Conversation 419-019

TapeTape 419StartWednesday, March 14, 1973 at 9:25 AMEndWednesday, March 14, 1973 at 9:50 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Ziegler, Ronald L.Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On March 14, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 9:25 am to 9:50 am. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 419-019 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 419-19

Date: March 14, 1973
Time: 9:25 am - 9:50 am
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

       H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman

       Press relations
             -Announcement
                    -Arrival
                    -Ronald L. Ziegler
                    -Kissinger’s proofing

       Vietnam
            -Cease-fire violations
                 -President's statement
                        -Compliance with cease-fire provisions
                               -Enforcement options
                              -21-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                          (rev. Sept-2010)
                                                Conversation No. 419-19 (cont’d)

-South Vietnam
     -Cease-fire
     -US accomplishments
           -Strength of forces
           -Non-Communist government
-North Vietnam
     -Cease-fire violations
           -Re-armament with artillery
           -US action
                 -Timing
     -Cease-fire agreement
           -Reasons
                 -US bombing, mining halt
     -Cease-fire violations
           -Reasons
                 -Effects of US bombing
                 -US resolve
                 -Renewed offensive

-North Vietnam’s offensive
     -Impact on US
           -Criticism of President’s policies
                  -Peace movement
                  -“Peace with honor”
                  -Prisoners of war [POWs] repatriation
           -Domestic policy
           -Foreign policy
                  -Public opinion
           -POWs
                  -Support for President’s policies
     -US retaliation
           -Public opinion
           -Violations
           -Aid to North Vietnam
                  -Cancellation
                  -Publicity campaign
           -Impact on offensive
                  -Timing
                                     -22-

            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                (rev. Sept-2010)
                                                       Conversation No. 419-19 (cont’d)

          -Viability of South Vietnam
                 -Need for US engagement
          -President’s political position
                 -Peace settlement
                        -Negotiations
                        -December 1972 bombing
                 -Criticism
                        -Eugene J. McCarthy
                 -Peace settlement
                        -POWs
                        -US withdrawal
                        -Criticism
                 -Violations
                        -Joseph W. Alsop’s column
     -Cease-fire violations
          -Press statement
                 -Tone
                 -Bellicosity
          -US messages to North Vietnam
                 -Escalation of threat
          -Press statement
                 -US concern
                        -Condonement
                 -North Vietnam’s compliance
          -US messages to People’s Republic of China [PRC], Union of Soviet
          Socialist Republics [USSR]
          -US bombing

Aid to Pakistan
      -Release
            -Publicity
                   -President’s statement
                   -State Department
      -Reactions
            -Indira Gandhi
                   -Kissinger’s cable to Daniel P. (“Pat”) Moynihan
            -India
                   -Purchase of materials
                                     -23-

            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                (rev. Sept-2010)
                                                       Conversation No. 419-19 (cont’d)

Vietnam
     -Impact of war on US
           -Kissinger’s negotiations
           -Bombing
           -Withdrawal
                  -Compared to France’s withdrawal from Algeria
                        -Gen. Charles A. J. M. deGaulle
                        -Nationalization of France’s holdings
                               -Compared to South Vietnam
                        -France’s citizens
     -Impact of war on South Vietnam
           -Vietnamization
           -Self-determination
           -Self-defense
     -President’s policies
           -Effectiveness
           -Choices
                  -Kissinger’s cable from Paris
                        -December 1972
                        -POWs for withdrawal
                        -South Vietnam’s viability
     -Public attitude
           -“Peace with honor”
           -Concern for cease-fire violations
           -Response to fall of South Vietnam
     -US actions
     -Defense Department
           -Air strikes in Cambodia
                  -Plantations
                        -Chup Plantation
                  -President’s call to Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                        -Report
                  -Air strikes in Cambodia
                        -Chup Plantation
                               -Kissinger’s message from President
                               -Civilians
                                     -Problem
                              -24-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                         (rev. Sept-2010)
                                               Conversation No. 419-19 (cont’d)

