Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 538 › Conversation 538-004

Nixon & Haig on US-USSR relations and People's Republic of China

Tuesday, July 6, 1971 · 9:10 AM–9:25 AM ET · Oval Office · 13 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Conversation538-004 on Tape 538 (tape position 00:04:58–00:18:42)StartTuesday, July 6, 1971 at 9:10 AMEndTuesday, July 6, 1971 at 9:25 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 538-004 ↗ · National Archives Catalog, NAID 417178437 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and Alexander Haig discussed strategies for managing U.S. foreign policy, specifically focusing on balancing negotiations with the Soviet Union while preparing for a diplomatic opening with the People's Republic of China. Nixon emphasized the need to adopt a tougher, more assertive stance toward the Soviets regarding Berlin and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) to counter their perceived delaying tactics. The President decided to bypass traditional channels like David K. E. Bruce, opting to communicate directly to ensure the U.S. maintains the psychological initiative in these high-stakes geopolitical maneuvers.

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NARA Description

On July 6, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:10 am to 9:25 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 538-004 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 538-004

Date: July 6, 1971
Time: 9:10 am - 9:25 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

     US foreign relations
          -Possible forthcoming US-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] summit
               -Negotiations
                      -Timing
               -Issues
                      -Agreement on Berlin

                            -Cable to [David] Kenneth Rush
                      -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
                      -Anti-ballistic Missiles [ABM]
                -Henry A. Kissinger’s concerns
                      -People’s Republic of China [PRC] initiative
                            -USSR reaction
                -Middle East
                -Relations
                      -SALT
                      -Berlin
           -Message to Kissinger
                -Channels
                      -Dr. David K. E. Bruce
           -PRC
                -Forthcoming developments in relations
           -Possible forthcoming US-USSR summit
                -Timing

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2012-002. Segment declassified on 06/22/2016. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[538-004-w001]
[Duration: 42s]

     US foreign relations
          -Message from Henry A. Kissinger
               -India
                      -Announcement about discussions with People’s Republic of China [PRC]
Show the rest of the log (35 more lines)
                           -Indian sensitivity
                           -Hide role Pakistan played

******************************************************************************

     US foreign relations
          -USSR

                 -Pace of negotiations with the US
                 -Kissinger
                       -Response to recent Soviet proposal
           -Statement on US-USSR negotiations
                 -Berlin
                 -SALT
           -Relations with the USSR
                 -Delays in negotiations
                 -Forthcoming developments in US-PRC relations
                 -SALT
           -Kissinger

******************************************************************************

[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 07/01/2019.
Segment cleared for release.]
[Unintelligible]
[538-004-w002]
[Duration: 22s]

     US foreign relations
          -The President’s direction
          -Melvin R. Laird

