President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss the legislative failure of the foreign aid bill, the recent UN vote on Taiwan, and the broader implications for the President's foreign policy initiatives. Nixon expressed profound frustration with congressional Democrats and the liberal press, asserting that he would take a hard line on foreign policy, including potential military action in Vietnam, regardless of political opposition. Kissinger and the President also planned a series of high-level diplomatic meetings with European leaders and strategies to manage the U.S. economic import surcharge. Finally, Nixon directed that the responsibility for presenting diplomatic credentials be delegated to the Vice President to avoid personal meetings with representatives of countries that voted against U.S. interests.
This clip was extracted from the full tape recording by Easy Nixon.
Listen to the full tape segment
Position in tape: 02:23:20 – 03:08:54
part A, 13:49
609a.mp3
609b.mp3
609c.mp3
609d.mp3
NARA Description
On October 30, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:21 am to 12:07 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 609-011 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 609-11
Date: October 30, 1971
Time: 11:21 am - 12:07 pm
Location: Oval Office
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.
Foreign aid program
-Previous Senate vote
-Kissinger's conversation with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
-Michael J. Mansfield
-The President's schedule
-John J. McCloy
-W[illiam] Averell Harriman
-George W. Ball
-White House response
-Congressional support
-Harriman
-Marshall plan
-Dean Rusk
-Kissinger's possible conversations
-Ball
-Congressman
-Editors
-The President's possible veto
-Aid to Israel
-The President’s view
-Aid to Cambodia
-Ronald L. Ziegler
-Previous Senate vote
-Carl T. Curtis
-Peter H. Dominick, Paul J. Fannin, Edward J. Gurney, Orval H. Hansen, Mark
O. Hatfield, B. Everett Jordan, William V. Roth, Jr., William B. Saxbe,
Margaret C. Smith, Ted Stevens, Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Milton R. Young
-William E. Brock III, Marlow W. Cook
-James B. Allen, Birch E. Bayh, Jr., Lloyd M. Bentsen, Alan Bible, Quentin N.
Burdick, Harry F. Byrd, Robert C. Byrd, Howard W. Cannon, Lawton M.
Chiles, Jr., Frank F. Church, Alan Cranston, James O. Eastland, Samuel J.
Ervin, Jordan, Jr., William Fulbright, Jordan
-John C. Stennis
-Republicans compared to Democrats
-White House response
-Effect
Show the rest of the log (232 more lines)
-Vietnam, Cambodia
-United Nations [UN]
-Amendments
-Compared to vote on Cooper-Church
-White House response
-Clark MacGregor
-UN vote on Taiwan, Republic of China
-James B. (“Scotty”) Reston
-Edward M. Kennedy
-White House response
-Separability
-Aid to Israel
-Jacob K. Javits
-Presidential candidates
-Israeli lobby
-Possible veto
The President's previous meeting with Josip Broz Tito
-Instructions to Alexander Akalovsky
-Communiqué
-Soviet foreign policy
-Vietnam
-US peace offers
-Possible US military action
-Prisoners of war [POWs]
-Laos, Cambodia
-Andrei A. Gromyko, Nicolae Ceausescu
-North Vietnam
-Communist participation in South Vietnamese Government
-Tito's contacts with world leaders
-Leonid I. Brezhnev
-US-Soviet relations
-Nixon Doctrine
-Arms limitation negotiations
-Possible US military spending
Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 11:21 am.
The President's schedule
-Manolo Sanchez
Bull left at an unknown time before 12:07 pm.
The President's previous meeting with Tito
-Vietnam
-US peace offers
-Casualties
-Ceausescu
-Cambodia
-President’s previous meeting with Gromyko
-Laos
-Possible military action
-POWs
-North Vietnam
-Possible blockade compared with bombing
-The President’s view
-Tito’s view
-Soviet Union
-People’s Republic of China [PRC]
-US strength
-US Government agencies
State Department
-Ahmed Osman’s previous visit to the State Department
-David D. Newsom's previous telephone call to Kissinger
-UN vote on Taiwan
-Morocco
UN vote on Taiwan
-US opponents
-Kissinger’s view
-The President’s view
Presentation of Diplomatic credentials
-The President's conversation with Haldeman
-Spiro T. Agnew
-African diplomats
-The President’s view
UN vote on Taiwan
-Newsom
-Ecuador
-The President’s view
-Italy
-Great Britain
-Kissinger's forthcoming meeting with George R.S. Baring [Earl of Cromer]
Georges J.R. Pompidou
-Possible conversation with Kissinger
-Possible meeting with the President
Great Britain
-Edward R.G. Heath
-The President’s view
-Sir Alexander (“Alec”) F. Douglas-Home
-Conversation with the President
-John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson
-Common Market
-The President's conversation with Pompidou and Charles A.J.M. De Gaulle
Willy Brandt
-The Nobel Peace Prize
-The President’s view
-Kissinger
-Berlin
The President's schedule
-Foreign leaders
-Possible meeting with Brandt and Pompidou
-Cromer
-Heath
-Brandt
-Possible meeting in Luxembourg
-State Department
-William P. Rogers
-Great Britain and Germany
-Dedication of Eisenhower Medical Center
-Brandt
-Pompidou
-Kissinger’s forthcoming conversation with Egon Bahr
-Possible dinner
-Eisaku Sato
-John B. Connally's Trip
Robert H. Finch's forthcoming trip to Latin America
-George P. Shultz
-Nelson A. Rockefeller's telephone call to the President
-Import surcharge
-Finch’s possible reception
-Import Surcharge
-Kissinger's forthcoming conversation with Shultz
-Economic package
The President's schedule
-Forthcoming trip to the PRC
-Allies
Import surcharge
-Strategy for removal
-Canada
-Japan
-West Germany
-Shultz
International monetary system
-Arthur F. Burns's view
-Convertability
-Connally's view
-Trade
Foreign aid program
-Previous Senate vote
-Public reaction
-Prospects
-Senate’s responsibility
-The President's defense of Johnson's Vietnam policy
The President's foreign policy
-John Kenneth Galbraith's view
-Press coverage
-Soviet summit compared with Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
-UN vote on Taiwan
-Views of Ronald W. Reagan and William F. Buckley, Jr.
