Conversation 382-003

TapeTape 382StartSaturday, December 16, 1972 at 12:45 PMEndSaturday, December 16, 1972 at 1:25 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Ziegler, Ronald L.;  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.;  [Unknown person(s)]Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On December 16, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, Henry A. Kissinger, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 12:45 pm to 1:25 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 382-003 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 382-3

Date: December 16, 1972
Time: 12:45 pm - 1:25 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Ronald L. Ziegler, Henry A. Kissinger and Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

       Vietnam War
            -Henry A. Kissinger’s press conference
                 -Ziegler’s view
                                -16-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                          (rev. June-08)

                                                 Conversation No. 382-3 (cont’d)

     -Tone
     -Settlement agreement
            -Conditions
                  -Prisoners of War [POWs]
                  -No coalition government
                  -Cease-fire
                  -US withdrawal
                  -October 1972
            -South Vietnam’s position
                  -The President’s position
                         -Signing
            -North Vietnam’s position
                  -Decision
     -Press relations
            -Negotiations
                  -Linguistic changes
                  -Settlement agreement
                         -Conditions
                         -Question and answer [Q & A] session
                         -Wires
                               -Cease-fire
            -Tone
                  -Kissinger’s “peace is at hand” comment, October 26, 1972
            -Negotiations
                  -Status
                         -Progress
     -Settlement agreement
            -North Vietnam’s duplicity
     -US military action
-US bombing of North Vietnam
     -News reports [media and press relations]
            -B-52s
            -Reseeding mines
            -Public Information Officers [PIOs]
            -South Vietnam
            -The President’s May 8, 1972 decision
            -Prevention of enemy buildup and offensive
     -Gen. Frederick C. Weyand
     -Reseeding mines
     -Press relations
                                              -17-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                         (rev. June-08)

                                                               Conversation No. 382-3 (cont’d)

                         -Settlement agreement
                                -The President’s May 8, 1972 decision
                         -US bombing north of 20th Parallel
                                -October 23, 1972
                                -B-52s
                                      -Hanoi
                                      -Haiphong
                                -The President’s May 8, 1972 decision
                                -Negotiations
                                -Defense Department
                                -State Department
                                -South Vietnam
             -Kissinger’s press conference
                   -Press relations
                         -Telephone calls
                                -National Security Council [NSC]
                         -Follow-up stories

Ziegler left at 12:55 pm.

       Vietnam negotiations
            -The President’s letters
            -Haig’s trip to Saigon
                 -Nguyen Van Thieu
                         -Notification
                         -The President’s letter
                               -Draft

An unknown man entered at an unknown time after 12:55 pm.

       Refreshment

The unknown man left at an unknown time before 1:25 pm.

       Vietnam negotiations
            -Thieu
                 -The President’s letter
                 -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew’s trip
                        -Purpose
                 -Settlement agreement
                              -18-

     NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                         (rev. June-08)

                                               Conversation No. 382-3 (cont’d)

            -October and week of November 20, 1972
            -Saigon radio
            -North Vietnam
                   -Concessions
                          -Demands
-Kissinger’s press conference
      -Press relations
            -Comparison to US action in Cambodia and Laos
            -Misleading US people
            -“Peace is at hand”
            -Thieu
                   -Agnew
            -Settlement agreement
                   -The President’s intentions
                          -Guarantees
                                -Cease-fire
                                -Free elections
            -Helen Thomas
            -Peter Lisagor
      -Timing
      -Options
            -Kissinger’s press conference
            -Scale
                   -US public opinion
                          -Number of sorties
                   -Effect on North Vietnam
            -North Vietnam’s delays
            -Agnew
            -William P. Rogers
            -Melvin R. Laird
                   -Settlement agreement
            -Duration
                   -B-52s
                          -Number
                                -Effect on North Vietnam
                   -Kissinger’s view
                          -Vietnamese intransigence
                   -Christmas pause
-Breakdown
      -North Vietnam
                                -19-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                           (rev. June-08)

                                                 Conversation No. 382-3 (cont’d)

