On May 29, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, Manolo Sanchez, White House operator, and Nelson A. Rockefeller met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:13 am and 10:32 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 507-004 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
What's the other day?
Same old stuff.
Keep coming.
More bodies in Yuba City.
That's a string of them.
Twenty-one.
My God.
Twenty-one.
That's right.
It's not only one.
So is it.
All of it.
All between 40 and 65.
There's a guy in the park.
No, he was a Mexican.
The guy was a Mexican who was an agent for itinerant workers.
You know, he shipped them around to them.
He wasn't like workers.
Now, most of them didn't have any money.
Some of them, one guy had 32 cents in his pocket.
One had $6 in his pocket.
How were they murdered?
Machete.
Ooh!
They were stabbed in half.
And they all have their hands above their heads and their shirts pulled up over their hands.
It's a very weird thing.
So how can you get the hands up?
Well, you can do it after you kill them.
Oh, yeah.
But then they had to drag it and pull it up.
Then they had to kill them for you.
Yeah.
So when you kill them...
this machete, and they found the machete, and they found the, what the hell were they doing on the machete?
You've got to go ask somebody how the hell did they, you know, take out the pipe.
It would be an interesting thing.
But, you know, a lot of it is a weird story.
People who steal are all whites, and I know Mexicans.
There's one guy that they think might be a black.
I don't think so.
Apparently he just followed around and sort of signed up, you know, if somebody needed tin workers and he'd go downtown to the tin winos or something.
Well, he's married and has kids.
He walked out in 1967 because they thought he was
potentially dangerous to itself and to others, but then they let him out.
You know, it's funny, something like that kind of comes along as no other than a trigger that sort of captured the attention of one of those detectives in there currently.
You know, I tend to run away from people there twice, but...
One of us bum type of people.
Yeah, we're girls.
Alcoholics.
Domestic news and the Soviet-Arab treaty got downcast and international news did not.
Please have these things.
I'm going to read these things for you.
I'm just so concerned that they did the crucible.
The reports on that are so different.
So you don't really know.
My writers in the state, people feel that they are Saddam Hussein.
Quite restraining, what he said.
And the, the other guy, he got all excited, but said, said, I didn't.
I meant, basically, it was like, they, they have a treaty, and it's like, so we have to fight on this thing, I don't, I'm not signing on the button, and at least, blah, blah, blah, that, but I didn't know this.
And he, because he's influenced by it, and it had been long, you go back, three months ago, they said there was going to be a war, maybe just months ago,
three months, remember, all last summer.
And also this fall, but also again this fall.
And early this year, and again early this year, they started coming in and saying, we're going to have a war.
Now, they were wrong.
They were wrong.
Why this?
Why this?
They were refining what the Jews were telling Henry, you know.
They were going to fight.
The other thing, Bob, is that we've got to have people in our actual lives and
by Paul Rodgers back in the day, because he squeezed the Jews goddamn right.
We can't wait until the 72 elections.
I mean, we can't wait until then, then we'll be in a position where the Jews will, well, this is sure a better time to squeeze them than what we're going to do otherwise, which is go.
And the claimers that they, that they're out there, and this, of course, I didn't draw it in.
We were the claimers, and they were really going to elections.
Did you see that in the rain?
They were waiting.
Yeah, boy.
You had to send those to Rogers, and you had to show along the track.
That's exactly what we were doing.
That's what we were doing.
Is there going to be a short circuit today?
I think so.
I'll try to see.
So excited.
I think it's a way.
Oh, that's right.
I suppose it's not a good smart thing to say.
Well, that's good.
That's good.
I can call him up there, I suppose.
Yes, sir.
Sir, come over here.
I'll try to see.
Okay.
I saw you in here.
Okay.
Thank you.
I'm leaving tomorrow morning.
I'm going to show myself around town today.
I'll go somewhere where people know I was here.
And I'll be back Monday afternoon, so I've left it.
I have no problem with the kind of your comics you know.
My only concern is the fact that some of it is my pale and
But uh...
It's never in the past, not just in my meetings, but when Harriman and Bruce met privately, that's never, they've never been there.
But if it happens, I'll just say that Santini was here.
And by the way, I'll tell you my, by the way, Santini, well, I just said by the way, you were there, you know what I mean?
I wouldn't say you're here, all right?
No, actually I saw Saturday the Air Force One was going over on a training flight and I went along.
I had a table from Rush and we are in a ridiculous position, Mr. President, that the talks are going so well that we may not be able to slow them down enough.
I think they'll have to build an agreement unless there's a snag by the middle of July.
which makes it imperative that I talk to Dobrynin and tell him this is it now, and actually the Russians are making two-thirds of the concession.
That formula we came up with, such the pragmatic things, no legal justification,
Which is actually a great help to us because any legal justification would give East Germany an enhanced status.
While if one just describes who does what.
And the Russians, that's their big concession, have agreed to assume responsibility or some responsibility for full power, for the access to Berlin.
Now I don't kid myself that any time they really want a crisis, they can find administrative reasons.
They can re-load the autobahn or tear up the road.
That is not affected by it.
But that they could do anything.
It's more complicated.
I understand the logic, but the logic is so clear.
You've got to wait.
Those are the things that send them up the wall, et cetera.
And that's the way the domestic is.
And that is one place where...
Oh, yes.
We have one other technical issue which is connected with Latin America.
The Brazilians have established a 200-mile limit, and they want to start enforcing it June 1st.
Now, our problem is that unless we tell them that we're willing to negotiate the fisheries issue with them, they will have to start enforcing it.
We've already agreed to negotiate, but we don't have a formal position yet.
And so there's some debate.
The State Department wants to negotiate now with the Defense Department once they have a showdown.
They're not so concerned about fisheries, but they're concerned about law of the seas.
I would recommend that we tell them we're willing to negotiate in the fall.
That is, because if we don't do it on fisheries, the Latin Americans will oppose us on the more important issue of navigation.
which comes up on the Law of the Seas conference later this year.
While if we can settle Brazil, it's not basically our style country to us.
If we dig in on the fisheries, we lose on navigation.
Well, that's my recommendation, Mr. President.
Let me tell you what my view is on this negotiation.
I would like to make it a much more coarse, blunt statement.