     -Cambodia
           -1971 Chup Plantation operation
                  -Defense
                  -Installations
     -Air strikes in Cambodia
           -Decision
                  -Defense Department
           -Lon Nol
                  -Request
                  -US ambassador’s role
-Ho Chi Minh Trail
     -US air strikes
           -Impact on North Vietnam
                  -POW repatriation
                        -Kissinger’s opinion
                        -Notification
                        -Delay
US message to North Vietnam
     -Cease-fire violations
     -North Vietnam’s military operation
           -Consequences
           -US resolve
-POWs
     -Experience in prison
           -Solitary confinement, torture
                  -Capt. Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr.
                  -Col. Robinson Risner
           -Non-verbal communication
           -Change in conditions in 1969
                  -Major [first name unknown] Bai
                  -Relocation
                  -Group housing
                  -1968 US election [?]
                  -Denton and Risner
                  -Fear of President
     -Charges of misconduct
           -Volunteering information
           -Political impact
                                            -25-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. Sept-2010)
                                                              Conversation No. 419-19 (cont’d)

                   -Support for Vietnam aid
                        -Effect of atrocity stories
                        -Justification
                        -Denton and Risner
                               -PRC, USSR
                               -Compliance with cease-fire agreement
                               -North Vietnam

Ronald L. Ziegler entered at an unknown time after 9:25 am.

       President's schedule

Ziegler left at an unknown time before 9:50 am.

       Vietnam
            -Aid to North Vietnam
                  -North Vietnam presence in Laos, Cambodia
                  -Infiltration
            -POWs
                  -Denton and Risner’s meeting with President
                         -Raid on Son Tay prison in North Vietnam
                                -“Operation Draft”
                         -Reaction to December 1972 bombing
                                -B-52s compared to jet fighters
                                      -Fear among North Vietnamese
                                -December 21, 1972 bombing resumption
                                      -North Vietnamese prison guards
                                      -Support for President’s policies
                                            -Skill of US pilots
                         -Shock
                  -Visit from high-level North Vietnamese official
                                -Denton and Risner [?]
                                -Treatment
                                      -Good relations with US
                                -Kissinger’s trip to Hanoi
                                -President’s possible trip to Hanoi
            -Bombing
                  -Effect of B-52 use
                                           -26-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. Sept-2010)
                                                            Conversation No. 419-19 (cont’d)

                             -Shock
             -Caution
                   -Normalization of relations
                        -Infiltration
                        -North Vietnam’s desire and necessity
                        -Risk of protracted war
             -“Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam”
                   -Value
                   -Adherence
                   -Commitment of North Vietnam
                        -Spring military offensive
                        -Effect on publicity
                        -Impact on US-USSR summit
                               -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                               -President’s political position
                               -Warning regarding offensive
                                      -Jeopardy
                   -Opportunity regarding critics
                        -President’s press conference [?]
                               -Hanoi statements
                        -Barry M. Goldwater, Sr.

       Kissinger’s schedule
             -David K. E. Bruce
             -Meeting with Dobrynin
             -Meeting with President
                   -Foreign policy
             -Conversation with William P. Rogers
                   -Bruce

