On October 30, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:21 am to 12:07 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 609-011 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
You know what I mean?
Well, he's, he's, of course, he don't mind, he's getting better.
He's totally irresponsible.
You can't be, you can't on Tuesday say, well, we shouldn't worry too much about Taiwan being out, and then on Friday say, well, let's buy a kiss or go to China, and all that bullshit.
Okay.
Okay, sir.
Good luck.
Yes, sir.
I'm sorry, I gave you the wrong information.
I'm prepared for...
I have a vaccine, sir.
I'm prepared for... What, sir?
Must be... Absinthe, ma'am.
Must be what, sir?
The absinthe.
That's fine.
It's a verb, isn't it?
Must be absinthe.
Right.
Thank you.
I've talked to...
Well, I think it has a way of splitting the Democrats.
This is one in which even Harriman has to do something.
They won't play.
I don't see what they can do except to put you.
I don't think we ought to call them in.
In a crisis like that, we don't have a vote right now.
We've got to get a new program.
I don't see what we can do.
I thought we can get them to come out for a foreign aid program.
Sure, I don't know.
Or to come out for a foreign aid program, but you see...
What does that do in terms of, I can't, we've got to get a beacon on the, so that there's something specific.
That's something that's something we should get something.
Well, we could get different people this time.
We could get, for example, I think Harriman would,
My view is not to do it in terms of falling into the White House, that kind of thing, but that's the way to do it this time.
The way to do it is to get rid of supporters.
I mean, in committing individual bitches or something of that sort, you can't just, you just can't repeat the same thing.
It's a little bit of a major smack of a, you know, it's not quite the way to be at it PR-wise.
And also for the reason that we don't have to come in and say, well, we need to get a question before we make that decision.
So it's a lot, it's a lot for our name.
Now, how do you look at it?
See, before you maybe call, you look at the train of thought, it's a city of hope, let's try it out.
And we sent people down to the Senate to work on various senators on that vote.
In fact, I bet with something here, we do not have a hard vote in principle.
Like, it's got to be able to get together and say where 14 went.
But would you mind if I called people like George Paul?
Oh, that's fine.
That's fine.
I didn't need to call senators, congressmen, leaders, editors, press.
Hell, you know, I said there's eight individuals in this stand.
Yeah, but they'd split that out.
I'll leave them.
I mean, that's what I'll do.
I will leave them.
I will never sign a traditional law.
Never.
Never.
I think you'd be done and go, ho, I won't sign 8 Bridge, I won't sign 8 for Cambodia, I'll leave it there.
Hell, we're not going to have it.
They've all got to go together now.
They're not going to play that kind of a game.
And they're going to be told that's a straight out thing.
I've already told them, right, that if one is about 8 Bridge, they're not going to see how we do it.
We're going to play a hard line.
We're going to get some of these people.
We're going to have to hold them.
We're going to have to hold them.
See, they're getting at various lengths here, people that want to vote against the United Nations.
Actually, we can expect that.
But as you said this morning, those 15 Republicans, 12 of them would have been against it anyway.
They always are.
And they've never voted for foreigners.
People like that.
That's...
But we only got eight Democratic votes for the day, haven't we?
I mean,
Dominic would be against it.
Fannin would be against it.
Fannin.
Go ahead.
Gurney.
Against him.
Hansen.
Against him.
Well, Hatfield.
Hatfield, yeah.
He is now.
He's a dove.
He's a dove.
Jordan.
Against him.
Roth.
Roth?
Yeah.
Yeah.
Probably.
Zach Spade.
Zach Spade, he's just a dove.
Yeah.
Smith.
Yeah.
Steve.
Margaret Smith.
Yeah.
Stevens is running.
Smith is running.
Weicker, and Young.
Those were the Republicans.
Young is always against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
He's basically taking the same line.
What about the 8 Democrats?
That's the whole point.
There were only 8, 4.
There were 26 Democrats against.
Allen, Bay, Benson, Bible, Burdick, the two birds, Cannon.
These are against?
Again, Childs, Church, Cranston, Eastland, Irwin, Fulbright.
Your son Dennis was against it.
Dennis, I can understand that.
Well.
He may have been just a fucking general.
Not against Russia.
Oh, no.
Just against the...
The tempers are shorter than the Olympics.
That's good enough.
There were more Republicans for the Democrats.
Oh, sure.