-New York Times coverage
-Carson F. Lyman's telephone call to Kissinger
North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
-Michael J. Mansfield
-SALT
-The President's foreign policy
-PRC
-Soviet Union
UN vote on Taiwan
-Timing
-Foreign aid vote
-Kissinger's cables to Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Richard F. Pedersen
-George H.W. Bush
-Kissinger’s view
-The President’s view
-Kissinger's previous trip to PRC
-The President’s view
-Rogers
-Kissinger’s view
-The President’s view
Vietnam
-Negotiating strategy on POWs
-The President’s forthcoming trips
-Timing
-The President’s view
-The President's conversation with Tito
-Last US offer
-Akalovsky's memorandum of conversation
-Security
-State Department
Kissinger's schedule
-Forthcoming meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-China issue
Soviet military preparation
-Shultz's previous meeting with Joseph W. Alsop
-Arms control negotiations
-The President's conversation with Tito
-Akalovsky's memorandum of conversation
-Security
-Haig
-Kissinger’s view
Bull entered at an unknown time after 11:21 am.
Requested Charles W. Colson be asked to join him
Bull left at an unknown time before 12:07 pm.
Arms control negotiation
-Senate
Vietnam
-Possible blockade
-Melvin R. Laird, Rogers
-Negotiating strategy
-Kissinger's forthcoming meeting with Dobrynin
-The President’s recent conversation with Tito
Kissinger left at 12:07 am.
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.
Click a timestamp to play from that point; the page address then links to that moment (e.g. #t=125).
Each line starts with a timestamp button; press it to play the audio from that point.
He's not coming off there.
Even in his reputation and appearance, it's our fault.
You don't think so?
Well, he's...
He's... Of course, we don't mind.
He's getting better.
Please be a little...
I'm totally irresponsible.
You can't be... You can't on Tuesday say, well, we shouldn't worry too much about Taiwan being out.
And then on Friday say, well, let's buy a kiss and go to China.
Right.
All that bullshit.
Okay.
Okay, sir.
Good luck.
you
Sir, I gave you the wrong information.
I'm prepared for...
I have a basket, sir.
I'm prepared for... What, sir?
Must be... Absinthe, sir.
Must be absinthe, sir.
Say absinthe, sir.
That's fine.
Suburb is an antithetical issue.
Must be absinthe.
Right.
Yes, sir.
Well, I didn't want to be there.
I didn't have a hell of a time to sit at that position, you know.
Henry was delighted by the sign.
He said, I mean, not delighted, but he said, you know, this is a good way for us to move on.
I've talked to...
Well, I think it has a way of splitting the Democrats.
This is one in which even Harriman has to do something.
Very funny.
Well, I don't see what they can do except to torture.
I know that's going to be supported, but I don't think you ought to call them in in a crisis like that in this area and say, you know, we don't have a vote right now.
You see that it's coming up.
We've got to get a new program.
I don't think so, either.
The other time we had a boat coming up.
We don't have one now.
That's one that's going to be fired up until we find a vehicle.
Now we've got a straight-out boat, and we can ask people to support that boat.
At the present time, all we can do is get people together and have them decry it.
I thought we could get them to come out for a foreign aid program.
Sure, I know.
Decry or to come out for a foreign aid program.
Did you see?
What does that do in terms of, you can't, I mean, we've got to get a beacon on the, so there's something specific to it.
That's something that said, I mean, you should get something.
Well, it's just exactly the same exercise.
Well, we could get different people this time.
We could get, you know, for example, I think Harriman would,
Much as he loathes it, Woodcutton would be in a tough spot not to support it.
As the former mouth of land, they would have to support it, or us would support it.
And it would put the dead on top.
Well, my view is not to do it, though, in terms of falling into the White House, that kind of thing, but that's the way to do it this time.
