sakes, what in the world is the matter with the strategy?
2:14:03These guys aren't strategists, and they haven't gone to West Point.
2:14:07Good God, any man knows
2:14:10that when you have territory that isn't worth saving, and Rock, I understand, that's a symbol, but the Central Highlands, why in the name of God, instead of getting huge stories out that we have lost the Central Highlands, didn't they immediately withdraw, make it appear that they were fighting, get back, get back, get back,
2:14:29and then call them to leave what they're using in their own property.
2:14:32Now, why wasn't that done?
2:14:33I just don't know.
2:14:35Because remember, I mentioned, Henry, you remember when I told you to have them do that?
2:14:38I know, Mr. President.
2:14:39I think they tried to do it.
2:14:42All right.
2:14:42But what I'm trying to say is they made this mistake.
2:14:46They did get it clobbered.
2:14:48But I think if it follows the pattern of all the other operations,
2:14:54You don't think it's bad?
2:14:55You don't think it's bad today as it did last time?
2:14:58No.
2:14:58They now have formed a defense line around Compton.
2:15:01They even lose Compton.
2:15:03What the hell is Compton?
2:15:05There's a bunch of goddamn warhouses.
2:15:07I've been preaching every goddamn movement for four weeks before there was an attack that we expected to lose Compton.
2:15:15And we've got to keep this thing in perspective.
2:15:17At the end of December,
2:15:19They were heading for Longtien.
2:15:21Every bloody newspaper in the country was writing about a tremendous defeat we suffered.
2:15:26Longtien hasn't fallen, isn't going to fall, and it was held by a rabble of Mios and by a few irregular Thai battalions.
2:15:38So I think now, and it was held against two of the North Vietnamese divisions.
2:15:43Now, we're going to lose some of these things.
2:15:47I think
2:15:48with a little luck at all, with some sense, that by the end of next week, the situation of the islands is going to be like it is in Third Corps.
2:15:57They come into this rush, then they get stopped, then they take a shellacking from the air.
2:16:03I do not see where they go strategically from Khantoum.
2:16:06Even if Khantoum falls, they get to Pleiku.
2:16:09If Pleiku falls, and they're still 100 miles from the coast, run away.
2:16:14Hue is in a different area.
2:16:16Now, Hue, that is different, but there they are facing the best South Vietnamese division.
2:16:20And they haven't made much progress.
2:16:21And they have made no progress whatsoever there.
2:16:23So I think, Mr. President, it's a fact.
2:16:26You were very pessimistic last night.
2:16:28I was only pessimistic because I get mad when I see these stupidities committed.
2:16:35But we have to face another fact about the South Vietnamese.
2:16:39Of course they should have been strong.
2:16:41Of course they should have been strong.
2:16:43Particularly when we told them three weeks ago to withdraw.
2:16:46I know, General, but you knew they should withdraw out, didn't you?
2:16:51I have told Mora every day, when it was quiet out there, I said, Tom, don't keep your units coming out.
2:16:58And he gave me his enablement.
2:16:59He gave me all this bullshit about them doing it.
2:17:04What's the crisis matter with Westmoreland?
2:17:07He's the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
2:17:09I have to say, no.
2:17:11No, but chairman of the Army Chief of Staff.
2:17:13But he had no command authority.
2:17:15I have to say, in defense of Westmoreland, he did point it out to me and to Al that they were overextended up there.
2:17:20All right.
2:17:20What's the matter with Avery?
2:17:22He's a great hero.
2:17:24What's the price matter with him?
2:17:25Why did he have to draw that?
2:17:28I really wonder.
2:17:29The irony was that they would fall back as soon as they got pressure.
2:17:32That's what they were told to do.
2:17:33On the other hand,
2:17:35What Jews' problem has been, and it's been consistently, is you can't get after your own peoples and populations.
2:17:42So it's resolved now.
2:17:43It's resolved.
2:17:44The story of mine says that the South, the Great, and the sound of the Vietnamese have lost half, three provinces.
2:17:52God damn it.
2:17:52What a hell of a province.
2:17:54Mr. President, we had big headlines.
2:17:58two days after Easter Sunday, Flitz Creek in the north, south-north Vietnamese Army smashing through, unless they've got units up there that they haven't thrown anywhere else.
2:18:08They are going to run out of steam by the end of this week.
2:18:12And...
2:18:13If the Southerly Police can pull any defensive line at all, and they're not pulling one at all, then they are, and we are hooking them over by air.
2:18:20Did we make the big strike or not, Al?
2:18:23Yes, sir, we did.
2:18:24We had massive people.
2:18:26Where to?
2:18:27Where?
2:18:27To Cook.
2:18:28To Cook.
2:18:28We did.
2:18:29Well, that's it.
2:18:29That's it.
2:18:31It's in the news.
2:18:32But all I meant is, now look, did they make this truck to hit anything this time?
2:18:37Did they know anything?
2:18:38I don't want to do that just because I have some screwy idea.
2:18:43What?
2:18:43Because they're coming down Route 14, they've stopped at a bridge.
2:18:46Yeah.
2:18:47Their armor's stopped there, and they're massed there, and they're going to get punched.
2:18:51Did we hit the bridge?
2:18:53Yes, sir.
2:18:54Good to know.
2:18:56We've seen pictures of that, so they're not... How about the armor?
2:19:01I don't think so.
2:19:02Listen, we're dropping more bombs in one strike than all of World War II.
2:19:05They ought to be able to knock a goddamn bridge out.
2:19:07But they've knocked the bridge out.
2:19:10They've knocked out 14 or 20 tanks.
2:19:12Now, I don't know if that's true, but it's almost inconceivable.
2:19:17I took Al and I both to the St. Petersburg...
2:19:21This morning?
2:19:21Yeah, and they show us the boxes.
2:19:24of these B-52s, and they're really one right next to the other.
2:19:27They're merging into each other.
2:19:28It's almost inconceivable that if there was anything there at all, that they didn't merge and replenish it.
2:19:35We have these intelligence reports where they are battalions.
2:19:38Let me say this.
2:19:40It's your job, Bob, working with Al, don't bother Henry.
2:19:45You know what, Henry?
2:19:48You see that the goddamn services out there in Vietnam get out as much positive stories as they can.
2:19:56Now, that son of a bitch from the AAP that's out there, I found out earlier that he's a bad actor.
2:20:01He's the guy who used to be here with Walter Echner.
2:20:04He is no good.
2:20:05Henry Bradshaw is no damn good.
2:20:08Now, I'm working with him.
2:20:10Working over it.
2:20:11Getting screwed.
2:20:12You know, that's what you do.
2:20:13Compromise the son of a bitch.
2:20:16You've got to do a little better job out there.
2:20:18Now, we've got...
2:20:19There are more PIO officers out there than they have in the whole goddamn Pentagon.
2:20:25And they aren't doing anything but sitting around in the damn bar at the Caravelle talking to our enemies.