That's the word.
Eighteen Republicans or more.
That's right.
I have no objection, whatever.
I think it's fine if you can get some of these people stirred up to come out if they really will.
I can't emphasize too strongly.
In a partisan political year, they're going to play partisan politics.
They really are.
They know what they're doing.
They like to make it difficult.
Don't expect that's the thing.
You get closer to an election.
So when you do it on the border, you've got some pipeline.
But it would knock out 500 million for Vietnam.
Economic aid would knock out, would finish Cambodia because all of that is in the foreign aid frontiers.
We can only get us to January, can't we?
I think so, yeah.
The next session, I think so, yeah.
The next session, I think so, yeah.
The next session, I think so, yeah.
The next session, I think so, yeah.
The next session, I think so, yeah.
The next session, I think so, yeah.
The next session, I think so, yeah.
No, you have a totally irresponsible group, there is no question.
Yet, we won all the individual votes.
That's what's so amazing.
That's why, I don't know, I am certain that the boys, which I regret, they sort of dropped the ball and the lock, and both were crying for faith or something.
Everybody got back.
There must have been a way that all this was coming, you know what I mean?
But I was talking to them on Thursday morning,
Everyone was worried about the amendment, but they thought that if they could beat the amendment, that they were in good shape, because basically the 41 votes against are something like the 44 votes that were for Cooper Church.
But that one we beat by 47 to 44.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Well, that was their line before.
That's what their accident line was before.
Yeah.
It was the Kennedy line.
This was a foolish policy, right?
Oh, yes.
It was inconsistent with our time initiative.
So let me say that it washes out in terms of the initiative itself.
And that overwhelms it all.
It will overwrite it all in the end.
Never be concerned about the day-to-day battles.
These people are fly-snaking and so forth.
They cannot destroy me.
It's too big.
Oh, no question.
It's too big, too big.
I'll tell you one thing.
We cannot separate anything out.
We do.
You see, the only way to do it, you have various interests that will support various things.
And he ever said, in order for the whole bill to float, you've got to have the 80-year-old in it.
That's the way you get Javits, for example, and presidential candidates.
But I cannot, cannot possibly vote against that if it takes you down.
That's why you've got to get the race lobby to work on these people, not say, God damn it, because I'm just cold-hearted.
And if they won't get a bill, I'm not going to sign one for them at all.
How?
Because they're not going to have a lot to spend it on right now, so they're not going to have all that change.
It's all right, because I think I'd have a plan.
It's all right.
Same as everybody else.
I told Angeloski to make a copy of this for you, and one for him.
The main purpose was I spent most of the time basically on very cold, dirty, awkward art.
They feared what the Soviets would do to the smaller countries.
We were not.
Well, that was a very weird way to read it.
It's almost a...
I said, look, we've been talking about all these nice things, but let me talk frankly to you, man to man.
You're a tough guy, so am I. I said, this is what I agree with.
And, you know, I also dropped it.
I dropped it on the alarm, which is extremely tough.
I said, leave me there for the last.
I thought for a second, what are you going to do?
I said, I just don't want you to be surprised.
I said, by the end of November, I said, by Christmas, I said, I'll have to take other action.
I said, it won't be against Laos.
It won't be against Cambodia.
I went over the whole thing, why I did Cambodia, and that I had warned Chester, or Chester, why we had Laos, and I had warned Jamaica, who were going to do it.
And I said, now, this time, I said, it will be against our willpower.
I said, I don't want you to be surprised.
So, just let it lay there.
Because that's what we have to do.
That's what we have to do.
I said, you make that impression that we have no option except to withdraw.
I said, that's not true.
What did he say?
Did he say anything?
No shit.
He said, no.
He said, I realize that you checked it out.
It shows that you're weak.
You got through to it pretty damn good.
Oh, even if you didn't, you should go out and do it for others.
They didn't want to comment.
It's got to be just the participation of everybody in the government.
I said, well, we made an offer to allow that to come on.
That's all I've got.
I said, well, the way I put it, he will get through.
I said, no, I should do it.
I said, I'm afraid.
I said, you're going to talk to many world leaders.
I said, they will ask you about dangers, and I've asked you about Russia, people that I don't know.
I said, I don't want any of them to be under any dangerous miscalculation.
I said, I am a drawing of Vietnam.
We have an excellent doctorate.
We are going to China.
We are going to the Soviet Union.
