Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 335 › Conversation 335-017

Nixon, Gray & Kleindienst on FBI and Soviet Summit

Wednesday, May 3, 1972 · 2:50 PM–3:35 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kleindienst, Richard G.; Gray, L[ouis] Patrick, III; [Unknown person(s)]; Ehrlichman, John D.; Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation335-017 on Tape 335 (tape position 01:02:31–01:38:57)StartWednesday, May 3, 1972 at 2:50 PMEndWednesday, May 3, 1972 at 3:35 PMRecording deviceOld Executive Office BuildingSourceNixon Library record for 335-017 ↗

President Nixon met with his senior advisors and officials to manage the leadership transition at the FBI following J. Edgar Hoover’s death and to strategize regarding the upcoming Soviet summit amid the North Vietnamese invasion. The group discussed the political implications of L. Patrick Gray’s nomination as acting FBI director and debated whether to proceed with the summit given potential domestic backlash and the ongoing conflict. Ultimately, Nixon signaled his intent to project strength and maintain leadership, emphasizing that he would only cancel the summit if it demonstrably improved the prospects for ending the war in Vietnam.

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1:02:20Yes, sir.
1:02:21Come right in.
1:02:22All right.
1:02:22How are you, sir?
1:02:22All right.
1:02:24How are you, too?
1:02:26Thank you.
1:02:27Mr. President, how are you, sir?
1:02:30Good.
1:02:31Can I tell you something?
1:02:32Yes, you got one.
1:02:32Yesterday, I authorized the acquisition by IT&T of the S&P.
1:02:35We need that company, too.
1:02:39The new name of the company is now S-H-I-T-T.
1:02:53No, that's right, let it go.
1:03:26uh, the, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh,
1:04:10Tell me that if we're in that kid's stadium.
1:04:46is now faced with quite a degree of involvement
1:05:26I don't know if you want to tell me something.
1:05:29Yes.
1:05:51I would want to comment.
1:07:18What's he to do?
1:07:20He's to say that this is a, technically this is, it turns out, it's a final.
1:07:25That this meeting with the president, the president and you directly have made the offer to Pat, which he's accepted as acting director.
1:07:34And then, again, that I have, that I was here in order this afternoon.
1:08:22Mr. Gray and Mr. Klein, technically, are still pending the Board of Congress confirmation, and so these questions are not appropriate.
1:08:49that because of various considerations which you'll enumerate, that due to the nature of the position and its long tradition and so on and so forth, the person has decided not to object to the nomination of a permanent director in this political year.
1:09:08He's got a statement written out and said it yesterday, right?
1:09:12I believe the nomination will be
1:09:24No possibility of change.
1:10:11Yeah, he is.
1:10:15Good, good.
1:10:22I think we can keep that open.
1:10:24Here, I'll make a couple of...
1:10:54And I said, well, I think my recommendation of the other person who came in was Bob.
1:11:08And he just recommended that to me.
1:11:5760 was tough, but this is 60 and joining, so this is going to be tough.
1:12:04That's going to be a tough assignment for your friend here.
1:12:07Very so good.
1:12:09That's right.
1:12:10I'm sealing 90, but I sure am glad you did.
1:12:12But the point is...
1:12:47Congratulations.
1:13:16Well, I'm afraid it doesn't make much difference because .
1:13:21But, well, might as well look at it to see what our problems are.
1:13:27That's what I was wondering.
1:13:32Did you get down the road?
1:13:36Do you have any choice anyway?
1:13:37Were you going to bomb?
1:13:41They may knock it off.
1:13:42They'll knock it off.
1:13:43Well, that's Henry's concern.
1:13:44He thinks that there's a 50% or a 50% chance that they'll knock it off.
1:13:47But, uh, and I don't know if you've got any questions on the way that they would be able to handle that.
1:13:58I think we did.
1:13:59We said, first of all, we asked the same question we'd asked on state issue groups the last time.
1:14:05approved this group, 68 approved, 17 disapproved.
1:14:07That is lower than the 74 approved, but it isn't significant.
1:14:13Well, that was the first question on the survey, which you automatically get a lower answer on.