2:20:32And I want them to get off their ass and start doing something.
2:20:34Now, here's the problem, Abrams.
2:20:36Abrams done pretty good PIOs since somebody told me.
2:20:40What is the problem?
2:20:45Can you direct these guys out and get off the goddamn passes and work these people?
2:20:51Oh, I know the problem.
2:20:53Don't change it.
2:20:54Don't let, under any circumstances,
2:20:57Abrams, or Bunker, or Blair, to change Jews' attitude about letting American reporters in with South American news.
2:21:06Keep them out.
2:21:08The stories will be worse if they get in with the South American news.
2:21:11There was only one good picture that I've seen in the paper this morning.
2:21:15One poor little Vietnamese woman who put flowers in the grave.
2:21:18The trouble with the goddamn caption of the picture order, you wouldn't know whether they were killed by American, our side or their side, would you?
2:21:25Huh?
2:21:26Bob, is that true or not?
2:21:28It's true.
2:21:28We have to face it.
2:21:29Well, give it a dot.
2:21:30It's a dot.
2:21:31It's a dot.
2:21:31Get to work.
2:21:32Get to work on it.
2:21:33The press has a vested interest in defeat.
2:21:35We know that.
2:21:36And that is the problem.
2:21:38My concern yesterday is...
2:21:40If this goes on for three or four months and they keep losing a division here and a division there, then the only question is which side is going to break first.
2:21:49I just can't believe we've got a million in the south and they'll collapse in the face of 120,000 in the country.
2:21:57That's not possible.
2:21:58Exactly.
2:21:59It's not possible.
2:22:00And they are spread along the whole frontier, one in the south and one in the north, and put all of this unit.
2:22:06At any one point that they want to attack, that's the classic dilemma.
2:22:11Now, it's your job now, the Skelly Act, to get his ass back here, and it's your job to use the Skellys and the Clawdons and all those people, and get that damn fellow over to the bench and arrest him.
2:22:24We start getting out some atrocity horror stories on what the North Vietnamese invaders are doing to the people of South Vietnam.
2:22:32Can we do that?
2:22:34Every time one of our aircraft pilots happens to drop one a little bit off target and they hit some South Vietnamese, it's a horror story.
2:22:43Now, Henry, they're slaughtering these poor bastards, aren't they?
2:22:46They're driving them mad.
2:22:47They're refugees.
2:22:48Now, you watch this story.
2:22:50How much of that has gotten through?
2:22:51You said last week some of it has.
2:22:52A little of it has at times.
2:22:56Would you not agree that the greatest weakness we have around here is not pushing our side enough on that kind of thing?
2:23:05Yeah.
2:23:06All right.
2:23:07That's your job.
2:23:08Al, will you work with him on this?
2:23:10If you've got somebody who should be in charge, get the Pentagon to work.
2:23:15Get the goddamn Pentagon to work.
2:23:17Get Roger's staff to work.
2:23:18Christ, McCluskey's got a staff of 80.
2:23:2280 people in the goddamn State Department press office.
2:23:25Did you know that?
2:23:2580.
2:23:26Of course they represented each one of them.
2:23:28Each desk officer's got a PIO, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
2:23:32The defense, you know how many the Pentagon's got?
2:23:363,000 in public information. 3,000.
2:23:40Now, what in the name of God are we sitting here talking about things that are so obvious?
2:23:45What in the name of God do these people do?
2:23:48I really mean this.
2:23:49Don't you agree, Henry?
2:23:50We have had a brilliant foreign policy, but due to the fact that only Henry and I have tried to sell it, and Roger's gone then.
2:23:59He came in good last week.
2:24:01But Henry and I have tried to sell it.
2:24:03We've had the most brilliant foreign policy in this century.
2:24:07sold most inadequately.
2:24:09And the reason is we ain't got people thinking about signing.
2:24:12I remember old C.E.
2:24:13Jackson used to say, I remember how much he meant our eyes and our open skies proposal.
2:24:19Oh, by Christ, that was funny.
2:24:21But it got in the public mind.
2:24:24See?
2:24:25But we've got sapphire, moor, scally, and all the rest sitting around, and we've got to use them better.
2:24:32See?
2:24:33But you've got to push it as best as you can.
2:24:35Oh, yes, I know.
2:24:36I know.
2:24:36Having said all this, the problem is that we've got an iron curtain, for instance.
2:24:41We can't break through.
2:24:43And as Henry was saying, my God, if Kennedy had even gotten biological warfare through, they would have been burning, lighting candles to it for three years.
2:24:54We didn't even get three hours in that story.
2:24:57Three hours.
2:24:59Next to nothing.
2:25:00That story, though, is bigger than anything Kennedy did.
2:25:04Oh, the assault on arms.
2:25:07I mean, that's never happened in history that countries have put their central armaments
2:25:13I know all about it.
2:25:14The point is, the fact that the president against us isn't enough reason, we aren't working on it enough.
2:25:20We don't have enough people pushing it.
2:25:21So if you guys are working on it, now let's get to the tactics.
2:25:28Go ahead, Henry.
2:25:29The game plan, here's what it was.
2:25:32Did you inform Roger, Jim?
2:25:36Yes.
2:25:36Did it work?
2:25:37Yes, sir.
2:25:37He's probably uncomfortable because he wants to know more.
2:25:43You're trying to have .
2:25:46I didn't.
2:25:46I told him that we were going to put out the statement at noon, and we were going to answer some questions, and you were considering having us to do it.
2:25:55But I didn't agree with that.
2:25:57Yes, I told him that.
2:25:58Oh, you had to?
2:26:00Yes.
2:26:00That's what he did.
2:26:01But I didn't tell him that Henry was going to read the press.
2:26:04I didn't say he was going to read the press.
2:26:06Just don't tell him that.
2:26:07Just don't tell him that.
2:26:08Don't ever tell him that.
2:26:09Just have Henry do it.
2:26:11And then if he does have it, he'll have you on the phone with me.
2:26:14That's excellent.
2:26:15But you did tell him that he wants to know more.
2:26:17What the hell is more than you want to know?
2:26:20Well, he really wants to be in a public sense, engaged in some way.
2:26:28That's quite obvious.
2:26:30He doesn't say it, but he doesn't want to be.
2:26:34I had to send it for people over.
2:26:35He was informed.
2:26:35He doesn't sit down and sit on my lap and tell me what the hell to do.
2:26:38But he can put out the fact that he saw all the guns in the bathroom.
2:26:40Yeah, that's right.
2:26:41That's right.
2:26:43He will put that.
2:26:45Now, what have you decided about informing him anything?
2:26:48What is the situation with regard to that?
2:26:56Zegar will do it at 11.30 then?
2:26:5711.30, I think I'll let Zegar go at 11.30, right at the end of the war.
2:27:03Now, the second thing, you go to Colton.
2:27:09Now, what is the situation about the...
2:27:15What we pretty much come down on is that what we ought to do is call them after the announcement or right at the time of the announcement.
2:27:35I just say, tell them about the Henry thing.