I said, I want you to know something.
I'm going to tell you a little about my background.
I know yours.
I said, uh,
You're a man of peace, but you were a man of war.
You were a strong man, a tough man.
I said, I came off the hard way also.
I said, I'm a man of peace.
But I said, I am not one who will take peace in any price.
And through the defense drill and the rest of it, I said, I just want to clearly understand that as far as the United States, unless we get an arms limitation, then I will have to make a decision for the United States to go over and finish my good and honest arms.
Go ahead.
Tremendous.
All of this is going straight back to the Russians.
Well, you didn't see it.
Mr. Gavrilovsky got a message in English.
But it was a very tough talk.
I mean, I don't mean, not from him, but I just thought, I guess, that I was wanting to know exactly who we're up against.
But also, the threat there is now, we've laid it out again, and on the day of the meeting, excuse me, Mr. President, I'm just going to confirm that you did get into one of these parties at 12.30.
Yeah.
Would you like to, Manuela, give me your lunch here, or?
No.
No, I wouldn't.
All right.
Thank you.
No, it was very, very good talk.
I mean, I just used it for a monologue, strength talks.
And I, it was particularly effective.
I talked to you last night, and I said, you know, I want you to tell you where we're working in the whole world.
To the retreat of the week being lost in 19-M.
I said, it's late.
In the summer of August of 1969, I approached Jessica and we were making an offer.
I said, if that offer is not accepted, then I said, we will have to act.
I said, we waited, we waited.
They did not even discuss it.
And we went into camp, but even our characters came down the water.
I said, now, I said, I'm not asking you to comment on whether we should have gone in, but I said, that's why we did it.
I said, Danny, in October of last year, we made another offer.
If you remember, on October 7th, when he was here, I told him that we had made this offer.
And I said, if it was not accepted, we'd have to hang, and we went to the office.
And I said, now our intention is to sell it in a week.
I said, now they've got 400 prisoners.
I said, I will take any risk, at any cost, to get those prisoners back.
Not against us.
Not against me, I believe.
But this time it's our idea.
I said, I don't want you to be surprised.
It's going to be sad.
It's going to be sad.
Because the way I think about it, I think we're going to have to move the blockade route there.
I think that's probably better than just bombing again.
I think that bombing is something you do every day that people can say you're killing.
Well, we blockaded, and then cut the railroad with bonds, correct?
Yes.
I guess it was blockades on the bench, and... That will get you into trouble with the Russians, but on the other hand, it gives the Russians a reason to put this... Well, Tito went up to the drill, and he says, I think the Russians can't help you in this, in fact.
I got through with my drill.
I said, well, I don't know.
I said, maybe they should.
I said, maybe they are the Chinese.
He said, yes.
But it's obvious that he is...
When we got through with it, he doesn't think that we have no choice but just to get out.
And know that he wants you to, because if you don't secure it, it depends.
Life over the weak United States would be a very great danger to the peace of the world.
I said strong United States is essential.
In fact, this whole thing should be read, unfortunately, not because I got that, but because I didn't leave it on at the time.
It ought to be read by people who want to know what the hell my name is, where I live, what the doctor was, and all this crap.
We go down before these agencies, before the committees, and say, well, the president, they say...
They don't understand that yesterday the Moroccan ambassador called on state about the reports that you were displeased.
They had a report that you had called them international bandits.
I didn't.
So Newsom called up what he should say.
He said he was going to deny it totally and say we weren't going to penalize him.
I said, no, you can tell them it is not right.
The president never called them international blackmailers, that's what they said.
On the other hand, you have to know that the president is extremely displeased by the UN vote after having made a call to Morocco.
I think it is wrong on the UN vote for us to act as if this were a sporting contest in which you win a few and lose a few.
When a sovereign country votes against you, it's got to take the consequences.
And I'm getting that list together, and I think we should, every single goddamn one of them.
Oh sure, we're getting, I know this is a concern, we're getting criticized.
Are we going to take it on?
Of course we are.
Of course we are.
Of course we are.
You shouldn't say it.
Don't say it, but do it.
That's right.
And don't say you're not going to.
That's exactly my point.
Oh, one other thing.
Henry, I want you to do something now.
Now this is something that can be done.
I changed the call.
I want to direct you to prepare.
Give me the money.
Whereby I delegate to the Vice President the presentation of the diplomatic credentials.