1:14:17The undecided went up, 8 to 15.
1:14:19The disapproved went down also.
1:14:20But then, in view of the continuing communist invasion of South Vietnam, do you feel the president should cancel the drug in South Vietnam until the Vietnam offensive is discontinued?
1:14:37You didn't put in there about the arms.
1:14:40Or do you feel we should go forward with the meeting, even if the offensive continues at the present level?
1:14:47Leaving out the arms.
1:14:4823 you said to cancel, 60 to go forward, 17 no opinion.
1:14:55Then...
1:14:57He said, in spite of the fact that the communist invasion of South Vietnam is supported by massive Russian aid and military equipment, do you still feel the President should go forward with the meeting?
1:15:1053.
1:15:11Still feel he should go forward with it?
1:15:162%.
1:15:16He said no, so he had to adapt to the 23 and get 25 at the same time.
1:15:22Yeah.
1:15:2222, I decided.
1:15:25Then we said, do you feel, or do you feel it would be better to delay the summit trip temporarily until there would be a non-invasion?
1:15:3533 said yes, 51 said no.
1:15:36When you boil it down, what you have is 68% approve the summit meeting, 60% say go ahead, it's part of the invasion.
1:15:48Now, you've got to remember that you have 17% that disapprove of going to the summit to begin with.
1:15:57of those who approve going to the summit.
1:16:01To begin with, the 68 percent.
1:16:03Seventy-six percent of them say go ahead, in spite of the concrete situation.
1:16:08When they're put in the question of Russian aid and support, it doesn't make any significant change.
1:16:15Half of them say don't, delay it, even temporarily.
1:16:17A third of them say do go ahead temporarily.
1:16:22But when you take those who approve of the trip, 68% who approve of the point of eruption, 21% of those say, if you like, 68% say no.
1:16:2912% say cancel.
1:16:30That's about what I expected.
1:16:33Yeah, it is.
1:16:34So in the analysis on this, what's happened here is that the potential benefits of a meeting with the top leaders of the government have been
1:16:53build up for this one.
1:16:55At the same time, there is evidence the English has slightly weakened public support for the 17th.
1:17:01But even when the offensive, the massive Russian aid, and the possibility of the lead are included in the questions, public still supports going ahead and leading the trip by a balance of 5 to 3.
1:17:11Thus, the bedrock support for the trip is at the 50% level.
1:17:13That's no matter how you raise the negative.
1:17:20He says this does not mean that should the President announce a delay or an indefinite postponement that the public would not support it.
1:17:27The typical reaction is to support the President's time of crisis and to accept his judgment.
1:17:32Nevertheless, should the trip be postponed, it would appear to be necessary to explain the President's reason in as specific terms as possible and to link the potential benefits
1:17:53We asked, should they go ahead with a cancel letter?
1:17:58We asked, why do you feel that way?
1:18:02And on an open-ended basis, the people who said go ahead anyway, 28% on the why said an answer ineffective just to get something done.
1:18:13is to be doing something, to accomplish something.
1:18:16It might do some good if nothing's accomplished by sitting back and doing nothing.
1:18:20Progress.
1:18:22Right.
1:18:22That was 28%.
1:18:2221% said a sort of similar thing, that the need to communicate.
1:18:26It's better to talk.
1:18:28Talk is better to run.
1:18:28But we've built that up for the Chinese.
1:18:31There won't be change without communication and all that.
1:18:3419% said to end the war.
1:18:35You've got to go because the talks could end the war.
1:18:40And 10% said, don't back down.
1:18:41We mustn't back off.
1:18:43Something has to be done.
1:18:44And it looked like he's backing away.
1:18:45There's no other reason why they think you should do it.
1:18:50Once you think you should cancel, 15% of them said, it won't do any good.
1:18:55It's no use.
1:18:56Those of you who are against it, then you can do this.
1:19:0213% say the Russians, you can't talk peace while the Russians are isolating in the war.
1:19:07The Russians are backing the Vietnamese.