2:27:38I say we'd like you to come over at 5.30 for a briefing on some general background.
2:27:46And then at that time, it's all about the return of the .
2:27:51And then have Henry come along.
2:27:53I agree.
2:27:54I think you've got to keep out of it, because you don't know what they're going to say.
2:28:03And we don't set this as a formal briefing.
2:28:07This is an informal .
2:28:10Well, I don't know.
2:28:11Fulbright?
2:28:11I don't think he'd do anything.
2:28:13Is that what you're telling me?
2:28:15Okay.
2:28:17See?
2:28:17I would never let him.
2:28:18I don't know about any other.
2:28:20Now, wait a minute.
2:28:20Wait a minute.
2:28:21The only problem is that Aitken is all with us.
2:28:25You have Aitken come over.
2:28:26Aitken is all with us.
2:28:27I'd have him there.
2:28:30But I would not have any enemy there at that point.
2:28:33I don't want the enemies.
2:28:34Do you understand, Bob?
2:28:35Yes, sir.
2:28:36But I would have Rogers inform the enemies.
2:28:39If we had our good people there, we could really lift the coach just a little bit.
2:28:44Right.
2:28:44Les Ahrens, who was in that company as well.
2:28:48George Mahon.
2:28:49Eddie Hebert.
2:28:50Well, if George had an Eddie Hebert, tiger teeth, you get down to the leaders of the people that defend us from that.
2:28:56The Senate, you don't need too many.
2:28:58Barry Goldwater, John Power.
2:29:01John Stennis, of course.
2:29:05Just a few of those.
2:29:07But then Bob just had that.
2:29:08And in the meantime, pick them.
2:29:10Now McGregor's got to get off his ass and pick a few others that have been fighting.
2:29:16Ernie, for example, has been fighting this battle for us.
2:29:19Maybe he did, didn't he?
2:29:21I don't know.
2:29:22People that have been willing to stand up and knock their brains out.
2:29:27The point is, by all means, I would have George Aiken.
2:29:32George Aiken has come out for us.
2:29:35He'll love having this.
2:29:37And also, he'll pass it to Mansfield.
2:29:48which is good, but I will not have Fulbright under any circumstance just tell Rogers that he can inform the others.
2:30:02Give Rogers, tell Rogers he shouldn't inform until 7 o'clock.
2:30:07What do you think, Henry?
2:30:12If he goes at 5.30, I don't want our guys hearing it from then.
2:30:18Well, it'll be on the news.
2:30:20See, I don't want it to be on the news at the time that Henry's trip is announced.
2:30:24See, I don't want Henry's trip to be on the news.
2:30:27Well, it will, but you're 5.30.
2:30:28You've got to tell these guys that it cannot, it's got to be all of a sudden.
2:30:32The guy at 5.30 we can trust, and therefore Colt Rogers shouldn't be told until about 6.45, 7.00, 7.00.
2:30:38Right.
2:30:38When the news starts and it's too late.
2:30:40Tell Rogers he can inform all of the others at 7.00.
2:30:44And he can inform anybody he wants.
2:30:47All drugs.
2:30:48Yeah.
2:30:49Yeah.
2:30:50The Foreign Relations Committee.
2:30:53In fact, I wouldn't include God's market in this if he stood with us on that vote.
2:31:02Yeah.
2:31:02No, no, no.
2:31:03No, then you'd have to come up with a vote, and I wouldn't do that.
2:31:09If you make that 530 group eclectic enough, then you have no problem if you just pick them among our friends.
2:31:15That's good.
2:31:16That covers everything.
2:31:18At the present time, there was a situation and everything else is done for today and no leak yet.
2:31:39In fact, the goddamn newspapers and the television this morning said he was planned to begin with unit license, including me, planning the next trip with Mark.
2:31:53Oh, and who's taking care of Laird today at what time?
2:31:59Let me call Conway because he doesn't want to be called by anyone.
2:32:06Ronald Reagan.
2:32:17And then they should be called tonight about going back to the talks.
2:32:29Now, going back to the talks, one technical thing.
2:32:33How do we get across the point today?
2:32:35Going back to the talks, and I put it in the speech, I have flatly rejected
2:32:40the Viet, North Vietnamese insistence that we stop bombing before Trump.
2:32:46I have a question for the president.
2:32:49When he, when he announces it, there are two things we should say.
2:32:53The top agenda item one, as the family is, to put an end to the North Vietnamese intention.
2:33:01Two, we have rejected, there is no question of stopping the bombing.
2:33:09Why didn't you just say it?
2:33:10I got that in my speech.
2:33:12I didn't just say it.
2:33:14Having put it in his statement, get it ready for him.
2:33:19There's two points that should be absolutely clear.
2:33:22Number one, the top agenda item is the end of the invasion.
2:33:26Number two, it is understood we will not- The President has rejected.
2:33:32The South, the North Vietnamese demand that we stop bombing before resuming talks.
2:33:40I've got that in my speech tomorrow very nicely handed.
2:33:45I said they sold that to us in 1968 and we're not going to buy it again.
2:33:50I think it's second because there's an answer to a question.
2:33:55All right.
2:33:55It's either way.
2:33:56Okay.
2:33:59Okay, what else was there?
2:34:17What else do you expect?
2:34:18If they'll notice it, there's something they have to do.
2:34:22They won't hear it, just as far as we're concerned.
2:34:26Yeah.
2:34:26Just so he gets it at the start.
2:34:28What time will they do that?
2:34:307.30.
2:34:30Oh, that's right.
2:34:33The problem with that is he's got to... What did you call that before?
2:34:39What do you call it?
2:34:44He's got to...
2:34:46There's nobody to tell them to.
2:34:47It's very much telling to people .
2:34:51It doesn't make, it has to make a hell of a lot of difference.
2:35:09I have to tell him that I don't want a big, I'm just saying, I have an announcement at 7.30 with regard to the talks.
2:35:19So that it isn't on the news?
2:35:21Yeah, that's right.
2:35:22Keep it out of there.
2:35:24The news is at 7.
2:35:25What does he call it?
2:35:287.30 a.m.
2:35:29Make it at 8.
2:35:30That's right.
2:35:32Call at 7.30 and make the announcement at 8.
2:35:34They're going to put it out at 7.30.
2:35:37What?
2:35:39They're going back to it.
2:35:407.15 he calls.
2:35:41He says I have an announcement regarding the Paris call.
2:35:45I don't think the minister does.
2:35:48He's going back to it.
2:35:50I'm not allowed to say something to the wife.
2:35:54So am I.
2:35:55Well, no, what I mean is, in fact, there's a certain advantage if it leaks out upside down, because it makes it absolutely clear we didn't relatively crack.
2:36:02Good.
2:36:02OK, fellas.
2:36:02I'll meet you back in a little time.
2:36:04I have one problem.
2:36:16The purpose of that was to get Bob on his ass working the game.
2:36:26And we're probably just like we did in Cambodia.
2:36:29I think it's scallying all those people to work.
2:36:32And I'm not going to worry about it.
2:36:33You and I, Henry, now, I'm sure you've got to think about the big things.
2:36:38Screw this all this stuff.
2:36:40The big thing, of course, is the selling of it, though.
2:36:42It's just, to me, a crime.
2:36:43We haven't sold it better.
2:36:44I don't mean you and I.
2:36:45We've broken our ass.