I am never going to be in the position again of having these goddamn black bastards come in here with their damn investments.
I'm not going to give you five minutes of my time.
You understand?
Now...
The way I will compensate for that with the good countries, is I will have them, after they've presented their credentials, I'll have them come in, you know, from 10 minute chat, into this office.
But now there's no reason for me to sit over there and do that anymore, okay?
It can't be done.
You work it out.
I allocate to the Vice President the presentation of diplomatic credentials from now on.
Fair enough?
Fair enough.
And I think it's just as well as just not to go through this thing, present the damn credentials,
And he can repeat receiving the vinyl soon.
Over there.
Let it receive him right there.
How's that sound to you?
That's fine.
We can even make a distinction, you know, you might want to do.
Oh yes, I know.
But I want to delegate.
It's a federal rule, it should be the vice president, unless you put special...
Unless I have time to go over it, then there are occasions when I'll go over it.
I'm going to distinguish on that.
The little things we're going to distinguish on.
But disillusioned as I'm going to come in here with a partner out of it, I will never approve anything for one of these countries that voted against us.
I'm not going to do it.
The goddamn Ecuadorians should go to hell.
That was partly our fault.
I'll tell you why.
I'm sick of it.
We did something last year that we shouldn't have.
There must be something we can do to get that.
I don't know what it is.
Well, there's one that we really should put it to.
Ready?
Well, I am going to have lunch next week with Cromwell, and I'm going to tell him this.
Well, I just give you some thought.
I think it might not be too bad an idea...
If you could work it out some way with the French, currently, when you're, when you're waiting over there having a talk with Pompidou, or needing to meet Pompidou second, goddamn it.
Why not try to break Papa Du off just as we won't from the others?
The typical idea is that we haven't got to deal with the kind of a deal there that Thomas wants to deal with this thing.
But why the hell should we just let the British, in other words, let's meet Papa Du separately?
He's the president, the others aren't.
I'll go with you separately.
I don't, I think it's a good idea.
You speak more than decent to them, man.
I know this common market thing.
It's not in our interest, but I support it.
I've talked, who wasn't there talking to me, Goff, at Pompidou about, you know, the British and who the Christ is.
You know, I didn't tell them they ought to, but at least I felt they had the weight for it.
You know that.
Very well, I know it.
You know that.
And I think it's just, you've got to have time to...
I think we should do, Mr. President, I think you should meet with Pompeo.
I think you should meet with Brown too, just to show some activity.
Do it separately.
Do it separately.
Then, after having met with those two, let's just leave Heath alone aside for the time being.
We've offered it to him, he kicked us in the cheek.
I don't know, with Kroger, I wouldn't say that we want to go second to Heath, but if Brown, if Papadou wants to meet me, I'll meet him now.
I don't know whether French Guiana is the place to do it, but there isn't a better place.
Where the hell would you meet with Brown until they don't know anything anymore?
No, no, but Brown is going to be delighted to come over here.
Is he?
Yes.
I guess he would.
Oh, delighted.
He said, why wouldn't he suggest that we meet at San Clemente this time?
Right, sure.
Something like that.
He'd be delighted.
He'd be flattered out of his mind.
Come to meet at San Clemente.
Or, or.
He'd be flattered out of his mind.
And we probably wouldn't come here.
But I'd be glad to go beyond.
But we proposed some other...
I don't think I should go to Paris.
No.
No, no, because then if you don't go to Britain, it's a real slap.
But if you start some activity of seeing allies, you start consulting with Pompidou and Brandt, then let those two invite you to that European meeting, because then you've got them positioned ahead of time.
Then you can go to Luxembourg.
I just don't do it, but...
If you want to.
No, no, let's just, let's just do it.
I just feel this, I don't feel we have to have the British there, goddammit.
Let's take them off, let's take them off.
I would, well, I, if you approve, then I'll start moving on front, and... Now, now wait, let's be sure that we get the goddamned State Department program on this, now how are we going to do that?
You know, how are we going to get, just, just, just... Well, I'll get that agreement in principle, and then... And then have them come in and offer it, then...
Like what you did with the others?
No, what I can do is say, after we can tell Postform Bidu and Brandt that if you agree in principle, we will make a formal suggestion to use through a diplomatic channel.
And then he can tell Ratchett you'd like to do this, and Ratchett can just go through his drill.
