Nixon, Kissinger & Haig on Vietnam War and US-Soviet Relations

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Minimum press.

We don't want to release this guest list, I shouldn't think.

What?

We don't want to release this guest list to the press, I shouldn't think.

We don't have Fred Harris.

No.

No, no, no.

So no press at all?

Yeah.

And after your toast, no one should respond to this?

No, and we're not going to release you from the press.

No.

Yeah, no, on the toast, I would like to select, have McGregor select out about the senior ranking Republicans that there are, and the senior men, and Cooper's coming.

They could...

To speak for a minute, Burge, let me explain.

Burge is a ranking Republican.

Colmer is a chairman.

Bo is a ranking Republican.

In other words, you've got to draw the line someplace.

So have the ranking people speak, and Cooper will speak, under the one-minute rule at the end of the sale word.

One more question.

Mr.

Colonel.

Shulker, who leads that Marine family, is retiring after 30 years.

Do you want to verbally recognize the Indonesians, the Italians?

Yeah.

He's quite a big man now.

Yeah.

Do you want to call him into the State Department?

I will.

I'll call him into the State Department.

I'll put it down.

Do you have any Army Corps?

Yes, I do.

All right.

We will not go into the other rooms for coffee.

At the end of it, we'll just sit there and have the ironing course.

All got a lot of work.

It started at 7 or 7.30?

7.30.

Black tie.

How many?

112.

Now, at my, what?

An E-shaped paper.

We don't have round papers.

Oh, I make round tables.

Oh, by all means.

Absolutely, absolutely.

They love it.

They like it better than they can sit around and gas and laugh and all that kind of thing.

Make it round tables and have more.

Did somebody get, did I say E-shaped or somebody get that right?

Well, you know, it should be round tables by all means.

Unless they've already got it set up.

I think they should.

The round tables would be better.

And then the tables put both in the ranking, with the various people around, put the oldest, I think, put the oldest guys.

You'd have to have Booker and Palmer.

And as I said, Cooper should be one of the one-minute speakers.

Yes, sir.

That's fine.

The main thing is to put one of our, the lightest guy should be at each, should be not sitting by each other, should be at the table, and put a ranking guy, a retiree at each table.

And put at my table, the ranking guy is George Maynard,

You know, people that really matter.

You know, that really matter to me.

Go ahead.

Right up to the hill, please.

Let me just start with the usual subject first.

Who in the hell puts this one out?

Frankly, I haven't read it in ages.

That was done right at the beginning.

It was done partly for psychotherapeutic purposes that we can claim.

It's got all the pieces that were still in place at the time that this thing went off.

Fundy was still in state.

I understand.

I'm not complaining, and I don't think it's a goddamn thing, and if it should, it should.

I don't like belief, that's all.

I think it was the paper that was leaked to Ellsberg as part of it, and also part of it.

I'm not even going to get a kiss on it.

It was the paper that was prepared before the president came to the conference.

I'm sorry if it doesn't make it look so bad, but it says that the world was lost before it came in.

Okay, I'm sorry about that.

That's really what it is.

I know.

That's what state defense was saying.

The basic argument of Nissen Fund is that you inherited a total unmitigated match.

It was.

And that's where the state said, well, it's gone.

It's on the bench.

It's going to be right there.

Thank you very much.

Thank you.

Well, anyway, I was, I don't think that's going to, I want to ask one question that would be, I did some dictating in this little talk last night.

I'm trying to get it down.

And I dictated that only an extreme rough block could be.

And I, whoever I decided to make it work on it.

I'm going to sit down and look and think over and over at the other.

For example, I want to put it in four sentences regarding the report from Abrams.

I'm just being very brief about my point out there.

So now, Henry, maybe quite frankly too.

All the rights closest to my rhythm and the rest over here is a young fellow named Anderson.

He's done.

He did the Newport speech and the rest.

Everybody else, including Sapphire, of course.

being more senior people, have to write with their data.

They cannot write and check and get in there already.

It takes more time.

On the other hand, Sapphire is a hell of a lot more privy to everything and works very well with you.

Query, if I give this damn thing to Andrews, I don't care whether it would work all right or not.

I don't know Andrews, but we can do it.

No, it's better because he knows my thinking 100% on a beat on every trip.

You see, for example, they've got the...

The less of his own ideas the fellow has, the better of you are.

That's the beauty of this.

This fellow will not have any ideas.

But the reason that other sapphire tribe afforded it was a bad time to make this bitch any smaller, he'll be... Well, it wasn't sapphire, Spalding.

I didn't believe it.

But that's the point.

That's what I mean.

He had too much of a go at it.

Andrews will believe what we have.

Now, second point on, before Holland gets here, is don't worry about missing one.

I figured prior to Ellsberg, I'm going to get one shit about it.

Do you, Alan?

I guess what I was concerned about was that some son of a bitch was leaking it now.

If anybody started leaking something, now I'll fire the Secretary of Defense and I won't.

Mr. President, we knew they had that for a long time.

It's a hell of a thing for them to put out because it really doesn't prove their case because it proves that you inherited the total mess.

And whatever you did, whatever it is now, is better than it was then.

Now the second thing is...

Bob, go out and have Andrews come over here right away with you.

And Lorde.

John Andrews.

John Andrews and Lorde.

Thanks, Lorde.

Lorde.

Yeah.

I don't know how there is a word, so I'm going to put Andrews, put his ass into a...

I think it will.

The main...

I'll talk to you about the content of the other two ideas.

In regard to this sort of thing, if they would put it out now, the first would be putting it out .

But the one thing that's in this paper is that not only does it do any good, but it doesn't do any good.

And that was the orthodox .

Oh, sure, because he'd given up the bombing for nothing.

On the other hand, that's another, that's a double-edged argument for them, because if not, his attention is held.

And they've also put out that bombing doesn't do any good, that somebody must have done it, must have been the army.

So they're sort of going, the liberals are going right now.

On the one hand, they say, except for our bombing, the army couldn't hold, but the bombing is very good.

Because without the bomb, we would never have gotten the Soviet attention.

Yeah.

Rose, I have marked...

Both of these tapes should be done simultaneously, Mark.

This one, here.

This webinar should be brought back to me.

There are random notes and conclusions and other things that get run and bring them back to me and have been on the farm.

That will be the double space that I can work on.