1:19:11The Russians have to prove they want to talk peace.
1:19:14Vietnam is more important than that.
1:19:19That's only 13%.
1:19:19And only 13% of those who say not to go.
1:19:234% say end the war.
1:19:235% say win the war.
1:19:24Yeah, yeah, yeah.
1:19:26That's about it.
1:19:27I think it's perhaps only...
1:19:34Look at that.
1:20:22He said, you'd be great if you could do it the way you did with the young one.
1:20:25I said, well, I should have done it.
1:20:26I said, well, you know, that takes a hell of a lot of time.
1:20:29I said, well, it's worth it.
1:20:30I read the same thing with Ron.
1:20:33He said, well, I'm sure it's great.
1:20:40Well, it's the old story.
1:20:41If it's worth the time, I can pay three, four dollars for it.
1:20:48trying to get it in my head and ad-lib it.
1:20:49My point is that I said to Ron, he says, not to be carried by, but I said, yeah, Ron, 11 o'clock in the morning.
1:20:53And I said, as far as the eating was concerned, I said, first, I have ad-libbed my first feed on it.
1:20:58And that's what the public was praying.
1:20:59Second on this one, I just wondered, where do you get the marketing from?
1:21:26more than about a minute of what you're going to say on TV, because they have to carry the setting, the procession, some days of the ministry, as well as see on television.
1:21:36It doesn't make any, it'll only have an enormous effect on the people there, and what the hell they're going to do with the elements they make, except in the queue of time.
1:21:51Remember after it died?
1:21:51Well, it was on TV.
1:21:52I mean, it was more TV with all of our, with all of our talk on it.
1:21:58and all these things I do that with.
1:22:04But with the things I do that with, I don't do it with a man.
1:22:06That's one of the few that do it.
1:22:14But believe me, it's easy.
1:22:18I mean, I don't do it with a man.
1:22:26I read that well.
1:22:27I mean, the eulogy, I'm inclined to think, in this instance, that everybody else reads it, that this is going to be understood.
1:22:39The eon was a graveside cemetery type of thing, which is a different thing than in church.
1:22:45I think it ought to be read.
1:22:49I just don't think it's worth the time.
1:22:59The factory, though, Bob, that I did the first statement, which got an enormous play.
1:23:15It'll get bigger on the next one.
1:23:18Right?
1:23:19I think that was the thing.
1:23:32And that was major personal...
1:23:34I'm not going to mention my 25 years this time.
1:23:36See, I've done that.
1:23:36That was your first...
1:23:37I had it all in there, and I cut it out after I said that.
1:23:39Do you mind if I... That's why I rather think of having done that one, which everybody could tell was it done right, and it's great that they made it in the heart.
1:23:47I don't think I have to do it this way.
1:23:49I think you can do it a little different.
1:23:53Anyway, I just don't think it's worth that much time, or if you think so, I'll take off three hours and get to work for two, two to take me a couple hours.
1:24:00The balance is not good.
1:24:04You gave a little of us.
1:24:08When we discussed this with Henry Bennett's conclusion, I think the president was out and says it,
1:24:22I don't want to, I don't want to leave them, because I'm not so sure you're right about that.
1:24:27Well, if that goes into anything you can't do, it's easy to convince them to buy.
1:24:34Don't read that claim, nevertheless, not even now.
1:24:39Linking with the benefits of ending the waterway for something good, I just don't understand.
1:24:45You're actually not...
1:24:47Canceling the summit, you can't claim to have been afraid anymore.
1:24:49Well, you could if you'd bought the ticket anyway.
1:24:54You didn't enter any of these figures, did you?
1:24:58Yep.
1:24:59Here's what I can tell you.
1:24:59The arguments, if you come back down to them, I want to listen to them.
1:25:04Well, you shouldn't have.
1:25:09You have to do it to get a message from the soldiers, if you like.
1:25:19I mean, that's the key.
1:25:22He said, it's marginal.
1:25:26He said, it's just a bombing-struck marginal where he's got the law.
1:25:31For his point, and it really comes down to the really hard thing, he said, there's something.
1:25:36At this time, with Russian tanks rumbling through the streets of the way, with the President of the United States signing agreements for credits
