Conversation 422-022

TapeTape 422StartThursday, March 22, 1973 at 10:35 AMEndThursday, March 22, 1973 at 10:56 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Scowcroft, Brent G. (Gen.);  [Unknown person(s)]Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On March 22, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft, and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 10:35 am and 10:56 am. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 422-022 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 422-22

Date: March 22, 1973
Time: Unknown between 10:35 am and 10:56 am
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft.

       Prisoners of war [POWs]
             -Patrick J. Buchanan's office
                   -David R. Gergen
             -Statements and messages
                   -Selection
                          -Patriotism
                          -Pride, gratitude
                          -Gergen

The President talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 10:35 am and 10:56
am.

[Conversation No. 422-22A]
                                               -14-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                        Tape Subject Log
                                         (rev. July-2010)
                                                            Conversation No. 422-22 (cont’d)



              -Party
                    -Announcement
                          -Ronald L. Ziegler
                          -Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon
                          -Dinner
                          -Arrangements
                    -Attendees
                          -Military leaders
                                -Secretary of State
                                -Secretary of Defense
                                -Chief of Staff

                    -Arrangements

[End of telephone conversation]

       Laos
              -US POWs
                   -US withdrawal date
                   -Informal agreement
                         -North Vietnam
                               -Complaints
                         -Publicity
                         -US public statements

       Vietnam
            -President's statement
                  -Release of POWs
                  -Withdrawal of US troops
                  -Timing
                  -US ambassador

       Laos
              -Pathet Lao
                    -Negotiators
                          -[Unintelligible place]
                          -Delay
                          -US strategy
                                             -15-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. July-2010)
                                                              Conversation No. 422-22 (cont’d)


             -Internal developments
                   -Possibilities
                   -POW return to US

       Vietnam
            -US military action
                   -Psychological effects
                   -May 8, 1972 decision [?]
                   -December 1972 bombing
                   -Justification
                          -Provocation
                   -North Vietnam’s reactions
                          -Henry A. Kissinger’s argument
                   -Possible effects
                          -Economic aid [?]
                          -Blockade
                                 -Harbor
            -North Vietnam’s future actions
                   -US reaction
                          -Attacks on Ho Chi Minh Trail
                                 -Effectiveness
                   -Bombing
                   -Troop withdrawal
            -Settlement agreement
                   -Violations
                          -Infiltration
                          -Offensive by North Vietnam
                   -Durability
                          -Peace with honor
                          -Dangers
            -Kissinger's recommendations
                   -Resumption of bombing
                          -Warning
                          -Future action
            -Message to Kissinger
                   -Scowcroft’s conversation with Kissinger

Scowcroft left at 10:56 am.
                                             -16-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                       (rev. July-2010)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I would like for you to get a hold of the .
I would like from the field of the letters, messages, their statements,
I mean, there...
We did what was right.
We're proud of what we did.
Thank you for bringing this back.
... ... ... ...
Okay.
So now, with regard to where we stand, I forgot to ask you, are we announcing the DOW party today?
Yeah.
Thank you.
I don't feel by myself that we ought to do that.
Okay.
So you'll follow through on that.
Well, with regard to our situation, is there anything new in terms of those nine POWs?
No, there isn't.
There is a little lorry currently inside .
That's right.
That's right.
But what's that worry ?
Well, they're complaining now.
That's right.
Well, I think you see the specific agreement on the release of the knowledge is basically more of our understanding.
I know it's not accurate.
That's all right.
Yes, it is.
It's a protocol.
It is.
Well, it's not a formal protocol, but it's a written understanding.
But I'm going through.
I'm sure this press conference said that we have assurances on this, and this was one of them.
preconditions for the whole thing.
But I think we can use that.
Are you sure you got it back?
No, they haven't.
They've not set a time.
That's right, that was an offer.
I'm arguing with you on that.
We said we would withdraw in charge of the agreement, and all U.S. prisoners in the U.S. have to go to court.
Right.
We'll stick to that.
That's right.
We'll have to go to court.
That's right.
As I say, we'll have to work some way so we don't disclose understanding as such.
But I'm sure you can cover that.
We haven't covered that yet, so they should have some sort of government decision.
They're getting it out right now, isn't that right?
Here's the problem.
What I would like to do is that I tell you that I want to make a statement that I think that is anti-valid.
I've heard all Americans who have gone and all prisoners who have gone.
I want to say something.
I would like to say that I applaud the people who got hit for your confidentiality.
I'm not going to put an end to that sort of development at all or anything.
I'm just hoping that everybody in the staff can see that I didn't take out what you should have done.
So that's what our goal is.
If we can't work it out, make sure we don't make mistakes.
We'll make it the next day.
But the statement cannot be made until all of you know what's going on.
And as far as the voting is concerned, we're going to make sure it's not that loud.
They're just, yes, as a matter of fact, they've had that loud for a few years and gone back to San Diego.
I think it's a moment.
It really was based on how internal loud developments of what we were saying.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
It's goddamn hard to find, at this time, the provocation or the pretext for this kind of an action.
That's the problem with this.
That's right, and I think it's just a matter of how important and how they would receive the message that you're prepared to use force to enforce the major prohibitions.
could work just the other way
And if they do not stop,
or to very, very, very substantially increase.
To make this critical, or to make this critical just a last, last little number before you get out.
To make this critical, you have to be quick the next time you start selling.
So that would be an extension to
I think that would be true if it hurt him that way.
But hit them on the trail, it doesn't hurt him that way.
It isn't.
Let's face it.
We take them to the ball, maybe, and we tender it after it's bad.
We don't want that now.
We don't want them cracking the trail.
I just wanted to slap the wrist.
Oh, there's no question about that.
That's the problem.
That's right.
The key to it is how would that register that thing?
Is it looping backwards?
They are, they are, but it's not a very acute question.
I would simply say that part of the reason why we were convinced that we were on the first line of duty, and that's a fair assessment.
That's a sensitive point.
That's a comprehensive point.
We were in violation of our jurisdiction.
Another question is justification.
.
.
.
.
.
.
that this thing lasted at least long enough so that we can demonstrate that peace is a fact, a truth, and not simply our way of getting it, not other ways of getting it.
I think that's the danger I see in this case.
As I said, Henry's feeling is very strong.
Hold on a minute.
He was very wrong for it last week.
He would have paid it off three times a day.
I'm not sure.
I'm not sure.
But he had to go.
Yes.
The first paragraph, which I'm sure is predictable, saying the opposite of the first paragraph.
The point is, well, how much does this have to do with that?
How much for one instance and second, how do we follow up?
That's a good question.
Do we need to re-follow up to say it's more of a regression curve?
Yes.
Correct.
Yes.
And I think we need to watch that very closely and see .
You got a message out to him, didn't you?
Yes, I certainly did.