Now this one here is a memorandum that at the very end says deliver it to Sasson and Sapphire.

I should be changing our signal.

We're going to give it to Andrews.

As soon as you finish it, I don't want to see it.

It's just rough, basically sort of rough, a very rough outline for the purpose of his making up a draft for what he's going to work out with Lauren.

So you look it over.

I'm getting him in now to instruct him on what to do.

As soon as you get that one over, you send it over, right over to him.

Where the hell do you think Kissinger was over the weekend when I was trying to call him?

Probably out at some base.

I hope so.

It wasn't through lack of office.

Oh, my word.

No, no, it's got nothing to do with modesty.

The head of the state security general, I don't know.

He greeted me at the airport and said he had a whole bunch of girls, all 25 years and younger.

You might remember that's how the guys go out from.

Yes.

Girls?

Not girls.

The rudeness of these guys is not to be believed.

Then I said I want to take a swim.

And that's also under the state security.

So again, then they said, do I want to go to this, you know,

Nurse?

Masseuses.

Masseuses?

Oh, they use those for that purpose?

Yeah.

Oh, God, if they said any hair color or...

But they did it.

Jesus Christ.

It's so revolting.

You know, it's all... You know, it's...

I don't know.

It was just absolutely revolting.

And they brought it up on every occasion.

Oh, wow.

General Antonio was riding in the shotgun in the car all the time, and he's had the music due to be due, which is a fair number.

We went past the Moscow film studios, and I said, I know a lot of actresses in Hollywood.

He said, try my music.

He had a lot more experience.

At the end,

When we left, there's a Russian, half of the parents, they sent a deputy foreign, first deputy foreign minister, to say good-bye to me, because I'm going to be going to go to the foreign government.

And he said, would you wait outside until the Lord arrives, and then you and he come in together, because I'm talking to you all.

And Coach Netto said, on behalf of the Soviet government and the Soviet people,

I would like to thank you and drink to friendship.

Antonov spoke out.

He said, I don't think I have Soviet state security.

Kuznetsov said, you are not saying state security is separate from the government.

Antonov said, I maintain that I don't think I have Soviet state security.

That KGB is nothing to me.

Well, I remember that the year, the year I went, I went there, one year by business.

Two translators.

And boy, they had a lot of money.

I've got a totally wrong about the kitchen today because

President basically said, yes, what President was trying to say, because he said to me explicitly, he said, I want to assure the President no such thing will happen while I'm in charge here.

He will be put under no public embarrassment.

That was what he was trying to do.

Look, the hope that you know, he said, I didn't want to mention it, but those two can come in when I want to take it.

So, so Buck's got it totally, absolutely right.

Good morning.

This is just mainly for your type of stuff.

I'm already starting to have to work to help you out.

And I'll take also a role to help you out in cases and so forth.

He probably doesn't know about the .

Well, anyway, tomorrow, today at noon, we're going to announce that Dr. Kissinger has been in Moscow in the last four days meeting with Chairman .

But at 7 o'clock tonight, or 7.30 tonight, we'll be announcing it.

Now, tomorrow night, what time?

We don't know what time right now.

Yeah, I think it'll be 10.

At 10 o'clock, I'm going to go on for 10 minutes to briefly to

who have given a praise for the state of the blood in Vietnam.

Now, what I want you to do, and I have dictated a rough outline, and it's more than an outline in some respects, but there's some sense thereof that I don't know briefly.

The main thing is I want you to prepare working with

or who is familiar with all of the factual facts.

So I, no matter if you just, after you get this out, this draft of what you sit down and put it into some sort of form, following the outline very carefully, and trying not to deviate.

the rhythm, the phrases by each one.

And certainly not from the order that I have presented it.

That was something that has to be said very much on my own.

Avoiding, too, your own ideas, whatever they may be.

But, of course, suggesting a side note or something like that.

What goes right up to what is probably one of the most important parts of the speech is the conclusion.

There are a couple of little things that I will be working into it once I get it back from another patient that I myself will do, but I will do it to myself without informing anyone else.

But hey then, what you are to do is to

Ignore the fact that it has no conclusion.

Just bring it up to the end.

Let me have a word so that you get the feel of where you're going to have to get in.

How do you feel?

Are you tired?

No.

These old men like history get tired.

It's such a trip.

Let's stay away from that.

Are you kidding?

Why the hell do you have to look around his office?

In a nutshell, like in a nutshell, what we are saying is that we were 49 in a military situation.

The situation is not in one role.

And it's a very beautiful brief review, as I always do, and I must always do, of what the situation is, whatever it is you're talking about.

You know, it's pretty strong.

You know, it's actually pretty nice.

That's why our programs and so forth, this is done very, very quickly, and it must be left for you.

I'm not going to go into how they all do it.

You know, I mean, what are they listening to, you know?

He said he was going to ask, well, he told me about the helicopter that was shot yesterday.

Yeah, I know.

That'll be next week.

Yeah, and then, that's where you made the most important comments.

peace offers and the history of the negotiation and so forth.

I deliberately hear when I don't want to go in and make a mouth shut about trying to make it too accurate, you know, and too rounded.

In other words, we've already ceased firing in exchange for all prisoners of war to withdraw from all of our forces in the elections.

It's been actually supervised.

That was just the kind of a thing that, so that people will be reminded what it was and so forth and so on.

That was in January 25th.

This is all in the alphabet.

I'm trying to give you the feel of it.

Then what was their answer?

They had a massive building.

We knew there was a massive building.

I showed restraint because our hope was to negotiate something.

And finally, on Easter weekend, they launched a massive invasion of South Vietnam with, and here, Al will have a picture for you, which is very hard to get out of the goddamn department of defense, but where 500, 5,000, or 50,000, whatever it is, not two or three divisions or 18 regiments or something like that, invaded South Vietnam.

Is he my client?

No.

And then they struck for the past three and a half weeks.

And as far as U.S. action is concerned, there's no ground for it.

There will be none.

That's all.

Incidentally, the U.S.

And then we go into, and now I want to give you a situation, give you an up-to-date report.

I had a report from General Abrams.

And General Abrams says, at the maze over the country, they're fighting courageously.

They're self-inflicted.

They're picking and flicking enormous casualties.

Two, with the airstrikes and legal orders.

have been essential to protecting the RMA and preventing the Congress from opposing the Congress.

We have another month.