2:36:46And part of the problem is, part of the problem is, let's face it, the biggest gun for selling our policy should be the Secretary of State, William B. Rogers.
2:36:55Now, the only time he went out, really, he said two things.
2:36:58One, he attacked Muskie.
2:36:59I mean, we brought William into that, and last time.
2:37:03Now, if he's done that, did you realize, you know, Russ made a beautiful statement.
2:37:07He said, I mean, the president's doing exactly the right thing.
2:37:13He doesn't have any other choice.
2:37:18You know, these are fine hatred.
2:37:20You don't ever lose support if you're president or vice president.
2:37:22That's an absolutely different thing.
2:37:24I'm not much of a...
2:37:25I'm surprised that's a devil in the name of this whole business of Gallup's moment.
2:37:29I don't give a shit about the polls.
2:37:35But to show that even though it's a slight majority, the majority favor, fine.
2:37:41If that means that after I talk, it'll be 60%, I assure you.
2:37:44Well, then, Mr. President, I believe if you pull this off, I think the chances are 64%.
2:37:52Your popularity is going to skyrocket even more.
2:37:55You've looked them in the eye.
2:37:57The thing we can't afford, we've got it.
2:37:59We can't afford it.
2:38:00We can't blink with it up.
2:38:02They've got to think that next week is what happens.
2:38:04Well, here's the fight I wanted to make to you for the moment.
2:38:15I'm quite late last night trying to get on a big TV show.
2:38:29I'm hearing your dissertation on the summit and on the freshness.
2:38:31I have a few months, I have very, very much emotion.
2:38:36I am convinced that for reasons that have nothing to do with Vietnam
2:38:45It's not a successful summit.
2:38:47It's very desperate.
2:38:49When he sees about this boat, the boat's going to go down.
2:38:55Brian might go down.
2:38:56No.
2:38:56No.
2:38:56No.
2:38:57In my view, I have a feeling he'll make it.
2:39:07He thinks a lot about it.
2:39:14I know that we're going to be sorely tempted to save the summit at almost any cost.
2:39:22I, well, I vote even in the other district.
2:39:24I'm going to do a picture.
2:39:31A few years ago, you murdered and you fucked and you got arrested.
2:39:34And I'll tell you what it was.
2:39:37I am really convinced that if we lose the poor town,
2:39:45The internal situation in this country will be impossible.
2:39:48I don't think, it's a, I think we could, let me tell you the political context.
2:39:53I am convinced now that we could lose the Vietnam and that I could camouflage it in a way by going to the Russian summit that it would appear that what he did the best he could, he would win the election.
2:40:06On the other hand, I am convinced
2:40:11But the American people, if we lose Vietnam and all of this, this is the great struggle between the left and the right, the great struggle between the Haitians and the patriots.
2:40:24And we cannot lose them.
2:40:27Now, having said that, I mean, if we see the situation as getting too rough regarding Hong Kong and all the rest, it's my view,
2:40:39what we have to do.
2:40:40That's all done already?
2:40:42This is your lead.
2:40:42And he said hello.
2:40:45Five minutes.
2:40:45Good, good.
2:40:47It's my view.
2:40:48And this requires work.
2:40:54And we've got to quit thinking in terms of three days' training.
2:41:00We've got to be thinking in terms of an all-out
2:41:13Now, by an all-out bombing attack, I am thinking of things that go far way up.
2:41:22I'm thinking of the dikes.
2:41:26I'm thinking of next to the railroad.
2:41:28I'm thinking, of course, the docks.
2:41:30But I think we are, I talked to Al about what they had in mind.
2:41:34He really said, we'll gradually move up.
2:41:37And I said, Al, brother, it's not that gradual.
2:41:39I agree with you.
2:41:41My view is that... You understand.
2:41:45I think we have got... We've got to use massive force to bring this thing...
2:41:50If force fails, then the cause will be wrong.
2:41:53I agree with you, Mr. President.
2:41:56And I think that will sink the Russian summit.
2:41:59But I think, on the other hand, if it saves Vietnam, there might be a Russian summit at some time in the future.
2:42:05That's the way it is.
2:42:05Mr. President, let me just make one question.
2:42:09You cannot go and meet President...
2:42:11If you have either pulled off your confrontation or if you've been defeated, that guy will never understand.
2:42:19So I'm with you 100%.
2:42:21And second, we have, however, the big practice of striking always from a good position.
2:42:31And for three and a half years, we've done it in a masterful way of Sweden Sauer and never being just butchers.
2:42:42What we have in Australia, it sweetens our very developed, delightfully sophisticated Chinese style, rather than the hard, soft of the American or the Russian.
2:42:57Dr. Braden told me at lunch, just before we left, he said, never has he seen a weekend played with such masterful skill as you played me in that.
2:43:06He said he knows it's a weekend.
2:43:07He knows it's a weekend.
2:43:08I mean, the magic that he said.
2:43:11Now, our home front is, to some extent, important to us.
2:43:15And what's important about it, Mr. President, isn't the support we get for one week.
2:43:19It's how the other side assesses the firmament of this support.
2:43:26Now, my belief is that what we're doing this week
2:43:31That's what we're doing next week, going to a private meeting now.
2:43:34If that fails, and by fails I mean, I don't mean sweet words, I mean a major breakthrough.
2:43:40Anything short of a major breakthrough breaks it all.
2:43:43We are not talking now about the meetings I had last summer, where I come back and say, I had, and you have changed two sentences.
2:43:51Last summer we were under pressure.
2:43:54Let me give you the hard part.
2:43:56Suppose they come through with you and say, we're now ready to have a ceasefire.
2:44:03I don't consider that a right.
2:44:04No.
2:44:04Because basically, that's two of them for us at this point.
2:44:08At this point.
2:44:08If they say, we have this problem about a ceasefire.
2:44:11Because we've offered it.
2:44:13But A, we've offered it.
2:44:14And B, if they offer it, we are going to be in one hell of a spot.
2:44:18So how do we handle it?
2:44:20Well, if...
2:44:21If they offer a ceasefire, I think we ought to delay our tackling of the fact that in some of these areas, they've got to pray if we keep working them over.
2:44:33We should delay for several weeks, work them over, work them over.
2:44:36Now, one thing Kurmiko told me on yesterday, and I didn't put it in the paper, which I have to tell you here, that is, look, why don't you have the summit?
2:44:46And after the summit, do what you want.
2:44:48Then we will understand.
2:44:51I'm not saying you should do it.
2:44:53It's just delaying us, and we can't afford the delay.
2:44:58Just like we did with the Chinese?
2:45:01Well, no, it's important.
2:45:02Before the Chinese summit, we didn't ignore Vietnam at all.
2:45:05No, no, no.
2:45:05But I meant, really, we delayed a lot of the time.
2:45:08China is very much too much homework.