I'd like to do this.
Oh yeah, he can do it, sir.
We don't have to do it out of here.
All we have to do out of here is to make sure if they approach right away, it leaks.
And if they don't want to do it, and also these people are flattered if you took the initiative.
All right, you take the initiative.
Work it out in principle.
I'll meet the French alone, and I'll meet the British alone.
The Germans alone.
The Germans alone.
The British.
Well, let's see.
After we cut those two, you'll come.
I see.
That's right.
But I'll see them alone.
I'll take the Germans, and I might just invite them to San Clemente.
You'll be there.
Well, I can go there anytime.
See my point?
It's worth it.
He's just being out there.
In fact, I am going to be there at Thanksgiving, which will be a beautiful time, but he'll be willing to come.
I would say, why don't you be there by the weekend?
See, for the dedication, incidentally, it would be a hell of a thing for marriage and friendship.
We're going to dedicate that Eisenhower Center, you know, medical center, on Saturday, the 30th of November.
And if he was to come, you know, I mean, I could stay right there with me in San Clemente in my house.
Okay.
Which would be a direct thing, you know, just be a guest in the house.
Okay.
Right.
Right.
Right.
Right.
Good.
Oh, he'll come.
I think his meeting won't be due at that time, but... We'll see.
But I'll suggest it to Bob.
Ja.
Ja.
I would like to have him do a meeting out there.
I think that has a good deal to it.
You can give a dinner to him if you want to.
Oh, yes.
He'll get a piece of prize on it.
Why not give it to him?
Oh, I can give him a dinner.
Of course I would.
Give him a dinner in Los Angeles.
Show everybody what you did.
They'll see people out there.
They'll love him.
He can put on a hell of a city dinner in Los Angeles.
Thank you.
I think we must show some activity towards our allies, huh?
Sure.
And we can even then consider seeing Sato, too.
Well, I think Connors Trevor showed some activity, huh?
And, uh... George, I'll talk to you about Finch's trip, by any chance.
Rockefeller called me, and he knows that we should let the surcharge before Finch goes or postpone Finch's trip, but we can't postpone his trip, in my opinion.
I am inclined to think that if Finch, Finch has got a handle on this trip, George, you better hand it over to him.
I'm having breakfast, so it makes sense.
If Finch has got a handle on this trip in a way that, you see, here's rock polish concerned.
If he goes down there, then he'll have a very, very rocky reception.
If the surcharge isn't lifted on the other end, it seems to me that he might go with the idea that one of the purposes is to discuss the problem of the surcharge.
Right, and to get it lifted after he leaves.
That's right.
That's right.
I think that would be, I don't think it's all that big an issue in some places.
But, you know, I mean, I think we...
I think it's an issue, but I frankly don't think that his reception depends entirely or largely on the search.
I think particularly, we indicated, this is one of the matters we're going to discuss, Rocky and Schultz, I started to put Schultz off on it last night.
Rocky called me about the day.
Okay, I'll talk to Schultz.
Just to get it out of the way, because Schultz is working on the search on Friday.
So you can...
I have scheduled the practice for next Tuesday to go over this whole economic issue.
We're going to be visiting this whole economic package.
But that is another area we're watching after the reason that we're going to start.
Between now and the time we have to get it started and ready for China.
And that's got to be on the 1st of February.
I got to start in two weeks.
I did not have to study.
I got to go in there really early.
I'll have a study trip.
And it's going to be a hell of a thing on my schedule.
Now that means that between now and the first half of the week I've got to get these things done.
I can't go to China unprepared.
Oh, God, no.
So my point is that let's get some of the nickel and dime stuff out of the way.
Let's consult with our allies and all that.
But let's get it going right away.
Okay.
I think you should have talked to your allies, to our allies, before you've gone to China.
Absolutely.
So we... You see, to remind this... Don't go overboard and say, well, because of the concern of our allies and the International Bank and the rest, we've got to procedurally remove search arms.
We must not do that.
Domestically, that would kill us.
I'm not out to search arms.
I think we ought to remove it selectively.
We're going to start that.
To take off some of the pressures and to keep the countries from ganging up on us.
Well, with Europeans, that's the problem.
When we remove it, as we may, on the Americans, including Canada, and possibly Japan, the Europeans, then, we think it might gang up.
That's why we'd like to pick the Germans off.
That's not going to be possible that way.
What I believe...