We can expect another month of continued enemy offenses.

There will be hard-fought battles.

There will be some losses.

There will be some errors.

There will be some errors again.

But it is a judgment.

that the South Vietnamese lines, that the South Vietnamese on the ground, will be able to contain, now this is very difficult to say the language, I don't want to go too far just about it here, but we want to prepare the people in effect for the fact that there will be losses, but preparing for the fact also

Which, despite orders I gave over the weekend, not a goddamn thing in the President's morning blog about any of the positive things.

And I can't find what happened to them on Thursday, right?

Not in the goddamn Washington Post, but you all can get it.

Okay, I'll read it next time.

All right, now.

Now, then we come to the critical point.

based on General, after reading General Ray's report, based on his report, based on his advice, based on advice that I've had from the, from Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Porter, the, and my other, and my senior advisors here, my senior advisors here,

that I have made the following decisions with regard to our future actions in Vietnam.

And then I go right into it.

I have ordered that I order the reduction of the troop ceiling of 20,000 to come by July 1.

This will reduce the ceiling to 49,000, which is a reduction of over one and a half million.

Two, I have ordered that directly- The idea that this is made possible because of the Yeah, well, I've covered that.

I've also said in there that with President Chu's complete appearance and so forth and so on, it's all in there.

This is a long time, but you can check this out.

Second, I directed for the purpose of .

Third,

I have ordered that during the disappearance, while we were in the military strike, we would start air and naval strikes on military targets north of Vietnam and in the battle area south of Vietnam, and so forth.

Now those are the three points.

Then at the last, we spent a little time about why, what our choice was, and so forth.

and why we had to do the bombing.

And we did it for every one of them.

And of course, protection of American forces, too, that were going to come in and take over.

And so forth.

And the choice, on the other hand, would have been to .

That's all you need.

That's all.

That's basically the basic outline.

All of that, we should be able to get in.

Less than ten times.

Mr. President, if I may drop one suggestion.

I would recommend strongly that when you base all these things on what you're doing, that there be two or three ominous phrases to be interpreted in the direction that you might do a hell of a lot more.

I believe that.

That's the one thing.

Once, if there isn't a stake, that's all you're going to do.

They do this because they don't mind having you bought down.

They mind having you make money.

Well, let me take you down the path just a little, including you, because I know that I'm trying to do the right thing.

But be that as it may,

If you want to develop, the only thing that is not covered, if you want to develop, is to provide the bonding.

But the main thing is get it done as quickly as you can.

You will get it from Rhodes, I would suppose, by 20, 25 minutes.

You sit down and work it over.

There's no pride or mothership in terms of the, I mean, some of this,

It's very, very rough.

It is sometimes repetitious in the rest.

Then you go over with Winston-Lorde, and you sit down with him, and you go over with Henry, and be sure that it's all right for substance use, as quick as you can.

Don't bother Henry with it at this point.

Don't bother Hayward with it, except to get the stuff you're bringing back to me.

Then I'll come back, and I'll know that this or that won't fit, and I'll make it and take another cut at it.

I will expect a copy back, you know, see if you're going to get a copy.

You've got to get a copy back here by the fall of 30.

That's all you need, that's all, that's basically the basic outline.

Now all of that, we should be able to get in in less than 10 minutes.

I would recommend strongly that when you base all these things on what you're doing, that there be two or three ominous phrases to be interpreted in the direction that you might do a hell of a lot more.

Because that's what we believe.

That's the one thing.

Once, if there isn't a stake, that's all you're going to do.

They do this because they don't mind having you bought down.

They mind having you make money.

Well, let me take you down the path of inclusion, because I know that I'm trying to do the same as you are.

But be that as it may,

If you want to develop, the only thing that is not covered, if you want to develop, is to provide the bombing.

But the main thing is get it done as quickly as you can.

You will get it from Rhodes, I would suppose, by 25 minutes.

You sit down and work it over.

There's no pride of authorship in terms of this.

I mean, some of this is very, very rough.

It is sometimes repetitious in the rest.

Then you go over it with Mr. Lord, and you sit down with him, and you go over it with him, and be sure that it's all right for substance use as quickly as you can.

Don't bother Henry with it at this point.

Don't bother Haywood with it except to get the stuff.

If you bring it back to me, then I'll come back and I'll know that this or that won't fit, and I'll make it and take another cut at it.

I would expect a copy back, you know, see if you're going to get it, but you can't.

You've got to get a copy back here by the call of duty.

You've got to remain on the phone.

Now, it's pretty, I mean, it won't be difficult for you to do this, but remember that you don't have to do it with us.

I would hope that...

What could happen is if you want Rose to do it, she could make a copy of my rough draft for Wynn right away, and then he could be in touch with you and say, look, I think maybe we've got to change this, or this doesn't work, or this doesn't work, or that, or the other.

In other words, my figures may be wrong.

Just a couple of points.

First, there has to be in here the fact, for example, one fact is that it's terribly important whether this is mitigation or not.

Let's, let's, let's stop all the man-towns.

There are 120,000 or 150,000 North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam.

There are no South Vietnamese troops in North Vietnam.

Don't confuse it with Laos and Cambodia this time.

I don't want to get into that this time.

But I know that.

But I just don't want to get back into this.

So basically, this is a clear...

in the case of the most brutal, blatant aggression in which one country invades another.

You get my point?

Sir?

That has to be a... And I think in the draft, by implication, if it doesn't get the figures from now, there are so many so forth in South Vietnam, there are none in North Vietnam.

There's also one other phrase.

Our...

our bombing of military targets in North Vietnam will continue until the North Vietnamese stop their invasion of South Vietnam.

That is another way to put that.

Our bombing of military targets in North Vietnam will continue until the North Vietnamese stop killing South Vietnamese and Americans in South Vietnam.

I'll look at both.

I mean, I put it down on the alternative there, and I'll look at both.

I'll determine which way I want to do it.

But we're mainly interested in getting this.

And we say, finally, we don't give a goddamn much about this, except for what Laura told you we have to have for accuracy in the port policy area.

We're looking for very simple, oversimplified, very direct,

reassuring, yet also quite untight and candid report.

Now, you don't put in such craftily effective

I want to be very candid.

I want to give you the bad news and the good news and the rest.

Just do it.

Just say it.

Just do it the way that I have it put and leave your own ideas out.