1:25:51with arms limitation, posting peace and friendship.
1:26:02That is very bad for children.
1:26:08I want to display a very, very great weakness to go after we get warm.
1:26:27It's not affecting the war, and it certainly may have a sentimental effect on the public opinion of the election government.
1:26:40It would make sense.
1:26:41Well, if there's any talks left, that's where it gets down to.
1:26:47It's doing this.
1:26:50If they want to talk, I'm sure they'll do it.
1:26:53And he, of course, says, and he says, you know, next to the president, he says, I've done the greatest thing in this.
1:27:07He says, my whole life has been that.
1:27:09Well, we don't mean to be bad, and I'm good about it, but... And we hear him, and it's very, very remarkable.
1:27:12And frankly, I made it to him, so I had already wired in...
1:27:36What if you told the Russians?
1:27:41I was going to say, just that he wouldn't.
1:27:43That would be banquets.
1:27:48Banquets don't mean much.
1:27:53They're starting to be free.
1:27:55At a time, they are screwing.
1:27:56They're not.
1:27:59They're not.
1:28:05and might turn out to be a bluff that would pay off.
1:28:08It's not a bluff, but I'm going to be casting.
1:28:11Yeah.
1:28:13Going back to this first one, that it gets a message to Hanoi and Canada and Moscow.
1:28:18It's an effect on the war, but maybe it is.
1:28:23I don't know.
1:28:33The thing that I'm still interested in, and I'm glad to think about it, is that this, by the time we got to China, I wouldn't have been able to see that during the war.
1:28:50So, at this time, I have a huge courage.
1:28:55breaking the peace and the continuation of war and self-destruction would not serve the cause of peace.
1:29:02It would harm the cause of peace.
1:29:04You might give them that thought, including the address that they're now looking on.
1:29:12The China trip.
1:29:13People liked the China trip, even though they thought there were a bunch of goddamn communists.
1:29:19To back up?
1:29:19They trust me.
1:29:20Yeah, as far as they liked it, that's it.
1:29:21They trust you, and they liked the president doing something.
1:29:25They don't like to see their government fail, frankly.
1:29:27That's the other thing.
1:29:28They don't like to see it fail, but they also don't like to see it seem to be helpless.
1:29:32See, Johnson gave the appearance of helplessness.
1:29:35Well... You haven't given that appearance, have you?
1:29:40In real life, it shows great courage, great leadership.
1:29:41I'm not so sure.
1:29:42Not being helpless.
1:29:45I'm inclined to think...
1:29:46I think he is sterile, and I mean, I don't think his judgment was entirely the best.
1:29:57And I must say, there are other little things that must complicate it for him.
1:30:04The goddamn conduct bomb of Rogers.
1:30:08But do you think Pedersen had the background, or you don't know?
1:30:13I think it was Rodgers and Pedersen who did the one on the ceasefire and tried to separate him from the information that was in that.
1:30:31Maybe you could have a way of checking that.
1:30:35Maybe you could.
1:30:37Would you mind?
1:30:42I'm not that uncomfortable.
1:30:46Roger's, well, that story is what I want to solve first.
1:30:51It's pretty strong.
1:30:52Yeah.
1:31:02You also have to keep in mind the fact that the United States is still a pretty goddamn strong country.
1:31:26We've got a strong hand in Europe.
1:31:32I suggest that you go over and get ahold of Henry and make the strongest case possible.
1:31:42I mean, you just say you're going.
1:31:47Henry, I don't know anything about the rest of it.
1:31:54You've got to realize that you probably have a loser of the San Juan American Holocaust.
1:32:07I don't see it this time.
1:32:08That's true.
1:32:12I think people want hope.
1:32:12That's the other thing.
1:32:14They don't want to...
1:32:15I told him that this morning.
1:32:18I don't think you give hope when there is none.
1:32:21But Henry does tend to get blood, sweat, and tears all the time, you know.
1:32:25You've got to put a little hope in everything.
1:32:28Not like Roger does.
1:32:30I'll show you right away.
