Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 493 › Conversation 493-010

Nixon, Haldeman & Haig on Vietnam War and SALT

Thursday, May 6, 1971 · 11:00 AM–12:10 PM ET · Oval Office · 43 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Haig, Alexander M., Jr.; Bull, Stephen B.; Rhyne, Charles S.; Moore, Richard A.; White House photographerConversation493-010 on Tape 493 (tape position 01:59:48–02:42:25)StartThursday, May 6, 1971 at 11:00 AMEndThursday, May 6, 1971 at 12:10 PMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 493-010 ↗

President Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman and Alexander Haig to discuss the critical need for a major policy announcement to strengthen his position against mounting congressional pressure regarding the Vietnam War. They evaluated the political impact of potential developments, including a Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement and diplomatic initiatives involving China and the USSR. Ultimately, Nixon emphasized that he required a decisive, high-profile move to bolster his support in the Senate, deciding to prioritize a meeting with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu as a key strategic action. The conversation concluded with a brief meeting involving Charles Rhyne and Richard Moore regarding the potential for a presidential initiative to promote international law.

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Position in tape: 01:59:48 – 02:42:25

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On May 6, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Stephen B. Bull, Charles S. Rhyne, Richard A. Moore, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:00 am and 12:10 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 493-010 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 493-10

Date: May 6, 1971
Time: Unknown between 11:00 am and 12:10 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman

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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 1m 15s ]

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General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. entered at 11:26 am

     Vietnam
          -President’s meeting with General Nguyen Van Thieu
          -Draft
                -Henry A. Kissinger
          -An announcement
                -President’s schedule
          -Negotiations
                -Kissinger
                -US position
                -Kissinger
                -Timetable
                -Xuan Thuy
                -People’s Republic of China [PRC], Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
                      [USSR]
                -US position
                      -Kissinger
                      -An announcement
                           -Date
                -PRC
                -USSR
                -US position
                      -Motivation
          -President’s meeting with Thieu
                -Timing
          -Congressional votes
Show the rest of the log (264 more lines)
                -Appropriations
                -US position in Vietnam
                      -Stewart J. O. Alsop, Chalmers Roberts
          -President’s meeting with Thieu
          -Negotiations
                -US offer
                      -Public opinion
          -President’s meeting with Thieu
          -Negotiations

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] agreement
      -Possible announcement
           -Effect on public opinion

Public opinion
     -Vietnam, PRC
     -Polls
     -Long-term
     -PRC
     -SALT
           -Antiballistic Missile [ABM]
           -Compared with PRC
           -President’s press conferences
           -Press
                 -Columnists

SALT
    -Possible announcement
    -Importance
         -Vietnam
    -Timing
         -Congressional vote
         -Consultation
         -Congressional vote

USSR
    -Possible summit

PRC
      -Possible meeting
      -Ping-pong team
      -Possible trade

SALT
    -Possible announcement
         -Congress

USSR
    -Possible summit

Vietnam

      -President’s meeting with Thieu
      -US troop withdrawals
            -Timing of announcement
                 -Senate vote
      -President’s meeting with Thieu
      -Senate
            -Forthcoming vote
            -Response to Washington, DC demonstrators
      -President’s meeting with Thieu
      -Draft
            -Timing
      -President’s meeting with Thieu
            -Effect of announcement

Congress
    -Effect of possible USSR or PRC announcements
    -SALT announcement
         -ABM vote

Vietnam
     -Military situation
           -Effect of upcoming Senate vote
     -North Vietnam
     -Negotiations
           -US offer
           -Kissinger
           -Importance compared with Talks with USSR and PRC
           -Importance compared with Senate debates
           -Possible effect of Senate votes
     -Draft
     -An announcement
           -Timing
     -Draft

An announcement
     -Timing
     -SALT announcement, possible summit announcement
          -Public opinion

PRC
      -Possible visit
      -USSR

      -North Vietnam
      -USSR

USSR
     -Possible summit
           -Public opinion
                -Compared with a PRC or Vietnam War announcement

Joseph S. Farland

PRC
      -Kissinger

Congress
    -Influence of possible announcements
          -Possible USSR summit
    -Edward W. Brooke
          -President’s forthcoming meeting
                -Possible SALT announcement
    -Senate
          -Possible announcements
                -President
                -Kissinger
          -Leaders
                -Position on SALT
                -”Doves”