Okay?

Okay, fine.

You can work together and try to go over in some room here.

Can you take the morning off?

Well, I think you're very essential to this because you can do the writing yourself, but I want him to know my style very well now.

And you can take a crack at it and get it by 1 o'clock and have it ready.

How rigid are we in the time limit?

That is, are we aiming for eight minutes to leave you two minutes complete?

Don't worry about your time limit.

I think it isn't going to make that time limit.

What I'm just simply suggesting is this.

Now, I've just got a couple of other things I want to finish.

For example, they did some.

Very good work over here, from what you did, what you figured my thing about trust on this, that the things that you don't need to put in, that they have.

For example, on April 20th, they shelved the account of Adlon for $560.

We have no time for that for anything else.

And then the

As long as the Communists are invaders.

Now, one thing that's very, very important.

I never want to see you again in anything ever presented to me the word the other side.

It's the enemy, it's the Communists, and it's the invaders.

Is that clear?

Sir?

By the way, don't you worry about the time.

Just get the thing in here and I'll do the cutting.

Because I've got a question to answer and my own part.

Okay.

Thank you.

Now, with regard to our tactics today, oh, and obviously with regard to this Pentagon paper thing, I think the best thing to do

is, rather than getting into any debates about it and so forth, is trying to say, well, the President has said, the average American doesn't care one goddamn, and I don't think it's going to get a hell of a lot of play.

And I think that Ziegler should just coldly say, oh, well, I don't know.

I don't comment on the national security.

I'm done.

Fair enough.

A couple of no comments, you understand Bob?

I don't get all the people are people that are bowing up and running around here because of the Washington Post.

We don't give a shit.

Is that clear?

It doesn't make any difference anyway.

You have been and now having some success of getting Abrams and BIOs and

to point out the, at least, Jewish man.

I'm not trying to gussy up this thing to make a defeat for Blanca Baker.

Although, let me say, bad as Laos was, it was a hell of a lot better, and the press made out, and it did a hell of a lot of good.

We agree.

That's what I'm trying to get at about this at this critical time.

But we're right up ahead, you know, of what we do have.

There's some support to do that.

The President thought that even in the present time, with all the lousy goddamn press we get, that even Gallup, who wrote this question the other way, showed that we're a mature people, favor the bomb, right?

I think Gallup put the poll out today, they pulled it over the weekend, they're going to run it today, saying, they said, do you favor the resumption of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, which is about as bad a way people looked in Washington?

People looked at 47, said yes, and 44 said no.

Mr. President, again, we ought to keep the Central Island State in perspective.

Now, I think they have this unit misdeployed out there.

That's what we're over to them.

The first time the North Indian is attacked, now that we drew the plan to join, we drew at the...

at the DMZ.

They're going to drive these people back.

Then when they get on the...

I don't want them to drive them back.

I told Al to tell them to get their asses off at mass.

And then show the bastards.

Do what they're... Henry, did you... No, that was a mistake.

I asked if you... You're a German scholar, a scholar of World War I. Jim Reddick was recently...

I had...

You know how Henneberg and Lutheran started to kick the hell out of the Russians?

The Russians thought they had a hell of a victory, remember?

Remember the Germans with barred courier horses, barred courier, they wanted to be on the other side of the moon, with troops.

And the Russians walked in, and the Germans put up pincers on them, and they killed them.

Now, God damn it, Al, why in the fuck can't our military ever teach anything right?

We have had more money out there.

We've given them more arms.

And Abrams, in his report, indicates, he says, the coordination...

and the air, and the sea, and the infantry is excellent.

Now, for Christ's sakes, what in the world is the matter with the strategy?

These guys aren't strategists, and they haven't gone to West Point.

But God, any man knows

that when you have territory that isn't worth saving, and Rock, I understand, that's a symbol of the Central Highlands, why in the name of God, instead of getting huge stories out that we have lost the Central Highlands, didn't they immediately withdraw, make it appear that they were fighting, get back, get back, get back,

And that column of E52s in there, they're all clobbered.

Now, why wasn't that done?

I just don't know.

Because remember, I mentioned, Henry, you remember when I told you they had them do that?

I know, Mr. President.

I think they tried to do it.

All right.

But what I'm trying to say is they made this mistake.

They did get it clobbered.

But I think if it follows the pattern of all the other operations,

You don't think it's bad?

You don't think it's as bad today as it did last time?

No.

They now have formed a defense line around Compton.

They may even lose Compton.

What's the difference?

What the hell is Compton?

There's a bunch of goddamn warhouses.

I've been briefing every goddamn newsman for four weeks before there was an attack that we expected to lose Compton.

And we've got to keep this thing in perspective.

At the end of December,

They were heading for Longtien.

Every bloody newspaper in the country was writing about a tremendous defeat we suffered.

Longtien hasn't fallen, isn't going to fall, and it was held by a rabble of Mios and by a few irregular Thai battalions.

So I think now, and it was held against two and a half North Vietnamese divisions.

Now we're going to lose some of these things.

I think

with a little luck at all, with some sense, that by the end of next week, the situation of the islands is going to be like it is in third quarter.

They come into this rush, then they get stuck, then they take a shellacking from the air.

I do not see where they go strategically from Khantoum.

Even if Khantoum falls, they get to Pleiku.

If Pleiku falls, and they're still 100 miles from the coast, they run away.

Hue is in a different area.

Now, Hue, that is different, but there they are facing the best South Vietnamese division.

And they haven't made much progress.

And they have made no progress whatsoever there.

So I think, Mr. President, it's a fact.

You were very pessimistic last night.

I was only pessimistic because I get mad when I see these stupidities committed.

But we have to face another fact about the South Vietnamese.

Of course they should have been strong.

We told them three weeks ago to withdraw.

I know, General, but you knew they should withdraw, didn't you?

I have told Mora every day.

When it was quiet out there, I said, Tom, don't keep your units coming out.

And he gave me the naval arms.

He doesn't understand.

He gave me all this bullshit about their doing it.

What's the crisis matter with Westmoreland?

He's the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

No, more of it.

No, but chairman of the Army Chiefs Staff.

But he has no command authority.

I have to say, in defense of Westmoreland, he just pointed out to me and to Al that they were overextended out there.

All right, what's the matter with David?

He's usually a great viewer.

What's the price matter with him?

Why did he have to draw that?