The way to do it is to get them to support it.
committing individual business or something of that sort.
You just can't repeat the same thing.
It's a little bit of a major smack of a, you know, it's not quite the way to get out of PR rights.
And also for the reason we don't have, you should come in and say, well, we need to get a question.
We're made for that.
So it's a lot.
It's a lot to our name.
How are you going to get it?
Before you may recall, the city vote was signed up.
And we sent people to work on that vote.
In fact, I bet with something here, we do not have a hard vote in principle.
Like it's got to be able to get together and say where 14 went.
But would you mind if I, say, called people like George Paul and... Oh, right.
Well, that's what I mean.
That's fine.
I think we should call senators, congressmen, leaders, editors, press.
Hell, you know, I think there's eight individuals in this stand that... Yeah, but they'd split that out.
I'll be told.
I mean, that's what I...
I will be told.
I will never sign a traditional law.
Never.
Never.
I think you'd be the one to go, oh, I don't sign 8 Bridge, I don't sign 8 for Campbell, you all need help.
We're not going to have, they've all got to go together now, they're not going to play that kind of a game.
And it's, they're to be told, that's a straight out thing, I've already told them, they're going to find it's about 8 Bridge, they're not going to see how we do it.
We're going to play a hard line, Devin.
We're going to get some of these people, we're going to get those guys, we're going to get some of those players.
You see, they're getting at various lengths here, people that want to vote against the United Nations.
Actually, we can expect that.
But as you said this morning, those 15 Republicans, 12 of them would have been against it anyway.
They always are.
They always are.
And they never voted for foreigners.
People like that.
That's, uh...
But we only got eight Democratic votes for the day, haven't we?
Dominic would be against it.
Fannin would be against it.
Fannin.
Go ahead.
Gurney.
Against him.
Hanson.
Against him.
Well, Hatfield.
Hatfield, yeah.
He is now.
He's a dove.
He's a dove.
Jordan.
Against him.
Roth.
Roth?
Yeah.
Yeah.
Probably.
Zach Spade.
Zach Spade, he's just a dove.
Yeah.
Smith.
Yeah.
Steve.
Margaret Smith.
Yeah.
Stevens is running.
Smith is running.
Weicker and Young.
Those were the Republicans.
Young was always against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
Brock was against it.
He's basically taking the same line, you know, the other example.
What about the Democrats?
That's the whole point.
They've got...
There were only eight, four.
That's what I mean.
There were 26 Democrats against.
Allen, Bayh, Benson, Bible, Burdick, the two birds, Cannon.
I think it's fine if you can get some of these people stirred up to come out if they really will.
I can't emphasize too strongly.
In a partisan political year, they're going to play partisan politics.
They really are.
They know what they're doing.
And they like to make it difficult, saying this and that and the other thing.
Don't expect that, you know, that's the thing.
You get closer to an election.
So what do you do without the foreign aid?
You've got some pipeline.
Well, it would knock out 500 million for Vietnam economic aid.
It would finish Cambodia because all of that is in the foreign aid fund.
He can only get us to January, can't he?
I think so.
The Black Session, I think so, yeah.
This is a casual attitude.
There's somebody in the U.N. Yeah, okay.
Sorry.
No, you have a totally irresponsible group, there's no question.
Yet, we won all the individual votes.
That's what's so amazing.
That's why, I don't know, I am certain that the boys, which I regret, they sort of dropped the ball in the log and both were crying for faith or something.
Everybody got back.
There must have been a way that all this was coming, you know what I mean?
I'm dead and open, but I was talking to them on Thursday morning.
Yeah.
Everyone was worried about the amendment, but they thought that if they could beat the amendment, that they were in good shape, because basically the 41 votes against are something like the 44 votes that were for Cooper Church.
But that one we beat by 47 to 44.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Let me say that in the end, they got to do it.
In the end, they got to do it some way or other.
Well, that was their line before.
That's what their excellent line was before.
It was the Kennedy line.
This was a foolish policy, right?
Oh, yes.
It was inconsistent with our timeline as you did.
So let me say that it washes out in terms of the initiative itself.
And that overwhelms it all.
It will overwrite it all.
Never be concerned about the day-to-day analysis.
These people are fly-snaking and so forth.
They cannot destroy them.
It's too big.
Oh, no question.
It's too big.
They're trying to work on it and see what they can do in the way of getting the votes and switching to whatever it is.
I'll tell you one thing.
We cannot separate anything out.
We do.
You see, the only way to do it, you have various interests that will support various things.
And he ever said, in order for the whole bill to float, you've got to have the 80-year-old in it.
That's the way you get Janice, for example, and presidential candidates.
But I cannot, cannot possibly vote against that if the chips are gone.
That's why you've got to get the race lobby to work around these people.
And I said, God, now, because I'm just cold-hearted.
And if they won't get a bill, I'm not going to sign one for them at all.
How?
Because they haven't got a little of the Senate on right now, so they're not all that excited.