And here's what I have in mind.
and others where you want to clear the record.
I think we have to realize in all candor that the likelihood of this record being made public or becoming an issue is about one-tenth of a thousand.
While it matters, it will be historically important, but it will not be important in terms of what we're trying to accomplish now.
I have a feeling that you ought to go in
this time, without the, only the barest of the formalities.
In other words, I think that I would like to see you start that I have come here at the express orders of the President for the purpose of making a final offer.
And I would have talked about Moe, who got, or any of these others, and I would have talked about...
I wouldn't go into this.
We want to be flexible.
I wouldn't put any of that in at this time.
I'd come here from the express order to the president.
Here is our time.
Here is our office.
And then I'd like to see you start just the way you talked to me at times.
But I'd like to please say we have thought this through.
It is quite apparent that as far as we're concerned,
Uh, the, uh, the, uh, murder negotiation is drawing to a close.
And you know that, let's be realistic.
See, that, uh, that I'd like to, uh, that, uh, break this deadlock and separate the political issues from the military issues.
And we do it now.
That's the one thing, Mr. President, that I think we should not say at that one sentence.
We should do it, because on this one they've already said no.
They might do it in practice.
But everything else, I think, if you don't care about what it looks like when it gets published, this is the better way of doing it.
This is the better way.
I've come here for the express orders, and here it is.
This is the final blood.
Strong, firm.
And then I go right down the line, we're prepared to do this, this, this, this.
Now, on the terminal date, are you prepared to, are you not going to mention a date, or are you just... Not until they accept the other port.
In terms of the infiltration, that's negotiable, as I understand it.
Right.
Yeah.
I put in a little more.
Yeah.
And if they agree, you see...
Except, this is not a paper from our other October 7th offer.
Oh yeah?
Well, no, except, except for the, except that it is, well, it doesn't, well, we didn't interpret some of the data there.
I don't think it will be last year's withdrawal.
We're not asking them to pull out.
Well, thank you.
Keep that for us to say that they can send in, uh,
But also, Henry, you know what I mean, when you talk about Laos and Cambodia and the rest, I would bother one hell of a lot about that.
I would negotiate that.
What I'm really getting down to is this.
I don't want you to give that at the beginning.
I think it's fine to make all these other things.
And I think you've got to get down to raw bones pretty soon.
But we're willing to do it.
What we're willing to do, as we know, is that they'll give us ceasefire, and they'll give the prisoners.
On the day, I'm sure you wouldn't get it onto them.
And on the day, that's negotiable.
But the point is, and I think if you would start it that way, and I would say on the questions of, like, for example,
I would not start the way you do.
I think the way you start is exactly the right at this earlier time to say, well, you've said this and I'd like for you to explain it.
You've said this and I'd like for you to explain it.
They'll take all three, four hours to explain it.
I go directly to the author and then do that.
And then during the course of the conversation later on say, no,
Let me tell you the reason that I think it's so effective.
When I was speaking at the crew shop, it affected the press conference.
The State Department gave me the goddamn as much crap that they wanted to raise.
You know what I mean?
Eighteen different issues.
Well, we had a long meeting.
I mean, as it turned out, it was a turn who came over to watch, which is me three hours.
And I know the State Department people, the voice holder was there, and Thompson and Preston practically were going up the wall because I didn't raise the issues.
I didn't raise them.
I just went straight into the guts of what we were talking about, the power, you know, the debate, basically, which had started earlier about
and push the other around, you know, the power complex and that.
And at the very end of the conversation, I put all the crap in, so that the record was made.
My point is, you put the crap in first, you'll get diverted around into things that might not come right to the point.
I would put it at the highest level.
I've just come directly from the president.
And I am authorized to make what is an offer which goes far beyond anything we've made before.
It is our last offer.
It is our last offer.
And here it is.
Ding, ding, ding, ding.
Now, for this to succeed, we have to have action on it immediately.
What is your answer?
I think we should do that.
I don't do this for the record, but I do it because I feel it might have some effect on them.
And it'll let them know.
I wouldn't put in the fact that the Soviet have told us that we're willing to talk here.
I would drop that in later.
I'd throw that in.
I think it's a nice little thing to throw in at the end.
Well, during the course of the conversation, you know, sort of slip it in with a stiletto, rather than putting it in at the beginning, that, well, the reason we're here is the Soviet told us, and so forth.
But you judge it on that, that's fine.
But I think that the more blunt, direct, and basically
shocking you can be, the more you might, at least the more you may impress this fellow that this group really is.
You're not here just to talk about peace.
We're both, you know, we'll both leave with smiles on our face and so forth.
I think that's all great for the earlier ones.
is it shows that we were reasonable, we tried our interests, that record's been made, but at this point, we're dealing with the much-gotten-advantages, and we've got to get, and I think the way, the way to do it is to put it right, they don't want to play it, fine, and say, and you don't want to take it, boys, we're, we're leaving, and I, and if you've got any time, and I think if you do that, you'll find out pretty quickly there, you're going to take it or not going to take it.
Absolutely.
So that's what I do.
I think, Mr. President, you're absolutely right.
I wrote it.
I don't know that I'm right, but I'm sure you're right.
I have a feeling that at this stage of negotiations, Henry, not from our standpoint, but from theirs, these bandits, they need some structure.
I looked at it from the point of view of May, perhaps you wanted to surface it, but that's not clear thinking, because if we surface it, you'll make a speech.
And you can make the proposal then any way you want.
I can do it any way I want.
When we service you, you don't have to do it.
At this point, the major thing is to get an impact on that.
I think that might impact on somebody.
They may be right, but they may not be.
I think that they might have to take this on.
No, I didn't tell him what we were going to do.
I asked him what he thought they would settle for.
And he said, well, they'll start out, he said, what we should do rather than make another offer to them is ask them, what are you willing to settle for?
Well, there he's wrong.
And he said, well, they will start by saying prisoners for a deadline.
But a deadline for prisoners isn't good enough.
You'll lose, everyone in Asia will think we're just running.
Therefore, we have to get something else.
And he said, therefore, we have to get a ceasefire.
He thinks we can get it through 72.
He said, they're not children.
And they will give us, and he said, they'll also ceasefire.
And he thinks they would stagger the letters, withdraw throughout 72, that it doesn't have to be early in 72.