I really wonder.

I don't think she was.

They would fall back as soon as they got pressure.

That's what they were told to do.

On the other hand...

What Jews' problem has been, and it's been consistently, is you can't get up to a draw.

Peoples and populations...

Some stories of mine say they left South.

Great.

And the sound of the Vietnamese have lost half, three provinces.

God damn it.

What a hell of a province.

Mr. President, we had big headlines on...

two days after Easter Sunday, Flitz Creek in the north, south-north Vietnamese Army smashing through, unless they've got units up there that they haven't thrown anywhere else.

They are going to run out of steam by the end of this week.

If the South Vietnamese can pull any defensive line at all, and they're not pulling one at all, then they are.

And three of them can come over by air.

Did we make the big strike or not, Al?

Yes, sir, we did.

We had massive people.

Where, too?

Where?

Two quarters.

We did.

Well, that's it.

That's it.

It's in the news.

But all I meant is, now look, did they make this truck to hit anything this time?

Did they know anything?

I don't want to do that just because I have some screwy idea.

What?

Because they're coming down Route 14.

They're stopped at a bridge.

Yeah.

Their armor's stopped there, and they're masked there, and they're going to get punched.

Did we hit the bridge?

Yes, sir.

We've seen pictures of that, so they're not... How about the armor?

I don't think so.

Listen, we're dropping more bombs in one strike than all of World War II.

They ought to be able to knock a goddamn bridge out.

But they've knocked the bridge out.

They've knocked out 14 or 20 tanks.

Now, I don't know if that's true, but it's almost inconceivable.

I took Al and I both to the St. Petersburg...

This morning?

Yeah, and they show us the boxes.

of these B-52s, and they're really one right next to the other.

They're merging into each other.

It's almost inconceivable that if there was anything there at all, that they didn't murder it and punish it.

We have these intelligence reports where they are battalions.

Let me say this.

It's your job, Bob, working with Al.

Don't bother Henry.

You know what, Henry?

You're lucky to talk to me about some things.

to see that the goddamn services out there in Vietnam get out as much positive stories as they can.

Now, that son of a bitch from the EAP that's out there, I found out earlier that he's a bad actor.

He's the guy who used to be here with Walter Ashcroft.

He is no good.

Henry Bradshaw is no goddamn good.

Now, but work him over.

Work him over.

Getting screwed, you know, that's what you do.

Compromise the son of a bitch.

You've got to do a little better job out there.

Now we've got, there are more PIO officers out there than they have in the whole goddamn Pentagon.

And they aren't doing anything but sitting around in the damn bar at the Caravelle, talking to our enemies.

And I want them to get off their ass and start doing something.

Now is the problem Abrams?

Abrams has done pretty good PIOs since somebody told me.

What is the problem?

Can he direct these guys out and get off their goddamn asses and work these people?

Oh, I know the problem.

They don't change it.

Don't let, under any circumstances, Abrams or Bunker or Blair change Jews' attitude about letting American reporters get into the South Pole.

Keep them out.

The stories will be worse if they get into the South Pole.

There was only one good picture that I've seen in the paper this morning.

One quarter of the week, the other week, when we put flowers in the grave.

The trouble with the goddamn caption of the picture order, you wouldn't know whether they were killed by Americans on our side or their side, would you?

Huh?

Bob, is that true or not?

It's true.

We have to face it.

Well, give it a go.

It's a work on it.

The press has a vested interest in defeat.

We know that.

And that is the problem.

My concern yesterday is...

But if this goes on for three or four months, and they keep losing a division here and a division there, then the only question is which side is going to break first.

I just can't believe we've got a million in the south and they'll collapse in the face of 120,000 attacking.

Now that's not possible.

Exactly.

It's not possible.

But they are spread along the whole frontier while the south and the north can put all of its units.

At any one point that they want to attack, that's the classic dilemma.

Now, it's your job now.

Skelly back.

Get his ass back here.

It's your job to use the skellies and the corks and all those people.

And get that damn fellow over to the bench and arrest him.

We start getting out some atrocity, horror stories on what the North Vietnamese invaders are doing to the people of South Vietnam.

Can we do that?

Every time one of our aircraft pilots happens to drop one a little bit off target and they get some South Vietnamese, it's a horror story.

Henry, they're slaughtering these poor bastards, aren't they?

They're driving them mad.

They're refugees.

Bob, now you watch this story.

How much of that has gotten through?

You said last week some of it has.

A little of it has at times.

Would you not agree that the greatest weakness we have around here is not pushing our side enough on that kind of thing?

Yeah.

All right.

That's your job.

Al, will you work with him on this?

If you've got somebody to work with, get the Pentagon to work.

Get the goddamn Pentagon to work.

Get Roger's staff to work.

He's got a staff of 80.

80 people in the goddamn State Department press office.

Did you know that?

80.

Of course, they're representing each one of them.

Each desk officer's got a PIO, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

The defense?

Do you know how many the Pentagon's got?

3,000 in public information.

3,000.

Now, what in the name of God are we sitting here talking about things that are so obvious?

What in the name of God do these people do?

I really mean this.

Don't you agree, Henry?

Do I agree with you?

We have had a brilliant foreign policy, but due to the fact that only Henry and I have tried to sign, and Roger's gone and came in good last week, but Henry and I have tried to sign.

We've had the most brilliant foreign policy in this century.

sold most inadequately.

And the reason is we ain't got people thinking about signing.

I remember old C.E.

Jackson used to say, I remember how much he meant our eyes and our open skies proposal.

Oh, by Christ, that was funny.

But it got in the public mind.

See?

But we've got sapphire, moor, scally, and all the rest sitting around, and we've got to use them better.

See?

But you've got to push it as best as you can.

Oh, yes, I know.

Having said all this, the problem is that we've got an iron curtain in the front.

We can't break through.

And as Henry was saying, my God, if Kennedy had even gotten biological warfare through, they would have been burning, lighting candles to it for three years.

We didn't even get three hours in that story.

You remember?

Three hours.

Next to nothing.

That story, though, is bigger than anything Kennedy did.

Oh, the salt of the North.

I mean, that's never happened in history that countries have put their central armaments

I know all about it.

And it isn't just, but the point is, the fact that the president against us isn't enough reason, we aren't working on it enough.

We don't have enough people pushing it.