It's all right, because I think I'd have a plan.
It's all right.
Same with everybody else.
I told Aunt Velocity to make a copy of this for you and one for him.
Yeah.
The main purpose was I spent most of the time basically on pretty cool, dirty, awkward things.
compared to what the Soviet would do in the smaller countries.
We were not .
Well, that was very .
It's almost a, I said, well, we could talk about all these nice things, but let me talk frankly to you, man to man.
He says, you're a tough guy, and so am I. I said, this is what I agree to.
And, you know, I also dropped it.
I dropped on Vietnam.
I said, by the end of the letter, I said, yes.
decision on our prisoners by Christmas.
I said, I'll have to take other action.
I said, it won't be against Laos.
It won't be against Cambodia.
I went over the whole thing, why I did Cambodia, and that I had warranted Chester, or Chester, why we didn't Laos, that I had warranted for Baker, who were going to go.
And I said, now, this time, I said, it won't be against North Vietnam.
I said, yeah, I don't want you to be surprised.
So just let it lay there.
Because that's all we have to do.
what we have to do, and she says, well, let them know that they're, I said, you make up the impression that we have no option except to withdraw.
I said, that's not true.
What did he say?
I don't know.
He said, did you say anything?
Oh, shit.
He said, no.
He said, I realize that you can't get out.
He said, you're weak.
He said, you're pretty damn good.
Oh, he said, you should go.
He said, no.
They didn't want to comment on the participation of everybody in the government.
I said, well, we made an offer to allow that to come up.
That's all that.
But I said, the way I put it, he will get through.
I said, no.
I said, I'm afraid.
I said, you're going to talk to many world leaders.
I said, they will ask you about me just as I've asked you about Gresham and people that I don't know.
I said, I don't want any of them to be under any dangerous miscalculation.
I said, I am a drawing of Vietnam.
We have an exit doctrine.
We are going to China.
We are going to the Soviet Union.
I said, but I want you to know something.
Let me tell you a little about my background.
I know yours.
I said, you're a man of peace, but you were a man of war.
You were a strong man, tough man.
I said, I came off the hard way also.
I said, I'm a man of peace.
But I said, I am confident we'll take peace at any price.
And through the defense drill and the rest of it, I said, I just want it clearly understood that as far as the United States, unless we get an arms limitation, then I will have to make a decision for the United States to go forward and to finish one of the billion dollars in arms.
Good.
Tremendous.
All of this is going straight back to the Russians.
Well, you hear the decision.
Sir, Dr. Mataloski got a phone message here.
But it was a very tough talk.
I mean, I don't mean, not probably, but I just wanted to know exactly who we're up against.
The threat there is now laid out again, and on the day of the meeting.
Excuse me, Mr. President.
Yeah, I'm just going to confirm that you indicated that you wanted to depart at 1230?
Yeah.
Would you like to know that, given your lunch here, or?
No, no, I wouldn't.
No, it was a very, very good talk.
I mean, I just used it for a monologue, strength, confidence.
And it was particularly effective.
I talked to you last night.
I said, you know, I just want you to tell you where we were in Vietnam.
And I said, oh, well, to the retreat of the week being lost in 19.
And I said, it was late in the summer in August of 1969.
I approached Jessica, and we were making an offer.
I said, if that offer is not accepted, then I said, we won't have to act.
I said, we waited, we waited.
They did not even discuss it.
And we went in, they can't believe it, our characters came down the laundry.
I said, now, I said, the, I said, I'm not asking you to comment on whether we should have gone in, but I said, that's why we did it.
I said, Danny, in October of last year, we made another offer.
You remember, on October the 7th.
And it was Romeo when he was here.
I told him that we had made this offer.
And I said, if it was not accepted, we'd have to act.
And we went to Laos.
And I said, now our intentions are separate from each other.
I said, now they've got 400 prisoners.
I said, I will take any risk at any cost to get those prisoners back.
And not against Laos, not against Cambodia, but this time against our Vietnam.
I said, I don't want you to be surprised.
He didn't say any more.
Good.
Good.
It's going to be sent.
It's going to be sent.
Because the way I picture it, I think the more I think about it, I think we're going to have to move the blockade route there.
I think that's probably better than just bombing again.
I think that bombing is something that you do every day that people can say you're killing.
Well, we blockade and then cut the railroad with bombs, correct?
Yes.
I guess it was blockade, some eviction.
That will get you into trouble with the Russians, but on the other hand, it gives the Russians a reason to put this through.
Well, Tito went into the drill.
He says, I think the Russians can help you in this.
In fact, I'm a big commenter.
I got through with my drill.
I said, well, I don't know.
I said, maybe they should.
I said, maybe they are the Chinese.
He said, yes.
But it's obvious that he is...
And he, when we got through with it, he doesn't think that we have no choice but just to get out.
And know that he wants you to, because his own security depends.
Oh, life over the weak United States would be a very great danger for the peace in the world.
I said strong United States is essential for peace in the world.