USSR
    -William P. Rogers
    -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
    -Vladimir S. Semenov
    -SALT talks
          -ABM
          -Semenov
          -Gerard C. Smith
          -Kissinger
          -President’s role
          -Smith
    -Possible summit
    -Joseph C. Kraft
          -Possible column
    -Possible summit

         -Congress
         -PRC
     -ABM

Vietnam
     -Possible announcement
     -Draft
     -President’s meeting with Thieu
           -Timing of announcement
           -”Doves” response
           -Thieu’s election
           -Possible outcome

Announcements
    -SALT
    -Vietnam

Vietnam negotiations
     -Kissinger
     -PRC, USSR
     -Effect of US affairs
          -Position of the dollar
                 -Washington Post
                 -Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS]
                      -Hanoi, Europe
                 -Thuy
                 -A Senator
                      -Balance of payments
                      -Public opinion

President’s schedule
     -A message
           -Farland
     -SALT announcement
           -Timing
     -PRC
           -USSR
     -Thieu meeting
     -SALT announcement
     -USSR summit
     -PRC announcement
     -Thieu meeting

            -SALT announcement
                 -Importance
            -Thieu meeting
            -USSR summit
            -PRC announcement
            -USSR

Haig left at 11:58 am

     Haig
            -Compared with [Name unintelligible]

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 11:58 am

     President’s schedule
          -Charles S. Rhyne
          -John B. Connally
          -Rhyne meeting
                -Time

Bull left at an unknown time before 12:06 pm

     Vietnam negotiations
          -Haig’s position
          -Kissinger’s position
          -President’s experience
          -Importance
          -Prisoners of War [POWs]
          -US position
                -Compared with Middle East
          -Kissinger, Haig
          -Administration policy
                -Hardhats, Congressmen
                -Howard H. Baker, Jr.

Bull entered at an unknown time after 11:58 am

     President’s schedule
          -Connally
          -Rhyne
          -Connally
          -Ronald L. Ziegler

Bull left at an unknown time before 12:06 pm

     White House Correspondents’ dinner
          -Mr. and Mrs. Arte Johnson
               -Mrs. Johnson’s appearance
               -Accent
          -A takeoff on Kissinger

Haldeman left and Rhyne and Richard A. Moore entered at 12:06 pm; a photographer was
present at the beginning of the meeting

     A book

     International law
           -Experts
           -Washington Post
           -Professors

     Rhyne’s schedule
         -Taipei, Yugoslavia

     Rhyne’s book
         -Publication date

     Lawyers

     A book

     International law
           -Possible announcement by President
                -US treaty obligations
                -African countries’ treaty obligations
                -Codification
                -Possible effect