So if you guys are working on it, by now, let's get to the fact that you said, go ahead and review the main plan, here's what it was.

Did you inform Roger, Jim?

Yes.

Did it work?

Yes, sir.

He's probably uncomfortable because he wants to know more.

You're trying to have .

I didn't.

I told him that we were going to put out the statement of noon and we would answer some questions and we were considering half-assed and two of them.

But I didn't agree with that.

Yes, I told him.

Oh, you had to?

Yes.

That's what he did.

What I meant is he didn't tell him that Henry was going to read the press.

I didn't say he was going to read the press.

Just don't tell him that.

Don't ever tell him that.

Just have Henry do it.

If he does have it, he'll have you on the phone with me.

That's excellent.

But you did tell him that he wants to know more.

What the hell is more than he wanted to know?

Well, he really wants to be in a public sense engaged in this matter in some way.

That's quite obvious.

He doesn't say it, but he doesn't want to be.

I had to send him for people over.

He was informed.

He doesn't sit down and sit on my lap and tell me what the hell to do.

But he can put out the fact that he saw all the guns in the bathroom.

Yeah, that's right.

That's right.

He will put that.

Now, what have you decided about reforming, if anything, until Henry's making back to this meeting?

10 o'clock.

What is the situation?

Zinger will do it at 11.30 then?

11.30.

I think I let Zinger go at 11.30.

Right at the end of the war, I'm breathing.

He beat the Russians that way.

Now the second thing, you go to Colcote.

Now, what is the situation about the bombing?

Bob, what did you decide on that?

He had a meeting there.

What we pretty much cut down on is that what we ought to do is call them after the announcement or right at the time of the announcement.

And just say, tell them about the Henry thing.

I say we'd like you to come over at 5.30 for a briefing on some general background.

And then at that time, it's all about the return of the .

And then have Henry come along.

Not Rogers and Laird.

Well, I agree.

I think you've got to keep Rogers and Laird out of it because you don't know what they're going to say.

And we don't set this as a formal briefing.

Us, as an informal, we invite a selected group of people over to meet with our ranks.

Who's picking them out?

Well, I don't know.

Bo Breit?

I don't think you do that today.

That's what you're telling me.

Okay.

See, I would never let, I don't go down to the other, no, wait a minute, wait a minute.

The only problem is that Aiton is all with us.

You'd have Aiton come over.

Aiton is all with us.

I'd have him there.

But I would not have any enemy there at that point.

I don't want the enemies.

Do you understand, Bob?

Yes, sir.

But I would have Rogers inform the enemies.

If we had our good people there, we could really lift the curtain just a little bit.

Right.

Les Ahrens, who was in that company as well.

George Mahon.

Eddie Hebert.

Well, if George had an Eddie Hebert, Tiger Key, you get down to the leaders of the people that defend us from that.

The Senate, you don't need too many.

Barry Goldwater, John Power.

John Stennis.

John Stennis, of course.

Just a few of those.

But then Bob just had that.

And in the meantime, pick him.

Now, McGregor's got to get on his ass and pick a few others that have been fighting.

Gurmey, for example, has been fighting this battle for us.

Maybe get him.

I don't know.

People that have been willing to stand up and knock their brains out.

The point is, by all means, I would have George Aiken.

George Aiken has come out for us.

He'll love having this.

And also, he'll pass it to Mansfield.

which is good, but I would have, without Fulbright, but I would not have, I will not have Fulbright under any circumstance just tell Rogers that he can inform the others.

Give Rogers, tell Rogers he shouldn't inform until 7 o'clock.

What do you think, Henry?

If he goes at 5.30, I don't want our guys hearing it from then.

Well, it'll be on the news.

See, I don't want it to be on the news at the time that Henry's trip is announced.

See, I don't want Henry's trip to be on the news.

Well, it will, but your 5.30 meeting, you've got to tell these guys that it cannot, it's got to be all of a sudden.

The guy at 5.30 we can trust, and therefore Colt Rogers shouldn't be told until about 6.45, 7.00, 7.00.

Right.

When the news starts, when it's too late.

Tell Rogers he can inform all the others at 7 o'clock.

And he can inform anybody he wants.

Oh, the reaction.

Yeah.

The Foreign Relations Committee.

In fact, I don't include Dr. Martin in this.

If he stood with us on that vote.

Yeah.

No, no, no.

No, then you've got the problem.

If you make that 530 group eclectic enough, then you have no problem at all.

If you just pick them among our friends,

That's good.

That covers everything.

Now, at the present time, there was a situation and everything else is done for today and no leak yet.

That is the matter or something.

The fact that God didn't do that was in the television this morning.

He was meant to begin with your advisors, including me, planning the next group with Mark.

Oh, and who's taking care of Laird today at what time?

Well, you got Laird?

You still got the special switcher Laird?

Let me call Conway because he doesn't want to be called by anyone.

Ronald Reagan.

And then they should be called tonight about going back to the talks.

Now, going back to the talks, one technical thing.

How do we get across the point today?

Going back to the talks, and I put it in the speech, I have flatly rejected

the North Vietnamese insistence that we stop bombing before talking to the islanders.

I have a question for the president.

When he announces it, there are two things we should say.

The top agenda item one, as the family is, to put an end to the North Vietnamese intention.

Two, we have rejected.

There is no question of stopping the bombing.

That question, why didn't he just say it?

I got that in my speech.

I didn't just say it.

Having put it in his statement, get it ready for him.

There's two points that should be clear.

Number one, the top agenda item is the end of the invasion.

Number two, it is understood we will not- The President has rejected it.

The South, the North Vietnamese demand that we stop bombing before resuming talks.

I've got that in my speech tomorrow very nicely.

I said they sold that to us in 1968 and we're not going to buy it again.

I think it's second because there's an answer to a question.

All right.

It's either way.

Otherwise, it puts it too hard for the...

Okay.

I mean, he can say exactly the same thing.

He can say, does that mean you will stop the bombing?

Absolutely not.

The president has flatly rejected this proposal.

It comes out the same way.

But if you make it as a formal...

Okay.

What else was there?

No, sir.

What else do you expect?

If they'll notice it, there's something they have to do.

They won't hear it, just as far as we're concerned.

Yeah, just so he gets it at the start.

What time will they do that?

7.30.

Oh, that's right.

The problem with that is he's got to... What did you call that before?