Well, I'd like to talk to Schultz about it.
I don't understand the reasons that keep us from formulating what we want from the Europeans.
Because unless we assume they're going to give us a better offer than we are capable of formulating, I don't see what we do by formulating an offer.
And...
So I would like to talk to Schultz.
I think we need a new system.
I disagree with Burns and those people who want us to go back to the old system.
No matter how it is, that's what it is.
A system of convertibility where the United States takes the responsibility.
We've got it.
We're not going to do it anymore.
I agree with Connolly that what's going to affect people immediately is what happens in trade.
But I think if you can go into the election as a man who's created a new international monetary system and a new international system, and if at the same time trade has improved somewhat, that would be the best possible outcome.
Coming back to this other problem of the Borges bill and so forth, it checks the...
Just a flag that's going to occur for a while, that's inevitable, and we just are going to be knocked off balance by it.
You want to remember that as far as the country is concerned, they aren't going to give much of a damn.
You know what I mean?
They're against Ford, Hagen, they probably don't understand that.
And a lot of this stuff, they're against the United Nations.
Our problem is to get it out of the way, and then the China thing will come back from the center.
It's got to.
It's too big.
It's too big.
You also have to realize that we have, we're going to have, you're just not going to have responsibility having been a part of these parties, the Democrats, and you're not going to do it.
Republicans, you're expected to be responsible.
It's always been this way.
I have always had to be responsible.
Who the hell else would have gone around worrying in 64, 65, 66?
I defended the goddamn Vietnam policy better than Johnson did.
It's a disgrace.
Who are they holding?
They don't do it.
They never defend us.
They just... Well, it doesn't defend you.
I mean, after all, Mr. President, if you wanted to, you could ride this way.
It's defending the country.
It's their own goddamn program.
It's something unbelievable that you are... Galbraith said this morning that if any democrat had done what you are doing, there'd be barricades in the street.
And... You mean on China?
On China, on the...
He said what you did with the Soviet, he thought it was a tremendous move.
Because it made it clear that it wasn't just a trick against the Soviets.
And of course, first, they never give you a break in the press.
They should have written that Soviet summit for weeks.
Right.
We all thought it would get some play, but it got two days.
The Soviet summit got two days, right?
Absolutely.
Unbelievable.
Exactly the same assault.
But the Taiwan thing, the goddamn liberal press has kept going for a week.
I don't object to Reagan.
He has a legitimate piece.
Well, luckily.
But why the hell is the New York Times writing it every day?
They're writing that one more than they've done it.
Because they're trying to... Because they're trying to... A stunning defeat.
That's right.
Kleiman called in yesterday, and I said...
I hope you told him all.
Oh, I said, listen, I ordered some violins to play when I read your editorial.
It nearly broke my heart to see the solicitude of the New York Times.
for Taiwan, I could hardly bear the thought, when I consider what you've been doing to Taiwan for 15 years, and now suddenly you remember, I said, name me the European expert, which country switched, which country switched as a result of lack of consultation, what should we have consulted with him about?
I said, name me one European country, you're an expert.
What did he say?
He said, ah, well, it's the mood,
The move?
I said, name the country?
Well, he didn't know the country that switched.
I said, which country could we have switched?
What if we had given them all six weeks advance warning of my first trip to Beijing?
How would that have affected the UN vote?
The move?
The crisis?
When we went over to Europe, we repaired NATO for crisis.
We kept a live man who was trying to kill the goddamn thing.
We've told them more about salt, which concerns them.
We've consulted them all the time.
Speaking is of no concern to you.
It's a Soviet thing.
They know we have that, but we must be considering that all the time we have to.
They've been urging us to have...
They're just pulling it out of...
No, listen, the Chinese is, they die.
They don't like the fact that the Poles are good and all, you know, angry.
Kill them, sons of bitches.
That's all.
At least what we do need internally is a better sense of strategy.
If we could have, for example, with the foreign aid bill up this week, if that Taiwan thing could have been pushed later, well, it sounds better.
You mean the Taiwan vote?
Ja, and we would have had to do that.
And radio crisis, we discussed that before you left.
And we were told the vote would be the earliest, would be Friday, and they could push it to the 2nd or 3rd of November.
That's right.
As soon as they were out of here, they accelerated.
That's right, I know, I know.
Particularly with the 480, they should have been that way as it turned out.