I'm just giving you his views.
I'm talking to the political, well,
Our major goal is to get our ground forces the hell out of there long before the elections.
We have to be prepared to bomb the hell out of them in the event that they break.
We can still do that.
They break the ceasefire and the South Vietnamese will bomb them.
That's enough.
Listen, Adrian, listen, those people, the little few goddamn things that'll do with 500,000 people there, or 400,000, or 350,000 the other time, allow some depression, they're going to do with 100,000.
Oh, no, 100,000.
The only problem is to prevent a collapse in 72.
I know a collapse in 72, though.
We had a ceasefire in the American Air Force today.
But don't you think I have no political judgment if there were an agreement this summer that said we'd be out with everything by September 1st next year, that this would kill the issue, no one would talk anymore after there's an agreement that emphases fire at the war stopping.
And what is it?
I tell you, September 1st has the random smack dab of politics.
You can do it August, you know, I'm saying that August 1st is the latest you can do because you've got to get it so it doesn't appear as if you're doing it just as the election campaign begins, we're getting out.
Democratic convention's in July.
That's, that's what you can get.
But my point is that I'll start asking if they agree to all the other propositions that say, now give us the day.
I'll say January 1st, 73, because they'll certainly not accept it.
And we can go back to as far as July 1st, 72.
They'll go on January 1st, 72.
Exactly.
And then for July 1st.
I think that is an amendment.
That's an amendment.
With our Air Force, as I say, we're going to remember, we're going to keep.
I'm gonna draw that airport for spare power and tire and a few other damn places.
Yeah, but the tires won't let us farm from there anymore after this.
Through the ceasefire?
Maybe through the ceasefire, I doubt it.
Well, that's the point, but I... You see, the thing is, these North Vietnamese are mean enough so that if they dare, they might want you, might want to have one hell of a blow-up to ruin the...
What you could do would be to have a deal of everything but our air power.
That's fine.
Maybe that's the way to go.
In other words, all ground forces out by July 1st and all air power out by May 31st.
I think that's a better way to say it.
But I think that, I guess my intuition tells me that if there is any chance, and I don't know if there is, there may be, if there's any chance you're going to get just a straight thing.
And I forget what they said about POWs.
Are you willing to discuss that?
Absolutely.
We'll find that out in answer to the proposition.
That's the main point.
So let Bruce handle that as to what they meant when they talked about POWs and so forth and so on.
What you're getting at here is to get them, if you can, is to get them to consider it.
P.O.W.
ceasefire, withdrawal of agreement, that's all, those three things.
Infiltration, I think you, look, on infiltration, sure, put it down, but as far as international supervision and infiltration, I never going to agree to that, Henry.
Yeah, that's true.
They can agree to it, I don't think it makes sense.
But we have to prep it.
It's something that you can give.
The main thing you can't give on.
You can't give on a ceasefire.
You can't give on a veto.
That goes to the... That's your rock bottom.
And the rest, it ain't nothing you can give again.
But remember that you can't give on the other.
You almost know what your final veto is.
That's your final veto.
You can't give on a ceasefire.
You can't give on a veto.
That we can say about very easily.
What we have to prevent next year, one way or the other, is
If there's a ceasefire, we're going to stop bombing throughout China.
But we want to prevent it.
Of course, we'd like to prevent it.
Infiltration might quite as much affect the interactions of the person that they have.
Well, just enough so that Cambodia and Laos don't collapse on us throughout that period.
I just don't have much confidence in this operation.
I don't either.
It just slows it down a little bit.
So we get through 72.
I'm being perfectly cynical about this, Mr. President.
If we can, in October 72, go around the country saying, we ended the war and the Democrats wanted to turn it over to the communists, then we are in great shape.
I know the Democrats haven't, the Congress haven't, the Senate hasn't.
Frankly, I don't think that's fine with me.
In fact, if it's got to go to the communists, it'd be better to have it happen in the first six months of the new term than have it go on and on and on.
I'm being very cold-blooded about it.
I know exactly what we're up to.
But on the other hand, if Cambodia allows and Vietnam go down the drain in September 1972,
Then they'll say, you went into these, you saved, you spent so many lives just to wind up where you could have been in the first year.
Yeah.
That's... What is the situation in cases asked about Laird's comment and Laird's testimony on the budget to be affected?
All American ground combatants cease to be this summer.
He said he actually made that statement.
Mr. President... You see, I've got to be... You may get this right.
You say that...
Because that's totally different just from what I understand.
No, you can say that Secretary Layard was talking of American maneuver battalions.
And that those would be, that those of course are being sharply reduced and it was a rough estimate.
And when the point is reached where we can announce it, you will make the announcement.
These were guesses as to when certain American maneuver battalions would be reduced to a certain point.
It was another typical layer.
Too complicated.
You do see what it does.
I think, as I said, Bill Rogers was probably protecting his own plane.
He said it to us.
He said it 15 times, and Laird said it.
Or he said it several times, and Laird 15.
But God damn it, just really something that they go in there and say all these things.
And in the faith, I sent a directive to them every three weeks, and it was an absolutely cheap shot in January.
No one was arguing about it.
They should have let you make it then, if anyone was going to make it.
What I would say is that the progress is...
of Vietnamization is on schedule, and when an announcement has to be made, you'll make it.
All the rest is speculation.
Hold on.
I'm just going to make this as one of those conferences.
We saw the news report this morning, but they led to it solved for four minutes on two networks.
I saw that.
And in a very positive way.
I didn't read it.
The main part of the news report is the news.
I did not ever read that anymore.
What do you want me to do?
You can't put human events in there.
Man, what do we do?
Do we public?
What the hell do we do?
What do we do?
See, yes, I noticed Henry had desperately tried to
get the POW issue up, you know, they've got two things, CBS, which has a thing on this, I know there's a man in that network who's a communist, I know there is, who's producing this stuff, he produced the thing here, and it was a great, great job, the POW thing, and they're on those three kicks, hard, tough, so you see, they're desperately trying to be a combat tough, a hell of a time, a hell of a time, hell of a time, well, what do you mean hell of a time,
That's what I mean.
Well, Mr. President, if we get Semyonov over here to sign the headline agreement, it doesn't mean a goddamn thing, it just...
