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Conversation 473-011

TapeTape 473StartThursday, March 25, 1971 at 4:23 PMEndThursday, March 25, 1971 at 4:40 PMTape start time04:25:22Tape end time04:31:04ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss strategy regarding the stalled Vietnam peace negotiations and to address concerns over South Vietnamese military capabilities. Nixon directed that U.S. negotiator David K. E. Bruce be withheld from upcoming meetings to avoid participating in North Vietnamese delaying tactics. Additionally, the President expressed frustration regarding reports on military supplies, ordering that South Vietnamese forces be fully equipped regardless of bureaucratic constraints, and planned a follow-up meeting with Defense officials to ensure compliance.

Vietnam WarPeace NegotiationsDavid K. E. BruceMilitary SuppliesSouth VietnamForeign Policy Strategy
AudioNARA Description

On March 25, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:23 pm and 4:40 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 473-011 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 473-11

Date: March 25, 1971
Time: Unknown between 4:23 pm and 4:40 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger

     Vietnam
          -Negotiations
                -Status
                -Dr. David K. E. Bruce
                -Delay by North Vietnamese
                -US strategy
                      -Delays
                            -Bruce
                                 -The President’s instructions
          -Melvin R. Laird
                -Press briefing
          -Military option
                -South Vietnamese
                -Bombing
                      -President’s view
          -Laird’s comments to Stewart J. O. Alsop
                -South Vietnamese military
                      -US military supplies
                      -President’s talk with Alsop

                     -President’s position
                           -Material and equipment
                           -Possible meeting with Laird, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, and
                                David Packard
                                -Scheduling
                                -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
          -An unnamed man
                -An unnamed man’s advice
          -Moorer
          -General Nguyen Van Thieu
          -Laos operation (Lam Son)
                -Importance compared with Cambodia
                     -President’s policies
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

All right, how'd you get along today, partner?
Good as.
How'd you practice with that story, brother?
How'd you get going on that yacht?
Mm-hmm.
Mm-hmm.
Oh, that brother's a lost cause.
Yeah, you won't be anxious.
One thing that I didn't do, I decided that I don't want Bruce to go to the next meeting.
In other words, if they're going to play, it's going to be an honest game, not easy.
Yeah, I'll just get that word over.
Don't let Bruce go to the next one.
They agree they put it off this week from next week.
All right, next week he puts it off, but not because he has a cold.
He just puts it off on purpose.
Either way, so it's an obvious front.
Why should he let it take place?
How did they put the meeting on?
He should just put the meeting on.
Put the meeting on?
Very, it's much better.
Much better.
All right.
You were telling me that you should put the meeting on.
I decided that I wouldn't take care of that.
Yeah.
Right.
Right.
Right.
Right.
Well, as far as the whole situation is concerned, I do think on the plus side, they seem to have, the metal seems to have done pretty well breathing on it.
Yeah.
With regard to the general situation there, they seem to have done, frankly, aren't you rather surprised they did as well as they did coming up?
Yeah.
Yeah.
And you know, you didn't expect this the first two weeks.
Remember we talked about it and you thought it was going to be pretty hairy for five or six days.
I did too.
I think actually it's coming out a little bit, it turns out, it's beginning to come true that way or something, you know, even seeking to cure the precipice.
Now the other thing I want, I didn't call all the softwares.
And he didn't raise the point that you raised and I want something done.
I don't know whether I should give him alcohol myself or whether it's underweight and that's this.
He said, now look, he said that softwares and these can't happen unless we leave bad.
military supplies for them.
Well, now, Henry, there is to be no damn argument about that.
They already have everything they need.
I mean, they already have ammunition, guns, tanks, planes.
I don't care about budgets, inventories, anything.
I want them to have it running out of their damn meters.
Yeah.
Or wait, could I do this?
Would it be, well, I just got in, hackered more over and said, now look, I want this done.
How would that be?
And there's two of them there.
Then they say tomorrow, if my time works out around 3 o'clock, I'll be able to leave at 5, that I might get him over for a few minutes, and that's it.
And so with him and Packard,
Or I'll tell you what, you talk to Holman about to see if we could have a meeting, not only just a 15-minute meeting for the way to California that I consider very important, but not only to respond to something else and see if we can work it out sometime tomorrow.
I thought he, remember I told you that he would not know what we were gonna do to suggest to somebody and say he didn't get the numbers, but did you talk to the whole thing?
Good, good.
Yeah, he liked it.
Well, it's time to leave.
Yeah.
Okay.
Did you discuss with him the problem and ask him what his advice was on how we handle the mental problem?
What did he say?
How do you say, what do you think we ought to do?
Just undo it on the day of the thing.
Or how the hell do we get more informed?
Do you?
Yeah.
I'm getting down on the heart of this operation.
It's been the great best, probably the best that we've been done.
Probably more important than you can't believe because of the heart of this.
Got it.
Yeah, okay.
Yeah, okay, hey.
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