Conversation 441-023

TapeTape 441StartTuesday, June 5, 1973 at 5:29 PMEndTuesday, June 5, 1973 at 7:14 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Buzhardt, J. Fred, Jr.;  [Unknown person(s)];  Sanchez, ManoloRecording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On June 5, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, J. Fred Buzhardt, Jr., unknown person(s), and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 5:29 pm to 7:14 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 441-023 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 441-23

Date: June 5, 1973
Time: 5:29 pm - 7:14 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with J. Fred Buzhardt, Jr.

     Watergate
          -Charles A. Wright’s paper on executive privilege
          -Hugh Scott
          -Buzhardt’s efforts
                -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                -Leonard Garment
          -President’s activities
                -John B. Connally’s view
                -Firing of H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman
          -Popular opinion
                -Connally’s view
          -President’s activities
          -Executive privilege
                -Wright’s paper
                -Aaron Burr case
                      -John Marshall
                      -James St. D. Clair expedition
                      -Thomas Jefferson
                             -Papers
                                   -Marshall’s ruling
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            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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                                                      Conversation No. 441-23 (cont’d)

           -President’s possible role
                  -National interest
     -John W. Dean, III
           -Files
                  -Relevancy to Watergate
     -Charles W. Colson
           -Conversation with Buzhardt and Colson’s attorney
                  -Executive privilege
           -Files
                  -National security
                        -Plumbers
     -Haldeman’s and Ehrlichman’s notes
           -Procedures
           -Possible subpoena
                  -Possible response
           -Supreme Court
           -Procedures
           -Contents
                  -Haldeman’s notes
                        -John J. Sirica

Smoking
    -Buzhardt
    -President

Melvin R. Laird
     -Cigars
     -Role on White House staff
           -Strength

Watergate
     -Executive privilege
          -Haldeman’s and Ehrlichman’s notes
          -Procedures
          -Wright’s paper
     -Blanket subpoenas
     -Subpoenas of May 25, 1973
          -Buzhardt
          -National Archives and Records Service
          -Earl J. Silbert
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       NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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                                                 Conversation No. 441-23 (cont’d)

-Subpoenas
     -Specificity
-Committee’s records
-Tapes from Haldeman and Ehrlichman
-Colson
     -Tapes
           -Howard K. Smith
     -Forthcoming interview with Smith
-Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Colson
     -Possible television appearance
     -John L. McClellan Committee testimony
           -Contradictions
     -Buzhardt’s conversations with Frank H. Strickler and John Wilson
     -Ehrlichman’s statements
           -Counsel’s work
           -Mexican money
                  -Conversations with President
                        -Meeting with Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters and L[ouis]
                          Patrick Gray, III
                        -John N. Mitchell, Haldeman
                  -Ehrlichman
     -Conflicting testimony
           -Reasons
-Richard A. Moore
     -Conversation with Buzhardt
     -Possible memorandum
     -March 19, 1973 meeting with President and Dean
     -March 14, 15-20, 1973 meetings with President and Dean
     -Meetings with Dean
     -Quality as witness
     -President’s conversations with Dean before March 21, 1973
           -Cover-up
-Dean
     -Role
           -Gray hearings
           -Haldeman and Ehrlichman’s activities
           -Ervin Committee
           -Executive privilege
           -Gray nomination
     -March 14, 15, 1973 meetings with President and Moore
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       NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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                                                  Conversation No. 441-23 (cont’d)

            -Patrick J. Buchanan’s preparation of questions and answers book for
              press conference
            -Executive privilege
                    -Supreme Court
            -Alger Hiss case
            -Executive privilege, Hiss case
            -White House, Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], Justice
              Department
      -March 19, 1973 meeting with President and Moore
      -March 20, 1973 meeting with President and Moore
            -White House response
            -FBI
            -Use by Lyndon B. Johnson
      -Meetings with President
            -White House staff involvement
                    -Gordon C. Strachan
-Haldeman, Ehrlichman
-Strachan
      -Testimony
      -Haldeman
-Lie detector tests
      -Jeb Stuart Magruder
            -Henry E. Petersen
                    -Results
-Samuel Dash
      -Possible subpoena of President’s logs by Ervin Committee concerning
       meetings with Dean
            -Garment
            -White House response
      -Motive
            -Dean
      -Possible subpoena of President’s logs
      -White House response
-Archibald Cox
      -Possible subpoena
            -White House response
            -Specificity
-Dean’s files
      -Custody
            -Secret Service
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       NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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                                               Conversation No. 441-23 (cont’d)

           -FBI
-Dean
      -Meetings with President
            -Petersen
            -Strachan
            -Break-in of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office
            -President’s response to information
      -Contacts with Petersen and Richard G. Kleindienst
-Ellsberg break-in
      -President’s knowledge
            -Ehrlichman
-Dean
      -Meeting April 16, 1973 with President
            -Resignation
                  -Haldeman and Ehrlichman
-President’s April 15, 1973 meeting with Kleindienst and Petersen
      -Resignations of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, Magruder’s testimony
      -President’s April 16, 1973 meeting with Dean
            -Resignation
-Dean
      -President’s conversation with Petersen, April 16, 1973
      -President’s conversation with Petersen, April 29, 1973
-Petersen
      -Possible blackmail by Dean
-Gray
      -FBI inquiry
            -Dean’s comments to President
-Dean
      -Conversations with President
            -Strachan
            -Mitchell, Ehrlichman, Haldeman
            -Haldeman and $320,000
            -Ehrlichman and Herbert W. Kalmbach
-Haldeman
      -Money
            -Order from Dean
-Ehrlichman
      -Order to Kalmbach concerning money for defendants
            -Angela Y. Davis
-Ehrlichman and Haldeman
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       NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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                                               Conversation No. 441-23 (cont’d)

      -Motives concerning funds for defendants
-Dean
      -Conversations with President
            -March 22, 1973 with Haldeman and Mitchell
                  -Mitchell’s position
                  -President’s desire for full disclosure
                        -Ehrlichman, Dean
            -President’s call from Florida
                  -Dean’s subsequent trip to Camp David
                  -James McCord
            -$1,000,000
                  -March 21, 1973 meeting
            -Call from Florida
                  -Ronald L. Ziegler
-Buzhardt
      -Role on intelligence evaluation committee
            -Robert F. Frohlke
-Dean
      -March 21, 1973 meeting with President
            -Funds for defendants
            -Clemency offer
      -March 22, 1973 meeting with President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman
      -Mitchell
      -March 21, 1973 meeting with President
            -Clemency offer
            -Subornation of perjury
            -Funds for defendants
            -Blackmail
                  -William O. Bittman
-President’s knowledge
      -White House staff procedures
-Dean
      -Conversations with President
            -Content
                  -Ervin Committee
            -March 21, 1973
                  -President’s response
                        -Investigations by Dean and Ehrlichman
      -Possible White House response to testimony
            -Testimony of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Moore
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       NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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                                                   Conversation No. 441-23 (cont’d)

            -President’s possible statement
                   -Connally’s view
-President’s possible testimony
      -Ervin Committee
      -Grand jury
      -Precedent
            -Andrew Johnson
      -Possible White House response
-White House response
      -Gerald L. Warren
      -Legal questions
-Dean
      -President’s call from Florida
            -Dean’s subsequent call to Ziegler
            -Dean’s possible pleading
-Petersen
      -Advice to President
      -E. Howard Hunt, Jr. break-in of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office
            -National security
      -Meeting with President and Kleindienst
            -Ellsberg information to William M. Byrne, Jr.
-President’s activities, April 15 - April 30, 1973
      -Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean
-Resignations of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean
-Dean
      -Meeting with Buzhardt, June 3, 1973
      -Logs
            -Possible release to Dash
      -Conversations with President
            -Lawyer’s story
            -Timing
      -Possible immunity
      -Conversations with President
            -Seymour M. Hersh’s story
            -Robert U. (“Bob”) Woodward and Carl Bernstein’s story
            -September 15, 1972
                   -Indictments of defendants
                   -Haldeman’s notes
                   -Internal Revenue Service [IRS] investigation of Larry F. O’Brien
                    and Howard Hughes
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               NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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                                                        Conversation No. 441-23 (cont’d)