In fact, this whole thing should be read, unfortunately, not by God, that's the opposite.
They believe it all the time.
It ought to be read by people like...
But the doctrine of us and all this crap, piece of crap, you know, we go down to the organizations that you meet before the committee and say, well, the president, they say, well, the president's doing everything you want.
They go, Mike, he's getting out, this and that.
That isn't the way to talk to them.
God damn it, it's not true that we're doing what they want.
They don't understand that yesterday the Moroccan ambassador called on the state
about the reports that you were displeased.
They had a report that you had called them international bandits.
I did?
So Newsom called up what he should say.
He said he was going to deny it totally and said we weren't going to penalize them.
I said, no, you can tell them it is not right.
The president never called them international blackmailers, that's what they said.
On the other hand, you have to know that the president is extremely displeased by the UN vote after having made a call to Morocco.
I think it is wrong on the UN vote for us to act as if this were a sporting contest in which you win a view and lose a view.
When a sovereign country votes against you, it's got to take the consequences.
And I'm getting that list together, and I think we should every single goddamn run of them.
Oh, sure.
We're getting, I know this is a concern, we're getting criticized.
Are we going to take it on?
Of course we are.
Of course we are.
We don't think you shouldn't say it.
Don't say it, but do it.
That's right.
And don't say you're not going to.
That's exactly my point.
Oh, one other thing.
Henry, I want you to do something now.
Now, this is something that can be done.
I change the call.
I want to direct you to prepare.
Give me the money.
whereby I delegate to the Vice President the presentation of diplomatic credentials.
I am never going to be in the position again of having these goddamn black bastards come in here with their damn investment.
I'm not going to give you five minutes of my time.
You understand?
The way I will compensate for that with the good countries is I will have them, after they've presented their credentials, I'll have them come in, you know, from 10 to 10, go into this office.
But now there's no reason for me to sit over there and do that anymore, okay?
It can't be done.
You work it out.
I allocate to the vice president the presentation of diplomatic credentials from now on.
Fair enough?
Fair enough.
And I think it's just as well as just not go through this thing, present the damn credentials,
How's that sound to you?
That's fine.
We can even make a distinction.
You know, you might want to do.
Oh, yes.
I know.
All right.
But I want to delegate.
It's a senatorial rule.
It should be the vice president unless you put special...
Unless I have time to go over it.
Then there are occasions when I'll go over it.
I'm going to distinguish on that.
The little things we're going to distinguish on.
But disillusioned as I'm going to come in here with a partner out of it, I will never approve anything for one of these countries that voted against us.
I mean, I'm not going to do it.
The goddamn Ecuadorians should go to hell.
That was partly our fault.
I know.
I'll tell you.
I'm sick of it.
We did something last year that we shouldn't have.
There must be something we can do to get that.
I don't know what it is, but... Well, there's one that we really should put into it.
Ready?
Well, I am going to have lunch next week with Cromwell, and I'm going to tell him this.
Well, I was going to ask you something.
I think it might not be too bad an idea...
If you could work it out some way with the French, currently, when you're, when you're with people that you haven't talked about, you're leading to meet Pompidou secondly.
Goddamn it.
Why not try to break Papa Deux off just as we're going from the others?
Now the typical idea is that we haven't got to deal with the kind of idea there that Thomas wants to deal with this thing.
But why the hell should we just let the British, in other words, let's meet Papa Deux separately?
He's the president, the others aren't.
I'll go with you separately.
I don't, I think it's a good idea.
the idea that you gotta have heat there, screw him, he wants to act like this.
This is a spoiler sport.
Look, when Hill was here, they told me about their problems in Latin and South Africa.
I said, now look here, you can be sure that I will never embarrass you.
Well, now, goddamn it, can you imagine Kennedy or Johnson staying in that corner?
They would have been out sporting them already.
I'm not gonna do it because of this.
You've been more than decent to them, man.
and all this common market thing.
It's not in our interest, but I support it.
I've talked, who wasn't there talking to me, Goff, at Pompidou about, you know, the British and who the Christ is.
You know, I didn't tell them they ought to, but at least I felt paid the weight for it.
You know that.
Very well, I know it.
You know that.
And I think it's just, you've got to have time to, well, not then, and as far as Brown is concerned,
My God, the Southern Michigan's the Nobel Peace Prize because of what you did in Southern Berlin.
Well, not that you did in making it possible.
Yeah.
But what I think we should do, Mr. President, is I think you should meet with Pompidou.
I think you should meet with Brown, too, just to show some activity.
Do it separately.
Do it separately.
Then, after having met with those two, let's just leave these along aside for the time being.
We've offered it to him.
He picked up and achieved it.
I don't know.
With Cromer, I wouldn't say that we want to go second to he.
But if Brown didn't, if Papadou wants to meet me, I'll meet him now.
I don't know whether French Guiana is the place to do it, but there isn't a better place.
Where the hell would you meet with Brown until they don't own anything anymore?
No, no, but Brown is going to be delighted to come over here.
Is he?