It helps.
It helps if the Berlin thing is going to break in the next two or three weeks.
I think that what we've got to figure, at least, is to get those two without entering the Berlin.
Can we keep Berlin from breaking if they don't agree with something?
Well, I'm going to give him an ultimatum on December the week from Monday.
We can keep it from breaking.
We have to be bastards, but we just have to...
The next time, they're going to meet on June 4th.
And that's mostly technical stuff.
Then Brandt and Raj are going to come over here.
And we see Brandt.
And before Grant gets here, I'm going to tell Dobrynin, that's it now.
We've forced around long enough.
We have.
We have to make our basic decisions.
The only thing is, the only way we'll make it plausible is to say, if you reject it now, that's it for this year.
That's the one step.
It's not a radio, it's a computer, it's not nuclear.
It is nuclear.
Oh.
It is a nuclear-powered submarine.
It doesn't have missiles on it.
It's one of these cheap gangster shots.
At first I thought it wasn't nuclear.
No, that was another conversation.
No, it is nuclear.
That's what I found out yesterday.
No, that's right.
He told me it wasn't.
I told him that although the submarines were not nuclear, our information was wrong.
And I corrected him.
I called him back and said that we had got new photography and it was nuclear.
So?
Well, he says they announced it.
It's at the very edge of the understanding.
It's just at the edge of it.
And they're not in Gianfuegos.
It's a gangster thing to do.
And I think if it comes up in the press conference, as it may, because now the word will get out, I wouldn't get into the question of whether it violated the understanding, but I'd be very tough on what would...
I should say there is an understanding.
We expect it to be quite aware that the Soviet is quite aware of it.
Right.
And I...
I won't comment on every single thing.
I won't comment on it.
The Soviet is quite aware.
Right.
Much better.
Much better.
The Chinese, of course, is now in the position to hit the planet.
Not because of anything we do.
Because of the polls.
I know those bastards.
They are also aware of the fact that the people oppose the previous government.
You'll see people switch it with Sir Joshua.
They follow these polls.
But we're in a pretty good position.
I know we are.
No.
What I'm getting at is this.
Because of the polls, this really does rule out what I really prefer, and that is we'll hard on the truth.
I agree.
I agree.
If we do that, then we not only lose the election, which I don't mind.
No, it's actually a balance.
I have a balance I'm going to get against our friends.
Here, if we lose the election, and...
We go against the majority of the country, which is no reason for us to do it.
If we're going to come out that way, can we?
I agree.
So what we're going to come out with, I guess, is some of it should do with China.
Well, if we finance it enough and if we make it low-key enough.
I think if we stay off the universality formula and just say majority for admission, two-thirds for expulsion, that has the practical consequence of producing two Chinas.
You see, if we say universality...
Well, no.
You see, if you say universality, you're saying Taiwan is a functioning government.
No, it will either then lead to two Chinas.
On the grounds, not that anyone says Taiwan is a government, but simply because there aren't two-thirds votes to kick them out.
Or it will lead more likely to the fact that the communists will not come in.
And that next year or the year after, they will kick Taiwan out.
But it therefore gives us a...
So the more modest we are, the less we claim.
We just say majority for admission, two-thirds for expulsion.
Then there'll be a majority for admission and probably not a two-thirds majority for expulsion.
And that gives us an effect to China, but it doesn't make it a universal principle.
Yeah, but that they might, that the communist Chinese can live with.
What they can't live with is if we say any functioning government should be in.
Because that makes Taiwan an independent government.
I agree with you that the state people want to get out of here.
I'm sure they're all wrong about this.
They won't agree any different on this.
I don't think there's a hell of a lot of political language
and the skeptics come around.
The state doesn't.
Everybody's going to know now.
We've really got to get an issue here.
The doctors doesn't mind.
They're going to get the credit right here.
Oh, no question.
Oh, yes.
I told him on his trip, he had to say, I'm in consultation with the President.
I want to find out what you think.
The best would be, Mr. President, it's not anything...
In fact, the best would be if Martha Greene said it in a testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, but I'm not going to make...
But this, ideally, would be the best tactical way of playing it.
Just drop it quietly.
Secondly, as far as Peking is concerned, or let George Bush do it, that would be even better.
George Bush would be the best to do it.
The next thing is, it would be best if it happened after we've established contact with the Chinese on the simple ground.
And if we can do that... Of course.
I want some positive news after meeting with you.
But if you think it's out of our position, because if these guys turn us down, we make the peace offer.
And if they don't turn us down and accept it, it doesn't matter what comes out.
If you do turn us down, then let me say that on that, I would strip away all the crap about it.
Oh, yeah.
There's a lot of stuff in there.
But actually, there's a big difference.
We've never set a date before.
We've never set unilateral.
So it is an enormous difference.
But we don't need the eight points for a presidential speech.
I put that on immediate basis.
If you make a public statement, you just say, the immediate release of all prisoner of war, the United States will withdraw all its forces and so forth.
They shall be on that Communist Party.
They shall also agree to a ceasefire throughout all of China.
Supervised.
That's all I have to say.
That's fine.
These are the essential points.
All the rest is belonging.
The rest, if you're negotiating, we have to put in.
All the rest...
But I just sort of put it right on that sort of thing, because that is very hard to argue with.
Very hard for anybody to argue with, to say, well, you've got to have a ceasefire while we're getting out.
Some of them may say, well, we'll have a ceasefire after we get out.
That's all right.
So we'll argue about that.
That isn't a hell of a lot to argue about.
The problem here, though, with the Russians and the Chinese, what really helps us is that they have an enormous problem between each other.
and cut us your balls off.
And here we are.
Well, I think they've never had a stubborn opponent in here.
As you've turned out to be.
And here you've got to give Armin a call or anything.
He had the Russian line.
We'd agreed to quit, to give up ABM before.
We had an offensive limitation.
But it's either awkward language or the communication.
It says together with.
Together with.
It might be people's student effect, though.
We say we shall concentrate this year.
But we shouldn't.
Maybe it'll be intended to a lot in the next sentence.
Together with, we will agree on.
Together with this, we will agree with that.
You see, that's all we can do.
See, look, you're all patient.
But what is happening is, Mr. President, I really think that the communists are beginning to dominate some of our media.