     A paper

     Rhyne’s suggestion

Rhyne and Moore left at 12:10 pm

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Now let me tell you the problem here.
First, we got to have a significant movement by that time on the Vietnam front.
We either got to do that or something else.
Henry Seltzer is a very remote possibility now in the draft.
That can't be pulled off.
See, if you could announce that, then I could put the other trip off until the end of June.
Because I don't really want to get to it.
Assuming it's out the window, then I have to have that.
Now, Henry's arguments against doing it then, of course, related to his little Mickey Mouse game with going over to Paris and seeing those fellows and so forth and so on.
I have no illusions about it.
First of all, it may be they may not see it.
Second, if they do, they live along, and we're not going to do that this time.
This is going to be an automated meeting.
That's right.
Well, I think that's who he's thinking about.
But the point is, he says if you take two meetings and push it past the eight, he's not going to have two meetings.
I mean, he's going to say, we're going to have an understanding.
Then he can give you three days or four days, whatever the case is.
But the idea that we will wait and have to screw around in those meetings in Paris again, it's just not going to happen again.
There's going to be two meetings.
The second meeting is for the purpose of finishing.
That's right.
There's not going to be another one for the purpose of hacking around.
Because there is really nothing in that record, the previous record, that would indicate that any progress was made on Strauch.
against doing it.
That, of course, related to what little Mickey Mouse came up with, going over to Paris and seeing those fellows and so forth and so on.
I have no illusions about that.
First of all, I assume.
It may be they may not see them.
Second, if they do, they're just gonna, they live alone, and we're not gonna do that this time.
This is gonna be an automated,
That's right, sir.
Well, I think that's who he's thinking about.
Well, but the point is, I mean, he says that he can take two meetings and then push it past the 8th.
He's not going to have two meetings.
I mean, he's going to say, we're going to have an understanding of this, you know, and then he can take three days or four days, whatever the case is.
But the idea that we will wait and have to screw around those meetings in Paris again, it's just not going to happen again.
There's not going to be two meetings.
The second meeting is for the purpose of finishing.
That's right.
There isn't going to be, there's not going to be another one for the purpose of hanging around.
Because there is really nothing in that record, the previous record, that will indicate that any progress was made on this topic.
There isn't.
I've read it again.
There isn't a goddamn thing.
And the way as long as we're talking and all the rest, I don't think there's a chance, really.
There's a very good chance that reveals, I know,
because of the Chinese move, they're worried because maybe the Russians may be doing it and so forth.
That's all gobbledygook.
That's against, maybe there is, maybe there isn't.
But it's either this or kind of maybe not.
Well, we have to have a record, sir.
You have to have a record of proposing a fix which will all be, and it be correct.
That record will be made, and then we'll go.
But Henry Staley was in my car from last night.
We made the record, and then they turned it down, and I just announced that I made the offer.
If it has something more than an author, we've offered a date, ceasefire, and arrest.
That's a nice little thing to offer, and it'll be a two-day story.
So my thinking now is that we've got to make our preliminary plans in terms of the
has nothing to do with it, absolutely nothing to do with it.
I mean, if whatever happens on that, we'll just be a hit or dead, or it'll not change the situation.
We're gonna do the channeling for better reasons.
But I just don't want any of you to, well,
We can hang around here this summer, and we've got the Chinese game, and we've got the Soviet game, and we've got the other games, and so forth and so on.
Because I know the domestic game at this point, at the present time, we have got to move decisively, crisply, for domestic reasons.
We're not going to change in terms of withdrawals and like that.
We've got to move up on the QB.
If that's going to be our big announcement for the summer, get over it.
Get over fast.
Because that's the only way that it sucks.
See, Henry has no sense of the situation in the Senate now.
The votes are going to start coming around on the 8th, 9th, and 10th.
Well, I won in the House next week on the appropriations over the term of the day.
The Senate votes are the ones I'm concerned about.
I've got to have something.
something more than simply, well, we offered the South Vietnamese or the North Vietnamese a term of the day or a date.
It won't be that way in the ceasefire, but it's coming here.
It's a good offer.
I mean, I agree that Stuart Alsop will understand it.
Thomas Roberts and a few others, but the guys up there will not.
So, on the other hand, the announcement