-North Vietnam’s strategy
      -Settlement agreement
             -Timing
                    -1973 Inauguration
-US bombing north of 20th Parallel
      -Duration
             -Effect
             -Christmas
             -Possible North Vietnam message
             -Settlement agreement
                    -Signing
             -Targets
             -Settlement agreement
                    -North Vietnam’s delays
                          -Number of sorties
      -North Vietnam’s air defense
             -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]
             -Surface to air missiles [SAMs]
                    -Transport
                          -Messages
                    -Ellsworth F. Bunker
      -US domestic reaction
             -Sophisticates
             -Press relations
                    -Resumption of bombing
                    -PIOs
             -North Vietnam
                    -Propaganda
-Kissinger’s message to North Vietnam
      -US bombing
      -Thanksgiving [November] understandings
      -“Administrative structure”
      -Demilitarized Zone [DMZ]
-US bombing north of 20th Parallel
      -Moonshot analogy
      -Public relations [PR]
             -Cambodia invasion, the President’s May 8, 1972 decision
      -Congressional relations
             -Michael J. Mansfield, Charles H. Percy, Charles McC. Mathias
-Thieu
                               -20-

     NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                          (rev. June-08)

                                                Conversation No. 382-3 (cont’d)

      -Meeting with Haig
      -Agnew’s trip
            -Advisability
                  -The President’s meeting with Agnew
            -Relations with US
                  -The President’s letters
                  -Ambassador briefings
                        -Saigon Radio
      -Laird
-Options
      -US bombing north of 20th Parallel
      -Nuclear weapons
      -Soviet Union
      -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
      -North Vietnam
      -US bombing, mining
      -North Vietnam’s offensives
      -Vietnamization
      -US withdrawal
            -POWs
                  -George S. McGovernites
                        -Mansfield Amendment
                  -US bombing north of 20th Parallel
                  -Bilateral deal
                        -US interests
                  -US aid to South Vietnam
                        -Laos, Cambodia
                        -Settlement agreement
                        -Thieu’s survival
-South Vietnam
      -Ambassador briefings in Paris
            -Leaks to North Vietnam
                  -Congressional relations
                  -US military involvement
                  -Nguyen Phu Duc
                  -Bunker
-US withdrawal
      -POWs
            -US domestic reaction
            -South Vietnam
                                -21-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                           (rev. June-08)

                                                 Conversation No. 382-3 (cont’d)

             -North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, Laos
                   -PRC
-October 1972 agreement
       -Effect
       -Clauses
             -DMZ
       -Thieu
       -Surprise
-Settlement agreement
       -North Vietnam
             -Delays
                   -Kissinger’s possible trip
                         -Effect
                               -US bombing
                               -Incentive
                   -Kissinger’s previous trips
                   -The President’s May 8, 1972 decision
-Status
       -Soviet Union, PRC
       -Kissinger’s message to the PRC
             -Reply
                   -Forthcoming briefing
                         -Timing
                         -Florida
       -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
             -Transcript of December 13, 1972 talks
                   -Tone
             -Conversation with Kissinger
                   -The President’ possible action
                         -Timing
                               -Christmas
-Haig’s conversation with an unknown Chinese
-US bombing north of 20th Parallel
       -“Doves”
             -McGovern
             -1972 election
             -Congressional relations
             -Thieu
                   -November 1972
       -Kissinger’s press conference
                                             -22-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                        (rev. June-08)

                                                         Conversation No. 382-3 (cont’d)