Six weeks ago, because now I saw a New Republic article in which they castigated you for the assault thing because you maintained the relationship between offensive and defensive limitations.
Here the Russians have already agreed to it.
And they are still getting away with it, which is, of course, what the Russians really want.
And that's what, if they babble away enough, of course the Russians will pick it up at the next Helsinki.
And that's why we should get the summit date fixed.
Because then they'll be reluctant to be too... Well, we know some of it.
However, our greatest chances are less.
We do have an inner assault agreement to put on the finish there.
We have to do that.
We're there without doing that.
I mean, they agree to it now because we can't be sure.
But we've got the gamble.
I think we can always sign the accidental war agreement.
We can announce some progress and so on.
If there is a deadlock in Vienna, we can break it at most.
Frankly, partly for domestic reasons and partly...
I frankly feel, Mr. President, at this point, that to keep the Democrats out of office next year is a major national necessity.
That's right.
It would be terrible, you know.
It would be terrible.
And, you know, really, really, with their irresponsibility to display it, that is, I think, to conduct foreign policy.
What about the radicals?
Well, just these two, Sam.
That's where the damn radicals are.
Yeah.
And another argument for the summit is we have a better chance of getting the assault with the summit safe.
I agree.
I agree.
They've got reasons as well as we have to have something come out of the meeting.
Well, we... Sure.
But this is the other side of the coin.
We're not going to have a son that comes out of the meeting.
Out of the question.
That we can't do.
Never.
Never.
Never.
That we cannot do.
I don't think it's all that difficult.
They can get, we can have an EDM agreement, a limitation on offensive weapons.
It's an offensive weapon, so it shouldn't be so.
Even though there are, I agree, media are dominated by the communists.
Well, they, part of the reason here is that they have got, they have desperately, they're paranoid about it, but they've desperately got to discredit in some way what we've done.
Yeah.
They're having one hell of a time, aren't they?
That's right.
Oh, absolutely.
Don't you mind running around?
Oh, with your social set, they must be up the wall.
They are up the wall, and they are becoming...
I can see it.
I recorded you last night.
You're out.
Last night, I had dinner with Joe and Stuart outside.
That's good.
How is your temperature?
Oh, I've got Joe completely... Good.
He's all right.
...turned around.
He's inherently all that.
Yes.
Stuart is all right.
Stuart is all right.
Stuart has done... Stuart has polled every Democratic candidate, seven candidates, on what they would do on Vietnam about air support and military and economic support.
What do they do now?
Almost all of them, except Jackson, now.
He said they're the most cowardly lot he's ever seen, the most disgraceful, despicable bunch.
He's going to write an article, a column about it.
But they are solidly for you.
They know those guys just can't control them, don't they?
Oh, yes.
Let's do it for them.
These people, Margaret Child, for example, is all out.
He thinks we are conducting a great foreign policy here.
I ran into Brinkley the night before that.
But even he and he did a good thing yesterday.
What do you say?
Are you talking about us all?
Yeah.
They all, the point McGregor made, yeah.
I'm surprised.
I'm surprised that you make the statement that there's more going on, that you are in charge of the foreign policy, that you have a concept of what you're building for.
John Sherman Cooper was just, that was the night before, was just warbling around.
And now if Berlin is settled, which I think is practically certain, we'll have Berlin settled by the end of July.
I believe.
And if you could see Rush for a few minutes when he's here.
And thank him for...
His health.
Because he's been magnificent.
He's smart enough to do it.
And he's done it beautifully.
He's a totally loyal man in any position he had.
He's the only guy in the Foreign Service I see now coming up that we can trust.
I think it's a good thing.
I don't know if you're ready to trust him.
He has the brains and the ability that should get him the top assignment.
I've never much learned.
In a new administration, he could be a superb undersecretary or higher.
Look, what you need is trust, trust, trust, trust.
That's it.
That's it.
You need people that are oriented towards you.
There are for us.
That will go out and beat the other people right in the goddamn head.
And that are willing to take the heat.
And don't shove it in here.
I mean, Connolly is the man who does it.
Connolly puts himself out front.
He makes good speeches on morality and that sort of thing.
That's good.
People keep mentioning a possible trip to England.
I don't think that's a good thing to do at this time.
What happened is that I invited him because it's this five-year meeting with the American bar and the British bar.
And I just told him, uh, when I was, I told Berger, Berger is asking me to go.
I said, well, it worked out with the world trip.
I'll go another trip.
I might do it.
I was thinking Moscow might come.
It's all directed.
It's all, it's all scheduled.
Because that's a special trip.
It would be, would create a... Well, at least I'm going.
I mean, actually, I don't have much time.
I don't go to adventure voyages.
There'd be anything here.
Right.
I think it'd be a mistake, no.
And I don't think the British really want it because...
It would look like the special relationship again while they're talking.
I was sorry to see, well, he's having trouble to come back.
Unfortunately, he's got plenty of time.
He's got four more years.
He's got, you know, it's only 20% of the British labor in the market now.
Yeah.
Oh, yeah.
Because that's the only thing that's going to crack these down.
Labor is up.
That's the main thing.
It's like, ours would have been down this mean a lot.
Because we've done very well with a whole 50% of this time period of time.
We've got the...
He's done the right thing, though, doing all his unpopular things in the first year.
That's right.
But if British industry doesn't get a shot in the arm, Henry Ford was in here to see me a few weeks ago, a week or so ago, and he said to me, never buy a British car, no matter how much they cost, because the workmanship is diverse, that the British ports, he said, are 30% less good than the ones they make in Germany and France, even though they are, of course, exactly the same specifications.
It's going to happen.
It is going to happen here.
You don't understand.
Because we're in the same thing.
I know there's two very strange articles about Nader.
There are two of them in here.
In a sense, it's now lashing out attacks on industry, the system, etc., regardless of what they do.
It's really smacks of the McCarthyist mentality.
Yeah, that's all right.
I think it is.
Do you agree?
Oh, and I've met him.
I've met him.
He's a lightweight.
He's a fanatical lightweight.
Yes, he is.
Oh, yeah.
I've never met him.
He's a lightweight, then.
Yes.
But a great politician.
A great demagogue.
You've got to stop him.