after meeting with jews and the american combat world leaders at a certain time that'll have some impact right sure that's just an offer that's turned in well now here's the point i said that we have offered everything else i know that we all know the technical difference that here we are not that here we are separating out the political settlement we're separating out all the agenda these congress and uh and we are saying
to cease fire and release our prisoners, we'll be out.
That's new.
And we all know that it's new.
And it's very significant.
We all know it's very significant.
But Al, the average person in the country, that's just $130,000.
You can do quite a lot of things for it.
See?
Well, it's not going to mean anything now.
Say that in my life.
But you see, what we need to do now is something, Al.
We've got to have something.
We need something.
That's the future.
People here, that's why the two boat, if we don't have another boat, it's got to be from Channel V8.
And the other boat is going to come out of Paris, I think.
I don't know.
No, I don't think so, sir, but I think our assault agreement will be a substantial one.
I think assault agreement would be a substantial one.
Well, we'll have that soon if we're going to get an assault agreement.
I agree.
I agree.
We get that.
We announce it.
And that would be a...
It'll confuse them.
It is going to confuse them.
But the point is, it'll confuse them just like China did.
But it will not have the impact that it's needed.
The American people, we've told all this and so forth, it's too cognitive.
The intelligent people, it'll confuse all of them.
But we must not ever...
confuse ourselves by thinking that that's the way folks are.
Okay, well, it's nice to be thinking with as far as the people are concerned, the whole China, they're not independent.
You can think of a lot of public opinion.
And in my community, intelligent community, you've got to give it the lips.
And for the long haul, it'll make a lot of difference.
It's a matter of the long haul.
But you see, and the same on salt.
Salt will have more impact than trying to do the fact that we'll deal with ADM, the rest.
Do you look over the press conference in Jersey?
Six months?
Fifteen hundred questions on it.
So, I can drag it in.
These guys out here are reflecting, because they're not dumb, but they're reflecting on folks that you see.
They're human intellectual economists who have talked about salt, and the people have increased it, and they're obsessed with salt and the rest.
We all know, you and I know, that the most important goddamn thing is more important than whether we have a normal day to Vietnam or combat troops or anything else.
But you see how in terms of the kind of problems we're dealing with in the Congress, it just doesn't, it'll help.
It'll help.
But we should, on that, we can appraise it.
My introduction was wrong.
We can appraise it.
I can damn well assure you in terms of, we'll have a chance to appraise it because we announce it next week.
It must be announced.
If we're going to do it, as I put in the note to you today, we're going to do it.
It has to be done Wednesday or next week.
Or you have to put it off two weeks.
Now, there's a reason for that.
There's a critical role in the House on that.
And otherwise, you should let it go two weeks.
I mean, there's no reason to get it out any sooner.
You might as well drag along and go through all the process and inform all the embassies and talk to all the commons and all that bullshit.
But otherwise, get it off on Wednesday.
It's too little.
Curse your pride.
So that's what we have there.
Do us any good in Congress.
You see, I would rather have salt come out two weeks later to affect the Senate bill.
But you see, these things wash out all of a sudden.
We forgot.
So we'd have to do a Wednesday or just fart around, which we probably will do, but not do anything about it.
And let it get screwed up again.
Or it will be.
It probably will be.
Now, it could be regulated.
Probably isn't going to be ready anyway for two weeks, so there's probably no question.
Now, what could have, what could have an effect, I will agree, I will agree, what could have an effect is an announcement from some of the Russians.
Perhaps could have an effect on the Soviet Union.
However, they aren't ready to listen, and we're not going to press them.
We told them, you're ready to tell us.
Now, they'll tell us.
If they should come in unexpectedly and say, look, we'd like to go forward with an announcement and so forth, because we're not going to ask no more, no more.
We can't peerage.
That could have a very dramatic effect.
See, that's the kind of announcement we'll make.
That's the kind of announcement of a meeting with the Chinese, of a meeting, you understand, as distinguished from, well, the president will receive the table tennis team when it comes over, and we're going to release more items for trade with China.
So here's the things that will happen.
Salt thing can have a little effect on the Congress for a day or two.
So if we can get it out of the way as we go away, we can not hold it for two weeks.
And we'll do it then.
Then the summit thing, if something comes on that, yes, it could happen.
In fact, it could be the big plan in early June if they were to denounce it.
But if not, then let it go.
Then we finally have only one vote left at this time in the political field, and that's the meeting with the Jew and the combat troop thing.