2:45:11Now, we've got Canua.
2:45:12I saw the bombing damage of Canua, for example.
2:45:16They leveled the power plant.
2:45:18Which one was that?
2:45:18The second strength?
2:45:20The second strength.
2:45:21And it worked good.
2:45:22It worked good.
2:45:23When I was...
2:45:24The power plant.
2:45:25Yes.
2:45:26The power plant, the dark area.
2:45:27Now, Brezhnev, Loprynin told me, at the end of every day, Loprynin came over and talked to me.
2:45:33When Brezhnev obviously didn't introduce it, I was like, tell me a thing.
2:45:37Sure.
2:45:37So that he could... Oh, I knew the same thing.
2:45:40You know, so that he could tell these top people he hadn't said it.
2:45:46And he said we got a report that you found 100 kilometers south of what the president got it while he was at the meeting with you.
2:46:00And I hope you know he didn't speak about it.
2:46:06We are now in the position where they are not turning on their worldwide propaganda campaign.
2:46:10And I think we should try to provide that we
2:46:13without hitting them.
2:46:14Now, I'm going to tell the wrong stuff today, that if this offensive, I just have to warn them, this offensive, new offensive may change, but I've said, I didn't give them any line.
2:46:23I just said, we won't get annoyed.
2:46:24You should tell the wrong stuff.
2:46:25You just had a very disturbing, you could say, I just had a very disturbing meeting with the President.
2:46:30I don't know if you put this down, it's a very important one.
2:46:34First of all, in one sense, it was one of the best meetings and one of the most hopeful meetings
2:46:44He was enormously impressed with President's frankness with the messages, with the personal communication that has now been established between him and President.
2:46:54And he thinks the summit can be the great event of the century that I have to recommend to President.
2:46:59On the other hand, President,
2:47:03but has been shot by the back of, in spite of the millions in Moscow, they have marked this as an offensive.
2:47:10And under certain circumstances, he's said that he has made a good, bold decision that with this offensive occurred, we are going to have this case.
2:47:18Our problem with the Russian system is that we don't want to have aggression.
2:47:22It does seem to me to have trouble in the public, you know, even by odds and Iowans.
2:47:27Yeah.
2:47:27People tell me that.
2:47:30We don't want him to be accused that we bombed our pipeline three days before I get there and then he gives up.
2:47:36So if we can...
2:47:38I was wondering if we could wait that long.
2:47:40I've warned them that if May 2nd doesn't lead to a breakthrough, if we go May 3rd or 4th... Now, I have also got the joy to work out another plan together with Trump and the pipeline, namely to sink a ship.
2:47:54We always talk about unimaginative things like mining.
2:47:59I thought that we were going to find the same two or three ships in the mouth of the harbor.
2:48:04How are we going to do that?
2:48:06We go across the sea, so you mean our ships?
2:48:09Our ships, we hold them in there and sink them.
2:48:12Then the harbor.
2:48:14Hold on the shore batteries with the... That's right.
2:48:18The harbor is blocked.
2:48:20for two months, and we are not mining.
2:48:23We are not .
2:48:23I'll have the plan tomorrow.
2:48:27So if we do all of this at once, say next Wednesday or Thursday, I feel very strongly that if does not
2:48:37This and this is going to happen.
2:48:39And I will not agree to another president meeting.
2:48:42By next Thursday or Friday, depending on whether and so forth, we go all out.
2:48:46We go all out.
2:48:47And the summit, I do not think, will be broken off.
2:48:50It depends what you do.
2:48:52Dobrynin's judgment, my judgment is, incidentally, Mr. President, I've seen these guys in action now.
2:48:59There are two guys who've got their asses in a sling.
2:49:01One is Dobrynin and the other is Brezhnev.
2:49:04I really believe
2:49:06And DeBruyne has some influence because he's so smart.
2:49:09And because he's a member of the Central Committee.
2:49:11And respected.
2:49:11And they know he talks to you.
2:49:13I mean, for example, when... No, he brokers every damn little conversation like that.
2:49:18I've forgotten.
2:49:18I even said it.
2:49:19He brokers it.
2:49:20He brokers it.
2:49:21But you have said it.
2:49:22That's right.
2:49:23And the President, for example, when he said to me, I don't want an announcement...
2:49:30He said, I don't want any of that.
2:49:33He said, it's too embarrassing for us.
2:49:36Do you, must you have it?
2:49:40The breeder was, he was vexing at me from saying, you know, he was coaching me.
2:49:47And I said, yes, you must have it.
2:49:49But my point is that the Breeden was helping me out.
2:49:53And the Breeden, when I really laid into Gromyko yesterday, the Breeden took a walk with me.
2:49:58And he said, you may not believe this, but you didn't need to think it's very well that it's ever been done.
2:50:03These guys think that they can maneuver the president.
2:50:07And I told him that if you think kitchen chairs can't wait, then you need to measure them.
2:50:12And he said, this was a tremendous lesson that you can't push these guys beyond a certain point.
2:50:18Now, my judgment is we can get away with a two-day strike, something that we can say is over, then wait a week and do it again.
2:50:25If these bastards put all their airbags into this, the worst mistake we've made, not the worst, but a bad mistake, we're going to cut it.
2:50:34to cut that other strike in half.
2:50:36Well, Henry, let's face it.
2:50:38Coming back from Canada, we got that here cancelled.
2:50:41You remember Laird, our hardliner, saved us from this, remember?
2:50:46He said, you know, the President and Henry panicked, he told them.
2:50:50Oh, all I wanted was to get Laird on tape, that he was recommended.
2:50:55There was no chance of cancelling.
2:50:57May I ask you?
2:51:02What did you think when you heard of Laird's suggestion about the next withdrawal?
2:51:10I mean, of all the crap that's come out of there, it's so dumb.
2:51:16But look, you know the worst, oh, what else happened?
2:51:20My God, we give the enemy a chance to shoot at it and say, we're going to have 15,000 men here to work up the order.
2:51:25We don't need to do it.
2:51:27We don't get another fight at the Apple.
2:51:30It is unbelievable.
2:51:33But I think, Mr. President, if we can get this thing turned into Vietnam, you will go to Moscow and destroy this position.
2:51:39We have learned everything.
2:51:40I don't know that we can.
2:51:41Right.
2:51:43If you can't go to Moscow, I believe that we cannot afford to lose Vietnam so that you can go to Moscow.
2:51:49But if we are lucky, and if we bring it on,
2:51:53these guys understand this is not like Joe Biden.
2:51:57You see, I don't really mean it that way when I say I am perfectly willing to risk the election in order not to lose in Vietnam.
2:52:07And the reason that I believe that is that I realize that whoever sits in this chair or the one over there is going to have to take so-called journeys for peace.