You've got to stop him.
And power.
You know, poor Lindsey did exactly the right thing.
He supported legislation to remove the rent soon so that that son of a bitch in the city can finally get his mom to sign.
And Lindsey never got it by saying we must do that.
Remember, you know the problem of housing in Paris, don't you?
That's not the reason you have the problem.
Because of the feelings, of course, of course.
All right.
New York is exactly the same situation.
I mean, that's why the east side, for example, I mean, the west side, the Hudson River, which has some of the best potential in the world, is gone now.
Exactly.
God damn it.
This Lindsey, I think Lindsey is an insane idiot.
Okay.
Lindsey is, Lindsey is the worst kind of politician that I've ever seen.
He's a lightweight.
He has the, he wants to imitate the Kennedys, but he doesn't have that demoniac drive.
And he doesn't have that.
But he, with him it's phony.
It isn't, it isn't.
The Kennedys were tough, basically.
They were driven into a school.
And Lindsey isn't really tough.
Lindsey is healthy.
Lindsey is a terrible, sloppy discontent.
What in the name of God is the matter with the American educational system?
Hundreds of thousands, millions of kids go to colleges, universities, they take political science, political science, they study all the great things.
I don't think that leadership is produced by learning.
It's produced by character, by family.
The British public school system wasn't all that hot, but it put the boys through a tough training of character.
where the personality had to develop, where they put them through Spartan training, they separated them from their family, they had to stand on their own, and that produced self-reliant masses.
That's right.
The only difference is that the Israelis, the Israeli leaders, when they compare frankly the Israelis to the American Jews,
who go to Harvard and the rest, by God, I don't think the Israelis would have contempt for these people.
But the Americans do.
Both are great, but those Israelis are tough bastards.
You ever talk to them?
Oh, yeah.
Oh, I don't even know me, but I've been through those taboos and all those other places.
These are different.
But the difference between the Soviet system and, say, the British and the good aristocratic system is
The Soviet system separates you out, all right, and gives you a good, tough education.
But then they create an enormous sense of personal insecurity because you're thrown into that brutal fight where you're always in danger of being knifed in the back.
While in Britain, when you were a Churchill, you could have voted to be out of government because you still were highly respected.
But you may think that Churchill, after the defeat...
I was tossed him out of the government, but then they brought him back ahead of the U.V.
Nation's board and all the other jurors used to consult with him more than he did in the United States.
I just called you to tell you that I, as one who has to read the New York Package when I know what's going on, that I'm on your side in that rant fight with your mayor, Grayson Anderson.
I just said to him, we were going over some things.
I told him that.
And I said, I knew what happened to France, to Paris.
Did you know that, God, the reason that you've got no housing in Paris is you had ceilings too long.
Now here in New York, I mean, you've got to, you've got to fight that bullet.
This is the total demagoguery that goes the other way, in my opinion.
Or don't you, isn't that, what's the matter with this talk?
Can't you get a, why don't you get John Loeb and some of the business guys to talk to him?
Yeah.
Yeah.
That's kind.
Well.
Yeah.
Things are coming around, you think?
Well, I, can you, but you know, Nelson, you've got to turn it around in the city.
Yeah.
Yeah.
I didn't know the implications of that.
Well, it's really what you need is sort of a fellow that he, if he weren't already in the other canon guy like, uh, like Brownell or somebody to go after, but he can't do it because he's, he's your guy.
be great, absolutely great.
You could, let me say that if you were to put him in a virtue, you could count on him to come up with the right answers.
But second, you could also count on him to talk to you before he gave the answers to test you whether you were willing to let him in.
He's the only man to do it.
As a matter of fact, I couldn't imagine more strongly giving Fred a call and saying, look here, I've got a guy that will work with us later on through this whole thing.
All these fellows on that commission, Roy Ashley, were just direct.
But this, Cattle was the man.
He's really the senior statesman in reorganization of the whole country.
No question.
Yeah.
All right.
Let me tell you, you talk to him, only if you feel it's worthwhile.
You can say we were chatting and I urged it.
Because he ought to do it.
He ought to do it.
I think that's what's needed.
You know, I feel, as you do, I mean, hell, I want Lindsay to succeed.
God, we don't want New York City to go down the tube.
But the way it's going to go, unless they settle some of these things, you know.
All of this, all of these problems are the result of his own, you know, well also pandering the search groups to, you know, to the demagoguery.
Yeah, he sure does.
He doesn't let me get a cab and all the other shows in Budapest are very effective.
The police, the firemen, all that.
Killings, right?
If we could... Get apart from some other things.
I see what you mean.
I'll tell you what I'll do.
I'm going to see John Irving in a few minutes.
I'll raise it with him.
I don't know what the problem is.
George Schultz is up to his farm this weekend, but I'll get right on it, and I'll have John call you back.
Fine.
I, uh...
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Even though, even though we couldn't, of course, we can't give a huge amount, but you know, if we could give you, give him money, it'd be a hell of a gesture.
It'd be very effective.
Right, right.
and that you suggested it and so forth and so on.
I suppose the problem is scattered around how much is left and all that sort of thing.
But we might find a way to do it directly.
Let me see.
Let me see.
I thought so strongly, as I'm sure you did, when those two policemen were murdered, particularly when you had a black and a white, you know, one black and Italian, actually.
That really stirred up people.
Yeah, and they're good people.
Most police are good people in your city.
You know, they aren't.
There's no police brutality.
Well, very little police brutality in New York City.
You know that.
That's right.
Well, anyway, I'll have John call you.
It's good to talk to you.
Yeah.
I'll talk to him first.
I said there isn't.
I said there isn't.
No, there's not.
Oh, he didn't tell us.
He already said it.
He said there isn't a lot.
Well, he's going to get us right through to America.
Huh?
He's right through to America.
Well, he hates Lindsey.
He ought to hate Lindsey.
He hates Lindsey.
Well, anyway, I was just getting back from a university problem, an old education arrest.
Karen's a person.
I'm a person.
I mentioned this once before, but I'm not sure you remember how you were a student before World War I as well.
It's ironic that the date is the same date that was our bad date on March 1st.
You know, it was the weekend that we had the bad deal.
You know, March 1st was the date when 100,000 British were lost.
a great German offensive, Lutendorff's crack.