                          -Campaign tactics
                          -Dean’s efforts
                                 -Haldeman
                    -Signing of President’s will
              -Memorandum to Haldeman
                    -Organization of Counsel’s office
                          -Frederic V. Malek’s study
                          -1972 campaign
                    -Haldeman’s response
              -Role in 1972 campaign
                    -Financing law
                    -Fred F. Fielding’s work
              -Documents in lock box
                    -Buzhard’s efforts
              -Meeting with Buzhardt, June 2, 1973
                    -Paycheck
                    -Staff members’ files
                          -Location
                                 -Archives
                          -Certificate
              -Dean’s files
                    -Certification
              -Contacts with Buzhardt

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[National security]
[Duration: 19 s ]

    INTELLIGENCE

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

*****************************************************************
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            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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                                                     Conversation No. 441-23 (cont’d)

Watergate
     -Dean
           -Meeting with Buzhardt, June 2, 1973
                  -Dean’s possible testimony
                        -Files
           -Files
                  -Return of personal materials
                  -International Telephone and Telegraph [ITT] investigation
                  -Robert Vesco
                  -ITT investigation
           -Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]
                  -Removal of boxes to Justice Department
                        -Vesco
                  -Buzhardt’s forthcoming conversations
                        -Ralph E. Erickson, Justice Department
                        -William J. Casey
                        -Erickson
                               -William Rehnquist
                  -Removal of boxes to Justice Department
                        -Casey
           -Vesco
           -Possible White House response
                  -Backgrounders
                  -Woodward and Bernstein
                  -Buzhardt’s conversations with Woodward
                        -Washington Post
     -Forthcoming trials
           -Possible Dean testimony
           -Outcome
           -Interest
           -Possible motions
                  -Effect
           -Mitchell, Magruder, Frederick D. LaRue
           -LaRue
                  -Funds for defendants
                        -Testimony
     -Dean
           -Meeting with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Monroe in California, February
     -Wiretaps
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             NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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                                                      Conversation No. 441-23 (cont’d)

          -Robert C. Mardian’s testimony
                 -Meeting with President in 1971 in San Clemente
                       -William C. Sullivan’s view
          -President’s instructions to Mardian
                 -Wiretap log
                 -Ziegler’s statement
          -President’s recollection
                 -Ehrlichman
          -Buzhardt’s conversation with Mardian and his lawyer
                 -Ellsberg case
                 -Ehrlichman’s call to Mardian
     -Mardian’s statement
          -Sullivan
          -President’s instructions
     -Mardian’s conversations concerning visit to San Clemente
          -Ellsberg case
          -Meeting with President, Haldeman, Ehrlichman
     -Wire service leads
          -Scott’s statement
                 -Johnson’s John F. Kennedy’s wiretaps

Johnny Mathis
     -President’s assessment
     -Buzhardt’s assessment

Watergate
     -White House response

Buzhardt’s schedule

Watergate
     -White House response
          -Ervin Committee, Cox
          -President as defendant
     -Dean
          -Statements
          -Immunity
                -Senate
                -Forthcoming indictment
     -Cox vs. Dash
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       NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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                                                Conversation No. 441-23 (cont’d)

-Dean
      -Use immunity
      -Possible indictment
-Cox
      -Blanket indictments
            -Possible effect
      -Possible trials
            -Dean
            -Haldeman and Ehrlichman
      -Possible indictments
-Possible indictments
      -Mitchell, Magruder
      -Hugh W. Sloan, Jr.
      -Strachan
      -Sally Harmony
            -G[eorge] Gordon Liddy
      -Colson
      -Kalmbach
-Kalmbach
      -Funds for defendants
      -Expectation of indictments
-Thomas A. Pappas
      -Funds for defendants
            -Mitchell
      -Mitchell’s possible testimony
      -President’s March 21, 1973 conversation with Dean
            -Mitchell
            -Pappas
      -Intent
            -Mitchell
-Conflict between self-interest and animosity
      -Mitchell
      -Ehrlichman, Haldeman
-Mitchell
      -Role in bugging and cover-up
      -Dean’s subornation of Magruder’s perjury
      -Pappas’s fund-raising
            -President’s March 21, 1973 meeting with Dean
            -President’s relations with Pappas
            -Fundraising efforts
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                  NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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                                                           Conversation No. 441-23 (cont’d)

                            -Maurice H. Stans
           -Dean
                -Possible statements
                      -Effect
                -Conversations with President
                -White House response
                      -Credibility of Dean
                -Conversations with President
                      -Lawyers’ efforts
                      -Woodward’s and Hirsh’s efforts
                      -Timing
                -Log for January 1973
                -Requests for March 1973 and April 1973 logs
                -Possession of logs
                -April 19, 1973 request of Jack Nessitt

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 5:29 pm.

     President’s schedule

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 7:14 pm.

     Watergate
          -Dean
               -Meetings with President
                     -Kleindienst’s impression
                     -Buzhardt’s impression
                     -Statements to lawyers
                           -Charles N. Shaffer
               -Lawyers’ actions
               -Possible immunity
                     -Cox
                     -Prosecutors’ view
               -March 21, 1973 meeting with President and Haldeman
                     -President’s methodology
                           -Ehrlichman
                     -Funds for defendants
                     -Haldeman
                     -Amnesty, clemency, funds for defendants
                     -Dean’s possible statements
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                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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                                                          Conversation No. 441-23 (cont’d)

                       -Bittman
           -Possible subpoena of President’s papers
                 -White House response
                       -Cox and Dash
           -White House response
                 -Dean’s meetings with President
                       -Logs
                             -Dates
                                  -Haldeman
                 -Buzhardt’s possible call to Dash