Kissinger left at 9:50 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Have they sent over to you?
They're not going to book those rooms.
Well, that company is coming over.
I don't think they're going to do that.
It's done.
I don't know if they're going to do that.
What?
I don't think they're going to do that.
Good, good, good.
Let me go over a couple of things.
First with regard to ceasefire violations.
Well, if you can't do this, there's a line.
Oh, you might need to read the first one.
Yeah, I just don't know if you get what I mean.
We've got some of that collection.
Whether we get out of it, they take us on the heat fire.
We expect to be provided with all that.
But while we talk about the vaccine, it's going to work.
On the other hand, once we talk about the vaccine, it's going to work.
And then it can't work.
So therefore, we just have to get out of the way.
In other words, it is a mistake, I think it is always a mistake that we expect the ceasefire to work, we expect compliance, we're not going to respect what we're going to do about it.
That's what we're going to do about it.
We're not going to respect what we're going to do about it.
People say it is good, but it isn't good.
We're going to go out there, we're going to take the knife, we're not going to take the petition, we're not going to take the petition, we're not going to take the petition.
Well, as a matter of fact, we call it a difficult discussion, but let's face it, that's what I'm saying.
Even if the ceasefire was not for some people, now, we still have to do it.
That's the key, Mike, that they're all together looking at the South.
The South is strong enough to defend itself.
The South does not have a communist government, and that's a hell of an achievement, correct?
That's true, but I must say, I mean, we've now got information that they've got more artillery than they did last year, but there's no sense in this.
In May.
To do it in May, that would be, of course.
What do you think that all means?
Why doesn't they agree?
They just want to tell us how to get the people to do stuff.
Get them buying stuff.
I know what, what does that mean to us?
Well, there's three kinds of things, just like I told you about yesterday, what they're doing.
One is that, uh,
They're just making up public figures in November and December and calling us to invest.
The second is that they're testing us to see how much they can get away with if they've already made the decision to make an investment.
I do not think they've yet made the third.
I think, and I've been looking at it the whole time, if they start an investment this year and roll the whole thing up, there's a deep movement there, and I'm cheering for them.
and so on and so forth.
If we can't, if we can't get a period, get a pause, so that when the time is right, we can say, well, we've got a reason we can't every time, every time.
In fact, I ask domestically, and when I say domestically, it's really, what is at stake with you is the liabilities of an active American foreign colleague.
Sure, because people, animals, let's face it, our people got this, and it's not that, it's really, they've lost it, it's not that, but it's that.
You know, they, you know, there are some Russian people who want that.
Oh, I'm telling you, it's the deal that you're saying.
We would rather have brought it with us for a few more years to walk out on our knees, thank you, and the best information possible for walking out with our heads tied, and yeah, many have been around.
The fight is, the fight is pretty distant, but I'm going to come to you with this.
First, what we say about it now, and second, what we do about it.
I guess we're faced with the fact that we can't just sit back and let it go.
I mean, I don't know how they're going to do it without us, of course, before they're doing it.
I just don't know.
Unless we suddenly go all out across Detroit and follow up on it, why do they have to do that?
Huh?
Why do they have to do that?
I mean, I think if we just got to put that line up,
then we ought to get into a decision for which we can cancel even after they're in and build a public back glass against the noise.
They won't start their offensive right away.
And my worry is if we don't scare them off within the next month, then they're going to make the decision how to attack in the fall.
If the whole thing doesn't work, if it lasts two years, Mr. President, then I think I wouldn't recommend that we put all the Germany's in the cage.
We've all talked about the fact that we achieved the peace, we negotiated the peace, we bombed at our side.
Even the December bombings, it becomes very much a question.
What the hell do we do that for?
And personally, what they all were looking for is that
The idea of what I hired you to do is that I'm very fond of creditors.
We're going through phases of the fighting, but they all look like this.
We could never have a deal with these people without creditors.
You know that?