1:32:35I think about all of my speeches on Vietnam, and I've always had, you know, on the cliff, as well as Brandon Barrett, you know, that's why they, as compared to the Henry documents, which, you know, just sparking life, you know.
1:32:49Country of this time, you know, you can't, you can't, you can't, you can't.
1:32:58You've never pulled any punches on the, on the top side of these?
1:33:00You haven't?
1:33:00You haven't given up flying?
1:33:01You haven't?
1:33:01You haven't given up flying?
1:33:02You haven't given up flying?
1:33:02You haven't given up flying?
1:33:03You haven't given up flying?
1:33:04You haven't given up flying?
1:33:04You haven't given up flying?
1:33:05You haven't given up flying?
1:33:05You haven't given up flying?
1:33:06You haven't given up flying?
1:33:07You haven't given up flying?
1:33:07You haven't given up flying?
1:33:08You haven't given up flying?
1:33:09You haven't given up flying?
1:33:09You haven't given up flying?
1:33:10You haven't given up flying?
1:33:11You haven't given up flying?
1:33:11You haven't given up flying?
1:33:12You haven't given up flying?
1:33:13You haven't given up flying?
1:33:13You haven't given up flying?
1:33:14You haven't given up flying?
1:33:14You haven't given up flying?
1:33:15You haven't given up flying?
1:33:16You haven't given up flying?
1:33:16You haven't given up flying?
1:33:17You haven't given up flying?
1:33:18You haven't given up flying?
1:33:19You haven't given
1:33:29Probably the end of the next week.
1:33:51Okay.
1:34:20Decisions like this, basically, without having in mind how far you can lead the country.
1:34:26You know, that's the whole point of all the one of us being brave.
1:34:29But you can't do it.
1:34:30The commander's out there without the goddamn troops.
1:34:35They're forgetting.
1:34:37Where do you get down?
1:34:38Well, you get shot down.
1:34:40And that, that's the problem.
1:34:43On this one, I just don't think I can kill him.
1:34:50In the short term, I'm not so sure.
1:34:55The public reaction, which I anticipate, honestly, although I'd say you might get a strong flip from the Hawks, but you see the great center as well, frankly, the massive people, are just going to be terribly disappointed in the shot.
1:35:13That's what's going to be told.
1:35:18You've got to know that.
1:35:25Henry's concerned there, and mine is too.
1:35:27And that would be the worst of both worlds.
1:35:35It would be the worst, but on the other hand, if you bomb them and they didn't cancel, that would be the best of both worlds.
1:35:44Then you don't go in a sweet position.
1:35:48Nor does your gun fall.
1:35:51Just taking a strong hand in the Russians for example.
1:35:52That's a settlement to cancel the summit.
1:35:55That's a settlement that Laura, we have not, still cannot be brought to a conclusion in a way to set us back from the Russian.
1:36:02Then, we've got to assail them.
1:36:05They're much better than we can change to lose the Russian.
1:36:12And then, the President will be a Russian passenger for sure.
1:36:28by canceling some.
1:36:29Canceling some, I'm sure.
1:36:30Did you raise that argument with him?
1:36:32So he probably had the word, you know, a little, he doesn't, he understands it, but he doesn't know how much they did in six months.
1:36:46They can send out the demonstrations here again and stuff, probably, too.
1:36:52It's so sad and wild, apparently.
1:36:58Isn't that interesting though, Sanjay, after we were just passing by?
1:37:07I think it has to be part of the...
1:37:08I'm going to make a strong argument that I really believe.
1:37:10Oh, yeah?
1:37:10I think you could say, Jessica, tell them that.
1:37:13Tell them, you personally, that you go along your hawk.
1:37:16You have to face up to some hard facts.
1:37:22These are just hard political facts.
1:37:29We're looking, frankly, at just almost a sure way to lose the election.
1:37:35put it that way because actually we are you know if that chain of events goes through sure see that's why i said to him now if the cancellation of the summit that is going to have more than a marginal effect of increasing our chances to come out successfully in vietnam we'll do it the minute and then we have the best work but he had to agree
1:38:00Very little.
1:38:01He has some, but he's marginal.
1:38:04Marginal.
1:38:06Okay.
1:38:07I'll be here.
1:38:08Okay.
1:38:45Secretary Conley, please.
1:38:56Hello?

