On June 15, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 2:39 pm to 2:58 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 521-005 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
We are going to
in exchange of a big diplomatic schedule about the timing of the latest conference, if the conference will be presented in person.
And of course, of course, we should do with the creation of a general nuclear design as well as partial measures which will be to this point.
And as for that time, we are open-minded, but we feel it's just a matter of time.
As for the place, we accept the same place.
We feel that we don't, we will not object, we are not going to object if the decision of Georgia and the whole of what is the case with you, with the other heads of the government, they will be organized and prepared for the commission, which will deal with the preparation
of all this content, of all the creations which are involved in the training process and so on.
My God, the whole team is very, very, very attached to this, and we are very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very,
So if America talks on that, we will continue separately, as eagerly as possible, on our political basis.
And so, of course, we have to get together.
We will get together.
So this is the thing that I was proposing to you now, to you, to the President of France.
Today, in the UK, well, it depends on all the plants that we have in the day.
And so that's been in the door for years.
Yes, it is the day of the war.
Yes, it is the day of the war.
Yes, it is the day of the war.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
the reparatory thing would be required?
Well, I think the idea is that, I'm going to clear, when first we proposed the exchange of opinions with the diplomatic force about the agenda and the ambassador problem, what was better and for the Ministry, in this case, to prepare this?
For the Ministry, for one case, for this other investment.
In this case, in the case of Europe, it's under way, but I don't know.
This is to discuss this procedure, how to use the centimeter to organize this counter.
One of the ways would be that the government finds out who they need to organize, or establish, and prepare the committee, which would be appointed to you by the head of the government.
We don't have to fight for relatives and all that.
and they will discuss this one.
Or, meanwhile, we could, before this committee goes in, organize the diplomatic channels, we could discuss it, take place, all that stuff.
So putting these cases together for a minute at the best.
So there's two ways how to handle this case in order to explore that with the diplomatic channels.
Or, you don't object to the committee to organize the prevention of this government.
They will discuss it.
So there's two ways.
You seem to have made the key to the leadership of the top.
What I mean is I'm not referring to the top of governments.
That, too, is important.
But I really think that the two major, the New York Congress and the Soviet Union and the United States, would have to provide the leadership role.
They are still so far behind, but they would look to both the Soviet Union and the United States for a leadership role.
I think a proposal like this is something that we personally will, of course, consider seriously without saying anything to your government.
I feel that the way that our two governments make the most progress is to frankly have the kind of talks that you and Henry have had on various subjects, on basically an arrangement where we aren't really trying to hide it from other people, but where you can talk freely and knowing that
Either side can accept or reject in a few times.
In my opinion, and I haven't talked to Christopher about this, but my opinion, with all the other things you're talking about, which are very important, I think they're correct.
that may come up, I trust, at least, if we keep various channels, we can make some progress to be able to solve the challenge.
Mr. Craig, to you.
Well, first of all, we had the topic printed, but nevertheless, the way it was done is to lay a relationship that was first, completely confidential, and not scattered through the bureaucracy with everybody leaking, reporting to the press, and all that sort of thing.
Right, and then from there we had our disagreements and we doubled the I's and crossed the T's and then the two of us got together and we and the I's almost agreed.
But your government obviously had a sense of security.
And now you're in the government, too, and you don't even know what you are.
Well, in a sense, you're in a different position than the average ambassador.
In a way, you didn't seem to like it, so anyway.
It's quite obvious that there's a lot of new history, of course, of the special relationship.
My feeling is that a part of the, basically, let's face it, the cosmetics of the five-hour session, which should go forward, this should be presented to you, of course, yes, there hasn't been a decision, but the State Department had to, you know, but apart from that, I would like to suggest
And I'd like both you and Henry to give me a clue on that possibility of when, in your other discussions, you might discuss this thought and see whether or not the two powers can play roles.
I think that's a very useful position.
And this is a part of other things that happen.
At any time, too, I would hope that we not, and I would suggest that
such a thing that it should be developed.
We talked about disarming.
If we have as much problems on, you know, limitation of armaments is difficult.
When you talk about disarming, of course, that is more difficult.
And so, and also when you're talking about instead of twos having five, that's even more difficult.
But, so this means, and I'm glad that you emphasized this a very early procedure,
I would not think, for example, that it would be helpful.
That's why I asked who would be the first.
I would think it would be helpful to say, have the forecasters all meet
until you have worked out at a working level, I don't know if the...
I don't know specifically on what levels would be the problem, because it's such a big problem in my experience.
But the same for the Tiberians, because this would give them a chance to do such a thing as we do now.
But I don't understand it, but from a human channel, it is.
And I'm glad that this text was written out.