You know that stuff?
That's it.
That's the concept of the day.
That's what he said.
What?
What?
What?
What?
But we don't want to get on the sort of calling out kind of thing that, you know, we have been, we've been, and you've been trained, and I have too, you know, I have said that this, this fire is always very dangerous and difficult to be expected by other people, 100% of the time we expect to be injured, can we just say that?
But I think that,
You don't want to have anything that's going on at this point in a press conference room.
I think that's right.
I would say, I would say, that many of your predictions were just with me.
I think there was some understanding to the question, I don't think so.
But I don't know, I don't know.
That's just the way it is.
Even if we take a little step back now, if we're not going to...
If you say something that seeks to condone it... Oh, I condone it.
This will be sent several messages to them, you know, and then I ask a message to them.
Why don't they just say it's hard to behave?
They're very much aware of our concern.
I'm not going to hit you, but that's what we do.
I'll be there.
Bye.
That would be expected.
That would be expected.
That would be expected.
And I'll be representing countries with these messages to the Chinese and countries to the, uh... And that's, that's the reason I blew up the walls, you know, we got bombed.
Yeah.
So you think that's fine?
That would help, yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
The point that, uh, a couple of points, uh, oh, one is, uh...
The fact is they will let me out by the time I go on.
It is how it is.
It is how it is.
They know and make it up.
Make it up.
So far the reaction has been too bad.
We've been looking at it.
We just can't just put it in a trailer.
We can't just be speaking in a voice tweet.
So I sent a tape with a point at it.
We went into the Indian and talked to them, and they said, what are you talking about?
We thankfully cannot just not use it.
We can say, well, I'll be virtual.
It's a different thing for us.
It's a different thing for us.
I think we just give it to them.
Especially if they're obese and they can say anything they want about it.
It's really, I mean, they are such a good young people.
The things we've done in Vietnam, and all the agony we've gone through, and here in the ocean, and we've gone through, and bombing, and so forth and so on, are we relevant to sitting here in this situation, aren't we?
Or have we got to start from the start again?
Maybe we should just do bombing.
No doubt that if we had to take this on, it's the police on that, it's the race that we would go on.
We would have gone to work there.
We couldn't have gone to sleep on it.
No way.
No way.
At that space, if you fail to take a crazy road, that's the right thing to do.
But getting out of that fear got me conditioned to take a crazy road.
That's right.
And he got that much worse feeling in that fear that we've been in all our lives.
In other words, the French.
The treatment of the French.
So that's the thing, you better read all the people all the time.
And they say, well, but what is the secret and so forth?
Well, look, we've got the South Vietnam, we've got the Vietnamization, we've got all the derangements we've made.
Now he has the way to determine his future.
He also has the power to defend that right.
We didn't get 100, Mr. President.
You remember I said you were capable of paying the deceptive state.
You go.
You have two ways to go.
One is prisoners for POWs.
The other one, a prisoner who withdraws.
The other one is this way.
This way will require constant brutal intervention.
And you said yes.
You always understood that.
Yes.
And that's what we are.
We are a slush.
It was your choice today, Josh, and I think we did it, Kelly.
This is really difficult.
All right.
Now, that's the case that we've got to start making.
We have talked about peace and honor and so forth, and we need to have our people think about it and remember that it's good.
Most of these people don't have all that concerned about the ceasefire violation, but they're sure they don't get shipped.
They will if the summit came.
But I did not see, strangely enough.
I just wanted to do this out of heat.
I think it would be quite a shot, a gross signal out of town.
Yeah.
Well, now, we all know, I want to be sure, just to be sure about that shot.
Are you sure these assholes in the defense department are going what they were told and can't believe it?
Oh, they can't believe it?
And they're hitting good targets and everything.
They're hitting a tough plantation.
Do I need to call more and ask for a report?
I'll hit it if it's tough plantation.
I'm very disappointed with the report I've received, and I can't believe it.
I want them to get the judge's plantation out.
What civilians aren't they looking for?
Do you know?
Do you consider this to be having a problem?
I think that the last time we met they said,
