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Conversation 501-003

TapeTape 501StartWednesday, May 19, 1971 at 8:55 AMEndWednesday, May 19, 1971 at 9:05 AMTape start time00:05:31Tape end time00:14:18ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Bull, Stephen B.Recording deviceOval Office
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to refine the messaging and strategy for the upcoming public announcement regarding the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). They discussed the content of the President's public statement, debating whether to emphasize personal involvement in initiating negotiations with Soviet leadership versus keeping the announcement brief and formal. To manage potential skepticism and ensure support, they also planned a background briefing for key columnists and a meeting with the verification panel to solidify Congressional and public confidence.

SALTArms ControlPublic RelationsSoviet UnionForeign PolicyDiplomacy
AudioNARA Description

On May 19, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:55 am to 9:05 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 501-003 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 501-3

Date: May 19, 1971
Time: 8:55 am - 9:05 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] negotiations
           -Kissinger’s previous meeting with Gerard C. Smith
           -Draft statement
           -March proposal
           -Instructions for Smith
                 -Schedule
           -Smith’s questions
                 -Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle [MIRV]
           -Kissinger's backgrounder
           -William P. Rogers
           -Drafted statement for President
                 -Kissinger’s contributions
           -President's schedule
                 -Meeting with American Red Cross
           -Statement for President
                 -Wording

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 8:55 am.

     Rogers

Bull left at an unknown time before 9:05 am.

     SALT negotiations
         -Announcement
              -President's statement
              -Future of negotiations
              -Kissinger's backgrounder
              -Hubert H. Humphrey
              -President's statement
                    -President’s position in negotiations
                    -Kissinger’s draft statement
              -Schedule
              -Leaks
         -Congressional support

           -Columnists
                -Richard (“Dick”) Wilson, William F. Buckley, and William S. White
                -Kissinger's schedule, President's schedule
                -Charles W. Colson

Kissinger left at 9:05 am.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

No problem.
Just what he wanted.
More than he had to treat.
You know, he's been taking around that some sentences from drafting, he
He would say, instead of saying they will agree to agree, he should just say, we should just say they will agree.
Of course.
We try.
But whether you say they'll agree, they have agreed to agree, or simply say they will agree, that's just a more elegant way of putting it.
That's all right.
You know very well.
I know her feelings.
We should dress in a much simpler way.
I know we're not getting this much
Oh, yeah.
Oh, that's no problem.
I went through the negotiating history with him, and he said, oh, yeah, they gave you, made you a March proposal.
I said, yeah.
That's what he wants to know.
Are they here today?
Yes.
Well, he'll do what we tell him.
But they're no hurt feelings, whatever.
Of course, he raises a thousand details.
What does this include?
Does it this?
Does it that?
And I just told him that's what we got you there for, to negotiate, but it doesn't include murder.
The question is, will it rework out, can it rework out, and so forth and so on.
Why does it rework out?
It's all in the letter.
Well, we don't have to say, I'll get it out in the background, because somebody will ask me about the freeze, and I'll
I'll, uh, I'm making an effort to shorten the, uh, the statement which we drafted for you, just for your consideration.
Uh, you didn't, I, I was, I won't be able to look at it because it's going to run across the day at 11.05, and I return it at 11.05.
I think development is a better word.
I'll use the word breakthrough.
You should say breakthrough.
I would read this statement and I would say this statement to both sides.
I should just put one other sentence at the end of the sentence.
You see what I mean?
Absolutely, Mr. President, unless you say...
It's a lot to be said for that, Mr. President, because this thing can still go south.
It can still go south.
I mean, the agreement can't go south.
I mean, the announcement can't go south.
In my view, I have a significant involvement.
I said that this
You might say that we're going this way.
I'm sorry.
I initiated discussions.
They would not like that, but I initiated the discussion.
Oh, yeah.
Oh, no.
No, I wouldn't say it.
I would just take character.
You can add.
I'll say this in background, Mr. President, rather than you don't.
Everything you say will be in background in this meeting.
No, that's the way I'll handle Humphrey.
I think I should say that I have negotiations with the leaders of the Soviet Union.
Maybe I should distinguish my role from the assault role and see my client.
You think so, or not?
I would say not, because we'll get it, we'll get all of that out.
But you can say, I, uh, no, you can say some months ago I initiated...
Some months ago, I...
I...
Who took the first step?
Now I can get it out.
As long as you don't say it.
I won't say it.
But let me make a draft statement which is very brief, understand?
Come to the sentence at the beginning and then read the statement and walk out.
That's what I'm saying.
But that, in many ways, would be the most impressive, Mr. President.
All right.
Yes, gentlemen.
I have this.
I have this.
And then I don't think I would publish it at all.
I don't think I would publish it at all.
I don't think I would publish it at all.
I don't think I would publish it at all.
I don't think I would publish it at all.
I don't think I would publish it at all.
I don't think I would publish it at all.
It's the most impressive, Mr. President, because you have a good story, and we can do all of it at once.
Thank you.
We don't have to settle in.
I'll get in touch.
It's a very long time.
I'll settle in in four or three years.
Say, look, we haven't told other people here.
It's a question of whether he wants to have this deal.
It's important that it's not with Russia.
The other thing is, the other thing is, it's important to know that people are important, but not to be with Russia.
We've got to be sure they don't wrap around us.
I think they should get Buckley and get Wilson.
And tell them it's very important to write the most important people.
Mr. Benjamin, what I would like to do all of a sudden tomorrow for 15 minutes is to get the verification panel in the head of all the people.
And if you could talk to them for five minutes, I'll do that.
I agree.
Because they're going to be the ones not to do the briefing, but they'll be called by the director of the state.
I agree with that.
We'll do all that.
I'm sorry.
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