It's officially come back now.
And the second time we'll be talking about this on the conference.
It's a matter of open discussion.
On what level is this?
Well, the way this will happen is that we'll have to send this to the state.
And the second thing is that I think you and the ambassador
at an appropriate time, you know, even the other things you were discussing.
Perhaps I don't have much to add about this.
I mean, I have accepted, let's also keep the, let's keep our discussions going.
You know, there's a lot of, you know, right now, how do we know, discuss another generation?
What does, and in general, do you look at a billion?
Well, we've got a billion.
And we've got some, those two are,
It seems to me that those are the ones that are on the fire, and we ought to, I think, they should be given equal importance.
I mean, it doesn't have to be.
Thank you so much for your reply to this, Mr. Kessler.
We'll prepare a formal reply, but in addition to that, then I think this, that this matter, I think, should, what I'm suggesting is that after we've had a chance to read it, sort of then,
If you've had a chance to consider it for us, we would be happy to talk and, you know, travel from there.
But we... Well, you know, I think...
I guess we'll make it a little bit...
Yes, I'm feeling this, that we're really in the testing period.
When I say the testing period,
You know, some people tend to read speeches made last week.
say, well, this is hard mine, this is softer mine, et cetera, but none of those things mean anything.
Now, that's right.
I don't know how we do it, but then talk to people.
What do you mean?
My view is that what really counts is what we're doing, not what we're saying.
We should all be careful.
It seems to me, Ambassador, that we're at that point where
If we play a constructive role, then we can make a breakthrough on Berlin and on salt.
If we do that, the whole post-war world, our two relationship changes.
If we don't do that, it's going to be sticky.
I mean, I think that's really what it gets at.
And also, if we can move in those periods, we then open up the way.
We've walked with it.
and open up the way for some other areas of discussion.
I'm not suggesting that if we don't move these other areas, we will not be studying them.
But I think it seems to me we've moved so far in both of these that we ought to do in both the land and salt.
Those are the ones I think are very, very high levels.
And I think, frankly, if you follow our press and the world press,
They're watching us both very closely.
Yes, we do, because they know we've been talking to them.
Before our initial announcement on Seoul, many of them said, nothing's happening, and something's happening.
Maybe something's more going on.
Well, they went for a landing notice.
I noticed some of the press lines.
We've said, nothing's happening, no progress.
Well, they don't know what's happening.
The point is that we now have an opportunity, it seems to me, on a basis where each surge is on its own.
You want to serve your people, serve our people.
That's what it is.
We want, like salt, you've got to make a deal that protects your interests.
We've got to make one that protects ours.
But it can be done.
And the same on Berlin.
And the same on such and such.
It's further down the line in Vietnam and things like that.
But I think we have established here a method of discussion that to me is quite satisfactory.
I would like to have it pursued.
And the main point is that we've got to remember, too, that we must want to make progress.
Well, we don't want to hurry or anything.
You don't.
We don't.
We now are at a point where we really shouldn't be able to make some progress.
I'm sorry.
I mean, we're at that point where with as many subjects as we've discussed before, it seems to me we're now at a point where we should culminate something.
And when we did culminate one, that's something of importance.
That's going to have a massive effect on world opinion.
Now, the steel beds was good, but you know, everybody knows that's just a start.
I think the ambassador is trying to lead you towards the Middle East.
But let me say that the Middle East is important.
We're aware of that.
Here's the problem with the Middle East, which you well know, is the great sensitivity of other powers.
They talk about a Soviet-American condominium in Europe.
They also worry very much about it there.
And yet, we have to face the fact that a Soviet-American
The interests of the Mideast are quite different.
We are playing here.
We both have constituents.
He may not be able to control.
That is, therefore, a very dangerous situation.
Between the two of us, the United States and the Soviet Union, we're both indulgent and we're so strong that none of us is going to be doing something wild on our own.
On the other hand, the moment that you are dealing with a situation that is very explosive and somebody else has his finger on the trigger,
You on the one hand may have your friends that may feel that they want to draw you, want to get involved in something that you have drawn in.
We may have people who are satisfied
The Mideast, by the way, is not prepared to discuss it at this point.
By the Mideast, therefore, it is very likely that at some point it will require discussion.
In our own interest, I mean, because of food, what earthly reason, what good is it going to serve the U.S. and the Soviet Union to get involved in something like this?
I don't know.
Good to see you.
Good to see you.
Good to see you.
Good to see you.
Good to see you.
Good to see you.
Good to see you.
Good to see you.
Well, I'm going to talk to you, and then we'll, uh, we'll give this, of course.
Okay, very serious.
Consider it, Captain.
Thank you.
I love you.
I love you.
I love you.