                   -Press relations
                         -Tone

Haig and Kissinger left at 1:25 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Oh, very good.
Well, I thought I had a chance on this.
You think it came over better than that?
Well, so now, now.
You finished your seance?
Yes, sir.
Seance.
First.
Now, now, listen here.
Good job.
General, first.
Well, sir.
But as we discussed, I did a very low fee play.
But any punchline that we may have, I think there are four conditions that we should look for.
One is, how many positions do we have?
Two is, how many positions do we have?
I realized that after the program, that I'm not doing it in a great way.
What we had asked for, and other opinions that we had, was to sign out.
The staff and the people are separate from us.
We have different perspectives.
But, as it happens, as it's a business, and it's difficult for you,
We don't want to be there in time.
One day, after the event is done, I'm going to go to the deck and I'm going to be there.
The question is, what if I don't have any food?
The question is, how is that?
How is that food?
How is that food?
And to me, the event is that at the end of the event, I want to be there.
Well, two things.
During the initial comments we were referring to, one day or two, three,
Without getting into detail about that setup, you can see the reaction to the question.
Let's set the question.
And as you said, I may say to myself, do I be charmed to reach you in a way that is not right?
I think that, of course, will haunt you.
Later in this Q&A, it's an amazing one.
Again, as you said earlier, your comments are right.
After a long voice, I'm supposed to be doing myself.
the overall presentation played a line beyond that
He did not get any.
You were not asked a question.
Henry, you said that this was at hand on October 26th.
What would you say it is today?
You had one question on that, not one.
And I think that is because you stated competently what the situation was and what our mission is at the outset of that number shift.
You know, they said, I'll be back in a moment.
I said, absolutely not.
We are.
But there's one decision that I think that we ought to be happy with.
We have, I said 98% complete.
We need that to be completed.
Plus the interpretation.
And that's going to be done very quickly by the first day of the decision.
So I put it entirely on there.
I'm going to ask you a question.
I'm going to be waiting for it.
I'm waiting for it.
I'm going to ask you a question.
I'm going to talk about it.
Let us know if you want to.
What is the situation?
.
.
.
.
... ... ... ... ...
All we have to say is we're going to have to go to action.
The system is going to have to go to action.
We're going to have to go to action.
We're going to have to go to action.
Thank you.
Yeah, I think so.
These are actions consistent with the policy that we have laid down.
And they will continue until we get a settlement.
As you said, these actions will continue until we get a settlement.
These are actions consistent with the policy that was laid down in May until we get a settlement.
Consistent with that statement.
These actions will continue.
I did it.
I did it.
I did it.
Negotiations.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
No, I would not make any explanations.
It's very important.
I would tell them to yell at me.
So that nobody, and that means nobody gets to it.
So if they have something, something to say, don't answer it.
And you don't answer it.
Move on to the next one.
And now they're there.
They've called them.
They're going to ask you.
No, no.
They're just not here.
They've called us.
They're here.
There's nothing there.
What can you say?
I'm sure.
I'm sure.
They've called them.
They're going to pile up.
Uh, they'll come in and say, well, I want to follow through with your line.
I have something I really want to follow through with.
All right, I think it would be helpful if you could hear what this guy is saying.
I'm sorry to interrupt.
Sorry to interrupt.
All right.
I'm doing a bit of a dissonant job now.
I'm just going to fly in.
Okay, sir.
I don't understand.
Come on out here.
The two of us have told them we have national permission.
One of them is looking for Tuesday news.
Tuesday news.
And he's going to have to be told.
What about my letter?
Yes, sir.
We've got a letter for you.
We've got a letter for you.
Why is it that I screwed it up?
I want to see the letter, too.
I've got it.
I've got it.
I've got it.
I've got it.
And, uh, I want to see it.
Sure.
The whole purpose of the bank account was to visit, and I know it's almost incredible to listen to you for the first time, but perhaps you're not going to stay here next year.
What, what do you think that is?
I don't know.
He got us a bullet there.
He got us a bullet there.
He would have gone over there and hit him.
He was an advocate.
I can go now.
If this Jew is going to try to play with people like Hagtag, which they probably don't want to, it makes it appear that she was wrong on their own.
It's not going to happen.
God damn it, we've got to leave something to it.
Al, do you agree or not?
We're never going to doubt about it.
I have no doubt about it.
