Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 601 › Conversation 601-017
Nixon, Haig & Hassan on United Nations and Taiwan
Saturday, October 23, 1971 · 11:59 AM–12:17 PM ET · Oval Office · 16 min
AI Summary
President Nixon contacted King Hassan II of Morocco to personally lobby for Moroccan support regarding the upcoming United Nations vote on the representation of China. The President argued that the expulsion of Taiwan by a simple majority would threaten the future stability of the UN and urged the King to support the U.S. position declaring the matter an 'important question.' Following the call, Nixon and Alexander Haig discussed the diplomatic strategy, expressing frustration over the necessity of presidential intervention and asserting that nations receiving U.S. foreign aid should be expected to align with American interests at the UN.
Audio
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript is incomplete. The transcription skipped stretches of speech — roughly 7 minutes of this recording (about 45% of it) is represented by only a few words. Listen to the audio rather than relying on the text below; a corrected transcript is queued.
This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.
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I think you'd better give me one of those briefings.
Thank you.
For some reason, I'd say the line is busy, to his majesty.
It seems to be a break time between the Arabian and the French.
Hello?
Yeah, yeah, put him off, put him off.
Anybody else is on the line.
Hello?
Yes.
Uh...
Good afternoon, Your Majesty.
I have disturbed you this afternoon to present to you my views on a subject that I consider to be of the greatest importance, the vote of the United Nations on Chinese representation, which will occur on Tuesday.
Hello, Your Majesty.
I have arranged this afternoon to present to you views on a subject to which I attach the greatest importance.
It is the vote on the United Nations on Chinese representation, which will probably take place on Tuesday.
As you know, since we had the opportunity to meet in 1957, I've always had the greatest respect for you and also for the independence and integrity of your country.
And because I cherish our personal relationship,
I want to speak to you on the frankest terms about this important issue.
It is my conviction that
The removal of an honorable member of the United Nations by a simple majority vote would be aggressive of the most disastrous consequences, which could have the most serious implications for the future survival of this organization.
I heard it's freezing.
I would ask you to consider voting with the United States in favor of making the issue of expelling the government of Taiwan an important question, and at the same time to support the position in establishing this matter as one of priority during Tuesday's deliberation.
I believe this is in the interest of the United Nations in the future.
because if any member can be expelled at any time by a simple majority vote, this could unravel the organization in years to come.
I think that this is in the interest of the United Nations and of the future, because if any member can be expelled to a small majority, it can have very serious consequences and exacerbate the organization.
And if you could find it possible to vote with the United States on this issue alone, that is an important question.
I would consider it a very, very personal favor.
I look forward, Your Majesty, to our meeting again at some time.
I know we didn't plan it, but events have been agreed, and I, Mr. Nixon, I look forward to welcoming Your Majesty at a time convenient to you and our country.
Hello?
Hello?
Hello, please.
Uh, if that is, we would like to thank you, Mr. Preston, for your questions.
Thank you.
Please send in your best personal greetings to Mrs. Dixon.
Hello.
Hello, hello, .
I have personally looked into this matter of China.
I know that it is a highly delicate issue.
I have explained this to Mr. Rockwell.
I don't think I'm following you.
It was my intention to look into this matter of being this afternoon with my government.
I want you to tell the President and I a fully understanding concern of the United States.
Hello?
Hello?
Hello?
Hello, I can't hear you.
Hello?
Hello?
Tell Mr. President that...
Yes, yes.
That you are...
Wait, I want you to tell the President that I'm deeply touched by the fact that he has called you first.
Any good?
And I want you to convey to the President my wishes for his first and happiness and prosperity.
Now we're looking to send you a message regarding our position.
That is all.
Thank you very much.
I don't want to state the idea I'm never going to do this or anything again.
Of course, this is what we had to, but it's just too much.
You can't have the president call people or anything else.
Absolutely.
Our ambassadors ought to be strong enough that, I mean, they rub it up at the United States.
You know, what is the problem here?
Maybe the ambassador, secretary of state, the president should never have to call anybody.
You should never have to.
Never.
It's a damn shame because... And it's not... By the time it gets to that, it's either settled one way or the other.
And you should not have to put your prestige on it.
I just hope they've been directing the call rather than the other thing.
Well, a Mexican, I think, will think very hard before he...
I think he will.
I think he will, yes.
And if they don't support us, well, they don't.
They've got a hell of a problem of their own down there.
Very well.
He's got a real problem domestically.
That's right.
Oh, well, well.
There's probably a good chance that Cain...
I did not get that.
He probably didn't even know what the issue was.
It doesn't turn just about every rock you can turn on this thing.
If it doesn't turn out, it doesn't turn out.