On May 3, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Richard G. Kleindienst, L[ouis] Patrick Gray, III, unknown person(s), John D. Ehrlichman, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 2:50 pm to 3:35 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 335-017 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 335-17

Date: May 3, 1972
Time: 2:50-3:35 pm.
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Richard G. Kleindienst and L. Patrick Gray, III.

     Greetings

     A joke

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 2:50 pm and conferred with the President.

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 2:53 pm.

     Gray
            -Appointment
                -Need for Gray's abilities
                -Arrangements
                     -Political pressures
                -Announcement

     Kleindienst
          -Nomination
                -Statement
                -Ronald L. Ziegler's announcement
                      -Meeting with the President

     Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]
          -Appointment of Gray
               -Charles W. Colson's call to Kleindienst

                -Ziegler's statement

John D. Ehrlichman and H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman entered at 2:53 pm.

                      -Status
                      -Confirmation
                      -Questions from press
                            -Ziegler, Gray, Kleindienst
                      -Status
           -Permanent director
                -Statement by Ziegler
                      -Political pressures

     Kleindienst
          -Status
                -Deputy Attorney General
                -Questions
                     -Answers
                     -Ziegler
          -Confirmation

     FBI
           -Calls to Senators
                 -James O. Eastland
                 -Schedule
                 -Possible nominee for FBI director
                       -Eastland
                       -[Thomas] Hale Boggs
                       -Reaction
                 -Other calls
                       -Timing
                             -Announcement of Gray's nomination
                 -Mississippi, Georgia

     Congress
         -The President’s view
         -Questions about W. Ramsey Clark
              -Rep. Emmanuel Celler

     Congratulations

Ehrlichman left at 3:10 pm.

Kleindienst and Gray left at 3:20 pm.

     Vietnam and Soviet Summit
          -North Vietnamese invasion
                -US response
                     -Bombing
                     -Henry A. Kissinger's concerns
                           -Possibility of Soviet summit cancellation
          -Public opinion poll
                -Soviet summit cancellation
                     -Questions
                           -Percentages
                           -Wording
                           -Soviet aid to North Vietnam
                           -President's trip
                                  -Cancellation
                                  -Delay
                                  -Continuation
                           -Soviet support for North Vietnam
                           -President's trip
                                  -Approval
                                  -Cancellation
                                  -Reasons for support for trip
                                  -Analysis of Charles D. Bennett
                                       -People's Republic of China [PRC] trip
                                       -North Vietnamese offensive
                                       -Soviet aid to North Vietnam
                                       -Postponement
                                                   -Public support
                -Support for trip
                     -Reasons
                           -Percentages of approval and disapproval
                           -PRC trip
                     -Cancellation
                           -Approval and disapproval percentages
                     -Expected effect on war
                           -Percentages
          -President’s meeting with Kissinger

     J. Edgar Hoover
          -Eulogy

           -John K. Andrews, Jr.
                 -The President’s view
           -Length
           -President's delivery
                 -Whitney M. Young
                 -Ziegler
                 -President's schedule
           -Television coverage
                 -Ziegler
                 -Amount
                 -Impact
                       -Young
           -Amount of time
                 -Value
           -President's delivery
                 -Dwight D. Eisenhower
                 -Method
                 -Young
     -President's statement at Hoover's death
           -Press coverage
     -Eulogy
           -Television coverage
           -President's relationship with Hoover
           -Amount of time in preparation
                 -Value