Buzhardt left at 7:14 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Well, how are you doing today, boy?
Doing pretty well.
Feeling like you.
We're going through, I thought, I know you don't get the time to read.
I have a paper here prepared for us by Charlie Wright.
I think he's found very interesting on the paper.
And a shorter paper.
There are both of them.
I want to say hello to him, not right now, but I think he'd like to.
Scott, you all right with anything?
Yes, there was.
Very well.
Well, the whole farm, including the wine.
Yeah, good.
Well, I just wanted to say to you that I haven't seen much of you, but I told Al I'm very grateful for what you've been doing.
You've worked night and day.
You've been landing orders.
I know you've been the honcho.
Oh, thank you, sir.
And I did have a walk-off with John.
He thinks it's very important.
But I say, wait, he said, you've got to run this country, and you've got people who've got to think you're running this, and you're not worth running this thing.
And more and more, I'm going to have to do that.
I had to be involved in it, going through that terrible experience with Bob and John for the weeks thereafter, here, back and forth.
We have a bond every day.
But from now on,
I think there's no need to be involved unless it's a basic policy decision.
or something of that type, which we will bring here.
On the paper.
And then he said, this is a particular person.
And if you reach, I will write some paper in there.
We have one case, which is the Burr case.
And that case probably goes further than he has history.
Any questions there?
Were there questions over the St. Clair expedition?
The court, of course, attempted to compel Jefferson's appearance.
He declined, or he said he wouldn't.
After that, they said Marshall ruined it.
He had the right to clean a paper.
Jefferson, I believe, gave his paper, gave the papers to his attorney general to make the decision of whether or not to release him.
Oh, it wasn't the same thing.
And Marshall held that that was unsatisfactory.
That it was not a delegable function.
and that the executive privilege only extended to those matters which the President, without delegation, where the President made the determination of whether or not it was in the national interest to make the disclosure.
Now, that's the narrowest definition probably we have of executive privilege.
The President, of course, is going to make it.
But it's something to consider here if we reach close to the point of litigation
that instead of saying, blanket, no, in order to avoid any implications of the holding of that case, we said, okay, we've asked for a specific measure.
We will make the present.
We'll make the determination whether it's in the national interest.
That way, you avoid the point, if a court now were to agree with that holding, we have a picture.
And by you making the decision as with respect to each request for papers rather than just saying no papers.
You can take it with anything they ask for with respect to the national records.
Now, judging from John Dean's statements, 95% of you are totally aware.
It's pretty hard to imagine anything in there that would be relevant, that actually exists, or that would be releasable in the national interest.
There are some documents that I have seen down there in front of Chuck Colson for all he ate by.
Of course, I had a long talk with both Chuck and his counsel, and I said, you cannot protect documents if you haven't your possession.
That's right.
So for heaven's sake, if you have any,
bring them to me, and finally, Chuck brought me a rather big file.
Now, there's nothing about commonality in this town.
There's some political matters which will never be disclosed.
But after having read the entire set,
in the background on most of them.
But this would be no problem if you made an individual determination.
These documents, it's not in the national interest because they do deal with national security matters.
They deal with the .
So if you don't have any problem, I'll tell you the problem with that.
If, for example, they have Horland's notes or Ehrlichman's notes of conversations with me, that is a rough cause because I don't have a lot of family.
But the point is, and I'm not suggesting that we ever give them the first one of those notes,
I'm suggesting it's as a matter of proceeding.
I think we will be in a stronger position, a two-position chair.
I don't think they can get up in any of that.
Even if the court issues a subpoena.
What could we do?
You can just ignore the subpoena.
There's nothing they can do about it.
And all that you're bringing out is...
Well, they're stuck at that point.
There's no place they can go.
And they admit that they have no way to enforce them on that.
But I think it's to our advantage to at least maximize our position so that the court will never issue such a subpoena.
You know, so that they will uphold it.
Or you might be able to give them a picture.
that we turn the papers down on item by item basis rather than on a budget basis.
That we tell them that they don't.
You couldn't say, Fred, that it was not on a national, that all of those notes were IPOC, to be very frank with you about saying that some judge was filing in this direction.
You mind if I stop?
Okay.
isn't that great into coming along it really is it'll be a great asset
But I think from a procedural standpoint, this will give us no problem.
We discussed this somewhere at length to see whether we'd be best.
And we discussed it on the assumption, the way the pros and cons, we discussed it on the assumption that if we went this route, we would have to be able to turn down anything to do with Howard and Eric's notes on my ground.
On the interest, it's not in the national interest.
National interest, huh?
It's not national security.
It's not in the national interest.
That's the decision you have to make.
Right.
But what we're saying is, the planning executive privilege would have to say, in the first place, it's not in the national interest.
That's the basis of salvation and power.
And we would be in a stronger legal position to say that with respect to specific requests
than we would if we said it in a blanket fashion.
Because of martial code.
So I think that's one.
I don't think we want to get down to the nitty-gritty on that one.
If you have a hand to read that paper, I'm sure you'll find it fascinating and relatively short.
And you'll see the point where it is a matter of procedure that it would probably well be totally selectively brought.
We've done a lot of research, and we can resist any blanket title of the man-worshipping.
The subpoena I have in my pocket, they serve on the, what priority is that?
You knew they served subpoena?
Oh, it's just as promised, isn't it?
They serve as someone on the archives.
And, of course, I formally prosecuted and threatened him so that I was ready to go to court with him.
Anytime he was ready, I was going to quash him.
There was a lot of drama going on.
I wouldn't stand up a minute without being talked about.
The court would quash this opinion.
They will have a great deal of difficulty getting specific about documents.
And we have to understand that.
Many of the relevant documents come around the river from here that they consider relevant.
One's written from here to the committee.
They have already got most of the committee's references.
For sure.
Rob and John have both turned over tapes of conversations with various people.
He says he has no tapes of conversation with the young man.
He says he does not have any.
Now, I know he made some.
I've seen the record where he played Howard Smith.
But anyway, let me just say this.
If he hadn't been in existence today, Chuck is a smart-ass dude.
He is.
He's going on with our case with the night.
He didn't do a problem.
Oh, of course he didn't do a problem.
What is your feeling about it?
I know Chuck better, of course.
I have confidence in Chuck Vaughn, of course.
Their statements so far have been good.
There is one problem I worry about a little bit.
They had different recollections of conversations.
And their conversations were apparently conflict.
Now, that's bad news.
I talked to John Wilson about it.
He talked to Frank Strickland about it.
And it makes them problems.
It was not a problem involving you, so not only involving us, but I talked with Frank about it, because he was concerned that, you know, John Wilson was not going to do it.
And I think it makes problems for both of them, where they have a conflict, you know, because they are apparently conflict.
I think John's statements have not had much work by his county.
And that presents a problem because there are
He raises questions by the way his statements are phrased that don't have to be raised.
So that gives me a little caution, I should be very candid about the type of statements he gives that can raise more problems for himself.
And they're not questions as to you, except for the maximum money when it comes down to raising them.
Yeah, well, it's a problem for me because there's a... That's a problem.
Only in this sense.
Only in this sense, though.
There had been a newspaper story about the next thing.
John had straightened this out.
Do you know what I mean?
That was the reason.
Actually, they came in and told me about it.
John says he told you this five or six days after the meeting.
What?
Rape.
What?
No.
I don't recall the whole thing.
Well, that is his recollection.
Because he didn't see you prior to the meeting.
He said it was his testimony.
God would have never saw you and then told John that you wanted him to sit in on the meeting.
So he had no way, and Holloman said he didn't tell him about it.
He doesn't remember if he mentioned it.
But Irving testified that was your primary concern.
And he then didn't say at what point in time
And he later took his notes and went back to the press and said that was about five or six days after the meeting that he talked with you about.
And there was more out in the press because the press was not there at that time.
Well, it's one that he would correct before he testifies on another form.
Well, we're bound to have these things in some way.
There's going to be more, there's already more conflict in this government.
They're having a heck of a time.
And you know, part of it is just conflict because of recollections.
Differences in recollections.
I'll tell you a long, a fat story of why
I would get very suspicious.
But if they all remembered exactly the same thing, it would be very suspicious.
I mentioned the hotel across from Dick Moore.
Dick is very reluctant to write a memorandum.
And I think he's right.
I think he should.
No, no, I didn't want to define him.
I just wanted to suggest in a way that we could use it.
I have gone through an interrogation.
And I thought you'd make other language notes.
Right.
Dick honestly does not remember much about the meeting on March 19th, but he has to note the extent.
But he remembers the general subject still in the house.
And it was continuing in.
He does remember the specifics of the March 14th meeting, both of them.
The 15th meeting, which was after your press conference.