He's got to...

And there's nobody to tell them to.

It's very much a telling to people that you might be self-conservatory.

It doesn't make a hell of a lot of difference.

I don't want a big .

I have an announcement at 7.30 with regard to the talks.

So that it isn't on the news?

That's right.

Keep it out of there.

The news is at 7.

What does he call it?

7.30?

Make it at 8.

That's right.

All right.

Call at 7.30 and make the announcement at 8.

The police are going to put it out at 7.30.

What?

They're going back to it.

Why don't they call at 7.15?

All right.

7.15.

7.15 he calls.

He says, I have an announcement regarding the Paris call.

I don't think it matters for us.

They're going back.

So they say, you're not allowed to speak to another wife.

So what?

All right, well, no, but I mean if it backtests us to an advantage if it leaks out upside down because it makes it analytical if we didn't .

Right.

Good.

OK, fellas.

I'll meet you guys in a little time.

OK.

The purpose of that, uh, electric side of it, in regard to the copycat, was to get Bob off his ass, uh, working the game.

and work on this like we did in Cambodia.

And it's scouting all those people to work.

And I'm not going to worry about it.

You and I, Henry, now, I'm sure you've got to think about the big things.

Screw this all this stuff.

The big thing, of course, is the selling of it, though.

It's just, to me, a crime.

We haven't sold it better.

I don't mean you and I.

We've broken our ass.

And part of the problem is, part of the problem is that the biggest stuff for selling our policy should be the Secretary of State, William B. Rogers,

Now, the only time he went out really, he said two things, but when he attacked Muskie, I mean, we rallied him into that, and last time, you know, he definitely, did you realize, you know, it's a, you know, Russ made a beautiful statement, I don't know what to do with this guy.

He said, I mean, the president's doing exactly the right thing, he doesn't have any other choice.

You know, these are fine.

You don't ever lose support if you're president.

That's absolutely the case.

I'm not much of a...

I'm surprised it's a heavyweight amendment in this whole business of Gallup's program.

I don't think it should run the polls.

But to show that even though it's a slight majority, the majority favor, fine.

That means that after I talk, it'll be 60%, I assure you.

Well, then, Mr. President, I believe if you pull this off, I think the chances are 64%.

Your popularity is going to skyrocket even more.

You've looked them in the eye.

I think we can't afford... We can't afford that.

We can't blink with it up.

They've got to think that next week... Well, here's the point.

Here's the point I wanted to make to you for the moment.

Sort of.

I... Quite late last night trying to... You know, I'm big kidding myself.

Really?

I'm hearing your dissertation on the summit and on fresh air.

I have a few ones that have very, very much emotion.

I am convinced that for reasons that have nothing to do with Vietnam,

Not a successful summit.

Pressure.

Desperate to keep this.

When he sees about this boat, the boat's going to go down.

The front might go down.

No.

If I do, I have a feeling that I will.

Think a lot about it.

I know that we're going to be sorely tempted to save the sun at almost any cost.

I, well, I vote even in the other extreme.

I'm going to do a picture.

A few years ago, you murdered me, but you got me arrested.

And I'll tell you what it was.

I am really convinced that if we lose the poor man,

The general situation in this country will be impossible.

I don't think, it's a, I think we could, let me tell you in political context, I am convinced now that we could lose the Vietnam War.

I could camouflage it in a way by going to the Russian summit that it would appear that what he did the best he could, he would win the election.

On the other hand, on the other hand, I am convinced

But the American people, if we lose in Vietnam and all of this, this is the great struggle between the left and the right, the great struggle between the Haitians and the patriots.

And we cannot lose.

Now, having said that, I mean, if we see the situation as getting too rough regarding Hong Kong and all the rest, it's my view.

what we have to do.

That's all done already?

Yes.

As he said, hello.

Good, good.

It's my view.

This requires work.

We've got to quit thinking in terms of a three-day strike.

We've got to be thinking in terms of an all-out

will continue until they branch.

Now, by an all-out bombing attack, I am thinking of things that go far beyond.

I'm thinking of the dikes.

I'm thinking of next to the railroad.

I'm thinking, of course, the docks.

But I think we are, I talked to Al about what they had in mind.

He said, well, he said, we'll gradually move up.

And I said, Al, none of this goddamn gradualism.

Well, I agree with that.

I mean, I agree with you.

My view is this, Mr. President.

You understand.

I think if we have God, we've got to use massive force to bring this thing handily.

If force fails, then the cause will be wrong.

My view is this, Mr. President.

I think that'll sink the Russian summit.

But I think on the other hand, if it saves Vietnam, there might be a Russian summit at some time in the future.

That's the way it is.

Mr. President, let me just make one question.

You cannot go and meet the President of

If you have either pulled off your confrontation, or if you've been defeated, that guy will never understand.

So I'm with you 100%.

And second, we have, however, the big practice of striking always from a good position.

And for three and a half years, we've done it in a masterful way of Sweden Sauer and never being just butchers.

What we have, like, in Australia, it sweetens our very developed, delightfully sophisticated chains, and rather carves off of the American or the Russian.

Well, Dr. Braden told me at lunch just before we left, he said, never has he seen a weekend played with such masterful skill as you've played me enough.

He said he knows it's a weekend.

He knows it's a weekend.

I mean, the magic that he said.

Now, our home front is, to some extent, important to us, and what's important about it, Mr. President, isn't the support we get for one week.

It's how the other side assesses the firmament of this support.

Now, my belief is that what we're doing this week

That's what we're doing next week, going to a private meeting now.

If that fails, and by fails I mean, I don't mean sweet words, I mean a major breakthrough.

Anything short of a major breakthrough breaks it all.

We are not talking now about the meetings I had last summer, where I come back and say, I had, and you have changed two sentences.

Last summer we were allowed to travel.

Let me give you the hard part.

Suppose they come through with you and say, we're now ready to have a ceasefire.

I don't consider that a right.

No.

Because basically, that's two of the number one for us at this point.

At this point.

If they say, we have this problem about the ceasefire.

Because we've offered it.

But A, we've offered it.

And B, if they offered it, we are going to be in one hell of a spot.

So how do we handle it?

If they offer a ceasefire, I think we ought to delay our tackling of the fact that in some of these areas, they've got to pray if we keep working them over.

We should delay for several weeks, work them over, work them over.