On April 25, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Alexander P. Butterfield, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, unknown person(s), Rose Mary Woods, John K. Andrews, Jr., Winston Lord, and Stephen B. Bull met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 8:53 am to 10:05 am. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 332-022 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 332-22

Date: April 25, 1972
Time: 8:53 am - 10:05 am
Location: Old Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger, Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and Alexander P.
Butterfield. The recording appears to have begun while the meeting was in progress.

     The President's schedule
          -Dinner for retiring Senators and Congressmen
               -Guest list
                      -Release to press
                      -Fred R. Harris
               -Toast
                      -Senior Republicans
                            -Clark MacGregor
                                  -Selection
                            -John Sherman Cooper
                            -Carl T. Curtis
                            -John W. Byrnes
                            -William M. Colmer
                            -Cooper
                            -Remarks
               -Marine Corps Band
                      -Col. Albert Shoepper, leader
                            -Tribute
                                  -The President's recognition
               -Army Chorus
               -Coffee
               -Starting time
               -Attire
               -Number
               -Tables
                      -Shape
                      -Seating
                            -Seniority
                            -Cooper
                            -Colmer
                      -Retirees
                      -The President's table
                            -George H. Mahon

Butterfield left at 8:59 am.

     Pentagon Papers
          -Leaks
               -Daniel Ellsberg
          -Preparation
          -Departments of State and Defense
          -Conclusions

     Vietnam
          -Situation in 1969

The President talked with H. R. Haldeman at an unknown time between 8:59 and 9:01 am.

     [Conversation No. 332-22A]

     Meeting in Old Executive Office Building [EOB] office

[End of telephone conversation]

     Vietnam
          -Winston Lord
          -Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
          -The President's remarks
               -John K. Andrews, Jr.
               -William L. Safire
                     -Strengths
                     -Work with Kissinger
               -Andrews
                     -Lord
               -Miller [first name unknown]
                     -Work with Kissinger

     Speeches and speechwriters
          -Safire

The President talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 8:59 and 9:01 am.