It was hailed after three or four days as a great German victory.
It was because the Germans did move a pommel out of the British.
Afterwards, it was found
perspective of history that this was the first battle, the first battle in World War I where the German losses and officers and men were more than very small.
It actually was the turning point of the war in 1918.
Did you remember that evidence?
Absolutely.
That March 21st, it was a great term of victory.
I didn't know that it was March 21st and it was the end of March 21st.
They call it that.
He titles the chapter March 21.
And that's when it started.
And Ludendorff, and it was a mistake on his part, his whole point was, the church's strategy was much more clever.
His view was that
Ludendorff, with just a little bit of force, he could have knocked the Italians out of the war quickly after Caporetto.
Is that his name?
Caporetto.
Caporetto.
He could have knocked them out of the war.
It could have a dramatic effect.
And, of course, the rest of it.
But no, Ludendorff always had his eye on the main force.
And, of course, he did it.
And, of course, that was the same thing.
That was the same thing, which is the British.
Robertson.
A little bit.
Abrams with Chipotle, it's a military obsession.
And rather than thinking in terms of what can we do to win the war, they think in terms of what can we do to carry on our fight.
And what can we do?
Almost no general understands.
MacArthur understood it.
is that you've got to break the will of the opponent and not necessarily his forces.
MacArthur never tackled in World War II.
He never tackled the...
He always went around them.
He did the same thing in Korea.
He made a mistake at the Yalu, but even there...
I'm not sure that the mistake was the greatest he made.
He made a mistake at the Yalu.
If MacArthur had his way, the moment that they came across the aisle, he would have bombed across the aisle, and we finished off the Chinese.
That's right.
We would have killed the Chinese.
Thank you, sir.
Absolutely.
I would have said at the time, you would have, but historically, you would have killed the Chinese.
Historically, the whole thing was, the whole Hillary, all the Russians, they were in no position to come in.
But it was the historical point.
Vietnam would never have happened.
Yeah.
All of Asia would be different today if the Chinese had a different kind of... As it was, the fact that the Chinese have been more peaceful than the Russians in the 50s and 50s is partly due to Korea because they got their brains beaten up.
Even with a lousy strategy.
Korea was the right... Rather than being the wrong war, the wrong place, the wrong time was.
If there is any right to war, it's the right to war.
the only time we didn't choose him.
He lost his nerve.
He lost his nerve.
But that's absolutely right.
If the Germans had thrown their weight against the Italians in 1917, they could have knocked them out.
The historical fact that is more interesting to me, even more interesting, is that what was hailed as a German victory in 21st, so then we got one of the great British generals
But that was another mistake.
They should have kept going against whichever enemy they had picked to begin with.
If they had hit the British again, they might have knocked them out.
Well, they had run into Russia, and they moved over there.
That's right, they had some invasion.
They had 55 buildings against one another.
I realize it's an enormous advantage.
Well, it shows you that Laos, who knows, it may be historically referred to as another country again.
If it worked for American television and for the undoubted public, we took in public opinion.
And whatever that may do to us, the strategic impact of laws, I have no question about it.
The casualties have not gone up in this whole year.
I don't mind how that
It wouldn't have happened if you hadn't hit the layout.
That's the whole point.
And there was no offensive now.
And there was no offensive, Mr. President.
Do you remember?
I know.
In our briefings in December, I've seen military briefings.
I've seen high points and so forth.
Predictions about them off the intelligence in Vietnam is absolutely beyond belief.
Absolutely beyond belief.
The sons of bitches are like people here.
They're only trying to make themselves look good.
No, I point you can't believe, Mr. President, that they do in order to cover their tale.
But, my man, our intelligence on those have been wrong.
That's what I mean.
I think any prediction didn't happen.
That's what I mean.
You can't believe those predictions.
But you can't believe... Oh.
That's right.
And it made sense for them to try to knock out Cambodia and to try to score some sort of a victory.
And that they haven't been able to do.
They took heavy losses in Laos.
It is a tragedy that Abrams screwed it up so much.
What breaks my heart is
that if he, that we were within two weeks of winning the goddamn war, and today, after the agony we took, would it be the same either way?
If he, if he had done his job, if he had set up ahead of orders, if he had blocked the roads rather than dashed for Chiffon, if he had stayed within the artillery fan, there are a thousand things, I have a book this thick, going through every cable and every... No.
He dashed for Chapon.
There was nothing in Chapon.
The road junctions were all to the south.
It's like the Germans.
It's like the Germans.
It's like the Germans.
It's like the Germans.
They just cut it into their heads that they wanted it.
You know, there's a
I have this little, little bit, if I can't say it in French, although I can read French, I have parts in French.
This little three sentence summary of the Great French Battle.
You remember we're in French, and after this was, this was later in the spring of that year, very late, probably in the end of the year, during the German, during the German war, they had artillery, you know, and so forth.
I mean, that was pretty bad.
And then they brought in divisions.
This is when a boat took over a tenant who was miserable.
He had about 25 French divisions.
The Germans moved in.
They rescued the general.
There were so many ghosts in that war because they slaughtered so many people, 20 million people.
It was a much bigger shock because no one expected it and there was no issue.
So they came down to this fact because...
There's a fascinating story that came out of that.
I remember Mangan, the French child, who had been disgraced after Mangan, they had captured, there had been a couple more captures of Mangan.
The German, the German, I mean the German side.
Which proved, of course, it showed a lot of guts.
But he said, there's still two minutes to go.
One of the things I don't think of in a movie, one of the things I don't think of,
And he says...
General Bush conceived it.
General Iran made it possible.
It should have been.
I did it.
Isn't that so?
Yeah.
But it's all in that general.
General Bush blocked the clue.
I did it.
Should have been.
That's a great expression to say.
It's a great rhetorical line.
It's like the way that
French is susceptible to that, sir.
Much more than English is.
Much more than English.
It's a very... You get it all done.
Dramatic.
Like when de Gaulle went tracking anything, he had Percy de Gaulle and said, you know, my ancestors were all French.
De Gaulle said, me, I was French.
I don't know.
She was warbling along to him about how she had to get all my ancestors were fed because they had to get my mother.
Let me out of here.
Let me out of here.
Let me out of here.