Yeah.
I guess he would.
Oh, delighted.
He said, why wouldn't he suggest that we meet at San Clemente this time?
Right, sure.
Something like that.
He'd be delighted.
He'd be flattered out of his mind.
Come to meet at San Clemente.
Or, or.
Yeah.
He'd be flattered out of his mind.
And we could probably, he would come here.
But I'd be glad to go to Lyon.
But we proposed some other.
I don't think I should go to Paris.
No.
No, no, because Stan, if you don't go to Britain, it's a real slap.
But if you start some activity of seeing allies, you start consulting with Pompidou and Brandt, then let those two invite you to that European meeting, because then you've got them positioned ahead of time.
Then you can go to Luxembourg.
I just don't do it, but...
If you want to.
No, no, let's just, let's just do it.
I just feel this, I don't feel we have to have the British there, God damn it.
Let's take them off, let's take them off.
I would, well, I, if you approve, then I'll start moving on the ground.
And... Now, now wait, let's be sure that we get the God damn State Department programming on this.
Now, how are we going to do that?
You know, how are we going to get, just, just, just... Well, I'll get their agreement in principle.
And then have them come in and offer it, and then...
No, what I can do is say, after we can tell Postform we do in front, that if you agree in principle, we will make a formal suggestion to you through a diplomatic channel.
And then he can tell Ratchets you'd like to do this, and Ratchets can just go through his trail.
Oh yeah, he can do it.
We don't have to do it out of here.
All we have to do out of here is to make sure if they approach right away, it leaks.
And if they don't want to do it,
And also these people are flattered if you took the initiative.
All right, you take the initiative.
Work it out in principle.
I'll meet the Franks alone, and I'll meet the British alone.
The Germans alone.
The Germans alone.
The British.
Well, let's see.
After we cut those two, you'll come.
I see.
That's right.
But I'll see them alone.
I'll take the Germans.
I might just invite them to San Clemente.
All right.
You'll be there.
Well, I could go there anytime.
All right.
See my point?
All right.
It's worth it.
We can get you to do some painting out there.
All right.
In fact, I am going to be there at Thanksgiving.
It should be a beautiful time, but he'd be willing to come.
I would say, why don't you be there about a week?
The dedication, incidentally, it would be a hell of a thing for a marriage and a friendship.
We're going to dedicate that Eisenhower Center, you know, medical center, on Saturday, the 30th of November.
And if he wanted to come, you know, I mean, I could stay right there with me in San Clemente in my house.
Okay.
Which would be a terrific thing, you know, just be a guest in the house.
Okay.
Right.
Right.
Right.
Right.
Good.
Oh, he'll come.
I think he's meeting Pompidou at about that time, but... Oh, we'll see.
But I'll suggest it to Bob.
Yeah.
I would like to have him do the eating out there.
I think that has a good deal to it.
You can give a dinner for him if you want to.
Oh, yes.
They'll go to Peace Prize on it.
Why not give it to him?
Oh, I can give him a dinner.
Of course I would.
Give him a dinner in Los Angeles.
Show everybody what you did.
They'll see people out there.
They'll love him.
You can put on a hell of a sitting there in Los Angeles.
Thank you.
I think we ought, we must show some activity towards our allies, huh?
Sure.
And we can even then consider seeing Sato, so... Well, I think Connors Trevor's showing some activity, huh?
Yeah.
And, uh... What do you think?
George Charles talked to you about Finch's trip, by any chance?
Rockefeller called me, and he knows that we should let the, the surcharge before Finch goes or postpone Finch's trip, but we can't postpone his trip, in my opinion.
I am inclined to think that if Finch, Finch has got a handless trip, George, you better hand it to him.
I'm having breakfast, so it's next time.
If Finch has got a handless trip in the way that, you see, here's Rockwell's concern.
If he goes down there, he'll have a very, very rocky reception.
If the Surge Hunter is living on the other end, it seems to me that he might go with the idea that one of the purposes is to discuss the problem with the Surge Hunter.
and get it lifted after he leaves.
That's right.
That's right.
I think that would be, I don't think it's all that big an issue in some places.
But, you know, I mean, I think we will.
I think it's an issue, but I frankly don't think that his reception depends entirely or largely on the search job.
I think particularly, we indicated, this is one of the matters we're going to discuss.
Right.
Rocky ended the shows.
I started to put shows up on it last night.
Rocky called me about the day.
Okay, I'll talk to him.
just to get it out of the way, because Schultz is working on the search arms matter, so you can...
I have scheduled a practice for Schultz for next Tuesday, to go over the whole economic issue.
We're going to be busy in this whole economic package, but that is another area we're watching after the recent, and we're going to start, between now and the time we have to get it started and ready for China, and that's got to be on the 1st of February.
See, on the first of February, I mean, I got to start in two weeks.
I did not have a study.
I got to go in there and really, really, I'll probably have a study period.
And it's going to be a hell of a thing on my schedule.
Now, that means that between now and the first of February, I've got to get these things done.