And that would help.
But it would have to come June 8th.
If it comes later in the month, it could be.
It would be past the votes, and I would hate like hell to go over and have a meeting with them and announce that no more combat troops are going to be there after the Senate had voted in Terminal 8.
See my point?
I don't want to have actions taken which appear to be a reaction to what you're asking for the Senate.
That's why the team, they very well may have to be the 8th, because if they've got it, it'll be an action.
recent demonstrations and the rest, and some of them may start to harden up a bit, and maybe the House will do better next week than we thought.
But what could you really send or worry about?
But I do know this, that now, it's a cold turkey proposition.
We've got to have something solid.
The only things that will affect us are, one, the meeting with you, since you've ruled out the draft thing,
Don't even think about it now until it's before the school year begins, and you can try again.
Maybe you can have an effect provided it has that announcement, but that announcement I'm not going to meet with.
Second thing is the announcement of the sign.
That really hit a great stock.
The other thing is Saul helps out sophisticated people.
I can talk to him on that.
He sent our guys to the map.
He again and again.
They're so good, really.
He's going to get it all right.
They had one hell of a time voting against ABM.
If we said we got agreement to provide that, then that's not a problem.
They couldn't do that.
Well, the main concern here, as I look at it, is that whatever is done, if the Senate does it and deprives you of what has to be done and the realities of the military situation over there and the thing unravels before November, we've got a disaster.
If they do it, it's their disaster.
But if you do it, it'll be yours.
And that's the reality of it.
That's what we're doing.
We're not going to do anything.
That's why I'm like.
Now the other thing, of course, that I thought of was this view of air turned on of our prisoners.
My normal reaction was that it was that would have been a hell of a good time to hit those three passes in North Vietnam.
But on the other hand, since he has this death offer hanging out there, I want to get that over with for that reason too, Alex.
You understand, with Henry bouncing back and forth with Paris and those goddamn trips, they'd like to string it along because they know very well that we won't do anything unless that's going on.
We're going to hit it.
And they can't turn around an offer like that.
And they can't make some of the jackass things they make without facing consequences.
That's the only thing we've got left.
So that's, see, that's another reason for you when you're talking to him, he must be pressed to, we can't do a little more.
That's the whole point.
all the idea that we can't do this or that or the other thing because of the fact that it might disturb our talks with the Chinese, it might disturb our talks with the Russians, or it might disturb what talks we might have if it's up, or if it's just up.
He's saying all that really matters is the talk that's going on in that Senate the rest of the time.
Therefore, what we have to do is that we have to do, we have to now oppose our actions in a way that will not destroy any of these talks, and they don't need to.
But don't, frankly, if you think it's going to disturb our talks, just have the goddamn Senate pass something like that.
Right?
Right?
Where's your bargaining position then?
The Congress said, well, get out the 31st of June, December, right?
Both the country might.
Will you do that?
See, this is the fact that we've now got to start thinking about.
We're coming right to the wire.
We're coming in pretty good shape.
We follow along in battle, and we can win.
But right now, we've got to shoot our bullets and shoot them in good enough time, even though it presses us a little bit.
That's why I probably don't have to go on the aid that he can't get.
Since he can't get the draft, I have to go on the aid.
And, uh, so I'm going to miss it.
What else are you going to do?
So I, uh, I think the draft thing is going to be...
It can't be done right now.
I can tell from the instructions here.
But let's leave it out for a moment.
Leave the draft out.
Assuming the draft can't be done, let's base all our assumptions on that.
Do you have anything else we can do before the aid?
You see, of the eight, we can be eight.
The only other thing coming up is salt.
Salt isn't enough.
I know that.
Your salt is not enough because it is not, you see, too directly enough related to Vietnam.
Salt wouldn't be enough because people would think that you, with salt, you might talk about Vietnam.
See?
Some people understand salt.
Some people don't understand salt.
Salt is way over there.
That's the slightest idea of what salt is.
You've got to copy it.
Of course, the China thing, I think, has the greatest impact.
It has an impact.
But there, there, what it really is, is that it's there, but the China thing, the China thing, which is China, an open meeting by a presidential emissary, or actually a presidential visit.
See, there's a problem with our whole China thing, though, is that there, we have the Russian thing.
We can't announce it.
or be a presidential visit to China.
