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Conversation 521-007

TapeTape 521StartTuesday, June 15, 1971 at 3:19 PMEndTuesday, June 15, 1971 at 3:31 PMTape start time00:52:19Tape end time01:05:07ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Bull, Stephen B.Recording deviceOval Office
AudioNARA Description

On June 15, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 3:19 pm to 3:31 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 521-007 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 521-7

Date: June 15, 1971
Time: 3:19 pm - 3:31 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

The President’s previous meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
     -Soviet Union proposed
          -The President’s response
          -Linkage implication
          -Proposed conference
     -US, Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China [PRC] relations
     -Channel for negotiations
     -Soviet Union intentions
          -The President’s assessment
          -Summit possibilities
          -Soviet domestic situation

Kissinger's schedule
     -Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT] meeting

William P. Rogers
     -Presentation of note

Foreign policy
     -President's diplomatic efficacy
           -Communists
     -Significance of rhetoric
           -Dwight D. Eisenhower
           -Milton S. Eisenhower [?]
           -Discussions with Nikita S. Khrushchev
           -John Foster Dulles
            -Dobrynin
                 -Dulles
           -Soviet Union-US relations
     -Announcement of PRC trip
           -Effect

President’s schedule
     -Upcoming meeting with Arthur K. Watson

White House administration
     -President's press and staff problems
     -Kissinger’s previous meeting with John B. Connally
           -Connally’s access to information
                 -Foreign policy
           -Leaks

                  -Connally’s view
                  -Melvin R. Laird
                  -Rogers
                  -Kissinger statements
            -Press coverage
                  -Connally’s view
                  -Poor treatment of President
                       -Examples
            -Pentagon Papers

Connally
    -Role
            -The Vice Presidency
                 -Spiro T. Agnew

Pentagon Papers
     -Effect on Vietnam War effort
          -Medal of Honor winners
          -Veterans
     -The President’s view
          -New York Times
     -Responsible parties
          -Punishment
     -Connally
          -Attack on Lyndon B. Johnson
          -Competency in government
                -Perception of public
          -John N. Mitchell action
      -New York Times
          -Access to White House personnel
          -Kissinger cancellation of editorial
     -Knowledge of implications
     -Use of leaked material
          -President's Vietnam War contingency plans
                -Kissinger’s memo's to the President
                      -McGeorge Bundy
                      -Johnson
                      -Circulation
                           -Kissinger
                           -Bundy
          -Past leaks compared to current ones
                -Kissinger’s view

                 -Department of Defense [DOD] role
                 -Department of State role

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 3:19 pm.

     President’s schedule
          -Meeting with Watson and Col. Richard T. Kennedy

     Kissinger’s schedule

Kissinger and Bull left at 3:31 pm.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