In this room, we all know the past is true.
That's the opinion.
That's right.
Because what's truly done, not just at the end of October, but the week of November 20th,
I am convinced that it was Saigon radio that killed them.
I have no idea of others.
That every confession they made to us would be celebrated as a victory in Saigon and would lead to another death.
True.
Now...
I'm not surprised.
I didn't expect it.
Well, that's how it could be.
I can't go any longer.
I did.
But, you know, not one time.
I have prepared answers to questions.
You can kill me, but I didn't let you.
Lava is at hand.
All of these things I really thought they'd come after us.
And the picture was just this.
In effect, I took you off the hot seat.
This is what the vice president had done.
I didn't do the greatest favor by attacking him slightly.
I'm saying it was the right thing.
I said if I was his president,
to the judge.
And the reason is, in fact, it's not Saigon, but it's the president of Massachusetts.
And it's all more than that.
It's more than that.
They have the propaganda.
They have the propaganda.
They have the propaganda.
They have the propaganda.
They have the propaganda.
They have the propaganda.
Well, they all want to end it.
They do.
That's right.
Now, quickly, the second thing they did in the last one.
On Monday, on Monday, they did that.
Well, talking about Monday Tuesday Monday, it seems to me that we have to look at two options.
Oh, is that true?
One is the one that you were assuming that we were trying to do.
I just wanted to point out to you I know second point second action is to go do everything at this point third is to do part of this point then more as we go along
Now, uh, now I understand.
As far as American public opinion is concerned, it makes no difference.
We can do nothing.
We can put 120 or we can put 5.
American public opinion is kind of our idea, but we'll handle that.
The problem, the question is, and we've got to judge, is the effect on our own.
And the further the effect on our own is, uh, whether...
going all out, who's going to have the effect of their then coming back and saying, we break off.
Or where they're going hard out, they still get the message they don't break off.
The option of doing nothing to me, absolutely rejected.
Because I do think they are doing this a lot.
Now, let's start from the last proposition, and then come to the second and the third.
You think at all that David did and so on, right?
No.
And you think so.
Absolutely.
So therefore, the point is, we've got to do something.
We've got to agree on that.
Good.
And you found that you're a prophet, sir.
You're a prophet, sir.
You're a prophet, sir.
You've got to do something.
Good.
Laird told me she'd do something.
Holmes told me she'd do something.
Yes.
Laird, Laird, Laird, in fact, thinks we should sign any of these.
At all.
I think I've heard it in his head.
That we can't get it if we don't know.
After that, he says, in his statement, I told him I'm not driving.
Beyond that, though, Laird will be all right once the trip is over.
What you can consider is to stop after three or four days and let it go at that.
That is something worth considering.
It's not worth, you don't get anything for it if there's 30 people, if there's not another 100.
So that you can .
All right, there's something to be said for us, but frankly, I would just love it if he's not suspicious.
My experience with Kobe and he's not as big.
If you kick them in the groin, knock them down, stomp on their face, it becomes reasonable.
Then when you feel sorry for them and say one thing, it's better to go to him.
So I basically think maybe we can stop.
Would you like to stop first?
But I ignore it as a day after.
I don't, I mean to stop it as a person's day after.
They may break the law.
That's, that's what they are supposed to do.
I don't see how they can do that.
They didn't mean to break off the talk, but they are hoping to get you to treat you, to run you up against being obfuscated.
And then they forget you're going to take just before, get, go back to the old appropriate treatment, and they'll throw all of the amount that you want to take, you're going to take it back up.
That's what.
I think they want to repeat it.
I think they want to repeat it.
I think they want to repeat it.
I think they want to repeat it.
I think they want to repeat it.
I think they want to repeat it.
I think they want to repeat it.
I think they want to repeat it.
I think they want to repeat it.
I think they want to repeat it.
I think they want to repeat it.
My feeling is, he's gone for three days.
Well, I can afford it.
I'm basically in favor of continuing it.
But at least continuing it until Christmas, and then we can look at it and maybe not do too much of it.
But I get the sense of all of them now.
Yes.
Yes, they're shaking with their teeth now that they've had their members.
Basically, I don't let them up for air now until they have to finish it on T3.
Yes.
I keep it up because the point one is I think we're going to find whether an operation is going to be or not going to be.
Not to give us the opportunity to do what's likely to be the best.