First, it can't be a presidential visit to China as long as they're supporting South Vietnam, or Vietnam.
So that's the deal.
It's got to be a straight culture if you deal with that.
Second, we don't want to throw the China thing until we get the Russian thing one way or the other.
Why do you do that if you've not got the Russian summit?
The Russian summit is more important.
It may be that we don't want it,
But you've got to let little springs play all around.
It's more important substantially.
It sure isn't more important, I don't think, in public drama in this country.
Could be.
You get more out of the China thing.
The China thing, I think, means more in terms of the war in Southeast Asia.
You're so opposed to it.
Yes, sir.
On that note, you see how we've got that position in the way that Henry's now sent a message, or I understand he's going to send it through the Ambassador Barlow on Saturday, October 19th, and that's fine.
Barlow will carry it back, so then they'll fire it off with the Chinese, and then the Chinese, they don't have to respond.
And the question is, when does he go?
Yes, at the time, you know, I don't know.
My personal view is that I don't think these things are going to solve the congressional problem.
I think we have to take it head on.
But I personally think that the position you've taken is the right position, and the responsible ones will be afraid to take it.
It is the right position.
It is responsible.
And I don't think you need to take it to understand.
I don't think it won't have an enormous effect on the congressional problem if you announce it to some of the Russians.
I'm an anarchist.
You could then take those bachelors of task for undercutting the president if you're about to do this.
You tell them these stories.
You're going to look awful bad.
You're going to look awful bad.
You're going to look awful bad.
You're going to look awful bad.
You're going to look awful bad.
You're going to look awful bad.
You're going to look awful bad.
You're going to look awful bad.
You're going to look awful bad.
He's a murderer.
He's a murderer.
Turn him off.
Some murderers, but many of them.
He'll understand it, too.
He's smart enough to understand it.
Now, I'm not doing this.
All that I know is that the Senate has, well, the House hasn't, but the Senate particularly is a very close proposition.
And if we, we've got to, we've got to throw, we've got to throw our best punches when they'll do the most good.
So I'm inclined to the gymnasium.
Now, we've got to do this in terms of that, too.
And as far as Henry's plans are concerned, that interferes with another trip he's going to take to Paris.
Forget it.
Let him take his trip and go back again.
It hasn't interfered.
When he used to go to Pakistan, he used to go out with a few other people.
There's no problem with that.
Nothing has to be the same.
No, I think your problems, in a sense, sir, are really your intellectual people.
And SALT does mean something to these men.
These are the leaders that are impressed by that.
I think the popular problem we're having now is dialectic, as it was last year.
The swing is a little higher, but it's going to recede the same way.
So we have to hold these real conscientious dogs that are in the Senate.
And I think the SALT would mean a hell of a lot to those people.
I really do.
We're going to play it like that.
I think I was encouraged by what Seminoff said yesterday.
I think what he was saying was, in effect, they won't take the Moscow package.
You can have ABM any place you want, but you'll have a ceiling on the number of missiles.
Oh, I got it.
Perfect.
Thank you.
I think they were talking about their own.
It could be either, but I think they're going to come back.
Well, on the other hand, why do you seem an outfellow to that asshole Smith?
Henry's always so jealous of his channel and I, and there are good reasons for that.
Well, I think the reasons for that are just as simple, sir.
To the degree they can keep you from getting the credit they're going to do it.
They don't want you to be elected.
That's one goddamn thing.
That's right, too.
So they may want to have a cover for Smith.
No, that's the other reason why we have to move before the...
The craft is back in town.
He said that everyone he's talked to in the Soviet Union said that if you're too tough, they don't want to deal with you.
They want to get another man in.
He hasn't written at least...
I got this from the cocktail circuit.
Yeah, good.
Of course he knows that.
Well, he's one of them.
Exactly.
For Christ's sakes.
Of course, he knows God damn well I'm too tough.
This last two weeks, this last month, the children again.
This really must be right.
They're having their problems.
Actually, sir, you've got everything postured beautifully in time, with the exception of this Senate problem, which is where we're short to you, Donald.
But the other things are ideal.
If they want to sell it, I think they want us to move with the Chinese.
That's the other reason why we can't move too quickly with the Chinese.
I'm not saying we're going to move with the Chinese or the Russians.
And on 8 p.m., I'll delay that goddamn thing until the military is over if necessary.
But I do say that we have to do something to capture more on Vietnam.
And since we don't have a, we can't do it with regard to the draft meeting, then we'll have to do the choosing of the governor.