They defended the Chubb plantation like mankind.
That is what I assume.
That they got their installation done.
Well, we can get the, that, we can get Lone Rose to ask us to do it.
Alright.
Get Blonde Rose to ask you.
Alright.
Fine.
Get Blonde Rose to ask you.
Get that goddamn investor out of there.
He won't get it before you let him ask you.
Can't we send somebody out to see if I know him?
I don't know.
But I'm too late.
Just say it.
The thing that really takes them up is that we have to go through that.
All right, now on that note, I just wondered, we need to wait this long.
I wonder if we should get a line tomorrow.
Well, tomorrow we still have to do some business.
All right, I know.
Now wait a minute.
My point is, you're saying that the trail is not going to jeopardize the prisoners coming out.
There's still that many left.
It's going to jeopardize these rates.
It'll sure as hell jeopardize the ones we took out tonight.
Well, I think if they've got a fee to stay with us, I think they won't.
They'll pick them out if they figure something like that.
As soon as we go ahead with what's being announced, if they're not coming with their families, they'll go ahead with what's being noticed.
But aren't we leading enough?
I think we should go ahead.
All right.
And also, we should pick them with chances.
All right.
All right.
I hope that you don't say that.
I've just listed about 50 violations.
I said if they're planning military operations in the country, that would be very good.
And this is why when you say they don't have to take messages like this.
That kind of thing, that might be a good part.
That's great, but I'm not going to consider other actions.
Well, I was going to tell you that the conversation about these POWs was a Christian thing, but they relate to this, uh, first and foremost, you know, they kept, uh, thoughts like that, early thoughts like that, and so forth, and solitary, four-year, on a helicopter that was around there.
They never saw anybody, they never saw anybody die in four years.
Four years.
After 12 years of life.
They were brutalized terrorists.
... ... ... ...
After going through all that in 1969,
They said there was a major bomb.
I told him to go.
I told him to go.
I told him to go.
I told him to go.
One of the self-criticists asked, I have a portion of the debt that I would pay for 2,000 cases.
We did the same thing.
We did the same thing.
Those of us who are in prison, I have violated that rule.
And so far, I've said my name to them, and I should.
I didn't take this out.
And I never saw them again for that.
For that time, I'll say that's true.
That's true.
They went in and after they got together, they polled Denton and Reiner and their penitentiary, so each of them had all the serious information that that was the cause of the election.
that they felt that, uh, that they were, he said that they, uh, had, uh, a feeling that they had to do, they all thought, thought, thought, thought.
And, uh, they said that they would tell that there was an enormous fear of Mexico.
An enormous respect for the fear of Mexico throughout the four years.
And so on.
They, uh, they went on to, uh,
There are at least two or three against them.
They believe that that will make charges high-crime and under-lawful.
Then, well, as long as they do the great extermination, I don't think that needs to have happened 37 years ago.
And we'll follow and carry the information without pressure.
I think, Mr. Besson, my biggest issue with the charges, because first of all, they're going to make us a discredit if we do these things.
We make them all give up.
I see.
All right, they may, but my point is I don't like it.
The other point is that I've asked them about the need to be a cop.
And recently, they said, you're saying that's the second rule.
You're saying that's the second rule.
You're calling it the second rule.
You're asking people to do what I've been asking you to do.
It's a goddamn call.
I don't know what I'm going to do.
I'm not going to do it.
I'm not going to do it.
It's always too long in the face.
And it'll be worse when the economy starts to get out.
The economy starts to get out of hand.
I said, well, tell us what you want.
And at first, they realized, I said, look, who do you want to have a thing for?
Who do you want to work with?
I said, if they don't comply with these things, it's very common that they're going.
And I said, that's what we can call them.
I said, no, we can't do that.
And at first, they went out and said, how so?
They said, it's a immigration commission.
That's the way it is.
It's an immigration commission.
We take what we want.
We like the argument.
We like being with these people.
But anyway, we're about to get some allies from those guys.
We're in that position to see.
I'll be right over there.
If this track keeps up, they don't get out of the way.
They've got to get out of the way.
I'm sure.
I don't know if they have to get out of the way.
I don't know if they have to.