Vietnam and Soviet summit
     -Polls
           -Kissinger
           -Bennett’s analysis
                -Soviet summit
                -Length of war
                -The President’s view
                -Bombing
           -Impact
                -The President’s view

Soviet Summit
     -Timing
           -North Vietnamese invasion
                 -Hue
     -President's signing of agreement

           -Trade credits
           -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
           -Friendship
     -Appearance
     -President's decision
           -Impact
                 -Vietnam War
                 -Public opinion
                 -Forthcoming presidential election
                       -Hawks
                 -Kissinger's view
                 -Timing of trip
                       -The President’s view
     -Agreements
           -Cancellation
                 -Impact on Hanoi and Moscow
           -Importance to Soviets
                 -Cancellation
                       -Interpretation
                             -Trip to PRC

Public opinion
     -PRC trip
     -Support for President
           -Sense of leadership
                -Lyndon B. Johnson
                      -Haldeman’s view
                -Kissinger's judgment
                      -The President’s view
                      -Reasons

William P. Rogers
     -Conduct
           -The President’s view
     -Richard F. Pederson
           -Kissinger's backgrounder
                -Source
                      -John A. Scali
     -A story
           -Accuracy
     -Trips
           -Peking

               -Shanghai
               -Soviet Union
               -Vietnam

     US role in world
          -The President’s view
          -Europe

     Soviet summit
          -Haldeman's forthcoming meeting with Kissinger
          -Continuation of summit
               -Public opinion
                     -The President’s view

     Public opinion
          -Need
                -Kissinger
                     -Tenor of public statements
                -Rogers

     President's speeches
          -Tone
          -Compared to Kissinger's statements
          -Tone after Soviet summit
          -Time
          -Announcement of bombing

     Kissinger
          -Forthcoming meeting with Haldeman
                -Length

     President's schedule
          -Forthcoming meeting with Haldeman and Kissinger
          -Hoover eulogy
                 -Time of draft delivery

Haldeman talked with Kissinger at an unknown time between 2:53 and 3:35 pm.

[Conversation No. 335-17A]

     Meeting
          -Time

[End of telephone conversation]

     Soviet Summit
          -Kissinger's advice
          -Public response
                -Support
                      -Hawks
                      -Center
                      -Michael J. Mansfield on doves
                            -Reaction
                      -Robert J. Dole
          -Bombing in Vietnam
                -Kissinger’s and President's concerns
                -Cancellation of summit
          -Possibility of summit cancellation
                -Effect on forthcoming presidential election
                -US appearance versus Soviet Union
          -Kissinger
          -Possible Soviet propaganda
                -Demonstrations
                -Timing
                      -Hoover
          -Haldeman meeting with Kissinger
                -Tone
                -Forthcoming presidential election
                      -Possible effects
                            -The President’s view
          -Cancellation
                -Results expected
                      -Vietnam

     President's schedule
          -Location

Haldeman left at 3:35 pm.
  • 023-136 2:30 PM · 8 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 2:30 pm.
  • 335-012 2:30 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at 2:30 pm.
  • 335-013 2:30 PM · 14 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at 2:30 pm.
  • 335-014 2:30 PM · 9 min — President Richard M. Nixon and John K. Andrews, Jr. met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 2:30 pm to 2:40 pm.
  • 335-015 2:40 PM · 19 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 2:40 pm and 2:41 pm.
  • 335-016 2:41 PM · 8 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, unknown person(s), and John D. Ehrlichman met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 2:41 pm to 2:49 pm.
  • 023-137 2:48 PM · 38 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and John D. Ehrlichman talked on the telephone from 2:48 pm to 2:49 pm.
  • 023-138 2:53 PM · 2 min — John D. Ehrlichman, White House operator, and Ronald L. Ziegler talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 2:53 pm and 3:10 pm.

Conversation 335-017, May 3, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/335-017 (accessed October 10, 2026).