That's good enough.
It's the best we've got.
A little bit of a mixed package that you visit.
The guns will say that you're propping up this election, too.
That's one of the criticisms.
But he wants to come over.
I say that if he's after that analysis, he will assume the full combat responsibility at some certain time.
That's pretty goddamn good news, isn't it?
I think it's very good.
I think it will help.
You mentioned that being accused of propping up the two government, because you are.
Now, let's pretend we're over there.
Everybody thinks they're propping up the government.
I don't think, I just think we just do it.
Okay, we can talk about it at that meeting also, about peaceful development.
We can get the salt thing.
That will set a warmer climate for the Jews and everything else that comes among the intellectuals.
I agree with that.
Don't let the little giants of Paris, I mean, that's one thing I'm trying to see.
Look out.
I never had that idea.
Everything has been too bullshit.
He thinks it is, you know, as he said, because of the Chinese thing, the right to create the Chinese thing, he thinks there's a 50% chance now that maybe they'll talk, they'll come and talk.
Why the hell should they?
We're going to get out anyway.
You see my point?
And they read our comments, yeah.
Yeah.
Well, you already talked about them.
You can set up a dollar problem to us, not to try to do the problems we're having.
No, sir.
And they don't agree with them, but they just certainly may be the Washington Post and the left-wingers.
Well, CBS last night took Hanoi's line.
They said that the war in Southeast Asia is caused by the problem of the dollar in New York, but it's a sheer propaganda.
I heard it on the news.
I heard it on the news.
No, they said it.
I heard it on the news.
That's the way they interpreted it.
But as long as we're maintaining work, then we have no way to maintain our balance of payment.
Oh, yeah.
I'm playing that.
Jesus Christ.
That's the best way to go about it.
People are not going to get too excited about that.
Balance of payment is a lot of crap.
Everybody around New York is chomping on their gum.
But understanding that there may be some problem with something shaking.
Right, right.
I'm just going to go back.
We just want to solve it, and get our introduction to Roosevelt through to the university.
He gets the message out to the department on the 2nd.
On Solve, we can't do it Wednesday, and I don't care.
There's no problem on Solve.
We can do it tomorrow, another redemptive time.
And since our purpose is to wait two weeks, wait two weeks.
Not an end for us to go in the balance of that week that I can see.
If that doesn't turn, then that influences your timing and your degree on chunking.
Sure.
Absolutely.
We do have better carbon.
That's the beauty of our situation today, which we haven't had before.
And the Russians don't know this.
I'm assuming the Chinese mean what they say.
We've just got to accept their goddamn people.
I wish that we all would rise up and, well, see our problems and know that we don't move it.
moving in a way so that we think that we do make all the plays.
That's the idea.
I much prefer myself, I prefer to have the two visit later in June.
Listen and solve the, don't listen and solve the bias of time you need to go down.
Solve all hell if it comes, but you leave there
I think if you end up with salt and you end up with the two meaning it's going to be tight and it's going to be tough, but you're going to have right on your side.
Then when you follow that with a summoner and a high-level Chinese meaning one or the other or perhaps both if we do it very well.
I think you just can't.
Your foreign policy would have been absolutely revolutionary.
You've got to.
The only trouble is, though, you have both some of the Chinese and some of the Russians.
Well, I say some of them are in a high-level delegation with the Chinese.
Well, he has a different view, of course, than, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh,
I'll be ready.
I'll bring in 12 of them.
Sure.
Yeah.
second view of Paris that Henry had.
And I don't think he ever has.
He's played along with it, you know, put it together.
But I've read these damn reports, and Henry's known to go on for an hour or a third.
Henry has three, four hour meetings.
They met for a break, wrote for lunch, and they met again, and so forth.
And curious dialectical.
Let's talk for a minute about conducting those meetings to also evaluate, because you can't have to get your own...
Sure, it's up, I'm sure.
And you want to find something good out of it.
You want to think that you've succeeded.
You want to think that you've made a sale.
You want to think that your trip was not worth while.
That's what it is.
I understand that you can't really accept it.
I'm an evaluator.
I'm an evaluator of those goddamn things.
They don't have anything.
They were hidden in the law.
And you've got to want to be cruel to it and tell him that the week I've had an illusionist.
Now they've looked at the same kind of thing, now they know there's only a deal in the law.
And you see, 5% of the bottom line is actually a lot harder after they do it.
If we hadn't had that meeting, the moment they turned down that prison for Sweden, we would have hit those three choke points, darn it, huh?