I can't go to China unprepared.
Oh, God, no.
Oh.
So my point is, my point is that let's get some of the nickel and dime stuff out of the way.
Let's consolidate our allies and all that.
But let's get it going right away.
Okay.
I think you should have talked to your allies, to our allies, before you've gone to China.
Absolutely.
So we... You see, to the rematch, this... Don't go overboard and say, well, because of the concern of our allies and the international mandate and the rest of it, we've got to procedurally remove the search army.
We must not do that.
Demand that they never kill us.
I am not on the search army.
Precipitly, certainly not.
I think we ought to remove it selectively.
We're going to start that.
To take off some of the pressures and to keep the countries from ganging up on us.
Well, with Europeans looking, that's a problem.
See, when we remove it, as we may, on the Americans, including Canada, and possibly Japan, the Europeans then, we think it might gang up.
That is why we'd like to pick the Germans on it.
That's not going to be possible that way.
What I believe...
Well, I'd like to talk to Dr. Schultz about it.
I don't understand the reasons that keep us from formulating what we want from the Europeans.
Because unless we assume they're going to give us a better offer than we are capable of formulating, I don't see what we lose by formulating an offer.
So I would like to talk to Schultz.
I think we need a new system.
I disagree with Burns and those people who want us to go back to the old system.
I agree with Connolly that what's going to affect people immediately is what happens in trade.
But I think if you can go into the election as a man who's created a new international monetary system and a new international system, and if at the same time trade has improved somewhat, that would be the best possible outcome.
Coming back to this other problem of the Borges bill and so forth, it checks the...
just a flag that's going to occur for a while that's inevitable, and we just are going to be knocked off balance line.
You want to remember that as far as the country is concerned, they aren't going to give much of a damn.
You know what I mean?
They're against foreign aid, and they probably don't understand that.
And a lot of this stuff, they're against the United Nations.
Our problem is to get it out of the way, and then the China thing will come back from the center.
It's got to.
It's too big.
It's too big.
You also have to realize that we have, we're gonna have, you're just not gonna have responsibility having been a part of these parties, the Democrats.
They're not gonna do it.
Republicans are expected to be responsible.
It's always been this way.
Iowa always had to be responsible.
Who the hell else would have gone around the world in 64, or 65, or 66?
I defended the goddamn Vietnam policy better than Johnson did.
Who the hell would?
But they don't do it.
They never defend it.
They just .
I mean, after all, Mr. President, if you wanted to, you could ride this way.
It's defending the country.
It's their own goddamn program.
It's something unbelievable that you are... Galbraith said this morning that if any Democrat had done what you are doing, there'd be barricades in the street.
You mean on China?
On China, on the...
He said what you did with the Soviet, he thought it was a tremendous move.
because it made it clear that it wasn't just a trick against the Soviets.
And of course, first, they never give you a break in the press.
They should have written that Soviet summit for weeks.
Right.
We all thought it would get some play, but it got two days.
The Soviet summit got two days, right?
Absolutely.
Unbelievable.
Exactly the same assault.
But the Taiwan thing, the goddamn liberal press has kept going for a week.
I don't object to Reagan.
He has a legitimacy.
But why the hell is the New York Times writing it every day?
They're writing that one more than they've done it.
Because they're trying to keep us... Because they're trying to... A stunning defeat.
That's right.
Kleiman called in yesterday, and I said...
I hope you told him all.
Oh, I said, listen, I ordered some violins to play when I read your editorial.
It nearly broke my heart to see the solicitude of the New York Times.
for Taiwan.
I said, I could hardly bear the thought.
When I consider what you've been doing to Taiwan for 15 years, and now suddenly you remember.
I said, name me the European expert.
Which country switched?
Which country switched as a result of lack of consultation?
What should we have consulted with him about?
I said, name me one European country.
You're an expert.
What did he say?
He said, well, it's the mood.
I said, name the country.
Well, he didn't know the country that switched.
I said, which country could we have switched?
What if we had given them all six weeks advance warning of my first trip to Beijing?
How would that have affected the UN vote?
The crisis.
And we even, you know, when we went over to Europe, we repaired NATO for crisis.
We kept an alive man who was trying to kill the goddamn thing.
We've told them more about salt, which concerns them.
We've consulted them all the time.
Speaking is of no concern to you.
And they didn't, they didn't solve it.
They didn't solve it.
It's no good thing.
They know we have that, but we must be considering that all the time.
They have to.
They've been urging us to have it.
They're just pulling it out of town.
Now listen, the Chinese is, they're dying.
They don't like the fact that the Poles are good and all, you know, angry and killing the sons of bitches.
That's all.
At least what we do need internally is a better sense of strategy.
If we could have, for example, with the foreign aid bill up this week, if that Taiwan thing could have been pushed later, well, it sounds better.
Trump, you mean the Taiwan vote?
Yeah, and we would have had to do it.
And Radio Crisis, we discussed that before you left.
And we were told the vote would be earlier, would be Friday, and they could push it to the 2nd or 3rd of November.