******************************************************************************

Haig left at 9:25 am

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript is incomplete. The transcription skipped stretches of speech — roughly 3 minutes of this recording (about 25% of it) is represented by only a few words. Listen to the audio rather than relying on the text below; a corrected transcript is queued.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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There's much time left in the sub-chapter.
What the hell, who's had the time to wait?
You know what I'm saying?
That's right, crude.
Crude and obvious sub-chapter.
I feel that's what they're wanting to be.
They want to keep us.
They want to get everything they can from us, but they aren't getting everything we are.
And now the thing to do is to tighten up on them very tough.
Don't you agree?
I don't really.
I just sent a message to Rush and told him to delay everything, not to accept any new meetings on a Sunday, and just to hold up, sweat him a little.
That's what they really want.
They're pressing to get that thing locked into shape.
Can't be still stopping?
It's still manageable, sir.
It's going to take a little gas pain because of the German side, the goddamn panning on this thing.
Sure.
but we think we can make it very difficult.
And I think they're also quite goosey about the salt thing.
They want to keep it more in their direction than ABM and maybe something general and fuzzy on the offensive.
We have to play the other option.
Yes, sir.
It really makes it a little easier for us.
It'll be a good goddamn lesson for them.
Yeah.
Well, the point is that the... Well, there are the major concerns.
This is Miami.
China raises all sorts of problems in the Pacific.
It does.
Yet it's going to come.
and I think those problems have to be dated sometimes.
I'm not sure that just slipping into it is gonna be, perhaps in my opinion, I think it's, otherwise others are gonna sort of move into this.
That movement's gonna change, but nevertheless, that's that.
The other side of that, of course, is that we've been concerned, well, if we move toward the China and the Russians, we're gonna need to put the sleeves on,
So they can race on the Middle East fine.
Cherokee, Cherokee, and Suburban.
That sort of thing.
I've been talking around, too.
But I'm sold.
So they do it.
Oh, I think we have the same couple.
They, uh...
They obviously... We could use the... We could use the Chinese for our major diplomatic move this year.
And, uh...
Well, I think they'll get the word on this thing.
We've played this thing very, very straight with them.
Beeson, that's something that some discussions that have just occurred.
My God, we've been talking about it for a year.
They knew it.
And we've made some very major moves in the direction of...
Right, they gave you that, true.
All very planted.
Right, sir.
And mostly this brilliant thing, my God, that
We've done things from there that they never could have accomplished.
And we played a fairly conciliatory, you know, unsolved business.
We met them halfway.
Oh, I'll say.
We met them at least halfway.
Well, that's right.
You sent it all to Henry.
The director, he knows.
You've already told him.
Well, I've sent him a message, yeah.
Double talk.
Just go for the marbles.
And it's got to be without a, without a, without a, I think directly now, no, no Bruce is in between.
You see my point?
Sure.
I think this now is one where, rather than going for Bruce, there's no use to screw around with that.
Just go for the presidentialism.
All right?
All right.
It's a little clinger right in the head.
It is clinger.
The way they wanted it, they suggested that we, it would be, that they, they're smart enough to know we're doing it for the law, like you said, Bruce.
Just come right up.
We'll let the Russians say what they got to say, please.
That's right.
This is the next time we discuss something with them, that'll give them a little harder time.
I'm inclined to think, knowing those bastards that
This is the way to deal with them and not the other.
They don't understand.
No.
No.
No, they want everything.
And we're doing it.
But we have played the other pretty tough.
I mean, pretty.
We've been very measured and ordered in the way we've done it now.
We'll play the Chinese thing.
And then...
And obviously the wording of that thing, they really stretched the point to be affirmative, and yet the whole, they didn't, could have been much more negative.
Well, it's pretty good, except that that doesn't mean anything here, that they're going to destroy that, and that's cheating.
Where's the custom in there?
When they talk about November, December,
That's right, sir, and they didn't make a commitment.
If anything, they could use any pretext to delay it.
No, but their idea that, well, look, we'll let you come, but if you do things for us, well, bullshit, we don't want to come that bad.
That's part of the idea.
We don't, we don't, we don't remember some of that much.
It's just the way it's going to be.
Henry sent a message last night.
He wanted you to be aware that there will be some Indian flack when an announcement is made about a discussion with the Chinese.
And most importantly,
He's apparently run into some real sensitivity.
I think that really lends itself to being sure that we mention it on Chinese soil, because if they think it was done in Pakistan, we'll never... That would be very difficult.
I wish they'll get their attention.
I'll tell you that.
They had no more
conceived of the alternative here.
They obviously thought that they would make a plan.
They obviously think they can play us at their pace and on their terms.
They also look at it because they also probably are afraid.
They want to get everything they can out of us.
They think we want it too much.
They don't think we want to come and repress them.
You know, they're not going to support you.
They never would.
They'd do anything they could to keep you out.
That's what you're shocked to see.
He was convinced they were
Well, I think he expected an answer that would be affirmative, but I think he was hoping for a negative one because it makes the whole exercise cleaner.
It's not either.
It's not really negative.
It's essentially a wishy-washy blackmail effort.
Oh, yeah.
You're right.
And of course, we had to support both sides of the system, and it's such a perfect match to ensure the proof was made.
And I said both sides, well, there's nothing to make the difference.
They're both in preparation for a weekend of positive results.
And to make we that more positive.
And certainly, you know, the region of San Jose's island, there's no full certainty that the rain could be reaching San Jose's island.
Well, I think what he's talking about is progress in the, uh, in Berlin and salt, uh,
He led himself to it.
Well, that's all right.
Well, this is going to be very, very awesome.
What is necessary is that they're not going to be able to stand up on a soapbox and say,
practice duplicity or we deceive them or we this at the stage where we're doing we didn't have a good picture before if they had come back affirmatively we were going to have one hell of a time bridging these two things you know as this comes out as it turns out you know it really seems like you can have both in a sense having both
I think we'd announce them and then announce China that they want to knock them out.
That's right, sir.
We don't want to.
Now, we'll go to China, and then it's up to them.
We've got the psychological edge here.
We'll see what the hell they're willing to do.
I suppose they'll be damned if they come and assault me.
But they want that.
If they want that, they'll have to readjust their entire timetable to come out from this.
They plan to go into China, and to do that, they've got to have a settled flank, a settled career.
Yes, sir.
I think they've got about two years.
I think they've been planning about two years to go in there.
This is just going to shake that up.
And the best part of it is that, by God,
We have had the psychological initiative.
They are the ones that have been entrenched.
And we were forced to react.
Good afternoon, sir.

Also recorded on July 6, 1971

  • 538-001 8:59 AM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:59 am and 9:10 am.
  • 538-002 8:59 AM · 20 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:59 am and 9:10 am.
  • 538-003 8:59 AM · 15 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:59 am and 9:10 am.
  • 538-005 9:25 AM · 21 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:25 am and 9:50 am.
  • 538-006 9:25 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:25 am and 9:50 am.
  • 538-007 9:25 AM · 41 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:25 am and 9:50 am.
  • 538-008 9:50 AM · 12 min — President Richard M. Nixon and George P. Shultz met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:50 am to 10:00 am.
  • 064-003 10:00 AM · 50 min — President Richard M. Nixon and steel industry leaders and union representatives, including George P. Shultz, Roger S. Albrendt, Stewart Cort, Edwin H. Gott, Fred G. Jaricks, Frank Nemec, John O'Connell, Thomas Patton, J. Warren Shaver, William J. Stevens, George A. Stinson, C. William Verity, John Wall, Walter J. Burke, Joseph P. Maloney, Bernard Kleiman, Elliot Bredhoff, I[lorwith] W. Abel, John B. Connally, James D. Hodgson, and White House photographer, met in the Cabinet Room of the White House at an unknown time between 10:00 am and 11:19 am.

All 17 conversations from July 6, 1971 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 538-004, July 6, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives (NAID 417178437). Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/538-004 (accessed November 2, 2026).