You couldn't do anything.
You didn't know until...
I kept sending daily cables to Hague saying I can't understand why the road is going so fast all of a sudden.
I think Pedersen snuck a push on this one.
Oh, yes.
In that madhouse, Mr. President, why did we hold stills for night sessions every night last week?
I've asked every expert on the UN I know if we had wanted to.
I mean, I don't blame Bush because he doesn't know anything, and I don't blame Rogers because he doesn't understand it either.
Pedersen knows.
But Pedersen is a UN expert.
He was up there.
Pedersen is out tonight, as every night he can.
And Pedersen is out at night, but he's out at night.
Me, although, me personally, doesn't make any damn difference.
But, uh...
He's probably lying.
Oh yes, this came out all right for him, because he's also anti-Taiwan, so it isn't that Peloton is for Taiwan.
I mean, he's one of these bleeding-hard liberals.
Christ, yes.
That's what killed him about the PK thing, you know, really.
It's a good question.
You're talking about the university, maybe I'm the professor.
Everything, Henry and the PK thing, just kills these cops because they know, they know very well.
And it isn't publicity for me of this trip.
If we had had a good shot coming back, not for me, but for the initiative, that would have given us another big lift.
As it is, it was positive, but it's not positive.
It got so confused with the other things.
It came at the time of you.
That's right.
And that was a deliberate ploy.
Not by Bill.
Bill is not that way.
Bill himself is.
I don't think Bill did that, really.
No, no, he isn't right enough.
He didn't tell me it was going to be that way.
I don't think he knew.
I think Bill thought that he was going to win.
And that he was going to get himself a good publicity shot.
I think he did think he was going to win.
And that he was going to.
I think that was Bill's motive.
But Patterson is too smart about the UN.
He figured either way it's good.
Well, Henry, let me tell you.
It's done.
It's a blip.
Remember to keep it in context.
No, no.
The personal part is a blip.
No, I mean in terms of the whole strategy.
That's all.
But we just stay on the head.
Talk peace, talk China, and all the rest.
Okay?
Oh, I think the basic direction of our policy has overwhelmed them.
They haven't got as long a policy.
We've got to get them.
Let me say, though, that I think you should know that I have made up my mind on Vietnam.
The rest of the Russian trip, the Chinese trip, everything, but we're finishing Vietnam, and the president thing has got to be decided before Christmas.
I've got to have you know something.
They don't have it.
Screw them.
Now they are not going to come back here.
We're not going over there and have enough place where they can eat tea and all that sort of crap.
And delay it.
We have laid it out here.
I've told Tito, and I told him, and I don't shoot bunnies.
And I said, we have made our last best offer.
If they do not discuss it, if we do not have an arrangement regarding prisoners before Christmas, I said I'll have to move in another direction.
And I will.
He knows.
It's all down in the paper, as you can see.
We've got to make sure that this memorandum of conversation doesn't go anywhere.
Don't worry.
Well, that Koloski guy, I told him, you better be sure he works at the State Department of Mississippi.
You grab that Koloski and tell him that memorandum is made only for Michael, only for me, and for you, but he's not to give it over to the State Department.
Correct.
You better be sure he doesn't, because that was a tough conversation.
Okay.
I've got the bring-in coming in.
I was going to talk to him for about ten minutes on the China thing.
What are the statements today on China?
Yeah, but that's probably just a minor.
They're probably just going to tell us what they'll do.
But they've already indicated that.
I don't know what it is.
They said they would see him on Saturday.
Late Saturday, so it's too early.
It'll be later today.
I would see him.
That one is currently on NRF.
It's in their interest.
And actually... And the Soviet thing is in our interest, too.
Incidentally, I ate at George's breakfast with George Lundgren and Joe Alsop.
He said, Joe has a crying towel on about this.
He said we're in a terrible position for the Soviets.
But you know how it is.
He just went, the Soviets are ready to kill us.
And we're way behind now.
We've got to do something.
Joe is always... Well, on the military side, the Soviets are working maniacally.
But we have to go through this.
What are we going to do?
What the hell can we do militarily unless and until we have run out of strength on the arms control?
That's what it is.
As I told you, I said, if we don't get arms control, I then have to move and strengthen the United States military, and I will.
And I said, I think in terms of 10 to 15 billion dollars.
So he's got that too.
I better get hold of my Colossus before it starts bouncing around.