That was about the press conference.
The 20th meeting.
Yes.
And he remembers very well his conversations with them after meeting on the 20th, urging him to come tell you all that he had gone.
I thought he had gone, right?
And he gets that pretty well now.
when you talk to him though let me ask you you've got any you've got an impression that the 35 well the 21 media plans prior the 21st prior
Mark, we're about covering.
Absolutely not.
They weren't about covering.
He makes this very clear.
And that's the one point he assures us about.
Because he does.
That's why he had me come in the train first.
That's why he didn't come in until he's got that down.
Well, you see there, they forget it.
We were going through grades, we were going through people I was fighting with who hadn't seen it.
I'll tell you the reason.
All of them, early on, were so bogged down in all of that Watergate stuff, I said, I want one person to handle this, and we've got to work on other things.
So we had him.
He was assigned to it.
Oh, and I'm not one of these.
I've got the urban committee, that urban committee here.
It was the urban committee, but it did more than that.
The urban committee, executive privilege, phrase confirmation.
Those were the subjects that were very much in our minds at that time, as I recall.
I had some pretty good notes myself.
And Moore has enough notes to get some very specific.
you know, about the subject of the conversation.
You remember some interesting things that were made very good, that's my part of it.
Well, on the 14th, you remember, we were dealing with Q's and A's, with your 15th press conference.
He had written, Pat had prepared for you before.
He had written some of the answers on the executive privilege and the hearings, and Dean had written some of the others.
During the course of the day, after we reviewed them,
They went back and prepared additional material and met the House of Minutes on the same subject.
Two things that you resolved to come out with in the press conference.
One, that you would welcome the Supreme Court test.
And another was your discussion of and final decision to go back on and talk in the press conference about your own position in 1948.
He said on March 15, after the briefing that you called in late afternoon, and he said it was more or less, how do you think it went session?
That's right.
And he said the one instruction you had for him was quit talking about executive privilege and refer to it as separation of powers.
Those were his notes because you were telling him to do something.
And he said the meeting then,
somewhat wandered off, he started reminiscing about the out of his case.
And that's what he spent the rest of it on.
So, the out of his case in terms of how it dealt with a similar problem where the government just put down a straight wall.
He couldn't get anything out of the FBI.
Nothing out of the FBI, nothing out of the White House, and nothing out of the W Department.
As I say, his meetings, his
His recollection is not as good about the meeting of the 19th, if you remember some general subjects that you were still talking about, the hearings and executive privilege.
On the 20th, he said you started on the same subject but got off the subject because then he came up with a suggestion that you take the offenses, take the affirmative.
One of his suggestions, as you noted, was that you should challenge the seven senators on the committee to permit FBI investigations into their own elections.
And then Dean got out into discussion of the misuse of the FBI by LBJ.
Yeah.
And he said this administration has abused it less than anybody else.
I remember that.
Moore has a reasonable recollection of this.
But I can only tell you this.
You see, his whole business came up covered in Soviet business.
In retrospect, as I look back over at notes in that church, I would say you can always see that Dean was raised in that church.
I hope.
I kept coming back to the point, I came to the point in one conversation, this is before World War III, I said, I want to ensure nobody in the White House is involved.
And he said, Strachan might be.
And I said, what do you mean by that?
He said, no.
And he says, nobody, I said, not all of them, not all of them, no.
Strachan might be.
Well, how?
But he just dropped it out, you know, he didn't pursue it.
But he said he's been a very good witness.
But then, if you rethink of that in perspective, if Fort Browning had been a good witness, it must have been that Strong had either denied it,
He still doesn't.
And they tried to get it strong.
I guess they gave it strong, and the gruder liked it.
The gruder did.
But it shows you the gruder, my gruder must be a rather fast little flyer.
from Glenn saying that Dash, the counsel to the committee, has just announced the intention of the committee to subpoena the president's laws.
And then says, I understand that the subpoena will relate to the meetings with John Dean.
The subpoena will be issued tomorrow.
I frankly think that, I think we all agree, that we don't ever give them the laws.
I think at some point we should give them the dates, give them the information.
Give them the information, not the laws.
Give them information about your meeting.
Sure.
I don't think that's what we're talking about.
I don't think that's what we're talking about.
we can make a quick call to the committee and hold this in the subpoena.
And I think we should reject their subpoena, which it will go to the law, to maintain the trust with them.
And make it clear that they never did ask for the information.
We'll reject the subpoena and then give them the information.
What do you think that is up to?
Is Dean a star in the mission?
I think he hopes so.
I think the committee at this point, he's going to do it.
Not a single person, by any means, has his confidence.
And they have to get a confidence that something can move.
And I think that is, he's trying to retain the confidence of the full committee.
How would you handle this, then, regarding the law, which you just said, telling that they're not subject to subpoena?
We would be glad to provide you information as to the present mechanism.
But reject the subpoena.
I don't think we want to submit to any subpoena at any point.
That's right.
And I really think that we ought to stay on the subject of executive privilege.
When we discuss what the cops is going to want to fight, if you send us a subpoena, we can get it.
Come on.
but if you want to send a request if you want to send that request we would consider and if it involves the second privilege the president will make a determination and i think we can fall back also on the fact that he has to very specifically identify what it is exactly and that's going to really drive them up the wall i've heard enough from the prosecutors except for the documents they have
They literally cannot describe specific documents.
They cannot describe specific documents.
You mean from Dean or anybody from any point?
If they ask us for what Dean said he had with the chronologist, we can tell them, sorry about that, there aren't any.
And if Dean claims they're destroyed, it would be very easy for them to see for themselves and say, well, perhaps they were destroyed by somebody before the files were sequestered.
But nothing was destroyed since they finished the Secret Service custody, which was probably the 30th of March.
I believe the Secret Service took over from the FBI and stuff.
Oh, and I don't know what the FBI did in their interview.
I'm assuming that they provided the same sort of protection.
But the Secret Service just always had somebody in the room when anybody was there, so they could tell if there was someone.
Now, let me make a couple of points to you that will represent that.
Thinking back on, say, when Dean, sometime before the 21st of March, made a very favorable comment about Peterson.
In retrospect, that now appears to me
And also, Dean,
did mention to me before the 21st that crazy keeper out there in California.
We covered that in our statement.
That's why I told them don't pin that down to April 15th because I said I think Dean covered that earlier.
Was it before the 21st?
Yeah, it was before.
But he just mentioned that as the...
And now the question is, it would actually arise, why didn't I report the strong thing?
And the answer of course is very obvious.
Dean was a funny man, you know what I mean?
It was your fan portion of the test.
Good heavens!
I mean, I wasn't, he saw Peterson and Cluny's time and time again, and I just, you know what I mean.
I had no reason whatever to think that, uh, I wasn't with COVID.
But that was the first time Fred remembered, and, uh, people wondered whether Earlyman ever told me about that early initiative.
I didn't know about the psychiatry of Fred until he came to me.
It must have been about the 15th of March, something like that, or the 17th, I don't know, in that period.
And you might be wondering, why did I keep being off when he came in and the fact is that I told the attorney, remember, he said, well, I was signing a form earlier.
Well, and I said, well, I don't know.
Now, that put me on a very tough spot, because you should know that the day before, the Peterson-Clingish Company and the Peterson-Clingish both recommended that they go.
See?
I could not do that then, and I saw them later in the day, and saw Dean the next day.
Dean at that point, however, was not asking for immunity yet.
That was after the 21st.
Over in the show.
This is the, on April the 15th, Sunday, Peterson and Plunkett came in.
And they told me about the testimony of Dean, and
then dean came in the next morning to see me and i saw him then and so i'm later in the day and uh and in view of his obviously having well basically confessed something
He said he took the food with him.
The question is why did I not just can him right away?
Well, I in that case, I think from the 4th of 16th to the 4th of 30th, I kept him off.
I, because basically, I talked to Peterson and a very close touch with him throughout that period.
I talked to him about this matter and
It was Peterson.
I said, look, I'm going to keep digging on as long as you deal with it.
I mean, you're going to make a deal with it considering it.
I said, I don't want to hurt your deal.
And Peterson didn't come to me.
He said, well, I can put it this way.
I interpreted his attitude as being one that would be useful to keep him on.
So I did.
from the 16th to the 30th.
Then he told me, the day before the April 30th broadcast, Peterson told me that the longer he agrees, the longer he can keep.
They were no longer .
I don't know what I'm getting at, but Peterson gave me a pretty hammer.
I think it would be useful if at some point I sat back down with them.
I presume at some point they're going to tell me, I'll get away with it.
Dean may have compromised pieces somewhere.
Well, let me tell you this.
I think he has.
My feeling is that Dean, basically, Fred is blackmailing, or rather blackmailing Peterson.
I don't mean it.
I'm sorry.
But that's a troublesome thing.
And I think Kennedy Peterson is an honorable, decent man.