That's what I'm saying.
That's exactly what we would do.
Now we see that as a result, they did that instead of kicking us in the teeth.
What are we doing, not a goddamn thing?
I don't share any of this earnest desire to hope that we can come out of it.
We can be the peacemakers, probably.
We can be the peacemakers.
We can be the peacemakers.
Nobody wants anybody else to get any credit on that motion, but we all want that.
in terms of what that really is happening, not any illusions, but a kid or so.
Of course, he's on the schedule for Monday.
It's the other day.
He's on the report.
He ain't alone, too.
He calls over about two of them, and he calls them, and he's, you know, generally he's directing, guiding, so that he can find good plans.
He said, our position is right.
These guys are wrong.
He's got to stick to a church right now.
But that ain't enough.
It's much tighter situation now.
I think we can do it.
I mean, if I suppose
speak to this hard ass anybody that will come and sort of drive out of there and give it to you.
The senators and congressmen must be their goddamned courage.
That's all I'm gonna say.
I have a hell of a lot of character in so many.
I was just reading this appointment with Baker.
You're in speech mode.
I'm going out of office.
See that?
This is the police squad.
I didn't know I'd ever heard of them.
Let's go.
Yeah.
Senator, you're coming with me here in about 12 to 15 minutes, sir.
Well, then you cut.
He's the entertainer for the Correspondent Center Saturday night.
He's got a very sexy looking wife.
I think he's going to take it.
All right, we've got some time.
David, we've got that.
He's going to watch that.
No, he said, I think this is the gentleman.
Because everything that happens to him, he's always petting him, he's his family, and he's dressed like a German soldier.
Thank you.
So this is the best competition.
So I would really propose, and I mentioned this to Dick out there, for you, is let's start a new initiative to make international law more important.
I mean, you can put yourself together a group of experts, as I say, as did Nicole and Justin,
Never been in the name of the Chiefs, maybe still shouldn't be there next month or not.
Ladies and gentlemen, the state of the world, the reports, the next in line, I mean, your comments, you know, the deal for war.
Now, this would be a, this would ring a bell.
Even though I'm supposed to be here today, it doesn't necessarily ring a bell.
You call in the different professors.
You don't want to go a long way from saying something to the GM.
Call him.
Say, Ken, did you know?
Yeah.
Sometimes you don't.
You don't do it to the GM.
All we did was we were trying to do it to the GM for 10 years.
But I decided in the last year, I hired Andrew Lee over on the time of day and worked with the Yugoslavians alone.
So I think it's, I'm very proud of it.
I think it's the best thing I've ever done.
Whether it's published, made one, I've just, I've just, I've just had a lot of, a lot of,
I don't want to publish this song, but you won't get paid for it.
There you go.
Now, if you want to know this, you can walk in.
I don't .
All right, but I .
Everywhere, more than anybody else, and if there's anybody who is .
You were at the .
You were at the .
But I do think, I do think that, really, I'd like to see your name associated with international .
is that if you make some kind of announcement that you're going to take a new initiative for peace by strengthening international law, that this is something that all the little nations and the big nations can work on.
We belong to 4,000 treaties.
some of the African countries belonging to Malibu, you see?
They haven't accepted such things as the Antarctic Treaty, the seabed, the outer space, and you can take just a few of these and begin to put them into some kind of a code, you could call it, a code, something like that, and so that expert's disciple goes in and challenges the other nations to join you in, in putting more parts in there, and you're gonna have to have some alternative.
  • 493-004 10:00 AM · 44 sec — President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:00 am and 10:08 am.
  • 493-005 10:08 AM · 39 sec — President Richard M. Nixon, Clifford M. Hardin, Norman E. Borlaug, and John C. Whitaker met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:08 am to 10:10 am.
  • 493-006 10:10 AM · 54 sec — unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:10 am and 10:28 am.
  • 493-007 10:28 AM · 31 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Clifford M. Hardin, Norman E. Borlaug, Clark MacGregor, H. R. Gross, and Jack R. Miller met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:28 am to 10:58 am.
  • 002-105 10:58 AM · 21 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:58 am and 11:00 am.
  • 493-008 10:58 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:58 am and 11:00 am.
  • 493-009 11:00 AM · 24 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Mohammed Ayub Khan, and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:00 am and 11:26 am.
  • 002-106 11:06 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Mohammed Ayub Khan talked on the telephone from 11:06 am to 11:07 am.

Conversation 493-010, May 6, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/493-010 (accessed November 17, 2026).