Now, one thing Krimiko told me on yesterday's invitation, which I've got to tell you, we have got to do now.

Look, why don't you have the summit, and after the summit, do what you want.

Then we will understand.

I'm not saying you should do it.

It's just delaying us, and we can't afford the delay.

Just like the Chinese.

Well, no, it's important.

Before the Chinese summit, we didn't ignore Vietnam at all.

But I meant really, we delayed a lot of China.

China has raised too much homework.

We've got Kanoa.

I saw the bombing damage of Kanoa, for example.

They leveled the power plant.

Which one was that?

The second strength?

The second strength.

And it worked good.

It worked good.

When I was...

The power plant.

Yes.

The power plant, the dark area.

Now, Brezhnev, Loprynin told me, at the end of every day, Loprynin came over and talked to me.

When Brezhnev obviously did his review, he got really, really big.

Sure.

So that he could... Why do the same thing?

You know, so that he could tell his top people he hadn't said it.

And he said, we got a report that you bombed 100 kilometers south of the...

The president got it while he was at the meeting with you, and I hope you know he didn't speak about it.

We are now in the position where they are not turning on the worldwide propaganda campaign, and I think we should try to survive this week.

without hitting them.

Now, I'm going to tell the Renaissance today that if this offensive, I just have to warn them, this offensive, new offensive may change, but I've said, I didn't give them any line.

I just said, we won't get annoyed.

You should tell the Renaissance.

You just had a very disturbing, you could say, I just had a very disturbing president.

I don't know if you put this down.

It's very important.

First of all, in one sense, it was one of the best meetings and one of the most hopeful meetings we've ever had.

He looks enormously impressed with President's frankness with the messages, with the personal communication that has now been established between him and President.

And he thinks the summit can be the great event of the century that I have to recommend to President.

On the other hand, President,

but has been shocked by the fact that despite the meetings in Moscow, they have marked this as an offensive.

And under certain circumstances, he said that he has made the bold decision that with this offensive occurred, we are going to have this case.

Our problem with the Russian system is that we don't want to have a president.

He does seem to me to have trouble with it, whether it be by odds or not.

Yeah.

People tell me that.

We don't want him to be accused that we bombed our pipeline three days before I get there, and then he gives us...

So if we can...

I was wondering if we could wait that long.

I've warned them that if May 2nd doesn't lead to a breakthrough, if we go May 3rd or 4th... Now, I have also got the joy to work out another plan together with the pipeline.

And if we sink a ship, we always talk about unimaginative things like mining.

I thought that we were going to find the same two or three ships in the mouth of the harbor of 5R.

How are we going to do that?

We don't know what to say.

So you mean our ships?

Our ships, we hold them in there and sink them.

Then the harbor.

Hold on the shore batteries with the... That's right.

That's right.

The harbor is blocked.

for two months, and we are not mining, we are not .

I'll have to plan tomorrow.

So if we do all of this at once, say next Wednesday or Thursday, I feel very strongly that if LIDARCO does not say,

This and this is going to happen.

And I will not agree to another president meeting tonight, that by next Thursday or Friday, depending on whether and so forth, we go all out.

We go all out.

And the summit.

And the summit, I do not think, will be broken off under those circumstances.

It depends what you do.

And Dobrynin's judgment, my judgment is incidentally, Mr. President, I've seen these guys in action now.

There are two guys who've got their asses in a sling.

One is Dobrynin and the other is Brezhnev.

I really believe

And DeBruyne has some influence because he's so smart.

And because he's a member of the Central Committee.

And respected.

And they know he talks to you.

I mean, for example, when... No, he brokers every damn little conversation.

Like that MacBook thing, I'd forgotten.

I'd even said it, but he brokers it.

He brokers it.

But you have said that at the end.

That's right.

And the President, for example, when he said to me, I don't want an announcement...

He said, I don't want any of that.

He said, it's too embarrassing for us.

Do you, must you have it?

The breeder was, he was vexing at me from saying, you know, he was coaching me.

And I said, yes, you must have it.

But my point is that Dobrynin was helping me out.

And Dobrynin, when I really laid into Gromyko yesterday, Dobrynin took a walk with me.

And he said, you may not believe this, but you didn't need to think it's very well that it's ever been done.

These guys think that they can maneuver the president.

And I've told him that if you think Kissinger is not waiting, you need to measure them.

And he said, this was a tremendous lesson that you can't push these guys beyond a certain point.

Now, my judgment is we can get away with a two-day strike, something that we can say is over, then wait a week and do it again.

If these bastards put all their airbags into this, the worst mistake we made, not the worst, but a bad mistake, we're going to cut it.

to cut that other strike in half.

I know.

Well, Henry, let's face it.

Coming back from Canada, we got that here canceled.

You remember Laird, our hardliner, saved us from this, remember?

He said, he said, he said, you know, you know, the President and Henry panicked, he told them.

Oh, oh, remember?

All we did, all I wanted was to get Laird on tape.

I know.

That he was recommended.

There was no chance of canceling it.

May I ask you?

What did you think when you heard of Laird's suggestion about the next withdrawal?

I mean, of all the crap that's come out of there, it's so dumb.

But look, you know, the worst, oh, what else have we?

My God, we give the enemy a chance to shoot at it and say, we're going to have 15,000 men here to war with us.

We don't need to do it.

We don't get another bite at the apple.

It is unbelievable.

But I think, Mr. President, if we can get this thing turned into Vietnam, you will go to Moscow in the strongest position.

I don't know that we can.

That's right.

If you can't go to Moscow, I believe that we cannot afford to lose Vietnam so that you can go to Moscow.

But if we are lucky, and if we bring it on,

These guys understand this is not like Joe Biden.

You see, I really mean it, Henry, when I say I am perfectly willing to risk the election in order not to lose in Vietnam.

And the reason that I believe that is that I realize that whoever sits in this chair or the one over there is going to have to pick so-called journeys for peace.

And I realize that the President of the United States

won't be worth talking to if the United States is to be humiliated or embarrassed.

But that's why you're going to make it, Mr. President, for that very reason.

Nixon, Kissinger & Haig on Vietnam War and US-Soviet Relations

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Also recorded on April 25, 1972

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Nixon, Kissinger & Haig on Vietnam War and US-Soviet Relations

AI Summary

Audio

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on April 25, 1972

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Cite this conversation