     [Conversation No. 332-22B]

     Meeting in Old Executive Office Building [EOB]office

[End of telephone conversation]

     Speeches and speechwriters
          -Safire
                -Independence
          -Andrews
          -Haldeman

     Pentagon Papers
          -Leaks
               -Ellsberg
               -Secretary of Defense

Haldeman entered at an unknown time after 8:59 am.

     Meeting with Andrews and Lord

Haldeman left at an unknown time before 9:02 am.

     Andrews

     Washington Post
         -Story

Haldeman entered at an unknown time after 8:59 am.

     Vietnam
          -US bombing
               -Effectiveness
                    -Post story
                          -Distortions
               -Soviets

Rose Mary Woods entered at 9:02 am.

     Taped messages and letters
         -Typing
              -Instructions
         -Return to the President
         -Format
              -Instructions

     Memorandum to Safire

          -Delivery to Andrews
          -Rough outline
               -Revisions for Andrews
                     -Work with Lord
               -Completion

     Kissinger
          -Location over weekend
               -Soviet Union
                     -Arrival
                          -Sergei Antonov, State Security Head
                                -Offers to Kissinger
                                     -Joseph W. Alsop
                     -Schedule
                          -State security
                          -Masseuses

Woods left at 9:05 am.

                     -Antonov
                           -Security
                                -The President's forthcoming trip
                           -Moscow film studio
                                -American actresses
                                -Soviet women
                     -Meeting with First Deputy Foreign Minister,
                      Vasily V. Kuznetsov
                           -Andrei A. Gromyko's schedule

Andrews entered at an unknown time after 9:05 am.

     Meeting with the President
          -Lord's arrival

Andrews left at an unknown time before 9:06 am.

     Soviet Union
          -Kissinger's previous trip
               -Kuznetsov's parting remarks
               -Antonov's remarks
               -KGB
          -The President's forthcoming trip
               -Translators

          -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                -Comments to Kissinger
          -Earl L. Butz

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 9:05 am.

     Andrews and Lord
         -Meeting with the President

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 9:06 am.

     Soviet Union
          -Visit by Butz
                -Butz's comments

Stephen B. Bull and Andrews entered at 9:06 am.

     Greetings

Bull left at an unknown time before 9:07 am.

     Speech by the President
          -Work by Andrews and Lord
               -Haig's assistance

     US-Soviet relations
         -Kissinger's trip
               -Announcement

Lord entered at 9:07 am.

                     -Time

     Vietnam
          -The President's speech
               -Time
               -Current appraisal of situation
               -The President's outline/rough draft
                     -Revisions by Andrews and Lord
                           -The President's guidelines
                                -Rhythm
                                -Phrases
                                -Order

                     -Suggestions
                -Considerations
                     -Vignettes
                     -Lord's suggestions
                     -Andrews's suggestions

US-Soviet Relations
    -Kissinger's trip
          -Accommodations

Vietnam
     -The President's speech
          -US military role
          -Conclusion
                -Situations in 1969 and present
                      -Conciseness
     -Losses
          -Helicopter
     -The President's speech
          -Peace offers
                -Generalities
                      -Cease fire
                      -Prisoners of War [POWs]
          -The President's guidelines
                -North Vietnamese build-up
                -US restraints
                -North Vietnamese invasion
                      -Figures
                            -Number of troops
                      -US response
          -The President's report
                -South Vietnamese performance
                      -Report from Abrams
                      -Casualties
                -US air strikes
                      -Necessity
                -Future trials and eventual victory
                      -Wording
                            -Caution
                -The President's morning report
                      -An Loc
                      -Washington Post
                -Abrams's report

     -Advice from Ellsworth F. Bunker, William J. Porter and senior advisors
           -Future actions
                 -Reduction of troops
                       -Number
                       -Nguyen Van Thieu
                 -Negotiations
                       -Porter
                 -Air and naval strikes
                 -Prevention of takeover
-Length
-Phrasing
     -Soviet interpretations
-Conclusions
     -Wording
-Completion of draft
     -Speed
     -Woods
     -Andrews's and Lord's review
           -Kissinger and Haig
     -Deadline for the President
     -Woods
           -Drafts
-North Vietnamese invasion
     -Laos and Cambodia
     -Figures
-US bombing
     -Continuation
     -Conditions for cessation
           -North Vietnamese invasion
-Wording
     -Simplification
     -Directness
-Revisions
     -Importance
     -The President's style
     -Time limit
-Deletions from draft
     -An Loc
     -Sanctuaries
-Wording
     -Description of North Vietnam
-Revisions
     -Time element

Andrews and Lord left at 9:25 am.

     Pentagon Papers
          -Tactics
          -Public opinion
               -Indifference
          -Ronald L. Ziegler's statements
               -Washington Post

     Vietnam
          -Abrams
               -Defense Information Office [DIO]
               -Report to the President
          -Laos operations
               -Problems
               -Benefits
          -North Vietnamese invasion
               -Reaction of American public
                      -George H. Gallup poll
               -US bombing
                      -Poll results
               -Deployment of forces
                      -Initial successes
                      -Instructions to Haig
                      -World War I
                             -German victories over Russians
                      -South Vietnamese failures
                             -Abrams
                             -Coordinations of strategy
                             -An Loc
                      -South Vietnamese retreats
                             -B-52 strikes
                      -Mistakes
               -South Vietnamese defensive line
                      -Kontum
                      -Initial losses
                             -News reports
                                   -Kissinger's briefing
                      -Highlands
                             -Lon Tien [Sp?]
               -Initial successes
                      -III Corps

           -Kontum
           -Pleiku
           -Hue
           -Pessimism
     -South Vietnamese withdrawals
           -South Vietnamese refusal
           -Kissinger's conversations with Moorer
     -US military
           -William C. Westmoreland
           -Abrams
                 -Advice to South Vietnam
     -Thieu
           -Political problems
     -Defensive line
           -US air strikes
                 -Location
                       -II Corps
                       -North Vietnamese armor
                       -Bridge
                             -Destruction
                 -Reports
     -News reports
           -Henry Bradsher
                 -Retaliation
                       -Military Press Information Officers [PIOs]
           -Abrams
                 -Handling of press
-Reporters
     -Abrams, Bunker, and Melvin R. Laird
           -Thieu's stance
     -Hostility to administration
     -Photograph
           -Caption
-North Vietnamese invasion
     -South Vietnamese strength
           -Capabilities
-Reports
     -Horror stories
           -Haldeman's efforts
                 -John A. Scali and Herbert G. Klein
           -North Vietnamese atrocities
                 -Need for publicity
     -Publicity for US side