That's a good one.
You made it pretty clear.
She discussed it at the highest level.
Even he worked on it.
He worked on it.
He was on it.
He worked on it.
Well, in effect, what you were telling him, it depended on how we do on other nuclear matters.
Yeah, and also it depended, too, on the fact that we couldn't have a five-hour conference unless the two big bars had all worked out.
And you gave him an incentive to stay on our good side with the Chinese.
Well, they're playing.
Oh, they're working practically.
I just can't.
I just feel myself.
We just don't think.
They don't know.
He knows.
They don't know.
He said, well, how are our relations?
I said, well, they're better.
They're only better if something happens.
That's exactly what you've got to go through.
Absolutely.
And basically, we've come up here and we had a combination.
Actually, if they don't
No, I think they'll make a deal that they may want the summit next spring, but I think they need a deal for their own domestic reasons.
I've got a meeting on the dam salt thing going on down today.
I've already done it.
I just said he'd brought it in.
It was a personal message.
He took it and said it will be sent to State and he'll get his answer through State.
And I think we're going to bring it in today, of course, because...
But I think what's hard about it is if I'm inclined to think that the way that I've been treated
Mr. President, you are outstanding in your diplomatic dealings with all foreigners, but you are particularly effective with the communists, because you have your interests and we have our interests.
And it's something they understand.
And it's interesting that O'Brien now says that the most impressive American he saw in the post-war period, I always told him, amid this administration, is Dulles.
He was the .
Yeah.
And now he .
He said he wanted to see .
But the way it is, we can't, we don't make quite so many Russians by, uh, by this, uh, by those accountants, by this .
No.
Uh, don't you agree?
Absolutely.
And, uh, I think we're, well, maybe something.
Oh, we've got so many, uh, .
Something is going to fall right there for you.
And you announce it.
It's the president.
No matter what we do, what they do, we are so, we are for once, we are ahead of the power curve with the... Well, the cards are going to begin falling at the end of next week.
I would just like you to hear before you start.
I heard Watson in about 15 minutes.
Oh, that's all right.
Because he's got it.
All right.
We really do have a situation that's pretty goddamn wearing in this office at the present time.
When you start to think of the
The problems we have with the Congress, the problems we have with the press, the problems that we did, the problems we have with the establishment.
You don't think that he could think of a curse, the way he promised you, to be greater because of the agony of his family and all of this?
On the other hand, he had a few friends.
My problems, I don't think we got any friends.
And he didn't have nightly television.
Well, but wait a minute.
Come right down.
I talked to Connolly today, and he made a very, very, very, very, and he said, well, Connolly said, of course, before he passed, he completely agrees with you.
the way you are handling, the method of handling foreign policy.
He did want to know everything, didn't he?
Oh, no.
No, he was marvelous.
He tried to escape it to him in the broadest outlines.
I didn't even tell him.
We had some things going on with the Chinese.
We had some going on with the Russians.
We had some going on with the Vietnamese.
I didn't tell him even that we had made a final offer or anything like that.
Yeah.
But he said you were right.
He said neither Laird nor Rogers are going to police their departments for you.
He knows that.
Yeah.
And I didn't say anything against them, Mr. President.
He volunteered that information.
And he feels that you're doing the right thing.
But he said, for example, take the press today.
He said, you saw Paul Clark, the ambassador.
That is on page two or on page four.
On the front page of the Washington Post, he says there's a story
nation upset about drug abuse.
They could have run that any day in the next two weeks or in the last two weeks.
They put it in the top news story.
I mean, he used it as a little example of what you heard, what this administration is up against.
No, we see how we do it.
And...
But where's...
He's not discouraged.
Oh, no, no, no.
He's all out.
He thinks we've got to fight these bastards.
Oh, yes.
Yes, no, he mentioned it to say, he said...
You know, he spoke again of you in the warmest terms and of the administration, but he says he just said he never realized.
It's worse than he thought.
That's the point.
The other thing, too, is that there's no question.
I don't know how it's going to go off in some area.
We're going to have to go in there.
They're going to try and concern us.
He's the only one in the whole band out there that's as strong enough to be in the job.
Well, there's a few of them.
I was the president, you know.
You can't play.
No.
You can't.
Oh, no, no, no.
I've seen enough of him now, yeah.
Oh, my God, I get so...
This presents a lot of honors for a lot of us, but... You see, all these guys are...
They're sort of mid-American families.
Bad manners.
Well, those are the ones we can't let down.
Jesus Christ, I think of those guys.
I mean, personally, there are times I get, I, you know what?
If I didn't mind the guy, I would shoot him.
I really need you.
I mean, I line the bash up against the wall, and I might solve it for the critters.
That's what I would do for the critters.
Conley made the point, incidentally, he said, don't fall for the line that this is an attack on Johnson.
He says, this is not an attack on Johnson.
The average person doesn't give a damn about Johnson anymore.
He says, this is an attack on the presidency and on the integrity of government.
He was very pleased with what Mitchell did.
He thinks we should fight it.
Yeah, absolutely.
It feels strong.
Everybody around here in Monsanto, the New York Times, has now cut off, cut, whatever.
That did it.
You know, there comes a time that breaks.
And I hate to do it, but, you know, they're going to learn.
We can punish them.
And I'm going to cancel that relevant editorial.
Yes, I'm sorry.
I can't.
I just put it on the page and said, well, if everything is done the way they are, fine.
I'm sorry I'm too busy.
I'm sorry I can't come.
I'm sorry I can't come.
I just wish I could.
You know, I just love to.
I'm busy.
The President's got me working on so many things.
We've got everybody playing a very clever line here.
They weren't going to know what they were doing, but they'll know.
I didn't know what they were doing.
They knew what they were doing.
You know, they were attacking the presidency and also they knew this would reflect on us.
They want to get the word around that the president, any president is a liar.
You can't believe a word out of one.
Also, the fact that they're trying to say, well, the president, why didn't I know about this?
We do all this stuff.
What does it mean?
Nothing.
This is simply the opinion of one son of a bitch over there who, a little group, about the way the war ended.
Nor can they tell, really, from, say, the Fundy Memorandum.
Yeah.
Well, how do you know?
How do you know what Johnson or Eagle?
How many?
Look at the contingency plans I've asked for.
That's right.
Right?
I have plans to bomb the North.
That's right.
I haven't done it.
That's right.
Absolutely.
Of course, there's one thing you can be sure of in your administration.
No memorandum of mine to you has ever left the White House.
Thank God.
Bundy used to send his around.
Well, I'll tell you.
No one knows what I write.
I'll tell you, we're going to get awful, awful frightened from now on.
I've got a perfect excuse.
Yes.
After this, I just want to say, well...
It's a terrible thing to do.
A terrible thing.
Men would be dangerous.
Well, this is, this is the worst I've ever seen.
I mean, this, up to now, this has leaked individual documents.
But this is hundreds of documents serialized in a newspaper.
I've never believed it.
Why do you have to believe it?
I ask you, why in the name of God did it have to be?
You don't have to stay.
Do you want to?
No, I've got to go.
Do you mind?
No, no, no, no, no.
I expect you to.
I just succeeded about it.
I don't have time to bother you.
Colonel, Colonel Kennedy.
I'll see you in a minute.
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