I am sure that he believed, you know, that he knew it was right.
I think the same thing happened with Grave.
Grave was very proud of his investigation.
Or we discussed that then, and I said, why didn't you send it down, so forth and so on?
He said, well, Grave was very proud of his investigation.
And then Dean said, I'm curious about that, though.
Which, as I recall, I remember he said that, he said, you know, Gray, Gray, however, he said, ran around the country when he stood as Joseph and stayed in Washington, stayed on top of it.
But here we were thinking of it from two different vantage points.
Dean was thinking of it as a vantage point.
Now I'd rather say.
I just, I was trying to think of any instance where I should have perhaps figured there was, where he was basically talking about cover-up.
No, that wasn't about Watergate, but I'm not sure about that.
I don't, in any way I can't,
And he only put it out as a surmise, you know.
And I thought everybody was guessing that.
He told me he had done it specifically because he wasn't involved in the problem.
He kept saying that.
Right after the 21st, when he finally talked about all of his problems, $1,500, and $1,500, and $300,000.
And I wrote his problems in regard to that, too.
You know, John and Bob, in that respect, though, I attempt to trust you, John.
for a lot of these things.
But basically, unless they were part of a joint conspiracy, I mean, Bob turns over the money that Judy says that he was told by the president's counsel, John Dean, to turn it over for two others.
What the heck reason was he to think it was illegal?
He's not a lawyer.
John Irvin has a lawyer.
You should know better.
John said, Mr. Grayson, that it's over.
The defendants need money for their attorney's fees and so forth.
So, for order of conduct, raise the money.
Now, that's perfectly proper.
They can raise it for Angela Davis.
They can raise it for these clowns.
You understand?
Yes, sir.
Here, I think they've got a relatively good defense.
They're going to have to prove, in essence, that they tried to induce them there.
They knew that money was going to be used to induce the defendants.
The defendants do not talk about higher office.
They basically write about higher office.
Let me ask you about that.
On the 21st, I noticed that on the 22nd, that you called in Damien and Richard.
For that conversation, I assume at that point, you did not have enough detail.
Was Mitchell still denying that he was involved with that?
Oh, he's never.
Still, he denies it today.
But then, the purpose of my calling them in on the 22nd was to say, look, we've got to get this story out.
You know, I was the hangout man, and so was her.
And Dean kept saying, no, we can't get out because of the grades.
There were grades law questions.
You know what I mean?
That's another thing.
No, the purpose of that was to say, how can we get it out, how can we cooperate, and so forth.
Then it was after that that I sent Dean off to the... Did you send Dean out?
There are two telephone calls, one from Florida, one was to here, in Washington.
13 in the afternoon, and he apparently went right after that to Camp David, because later in the day at Camp David, so that day was apparently the same period.
That's when McCord didn't say anything.
Yes.
any of those calls, and no recollection on the ground.
I have no recollection of that.
I have recollection that he didn't tell us.
He didn't tell us anything on that.
He said, oh, God, no.
There was never any discussion of a million dollars, except on the funny version.
Never, never, never.
Good gosh.
I mean, that was pure hypothetical crime, frankly, I would say.
And Mr. McZiggler was present when they made that call.
Ron Hogan.
Incidentally, I should mention to you, they're now getting after me.
So you know I was not involved in any of that.
I was called today and asked, was I ever a member of the intelligence evaluation committee?
Well, you know, I made a statement to President.
Bob Crockett was the new Secretary of the Army.
There was talk that I should just handle the relationships, but they never had another meeting after that.
I never went to a meeting in Hawaii.
I wasn't even sure of the name of the committee.
But, so you'll know, the defense liaison man reported to me with their reports.
Absolutely nothing on it.
Like, they were kind of sterile.
They were very useless to the Army.
They were very useless.
To an extent, I could have been a number.
I just thought I'd mention that to you, because they're now raising the point.
Now, let me explain.
The whole business of my daughter is, to me, embarrassing.
Because we were discussing it, but I was really, you know how it was.
Old cross-example, you were doing exactly the same thing.
You were fucking the world.
But these, these fellows don't keep doing it.
How am I supposed to be proud of them?
Because they are weak as a mountain.
I'm proud of them, actually.
How do you say that?
And what do you do about the lemons?
I said, you better not talk anyway.
Or, you know, thank me.
You could have done it.
Oh, yes, yes.
You could have always done it.
You could have always done it.
You could have done it.
In the next day, when we met, and here you'll have to, you'll have to hold it.
How can we get this hold?
He didn't tell me that he had offered a claim.
He didn't tell me that he was subordinate to perjury.
He didn't tell me that
In fact, he didn't tell us if there was anything wrong with it, particularly.
The only thing that he really implied was a real problem.
The real problem was that now there was blackmail.
There used to come blackmail upon first conversation.
But Bittman asked him for $120,000 for hunts, attorney's fees, and expenses.
I guess, I think it was all for Bittman, basically.
it's hard for anybody to believe that i would not have known about it the way we were only operating them both all of them thought it was perfect
They didn't want me to be diverted at that time.
I was doing the war and a lot of other things.
But this Watergate, I believe, made no attention to the Dow Company.
Until, until basically, the Irving Committee started.
And then, like I said, and the Irving, we were worried too much about the Watergate.
We didn't have the Watergate conversations with Green.
27th, 27th, no, it was 7th, 8th, and I hear it then, but Wall Street was about it.
But it was about the urban community.
How do we make our connections?
Where do we go?
That seems to be for those of us who have worked in the government.
Outside, I don't believe we are.
I make objections to it.
There's no use bothering the boss with this one.
But the point that you have to have in mind is that
From the 21st on, anyway, as far as our record is concerned, the president and I have a pretty good public record on that.
That is what triggered my own investigation, first under Dean, and then second under Erling.
The reason they would come to me, not basically, but he helped us to deal with it, frankly, both.
And think as if we can't, we'll never really have to deal with this.
It's one testimony, but I think, I think as if we can't, we won't.
But we may have to.
We do, we have to.
Let's face it, if we do, there are several ways we can have it.
There's a testimony of Parliament, Erdogan's extending with the President, Richard Muller,
And if that doesn't do the trick, then we have to do something like .
I think that is a very last resort.
I agree with John Connolly that it should be only as for you to be able to answer a treacherous counsel to the president.
The President answers John's questions.
That's just not appropriate, John.
And I agree, maybe a White House statement, but it might be a statement by counsel of the effect that this is incorrect, and so forth and so on.
I think that's far better.
I must never be in a position, I did not do this, I did not do that, and so forth and so on, because the minute you do that,
And the other thing you've got to be watch out for is the committee, you know, and or the Grange or the Chads asking the president to testify.
They may do it.
They may do it.
But that's, you know, we just don't know why.
I think that is ridiculous.
I think it's absolutely ridiculous.
Any president ever testified?
No.
Interestingly, when Johnston was impeached by the House, he did not testify in his own image.
There is no precedent, not even close, under any circumstances, for a trust to testify.
I think at some point, you may want one of us as your counsel, if it gets to that stage, and I'm still hoping it won't, to address it.
Sure.
We did get Kerry Warren out there today with a prepared statement.
But look, because of the problem, he got even yesterday.
And we did get in trouble.
And he stated that he was an actor.
Yeah.
And we used that as an example and said, from now on, on legal matters and public quality, we'll take your questions.
And if it's possible or appropriate, we really would have written an answer.
But we're not going to take any more exchange that came before being misunderstood, either by the press secretary trying to understand legal nuances, or you trying to understand what he's saying.
So we just won't do it anymore.
And Gary made that announcement.
They apparently took it very well.
I think they sold it to the chief.
They sold it.
hopefully we've got that in hand and i think it's a big improvement actually the uh you see part of the problem here when i called me on easter actually it was basically just the
I would say an act of kindness and everything else, you know.
I mean, I called my dad and I said, well, of course, I'm a guy and you're scared and all that sort of thing.
The cigarette truck driver, Dean called him right back and said, well, that's such a nice thing to do.
That's all I want.
Well, Dean did say to me, you know, I might have to come talk to you about how I feel on that topic.
And of course I didn't even say yes nor maybe because, oh I mentioned Peter Peterson perhaps later.
And he of course, I was against him.
Because I didn't make a move without Henry Peterson from the time of April 15th.
I talked to him all the way through.
We had only one unfortunate
which was embarrassing to him, but when he did clear out that he had a conversation with John Felsberg, I said, you cannot, you cannot, I think we've got to stay away from national security matters in this thing.
You know, I mean, we talked about it on Friday.
Well, that one, we've got that one on the list.
Well, I think you've got it on the list.
And Henry's taking care of it.
Well, Henry points out that the main point is that when he came in
a few days later, ten days a week later or so, and he inclined us and said, we want to send it to the judge.
And I said, fine.
So I didn't, I wasn't trying to suppress that in his case.
He said, huh?
You didn't compromise his case?
Well, I didn't compromise.
What?
No, you didn't, you said nothing that would compromise any case he had in court.
I said, no, contrary.
He asked me that night, he said, when I said that the national security, I said, did the, I said, this was a national security operation.
He said, was any information obtained that is in the hands of the prosecution?
I said, no.