And what we have to be careful of is if they don't get running for some kind of a fallback compromise that looks for two Chinas, we'll be in trouble.
Because that Peking would really take, take exception to.
There's no way you can do that.
All right, I'm going to put you through this.
I know it's a strange person.
I, well, Rogers, I know is, will be his son's husband.
Oh, he's his son's husband.
He just, if you let it go.
Okay.
He's worked so hard at this thing, and I think he really has become a personal thing as well as an objective one.
And that's good.
He's done a very fine job.
Iraq was like Botswana, and I saw that on the other side, too.
They have no reason not to be with us, the country.
But every country that we ADL has got to vote with us.
Now, that's probably something, like, instead of media, I guess, but we have no sense of us giving aid to countries that don't vote with us in the United Nations.
It's cruel.
Don't you agree?
I agree, and these are usually the places where we have the sorry sisters as ambassadors.
I'm afraid to break any crockery.
I'm sure it's going to be close, but I think at least if we go down, we'll know we've done as much as could be done.
I'm inclined to think we'll just make it.
I think most of these people, when they get down there,
That issue, if it evolves to the important question, they're going to be hard-pressed to let a simple majority rule.
Well, they don't even need to make calls over there if you want this to be discussed.
If you want to get the attack, you've got to get an extension.
Of course, that is better than the answer.
It should be an extension.
And incidentally, he ought, Rogers, I'm sure, should try to get an extension from Mexico.
Oh, in the room, yes.
Yeah.
I think the route really has to be that if he finds he can't get the nose, eyes, that they really ought to go all out on the sentence.
That'll win him.
Let him off the hook.
Easy.
Well, anyway, that's enough for today.
There's something getting his call, sir.
There's something getting him.
He was hit from that honey apparently.
Okay.
This is very bad.
Back off.
Well, back off.
Why is everybody here?
As it turns out now, Henry will not be back until Tuesday afternoon.
That's right, sir.
And he's fervent now.
Now, if we have a change in this boat, honey, we could be...
I think we better than Ben just decide to bring him home back.
Because I have to go.
Let me ask you this, I'm sure.
We overreacted something, didn't we?
This is why maybe I went, too.
No.
I was just going to sit down there.
She needs to come here.
No, it would be very obvious that he was being held in orbit for the vote.
All right.
This is ready to go.
Oh, uh, you should know that I don't want the...
I don't want an escort.
I mean, it slows us down.
Why is it up there?
All right, well, you can call over there and say that I'll be out over in five minutes.
All right, thank you.
NARA Description
On October 23, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Alex G. Toumayan, and King Hassan met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:59 am and 12:17 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 601-017 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 601-17
Date: October 23, 1971
Time: Unknown between 11:59 am and 12:17 pm
Location: Oval Office
The President met with Stephen B. Bull, Alexander M. Haig and Alec G. Tourmayan.
Telephone call difficulties
Briefcase
The President talked with King Hassan II between 11:59 am and 12:08 pm
[Conversation No. 601-17a]
[See Conversation No. 12-106; one item has been withdrawn from the conversation]
[End of telephone conversation]
Tourmayan left at 12:08 pm.
Forthcoming United Nations [UN] vote on Taiwan
-The President's direct role
-Ambassadors
-Role
-Secretary of State
-The President’ view
-Mexico
-Haig’s assessment
-King Hassan II
-US efforts
-“Two China” Policy
-People's Republic of China [PRC]
-William P. Rogers
-Morocco
-Botswana
-US foreign aid
-The President’s view
-Haig’s view
-US Ambassador
-Haig’s view
-Rogers
-Mexico
-The President's conversation with King Hassan II
Henry A. Kissinger
-Schedule
Haig left at 12:14 pm.
The President's schedule
-Camp David
**********************************************************************
BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 18s ]
END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
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Bull left at an unknown time before 12:17 pm.Also recorded on October 23, 1971
- 012-104 11:43 AM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon, unknown person(s), and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:43 am and 11:53 am.
- 601-013 11:51 AM · 5 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at 11:51 am.
- 012-105 11:53 AM · 32 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Thelma C. ("Pat") (Ryan) Nixon talked on the telephone from 11:53 am to 11:54 am.
- 601-014 11:53 AM · 32 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Thelma C. ("Pat") (Ryan) Nixon met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:53 am to 11:54 am.
- 601-015 11:54 AM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:54 am and 11:59 am.
- 601-016 11:54 AM · 18 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:54 am and 11:59 am.
- 012-106 11:59 AM · 14 min — President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, King Hassan, Stephen B. Bull, and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone from 11:59 am to 12:08 pm.
- 012-107 12:17 PM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 12:17 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 601-017, October 23, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/601-017 (accessed October 12, 2026).