                -Pentagon
                -State Department press office
                -Pentagon
                      -Size of Public Information Office
                            -Mobilization

US foreign policy
     -Execution
           -Kissinger and Rogers
                 -Lack of public relations
     -Dwight D. Eisenhower
           -"Open Skies" proposal
                 -Charles D. Jackson
                       -Public relations efforts
                             -Success
     -Public relations efforts
           -Safire
           -Richard A. Moore
           -Scali
           -Press corps
                 -Hostility
                 -Bias for John F. Kennedy
     -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
           -Significance
                 -Press black-out
     -Public relations efforts
           -Lack of effort
     -Kissinger's briefing
           -Arrangements
                 -Rogers
           -Announcement
     -Rogers
           -Public relations efforts
           -Meeting with unknown Ambassador
     -Kissinger's briefing
           -Ziegler's statement
           -Timing
           -Briefing of Congress
                 -Notification
                 -Kissinger
           -Rogers and Laird
                 -Role
           -Formality of briefing

                -J. William Fulbright
                -George D. Aiken
                -Congressional opposition
                -Supporters
                     -Leslie C. Arends
                     -Gerald R. Ford
                     -Mahon
                     -F. Edward Hebert
                     -Charles M. Teague
                     -Barry M. Goldwater
                     -John G. Tower
                     -John C. Stennis
                     -MacGregor
                     -Edward J. Gurney
                     -Aiken
                           -Encouragement
                -Opponents
                     -Fulbright
                           -Rogers's briefing
                                 -Hiram L. Fong
          -Time
                -Television news
                -Kissinger’s announcement
                -Rogers's briefing
                     -Foreign Relations Committee
                     -Bob Morgan
          -Attendees
                -Fulbright
                     -Exclusion
                -Supporters
          -Leaks
          -Briefing of Laird, the Vice President, John B. Connally,
          -Ronald W. Reagan and Nelson A. Rockefeller

Vietnam
     -Peace talks
     -Negotiations
          -Aleksei N. Kosygin
          -Conditions
                -End of North Vietnamese invasion
                -US bombing
                      -Conditions for cessation
          -Ziegler's briefing

                     -Kissinger's views
                     -Time
                     -Call to the President
          -The President's speech
               -Announcement
                     -News programs
                     -Timing

Haldeman and Haig left at 9:50 am.

          -Public relations efforts
               -Intensification of efforts
                      -Cambodia
                      -Haldeman, Haig and Scali
                      -SALT agreement
               -Deficiencies
                      -Secretary of State
                            -Attack on Edmund S. Muskie
               -D. Kenneth Rush's [?] statement
          -US bombing
               -Gallup poll
                      -Support
               -The President's speech
                      -Increase in support

                     -Soviet response
          -The President's speech
               -Rough Draft
                     -Kissinger's meeting with Brezhnev

     US-Soviet relations
         -Summit
               -Brezhnev
               -US value
               -Vietnam
                      -Results of US defeat
                           -Left-wing contrasted to right-wing factions
                                  -Necessity of victory
                      -Kontum

Rose Mary Woods entered at 9:52 am.

     Typed document

          -Completion
              -Time

Woods left at 9:54 am.

     Vietnam
          -US strategy
               -All-out attack
                     -Conditions for cessation
                     -Targets
                            -Dikes
                            -Railroads
                            -Docks
                     -Use of massive force
               -Soviet Summit
                     -Need for credibility
                            -Brezhnev
               -US conditions
               -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                     -Conversation with Kissinger
               -North Vietnamese assessments
               -Chance of breakthrough
          -Negotiations
               -Conditions for resumption
                     -Cease-fire
                            -US responses
               -Gromyko
                     -Comments to Kissinger
                            -Soviet Summit
                                  -Compared with People's Republic of China [PRC] Trip
          -North Vietnamese invasion
               -US retaliation
                     -Power plant
                     -Dock area
               -Dobrynin
                     -Brezhnev
                     -Report to Kissinger
                            -Kissinger's response
          -Kissinger's forthcoming conversation with Yuli M. Vorontsov
               -Hanoi and Haiphong

     US-Soviet relations
         -Kissinger's meeting with Brezhnev

                -Soviet Summit
                      -Conditions
                            -Cessation of North Vietnamese offensive
           -US ships in Vietnam
                -Blockade
           -Soviet Summit
                -Cancellation
                      -Dobrynin and Brezhnev
                            -Influence in Central Committee
                -Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBMs]
                -Announcement
                -Kissinger's conversation with Gromyko
                      -Dobrynin's role
                -US air strikes
                      -Impact
                -Possible cancellation
                      -Laird

     Vietnam
          -Laird's statement
               -Troop levels
          -US successes
               -Necessity
                      -The President's trip to Moscow
               -Risks
          -Chou En-Lai
          -US determination
               -1972 election
          -Negotiations
               -Cease-fire
               -William J. Porter's line
               -Porter
                      -Abilities as negotiator
          -Soviets

Kissinger left at 10:05 am.
  • 332-023 10:05 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 10:05 am and 10:40 am.
  • 332-024 10:05 AM · 35 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 10:05 am and 10:40 am.
  • 332-025 10:05 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 10:05 am and 10:40 am.
  • 332-026 10:05 AM · 19 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 10:05 am and 10:40 am.
  • 332-027 10:05 AM · 21 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 10:05 am and 10:40 am.
  • 332-028 10:05 AM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 10:05 am and 10:40 am.
  • 332-029 10:40 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 10:40 am to 10:45 am.
  • 332-030 10:45 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 10:45 am and 10:50 am.

Conversation 332-022, April 25, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/332-022 (accessed September 18, 2026).