Because I assumed they hadn't done anything.
He said, well, that's good.
He said, thank God or something like that.
Anyhow, that was it.
And that's why he did not send the information out there.
But then the prosecutors appeared.
They all knew about the fact that they, they said, by the way, we better, we better get it to the judge.
So they got it to the judge, and the judge used that among other things, and the wiretaps, and so forth, and got the, to that.
But you know, one of the reasons, one of the problems that I had throughout this time, too seriously, from the 15th of April to the 30th of April, I had to go through the first day,
Because I had to work at home when there was a problem.
And I had to do it alone.
I mean, I had nobody here who could handle it for me.
And between that and that, I could not move on to these problems.
We have, oh, another question.
Why was it that I let all of them, or they, reply voluntarily, and why was it I said I requested a separate recommendation?
Simply, very simply, because he was asking for immunity.
Anybody who asks for immunity actually is automatic.
He was talking when he was here the other day.
Yes, please.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
twice, from the occasion that he downed the dead man, and so forth.
Yeah, other than when he came back, he was quite upset when he came back.
So it's something we've come to the fact that, at that time, I was not giving logs, which he wanted.
He wanted logs.
He has a log.
I'm just, you know, just wearing it into our decision.
He should give the confirmation to the commission first.
Dean has copies of the law.
I'm not pretty well right now, but we'll get through it from there.
Oh, yes, he had a right to.
And he did.
But he didn't get them in a form which would verify it.
You know, there was no signature on them.
Then why did that have to stand on them?
Why didn't he have the same thing?
He didn't want a signature.
He didn't have time to do it.
He didn't want to answer.
You see, Fred,
The story his warriors put out, that from January to April he saw me, forty times or so, gives the impression that before these guys fled, that he was sitting in their corner with me all the time.
And the first time, the first time I saw him, I discovered it myself.
There was no telephone call before him.
And before that, the last time I'd seen it was September 15th, the day these guys were indicted.
And maybe his lawyers figured that their immunity claim was made stronger by making it appear that his contracts began earlier.
What do you think?
I think there's two stories that were written on this subject.
One was written by Cy Hershey, who was very careful.
He's the man who said he saw you about 40 times.
I don't think that's even what the log is that they know.
Woodward and Bernstein wrote it accurately.
35.
They said that he had talked to you on 35 occasions.
Which is right.
And it implies...
that he was with you on the 30th of October.
That's wrong.
That's the only time you saw him.
Now, some pickup stories have carried it to 35 meetings.
Yeah.
Right.
But, you know, that's an easy guess.
Well, yeah.
It's a problem tonight.
I don't know if he's going to create any problems.
The September 15 meeting, do you remember what that one was about?
Because he will bring that one out.
Oh, sure, sure.
He came in to tell us about it.
The guys were invited.
Haldeman has a record on that.
I don't have it, but Haldeman has it.
You know, he sat in a meeting and made a record.
It involved a number of things.
I said, when are we going to get the dope on?
O'Brien, there was an IRS investigation with O'Brien and Hughes.
We were talking about that.
Everything not related to Watergate at all.
Offensive tactics that we ought to be engaged in whenever we got this information, counter-attack information, the Democratic harassment of Watergate and things of that sort.
things that you would normally discuss well harlem as i said i i can't tell you i don't even remember except that he came in and uh
All of a sudden, he came to us carrying a very heavy loader, and he was very, very shocked.
And I said, I understand, it's a very heavy loader.
He said, I didn't see him at all.
I didn't know him.
Except in a group, that's very apparent.
The only other time I saw him in 1972 was when he came in for my will signing.
I had pretty much forgotten this one.
And they don't train at all.
My will signing, I did with him.
Because he was the lawyer for them.
That's the only other crime that's ever put us on it.
I didn't see him in the planning stages of Watergate or right after that.
It's interesting, and we'll call it the Bob Haldeman thing.
Bob Haldeman, Dean Roebuck, in the spring of 1772 wrote a memorandum to Bob Haldeman about the organization of this office in response to a request to re-examine what they were doing.
And Fred Maddock was doing a study of the staff for the officials.
Strange subject, too.
Yes, early in 72.
And Dean set out all the things he proposed for his office to do.
And there were a number of them, a whole list of them, that related to the campaign.
And Haldeman wrote another one, and said, don't take on all these committee functions.
upon a council for the committee, that the committee had their own council.
You are council to the present.
And then under each one of these individual things, he wrote committee council.
Committee council.
And for an Exxon.
How do you know when it flew?
Because I thought of these things.
It's up.
If there's any complaint that Harlan did injecting into the campaign.
No.
It's up.
No, he didn't.
But the way, the reason Dean got into the campaign was on the campaign financing of the laws, the interpretation of the laws.
That's how, that's what, I asked him, how in the world, why is it that John Dean was sitting in the session?
It was apparent he wrote a lot, but surprisingly he did not write much of the material.
Most of it was done by 38 years old.
I could not even see the material he was building early, but the transmittal memorandums to Dean are always a thought.
We worried so much about that stuff in the state and we had reason to worry and then it turned out to be
You know, Dean really, I think, I think that was, he really thought it was his whole car, don't you think so?
He thought he was going to sink us with that.
Yes, that's what he thought he could do.
He had something else, I think.
And you came over at that time.
I'll never forget that, after two days, but you nailed it down.
Dean, on Saturday, one of his complaints was that he wanted to do a, his last paycheck is still being held up.
Oh.
How about the world?
Before Dean left, and there's good reason for it,
He wrote some White House staff rules, literally wrote the rules for the White House staff, particularly with regard to presidential papers and files.
One of the requirements he laid down was that they, that everybody turn in their files, and he had a printed form made of a certificate.
And this certificate must say what files they turned over to the archives, and what files they have left here
and certified that they had taken none away or copies of them.
Where they all are.
Dean said, I can't sign that certificate, so I can't get my final certificate.
And they're demanding the certificate, but he had written the rules that they wouldn't get their final certificate.
Well, because he carried out this one case.
Well, not just because.
He was claiming that he had
that he didn't have custody of his own files, so he couldn't very well say that he turned them over to somebody else who was there to form them.
So I said, John, you can have your paycheck if you'll put on that certificate.
This wasn't it.
Just tell all the files.
You'll have to show them the certificate.
But he turned over the archives.
He did turn over the archives.
And I said, the list is there.
If you've got it, you know.
He said, yeah, I've got it.
I said, then you certify that there are portions of your files which have turned over to me that are now in storage and in the custody.
I said, you can say they're in my custody or the Secret Service custody, whoever you want.
But they are in custody.
Because you've been down and seen them.
You know they're there.
And then you list every other document you took out of this place.
You know them all.
You want to know them.
All the documents you've taken out are those that you've turned over to the court.
I recommend that you put them on the pageant.
How many of you, if you share about this thing, what thoughts do you have?
He told me at the time the only documents I took out were the ones I put in the box.
People like to design a document for Satan, but that's where he is now, under oath.
Why didn't he say to you, he said something to you that he didn't want to?
He sort of regretted his position.
And I hope he did.
He told me he, and I knew John.
I worked with him here.
Oh, I worked with him here.
There were any number of questions we had.
Of course, we were all very committed to him.
And as counsel to counsel, I worked with John, didn't know.
But he said, you've clearly come out here planning for security assistance.
I think there must be justice.
Yes, that will be the case.
fairly well, and what he said was that he was living in a very difficult position, which he certainly regretted being in.
He didn't like where he was.
He said he would have to testify on everything under the sun.
Everybody wanted to know what he did throughout his full time here.
Couldn't tell him that without his file.
He said, what can I do without copies of my file?
And I said, what you can do under that circumstance is tell him he doesn't have the best of your recollection.
That's all you can do.
But that's what you'll have to do if you can't have copies.
So, you could really get a copy of his file.
That's what my point, what turns out.
Then why is it he's making such a great hunger?
Incidentally, we should give his personal funds.
His income tax returns.
And we'll have to have these inventory.
There's about four and a half of them.
That was one of his complaints about his policy.
The other was being able to testify on what party took him.
I didn't see the investigation.
The party took him to the best go affair.
I don't know myself what it was.
And he had one of them.
There's also the case of the SEC matter where he had the boxes
I don't recall, but they had 38 boxes moved from the SEC over to the Justice Department.
And it was not the Lescoe case, to the best of my recollection.
I've got what case it is down there in my notes.
I have talked to Ralph Erickson and Bill Casey about it.
And unfortunately, throughout the process, right up to the very end, they didn't talk to each other, each one talked to me.
And they're both, the cousin of the Stafford Committee on this.
He was asked for the file unless there was a memorandum of reference for some reason for him asking for it.
He's coming in to testify either the day of tomorrow or after he testifies.
He's coming in on the phone.
He was Bill Rankin's successor in justice.
And when he got the boxes, he did exactly the same black thing, but he sent them down to the criminal division.