I think we're going to have to make that decision as we go along and see what coverage we're going to require because we're going to be really doing a job that's certainly going to be alright.
They are on the verge of crashing, living with that guy for five or ten years.
I haven't even thought about it before.
No.
I never thought about it before.
One thing I can't get rid of is food.
It's not just a question of their saying they want to be served, they want to sell.
They're way beyond that.
They don't have to be successful.
We know what they have to be successful.
What's the chance?
You're going to have to do it.
You're going to have to do it.
You're going to have to do it.
You're going to have to do it.
You're going to have to do it.
You're going to have to do it.
You see, what you can do, you don't have to go 100 a night.
What you can do is give them a hell of a walk for three or three days and then let them proceed to basically just, they're going to crack something every goddamn night.
I'm right.
They're getting something every night.
No one's got something.
I mean, we may come back with another hundred.
That's sort of the case, too, that I have.
All right.
Well, we should keep up on this.
I think I've got copies.
All right.
Yeah.
We've got to do it.
Yeah.
All right.
Yeah.
We've got to do it.
We've got to do it.
We've got to do it.
There are going to be considerations about what nutrition is over here, and that's a good idea, and that's a good idea, and that's a good idea, and that's a good idea, and that's a good idea, and that's a good idea, and that's a good idea, and that's a good idea, and that's a good idea.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't think they expect me to do that.
And we still don't know what that is.
Well, the reaction here will be, I forget the whole thing.
It's an argument.
I don't think it's a question to write that.
I don't think it's a question to write that.
I think all of us are concerned.
much bigger than the bomb table that the DSA stories of the media types and so forth and so on.
But we have a person that's just another goddamn bomb.
And it's up there bombing our lives.
What I really get down to is that we have reasonable, heavy bombing of an army.
But I don't want to be idle people and all to say that heavy was ready for the war and all that kind of stuff.
Our people, at least when I say that, I quote the rest of my writings.
Our people, I don't want to say it.
They don't want to say it.
They don't want to say it.
What we're going to have is a time when we find that Wednesday or Thursday, and then we're going to start to build up.
And then we'll build up.
And then we're going to build up.
And then we're going to build up.
How would you react to that?
I wouldn't say it.
I wouldn't say it.
I wouldn't say it.
I think you should say, you might say, a long conversation.
Very cool.
There's nothing about the bomb that I haven't really been able to do.
That's what I'm saying.
Depends if it's what they agreed to or they're giving, right?
But they had a history of pressure.
But, uh...
But that includes the D.F.D.
I'm changing the road articles.
I don't have a lot of money.
That's good.
That's all.
Well... What does it say with me?
I don't know.
It says, uh...
All signals are going.
All systems are going.
I'm going to look back.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Now, we're going to go on to a much bigger group.
What I think, Al, you've got to get across to you is that this is it for you.
That's why I want to read that letter myself.
There isn't going to be any screwing around.
I just feel that we're not going to let him go again.
And to that, I think that's my problem.
I don't think there's a risk.
When I talked to him, when the project was done, he was 100% informed.
He had no second thoughts.
He had to be.
I got the impression this morning that you felt that we ought to be more conciliatory than you.
But for Christ's sake, haven't you been conciliatory?
Well, in fact, we may have been.
You read my letter for conciliatory.
We may have been a little personal, but we should not have breathed in God as a passage that we might have done.
Absolutely.
Because that way...
We should have just negotiated something and brought it to him.
Okay.
Because all the grieving did was to give this radio a chance to kill us.
And we never got any feedback from him.
We never got any gratitude from him.
How do you know it, sir?
It's been a long war.
It's what it has been about.
And this we have to realize is about the match.
There isn't much left to do unless you're going to do it.
What else is there to do?
They talk to the Russians.
We have.
Talk to the Chinese.
We have.
Talk to the Japanese.
We have.
Bombs.
We have.
Mine.
We have.
Stop the defense.
We have.
Vietnam.
We have.
What's the name of that?
We've got to get out of here.
Huh?
After a second, we'll do that.
How did you go on?
What did you propose?
Now wait, let's talk about that.
I've been wondering.
Maybe we should.
Maybe we should just continue.
Why don't we go back to that position?
See, we can keep doing it.
second, he would say, well, the McGovernites, the Dove Senators were right all the time.