Let me out of here.
Let me out of here.
Let me out of here.
Let me out of here.
Let me out of here.
Let me go.
I was able to have a perception to see through those songs.
He texted Kennedy, he treated him...
If you wouldn't get that from the press, it would all have happened.
He all had no respect for Eisenhower.
What did he do that he had great dislike for Eisenhower?
Yes, this was due to Al Sharia.
Yeah, period.
But on the other hand, when it came to Kennedy...
They all said that Kennedy scintillated and was brave.
It all said he was the greatest statesman of the century.
I don't think he ever said that about me.
He thought that Kennedy was a schoolboy.
He should put on a show for him in Versailles.
Nobody will ever forget that.
Sure, because he was the President of the United States.
You didn't have to think that it was a good show.
In that, he had enormous respect for you.
Everybody has been, that's been well documented at a time when there was absolutely nothing in it for him.
And from 63 on, he said that you were marked for great sex.
And, uh, but he despised Kennedy.
And Kennedy hated him because the goal was what Kennedy would have liked to have been.
But Kennedy doesn't have the character.
That's the conclusion, and this is very important.
as he was speaking, the German Empire, nothing can save them.
There's no policy, no man, nothing can save them.
And the great problem the United States has is we rapidly are tearing that plant.
We're rapidly tearing the plant.
We're tearing it economically.
We're tearing it also very much in the geopolitical field.
And to do that, I mean, after all, it is a historical accident that you're president.
I mean, you're not the type that at this time would normally have become president.
And any possible alternatives at this period that the political process would normally have produced would have cut and run out of our commitments in the world.
This is a fact.
Humphrey would have been a total disaster, but also any other Republican.
You know how 80% of the press at the time happened to be in the 1966 elections.
80% of these little bastards out here weren't going to get a chance.
Nobody thought I had a chance in 1966.
As a matter of fact, Eric Severin is a big loser in the 66th election, so the next one's next.
His affection for Rockefeller is a close friend of his.
He could not have succeeded.
He would have fucked out of Vietnam.
He would have been hurt.
He might have hit them.
The one thing he might have done is made an all-out blow.
But finally, probably the psychiatrist and happy would have kept him from that, too.
Sure.
Copy that, Mr. Mayweather.
The point is, the Democrats... An open-loaded publican would have done it, Reagan.
Would it be... Trouble to Roquemore, and he did it, is that he would have lost, established the chariots, beaten down his door all the time, you know, because he was one of us.
He was going to make John Cotton Secretary of State, so, uh... Who?
John Cotton.
Secretary of State?
Yeah.
Reagan would have lost Europe.
But after all, you've performed this enormous balancing act of having a very strong standing in Europe.
which is still the keystone of our foreign policy.
There's no visitor that comes, that travels through Europe that doesn't.
That seems to be getting across to a number of people, but it certainly doesn't to the average journalist, does it?
Because there's no foreign leader who doesn't consider you the most reliable man in the world from their point of view today.
Now this, to put this across to the American people is, isn't easy.
But Reagan would have been considered a menace by every leader in the world.
And justifiable.
Because he would have been a menace.
Because he is totally simplistic.
And he couldn't have learned because he's a congenital lightweight.
He doesn't learn.
Reagan memorizes that he doesn't learn.
He doesn't learn anything.
I talked to him in Palm Springs and...
really all he's looking for, which is some catchphrase.
And then, all right, I've understood that now.
So he can go out and say this is the answer.
He's looking for simplistic answers.
Unfortunately, the new conservatives are that way.
They have to take all of them for simplicity.
Well, there's an answer here, and the answer is very simple.
Why do we have all these complex problems?
Boy, now it's what Reagan used to be.
Back on the desk and screams and everything else.
God damn it, don't talk about it.
complex.
That's how you cover up all these things.
There are simple answers, and we've got to get to the simple answers.
The simple answers may solve the short-term question sometimes, but boy, they sure do.
President, for us to get the lid solved, China's
sum it all into one time frame, and to keep any of these countries, to keep Europe happy, to keep Vietnam from collapsing.
That takes great subtlety and intricacy.
Get this Berlin thing, as I now consider practically certain.
We've got that where we had sawed them off.
How about you, bud?
I probably ought to get into that action sometime.
Well, then, yeah, still, but from this here, you might be able to do something, isn't it?
Let's see.
Well, I heard our friends in Germany, so if I can get into that somehow, bitch.
Well, that's the thing.
I think we can leap far with the ego to lead our death story.
Yeah.
But you see, I talked to Harriman the other day, and all he's got left now is Vietnam, but he's hacking around in Berlin.
He says if you could settle Berlin, he figures it's a hopeless town.
I said, what a great achievement.
He said, but you are so against Brunt that you're not going to be able to do that.
So I said, all right, I have no way.
I didn't tell him anything.
So with that bunch, it will compound their confusion because we are not supposed to be able to settle further.
I mean, the difficulty with all these things... How to get it across?
The difficulty with all these things, it has great effect on that bunch, and I don't want to vote for it.
That's right.
The thing we have to remember is that we have to, that's why I say we have to down-copy do things to embarrass businesses and solve them.
basically for me not to make the announcement.
So I think we'll get a little credit for it.
And the same with the government.
You have to realize that we're in all these areas now.
All that matters is the political consequences.
The trouble with Berlin is it's technically a four-power thing, so you can't do it alone.
We have a congress on it.
We have one over there, and we announced it.
So it's a big deal about being there.
We could have a western summit or something.
That could be done.
A western summit.
If there isn't more power, we can't do it alone.
I don't know.
I don't know.
We ought to move now to get Ballou in as undersecretary and give it a deal.
Where is he going to fight that?
All right, I think you put it coldly.
The Senators all want the loot, which is true.
The Senators all want the loot, and now the President's given you one.
He insists on this one.
Just put it that way.
The President has given him this one, but he has to insist on this one.
Please don't raise it with him.
He's taking a lot of heat on the other, which is that we need the loot in there, because the other guy is not going to have any strength on the hills, and the Army's going to have a problem with the other guy.
And, uh, oh, may I take your comment to, uh, first of all, I understand that the whole order is on you.
But I'll take it, Mr. Barbon.
Yes.
And I'll report to you.
I did not do that.