He told them to examine all the files and see if there was a criminal offense indicated by what was in the files.
Dean did that?
Dean?
took the boxes, took the files from Casey, or had Casey sent them to Jeff.
He was in charge of the whole transaction.
Apparently there was a vertically, uh, sensitive materials in the files, and there was some fear that they would be subpoenaed by one of the House committees.
He was in on a lot of things, but apparently, they just didn't.
That's what we were doing.
That's what we were doing.
He was obviously very interested in Matthew.
Up to his years in Catholicism, he was very interested in Matthew.
I don't know if it was anything improper, I guess.
I know I was, because I think it was his father.
But he did bother quite a bit after he met Matthew.
But he was fine.
He was a well-known prophet, so that he can't...
Before we ever consider even making a statement that we never had before, and if it ever gets to that, it might even be possible that we background some of the issues of this time when it comes to that.
I think I could background even probably Woodward and Bernstein and have probably said my words before actually happening.
My comment would be
We don't
Of course, we prefer, let's say, if they do not testify, we prefer that we don't have to explain about this or that or the other thing.
But if we do, we do.
The whole point is that I don't have any question about the opposite.
I think it will be a relatively short period when we have this high intense interest.
After that, they will get to the motion stage and the trial.
I'm sorry, I don't know what it is.
And it'll pull everybody to death because everybody will get quite technical with the motions here.
And the motion calendar on this case will probably last, let's say, and you could have a number of appeals.
And this comes in progress with all of the motions of the employers.
What do you think you're going to be defending now, sir?
well the obvious ones are as one who knew about the participation as one who furnished the money to the defendants
or that he's, he says that he's, is he admitting he furnished it for purpose of covering?
The newspapers report that that is his testimony to the county sheriff.
Oh, it's about an indication of where it comes from.
Dean was in California at a conference call earlier.
In February, February, when Lincoln's birthday,
And they were, you know, they were talking about it.
And Merrill was there.
Merrill was there.
And I didn't see him.
I mean, he was, I was there and I didn't see him at all.
I didn't know what he was talking about.
I didn't know what he was talking about.
This one person has come up on the White House.
Martin has testified.
and Bob Keene-Vine talks to me before you that sometime around the first part of July 71, through the same committee, he saw you explain the situation for the purpose of the White House law, that Bill Sullivan thought they should not be left there.
And he has told the committee that you instructed them to take possession of the law.
A statement on the record, I believe, and I'm trying to find it, of Ron, the affected community, did not know the lodge was a farmhouse.
I'm throwing that.
I don't remember that Marty ever talked to me about it.
I think it's more likely that he talked to Erlichman about it.
I have no recollection of it, but it could be true.
I would have done it in a minute.
I would have done it in a minute.
I talked to Bob about this thing.
Bob and Ms. Logan came in and talked to me.
He insisted this was the case.
And I questioned him at length about it because he had told me previously not what the subject was, but that he had seen you when he went to California.
At that time, we went there to social conference, which is what we're working on now.
Well, I don't know.
But let me say, in the next instance, Father said, they've got the boxes.
He doesn't know how long he had them.
But it was sometime subsequent when Father John Irving called him and asked him to bring them over here.
So, it was not necessary that you knew they were ever brought over here.
You know, there's a difference between the times while Marty was in Jacksonville.
He'd take possession.
And then no one could take the White House over there.
They'd have a different transaction with us.
I, uh, Marty then says that he told me that Sullivan wanted to move to the White House.
And the White House said that Sullivan wanted him out of the department.
Out of the FBI.
Yeah.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
And Marty had possession.
Right?
I don't remember the conversation because, but uh, but I would have, I would have approved even moving to the White House, necessarily.
You know?
But I didn't, I wasn't asked.
But I think that's important.
Important distinction.
That's right.
You can say, that's why I said that Marty and us should take possession and some of them ought to turn them over to us.
And I don't know, Bob, this is an awful thing.
Bob may have
So it might be that he was in a little bit of a box with me when he came back to stick to the same story that he did to you.
Well, I should make a check.
We must have records out there.
I would check that.
I wouldn't be sure he's lying.
I wouldn't.
It occurred to me that it would be difficult for him to tell me later he didn't see me.
You know, we've talked about it, John.
Well, let's don't get involved in any of the crap.
It's not really important.
I think we've got to work that case out.
I think we've got this one.
We've got to work that stuff out.
the wire service leads were very good.
What'd they say?
They said that Senator Scott had revealed that the National District of Wiretaps in this administration were less than half the level that were running in the early and mid-60s.
And the lowest since World War, right?
And the lowest since World War II.
Okay.
So that was a very good lead.
He was very special.
Where are you going to hear Johnny Mathis?
Do you know him?
Have you heard of him?
I've heard of him.
I'd like to hear him sing.
He's a... That's another way to know him.
That's what he did.
of the book of the mind.
Just follow me as well.
Just slowly entertain him.
I would hope not.
I'll tell you what I think.
You have to come home to us, or even if you'd like to, I'll come home and get you.
How far away are you from us?
Oh, yeah, you've got the label.
Oh, that's right.
Oh, I didn't know what you were talking about.
You'd be in a position, I mean, there was...
This wasn't a police committee talk.
I was right where you were.
It was me.
a common criminal defense that we've got to avoid at all costs.
That's where making the state president defendants, you know, the president answers, the president, you know, I think that's very good.
We may have to come to it,
I'd rather be liable than do it.
Well, we're certainly a long way from it, because Gene has never done a statement on the oath.
It's problematic whether he ever willed it.
Do you really think that?
And this boy gets terrified if he ever gets it.
Well, they're going to get him to be up the Senate.
Will he tell us why it's there then?
Doesn't he have to?
Does he have to?
Tell him he has to.
He has to unless there's an indictment pending.
Pending.
And I think in that case... Well, there is one pending.
No, there's not an indictment.
Oh, unless he has an indictment.
Well, I mean, there is one pending, though.
We know very well that he will be indicted.
Unless he gets immunity for it, he doesn't get indicted.
That's true.
I think he will be.
The question is, which comes first?
I think even if he's under indictment, his lawyer would conclude that they could never get him for contempt and refuse him to testify.
And the Senate committee hasn't said it, but it's fairly common knowledge that they have pretty well concluded that even with immunity statements, they won't get anybody to testify that he's indicted.
Oh, good God, no.
Even with them, a use of him.
So, they were talking in one of the papers today about the race between Dash, I mean, the race between Dash and Cox, which is to get to these people because if Cox gets the indictment first, then he's pretty well shut off the Senate committee.
If he gets abroad and doesn't die, he's covered by people.
But if you were Dean's lawyer, I mean, even in America, he gets to use some young people, you know, the 18-year-olds.
I don't think either of them are the 18-year-olds.
Well, the cops are very able to stop them.
He hasn't given them consideration.
I bring some help to the prosecutors and themselves with the cops.
has considered a blanket indictment, one count, obstruction of justice, and misdemeanor.
Nearly everybody knows that.
Very well, he's making a very useful film out of the CIA, which is about to be served.
But we get a large number of people on one count indictment of obstruction of justice, so we go to the judge and join all witnesses in all cases of testimony.
That would be a strange move.
Probably do almost as much damage to his chances of getting the fitting as it would do to, as the Senate hearings, perhaps more, because if he indicts everybody for the same offenses, then he stands the danger that all witnesses will refuse to testify.
Being unindicted, and then he has no evidence.
Because he's indicted all the witnesses.
No reviews to testify where?
According to any of the trials.
If he alleges a conspiracy that they're all, one will not testify against the other so that his testimony can be used if they're all under the same indictment.
So that gives him a great problem of the blanket indictment.
At this point, he has rejected it.
Well, it shows how far he's willing to go
to stop the Senate committee.
What else can he do?
He doesn't do that.
He can move on some of them.
He can move on some of them.
The problem is that he approaches them realistically.
He can't get any of the people close to you in the White House.
He's as far as he can get.
He can't get Ernie.
He can't get Hull at this point.
He doesn't have the others.
He can get an indictment.
Yeah.
But he doesn't have the evidence to take him to trial.
What else did you say would be indicted in your opinion?
Mitchell, McGruder, Slum maybe.
He will probably be indicted.
strong ladies, strong, strong ladies, strong ladies.
Miss Harmony for Pertree.
Oh, we've got several Pertree, Pertree accounts.
She would be the secretary of the committee.
The one who doesn't have anything, the prosecutors have told us they have no case against Pertree.
What about Kambach?
They really haven't been into it in too much detail yet with the committee.
I mean, with the prosecution.
That's a very difficult area for them to get into.
Compaq raised the money.
But he didn't pass it out?
But he hasn't passed it out.
No.
And he didn't.
He can just say, I agree to become an imposter.
Compaq thinks he will be indicted.
That he will be indicted?
He doesn't have that special sort of emotional reaction.
But he thinks he would.
He thinks he would be.
I don't really know because I haven't talked to him.
Oh, yeah.
I haven't talked to him.
For him to get indicted for raising money for crime, I don't know.
He's got another guy in there who raised money to call the police.