But they cannot continue, they cannot continue ascending on the crater.
But that will be ambiguous because they won't be infiltrating.
Let us see what happens, what happens.
Uh, the point is that, that's very important.
It doesn't matter what happens.
Uh huh.
He was the site they made the bulletin book on, on old Pettersson's head.
And so they had been in Kansas on Thursday, and it was cold out there, and they had not been.
But they said after Santa, they had to get a group for that as an operation to draft.
And basically after Santa, they all wanted to meet the colonel and so forth.
And they said that after that, they were all in New York and Ohio.
And so there would not be another operation to draft, as they called it.
So they were all about it.
They thought it had a good effect.
They said, well, the fighter's name are Residues of Sema.
They have to die, and all that other stuff.
Their guards would get out and laugh, and they were very paranoid, sort of making them talk about shadows and so forth, on words of law.
They said that these people, these people, despite the fact that the war has been so long, are basically a herd of cremated people, and they're very super strict.
And I said, what do you think they do?
He said, the main fighters.
that it, it, it, it, it, it, it, it, it
When we resumed it on the 26th, they said, on that time, they said, we've lost about 10,000 members of the class.
They're all fell in.
Three percussions came in.
These guys, we had guards came in.
They said, what do you see here?
They said, look, our pilots don't know where we are.
They don't know where we are.
But they said to me,
They were shocked.
And I said, well, that's quite a great mistake.
I've done that before.
And of course, I'm not sure that we've done it today.
Nevertheless, we could have done it.
We could have done it.
But I don't know if we could have done it.
Just threw it around.
But anyway, then comes the part where I'm sure you were in order.
They had something that would be condensed in my own wilderness.
But that's a very higher idea.
Thank you.
Thank you.
and they said, uh, they said, they said, they said, they said, they said, they said,
Now they might not understand this, but it's just a matter of fact that we have reason to believe that the presentation orders and the knowledge that we make can be compared to our knowledge and the way that we do things.
So they want that out there too.
Now, the whole, and the two things that come out of this, one,
I just don't know
Why are you lying to me?
I think they buy into that.
I think, I think they are told.
They would like to prove to you, right?
Yeah.
They can't drop the risk of this thing starting all over again.
You see, I also want to say this through good grief, and I say this because I'm very angry.
You can't take it.
It was a good agreement.
They're very much pissed about it.
It was possible under these circumstances.
But then, at the end, there's nothing wrong with the agreement.
It'll only be the intention of you to keep it.
That it is just a record of it.
Well, I don't want to be too bearish here.
I think there's a tendency for us to cry with the law.
I don't do it with the law.
I don't want to be bearish.
I've never been through this law before.
i don't think you know i have yet committed myself that's the point if they have then maybe you know we've got to take a hard look at how we're handling this we are we don't want to go around i don't think they've committed themselves yet i think there's a pretty strong strategy i think you've got to tell the brain
and it would make it very difficult for me to arrange the kind of reception I want.
Right now, I'm going to see if I can get a full amount.
Well, you know, the nations who are in Africa, they need to improve reception, but I'm there.
I'm just saying, if there's an intensive bond, I just want you to know, so you and your stuff, the President wants you to get a warrant on it.
You can't have any hands, you can't have everybody want to see it, but if there's a major defensive line, supply, if I show you the match, if I'm disturbing you, you've got to realize it.
The substance of our talk, but also I don't expect you to make sure that's the sound.
I would not.
I would not make anything.
That isn't the problem.
But I also think that you shouldn't be bearish about what is needed now.
It's the final shot across the barrel.
And in a way, it distracts us.
We want to know what those bullets are.
So if it is an agreement you should debate about, you should simply, these three lines you have about Hanoi, they'll be understood in Hanoi.
There'll be a few people next to me here, but I am very serious about taking you on now, these foreign politicians.
They're not going to take you on.
Henry, I'll check with you.
What is the situation lately?
I'll be available if I have.
I'm on 5, 4, 1, 4, 5, maybe we'll say 5 o'clock, I may want to talk to you later on.
Second point, you will inform Rogers and Bruce today.
Yes, sir.