Now the administration is finding that all class has come to the position of the Mansfield Amendment, of withdrawal of prisoners.
That's why I was over to the Capitol.
I know.
I'm just wondering if it's true.
I think that the withdrawal statement, I'm inclined to think that if you can take it, maybe rather than doing that,
You may have the wish to continue to live with the living.
So, what do you think that all those goals are going to be of that occasion?
In the case of the other conference, I have made a separate case.
The first day of the conference, I think it was great.
The first day of the conference, I think it was great.
The first day of the conference, I think it was great.
The first day of the conference,
It's basically a separate piece, and that's what you're talking about.
Yeah, but on the other hand, it would be a rough deal to go down, because if they start to decide to, you know... Because they're off the withdrawal of the president, but, you know, in any... Oh, yeah.
Because, in fact, as long as they can't vote, yeah, I'm not so sure about it, but they get this in, uh...
The advantage of this settlement is that it gives us the right to stay here.
I'm afraid these sons of bitches are getting all their power.
All our freedom.
I'm afraid all this stuff we've told them, thousands of years, first was not congressional justice.
Secondly, what this agreement really does is keep us in.
And give us a chance to wax it.
In the event that we're broken, all of this got back to our hearts.
That's what I heard.
Don't you think?
And that's where it is.
And I don't think it came from you.
I think it came from these bastards, or the bastards in Penn.
And how did they lock you up?
Because, you know, it's hard to lead to the other side of you in the presidential palace.
And those guys in Paris got us.
And that was probably a mistake.
We should find a reason.
And then we would have done absolutely good.
That's great.
You see, the withdrawal of prisoners thing, the major argument you made for it, if you want to look at it, is that if they're not going to get together, the withdrawal of prisoners at least gives us a much stronger domestic position among which to stand.
That's what it does.
That's why you agree with it.
And because the...
It's probably the South people who prefer to select methods for that.
And so, by then, it's actually like the South people who found God in order to live in Cambodia.
That's large.
So, you know, I would define it like that, rather.
Either case, it might be better for our willingness.
My worry is, the reason I was so much in favor of the decision, of course, was that we could have settled this thing as a set package by ourselves.
It would have given us so much credit as a country that we could have done almost anything.
That must, to me, be overriding because there's all this bullshit about this law, the TMZ,
All of that was unimportant, unimportant, unimportant.
And this is what Jews grew us out of, and grew themselves out of at the end of October.
He had had to listen to how the Jews were approaching.
Uh, we offered, which God knows we offered, but it would have been a total surprise, and we could have met this guy and worked with him.
Uh, now, uh, now we've lost that, uh,
and I don't think they have to afford it.
I'm looking at their perception.
I think they are certain.
I think the nature, if I had employed back then, it would have used the driver's license, it would have used the vehicle, it would have used the vehicle, and given us just enough
We had three booths there and that is what really happened.
This may not do it, but the other group, which sort of made you look into this?
I'm supposed to say we've talked now for four years, and you've now made 16 trips, and I know 17 each, I think.
All right, we'll save time.
We'll give you that day.
After 50, now that quite is, we've done that, that's, and we've gone into the price.
Now this has got to stop.
That's really what this is all about.
That's what May is about, too.
And it draws very close to May.
And it helps you with another thing, exactly.
Now what this does with Russian and Chinese, you know, I've had to, I've had to, I've heard of, I've had to message to the Chinese yesterday,
Just saying, I understand you can lie too.
And if you want a briefing, I'll be glad to give it to you.
So I got a message back.
They wanted to see me, to meet you today.
And your friend?
He has no knowledge.
I told the briefings, but I gave them the transcript of the last day's story.
That was the most positive of them all.
Right.
And I said to the president this morning, I said, what do you think this president is going to do?
He said, he can't be trapped.
He said, no, my only question is what he's doing before Christmas.
I think he's going to have to do it.
That's what I said.
I was a horrible thinker.
I'm going to be in a position where I'm going to be here for a while, and when the election is over, I'll be getting a report to the Congress.
There was another group in the cell room.
A lot of different cells.
They were very attached to each other.
And so I was here.
And they're out there.
We're on the way, boys.
Good luck.
But I was really amazed by the reaction.
I mean, they were really respectful.