I think they pursued him.
They're almost going to need Mitchell's testimony before they can get Patterson.
I can't concede that Mitchell was ever involved.
Because Mitchell's a link, apparently, in that money-wasting thing.
So Dean could testify on that.
Dean, Dean in the 21st conversation mentioned Mitchell was getting money from Patlis.
But the question of whether Dean could testify is to what Patlis knew about the purpose of it.
Because he would have had to sit in on the meetings with Pappas and he has never alleged that he has, that he did.
I'm sure Pappas did not have the slightest idea what the purpose was.
Now he's, John says, I think he's trying to, you know, formigate an impeachment that would cover up the intent.
That's where I think of Kambach.
I don't think Kambach, I just can't see his, he's nothing then.
That was an early time he raised the money very well.
Here's the way it happened.
Hackness was raised even later.
He was being used by Mitchell.
One of the problems we have to face realistically is, as far as this is concerned, it's a conflict between the self-interest and animosity.
It's very clear that among many of the people involved here, Mitchell on the one hand, and John possibly on the other, that there appears now to be a substantial amount of animosity.
I'm not sure to what extent they will do each other that, or can, while not.
of protecting their own.
But John, there's a lot of police.
They say they've been pretty rough on John, actually.
Let me tell you what the situation is there.
I'm not sure, but from the way I see things together, I agree with you.
Mitchell may not have approved it specifically, but he approved it right away.
And there is something, some conversation for the effect that he told him to go back and get more stuff, so it's good.
Mitchell was present with Dean Savard and a group of characters and a group of men.
And Mitchell also was involved in the search for the pathos of Dean and Burton Washington for this conversation.
Mitchell.
He said it right, that Mitchell, that Mitchell was, that Pat was just helping.
Mitchell and so forth.
I'm curious to know what your thoughts are on that conversation.
There you go.
I don't text for years because of health conditions.
I mean, it doesn't matter.
We do dinner every week at a standard table.
Well, that's, that's, that's, that's, when Dean gets up there and starts pulling that sort of stuff, the president can do it.
I guess how this feels regularly, I don't know if the press can play it, but
If this guy with immunity gets up and starts down that trail, I don't think that we won't have the credibility.
I guess the only time I have that problem is ten months he didn't come.
What do you think?
Well, the circumstances can be used to affect his credibility.
I think one of the problems is that he's a decent guy.
I think we need to keep it up to make sure that things go to completion.
The fact that he is now trying to say he will buy it, even by his sense, he sat on it from January of 72 when he first knew about it, he wanted to keep buying it.
All the way through until more than a year later,
Assuming that he, on the February 27th, he told me about what he did.
See, it would still be more than a year that he literally gave from you what was going on.
And now he's trying to hang you with it.
The President was aware of the conversation he had with you a year after the whole thing started and had been in progress.
Why are they trying to put this back into January?
That's a curious thing.
They know that.
They must know we have a law.
They know that he didn't come in.
He knows it.
He knows he didn't say anything.
I know, but why would they do it?
They want to give the impression, you see, anything they know is worth it.
That anything he told you, certainly after March the 21st, is of no help to him.
Because it won't do him any good.
Anything, even in March, gets... Gets close to the time.
Gets close to the time.
So they've got to get it back as far as they can.
even with exaggeration, because Dean won't be helpful if he didn't say this.
So, they've got to make the best case they can.
Interestingly,
I looked at the paper prepared for him, and he doesn't have the law of the kingdom.
He does not have the law of the kingdom.
The one who got back on April 1st was I, the law of the kingdom.
And this is where he finds the truth.
He probably thinks he didn't meet the people he dated since the log for that period.
This was one of the things I'm sure he wanted to do.
He can't.
But why doesn't he have the log for January 1st?
Because there's nothing in it.
The blank period he asked before he left here was specific.
Specific questions and asked for the log for a certain period.
In fact, he asked for the log for March and April.
Now, you may remember the meeting in February, but he doesn't work for either January or February in our collection, because he has the law.
Because on the 19th of April, he was thinking in terms of this March and April.
Probably at that time, the gentleman was just trying to get straight into his head.
And those are the dates he specifically asked for.
He does not have the law for the prior year,
uh because he didn't know what date specifically it was in september this is april 19th yes
Well, they don't have information for that period.
They probably assume that it goes back.
Well, there's another thing about that.
Another thing that I think I told you.
Okay, I'll go over to House Tom.
Everybody dropped me.
He was amazed when I told him that I had only seen Dean.
I mean, from one substitute kid in a whole year.
He said, you would think that John Dean was in your office every day.
He gave that a fair amount.
I have the same impression.
Really?
I had the impression that this was the impression he wanted to give.
I worked with a number of members of your staff, and I guess I never fully re-accepted it.
Yeah.
Well, I was interested to find these thoroughly, which must have given your dean the enormous credibility that I always do.
I had a better view because I was working on the national security side of the house and monitoring the operations of the military, so I had some idea of the other things you were working on.
But I mean, you couldn't be spending all that time on the thing he was working on.
I mean, it was some doubt up there.
I could never be sure of it.
But isn't it possible that he had misled his lawyers?
No, sir.
I don't think so.
So then he might be a better guy.
Right.
I think he hasn't allowed for them.
You may actually not remember when this series of meetings started.
And both of his lawyers are plenty capable of stretching themselves.
I know who Schaefer is.
I've run into him before.
He's a very partisan Democrat.
He's antagonistic, so he's sure to do so.
And these cases were stretched from those things.
Looks like lawyers are looking at it.
The lawyers may have stretched the whole thing in terms of the problem was aware of and all that sort of thing.
They're trying to get this man out there.
And they don't know that in the best case they could make an incurable damage they can do to those lawyers.
Yeah, they like them for partisan reasons.
That's what I'm saying.
I don't know.
Would you think Cox would want to give him immunity?
I think Cox will not want to give anybody immunity.
Really?
For what reason?
But on the other hand, Cox does figure this.
If he figures it by giving Dean immunity, he gets...
It's up to the president.
Maybe that's what he would do.
Let me ask you that question.
He's having to deal with his prosecutors.
But maybe they do anything about it.
His prosecutors do not believe, and delivery, one of them has told me so, that Dean has any substantive information, which he would give on an oath, that would tell you anything about it.
They just do not believe in anything you would give on the oath.
A careful choice of words.
They are as skeptical about how far it was going to exaggerate on the oath as them.
They're the first one to ever raise a question to faith.
But the only thing you got to read, the only thing you got to read is basically that March 21st meeting.
And the March 21st meeting is as we said.
Well, I think so, Laura.
If I were to rewrite it, I wouldn't look.
I'll sit here and talk to you, or Earlith, or anybody on the staff, very freely about things.
I have the kind of mind that runs around, let's see what the heck this is all about.
You can tell any lawyer what the heck this is all about.
But I would, if I was sitting there talking to a guy about what he's going to be thinking, I wouldn't say that, but now I'm sure it's going to cost, and how do you deliver the money, and so forth and so on and so forth and so on.
I don't know what I mean.
It is a, that's one thing about it.
If anybody had a memcon on that, it would look terrible.
It would look terrible.
Well, I don't think he had a memcon, but my point is, uh, all of his testimony on it, who he took, who was there for half a minute, for the last half a minute, Dean Bates, who he's left over, repeated those.
I must have called all of them in.
Then he kept them.
I don't think we have any problem whatsoever.
And the circumstances are such that we should be able to
I don't believe the team can have a party by themselves.
I just understand.
Of course, he could claim things, but he wouldn't be.
He could claim to act or march on diversity.
I believe he'd go out and get a million dollars, or he'd go out and pay all the other time or something.
Well, he said that.
I don't know.
I don't know.
more problems right here they feel like because of the we should
we should be prepared to take a position on the papers and what they're proposing is general is to say nothing will be subpoenaed we'll be glad to that we want the funding
but that we will be glad to discuss with Mr. Cox or Mr.
Dash any request for information that they have.
And that we will, that consideration will be given, not a consideration, but we'll actually sell it, is that any specific request for a document
will be considered from the standpoint of an executive firm.
And just put it that way.
What we do is to say we will consider them from the standpoint of an executive firm, instead of saying, well, I think we have conceivability, but ask me, what will we give you?
And then we take them on case by case.
That's right.
We say we can't do this because they're different.
On the other hand, I think it would be good to be forthcoming with regard to the dates you saw.
Yes.
27 28
I have asked them to re-verify this 27-2.
Well, it's right with one rod and wrong with another.
I mean, if I'm going to do that with 28, that's wrong.
Maybe not that way.
No, no, I know one of these did say 28.
Well, all of them had the same opinion.
Well, anyway, I'll check that.
I'll make money out of that.
Well, I thought that's what Dagwon, the meeting with Dean, did.
What we want to resist is a ban.
I don't think we want to just call in and say, look, do you want to do a meeting?
Frankly, we'll give you the information, but we don't stand up for something otherwise.
We want to have a meeting, right?
The idea is that we're the first to do that.
Thank you.