That's right.
As soon as it was out of here, they accelerated it.
That's right.
I know, I know.
Particularly with the 480 thing, it should have been that way as it turned out.
What the hell did we do?
You couldn't do anything.
You didn't know until...
I kept sending daily cables to Haig saying, I can't understand why the road is going so fast all of a sudden.
I think Petterson snuck a push on this one.
He did?
Oh, yes.
In that madhouse, Mr. President, why did we hold stills for night sessions every night last week?
I've asked every expert on the U.N.
I know if we had wanted to.
I mean, I don't blame Bush because he doesn't know anything, and I don't blame Rogers because he doesn't understand it either.
Pedersen knows.
But Pedersen is a U.N. expert.
He was up there.
Pedersen is out to knife us every time he can.
And Pedersen is out to knife us.
He's out to knife me, although me personally doesn't make any damn difference.
But he's probably lying.
Oh, yes, this came out all right for him because he's also anti-Taiwan, so it isn't that Peloton is for Taiwan.
I mean, he's one of these bleeding-heart liberals.
Christ, yes.
That's what killed him about the P.K.
thing, you know, really.
It's a good question.
You're talking about the university, maybe I'm the professor.
Everything, Henry and the P.K.
thing just kills these cocksuckers because they know, they know very well.
And it isn't publicity for me of this trip.
If we had had a good shot coming back, not for me, but for the initiative, that would have given us another big lift.
As it is, it was positive, but it's not positive.
It got so confused with the other things.
It came at the time of the events.
That's right.
And that was a deliberate ploy.
Not by Bill.
Bill is not that way.
I mean, Bill himself is.
I don't think Bill did that, really.
No, no, he isn't right enough.
He didn't tell me it was going to be that way.
I don't think he knew.
Well, I think Bill thought that he was going to win.
and that he was going to get himself a good publicity shot.
I think he did think he was going to win.
And that he was going to, I think that was Bill's motive.
But Patterson is too smart about the UN.
He figured either way it's good.
Well, Henry, let me tell you, it's done.
It's a blip, believe me.
Remember to keep it in context.
No, no, the personal part is a blip.
No, I mean in terms of the whole strategy.
They're going to crap on, I mean, I'm not crazy.
If we won the U.N. vote, they would have crapped.
That's right.
Now, we lost the U.N. vote, they crapped.
That's all.
But we just sail ahead, talk East, talk China, and all the rest, okay?
Oh, I think the basic direction of our policy has overwhelmed them.
They haven't got as long a policy.
We've got to get them.
Let me say, though, that I think you should know that I have made up my mind on Vietnam.
The rest of the Russian trip, the Chinese trip, everything, but we're finishing Vietnam, and the President's thing has got to be decided before Christmas.
I've got to have you know something.
They don't have it through.
Now, they are not going to come back here.
We're not going to go over there and have enough place where they can eat tea and all that sort of crap and delay it.
We have laid it out here.
I've told Tito, and I told him, and I don't cheat bunnies, and I said, we have made our last best offer.
If they do not discuss it, if we do not have an arrangement regarding Christmas before Christmas, I said, I'll have to move in another direction.
And I will.
He knows.
It's all down in the papers, you'll see.
But to make sure that this memorandum of conversation doesn't go anywhere.
Don't worry.
Well, that Koloski guy, I told him, you better make sure he works at the State Department of Mississippi.
Yeah, but I don't get it.
You grab that Koloski and tell him that memorandum is made only for, I told him, only for me to be here.
I told him, and for you.
But he's not to give it over to the State Department.
Correct.
Correct.
You better be sure he gets it, because that was a tough conversation.
I've got the Brennan coming in.
I was going to talk to him for about ten minutes on the China thing.
What are the statements today on China?
Yeah, but that's probably just a minor.
They're probably just going to tell us what they'll do.
But they've already medicated on it.
Yeah, but they may tell us.
I don't know what it is.
They said they would see him on Saturday, late Saturday, so it's too early to be later today.
I would see him.
That's what it's currently on, there I am.
It's in their interest.
And actually... And the Soviet thing is in our interest, too.
Incidentally, George had breakfast with Joe Alsop.
He said, Joe is really crying, has a crying towel out about him.
He said, we're in a terrible position for the Soviets.
You know how it is.
He just mentioned the Soviets ready to kill us.
We're way behind now.
We've got to do something.
Joe's always... Well, on the military side, the Soviets are working maniacally, but we have to go through this.
What the hell can we do?
What the hell can we do militarily unless and until we have run out of the strength on the arms control?
Absolutely.
That's what it is.
As I told you, I said, if we don't get arms control, I then have to move and strengthen the United States military, and I will.
And I said, I think in terms of $10 to $15 billion.
So he's got that, too.
I better get hold of my Columns, because it starts bouncing around.
Also recorded on October 30, 1971
609-004 9:58 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:58 am and 10:05 am.
609-005 9:58 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:58 am and 10:05 am.
609-007 10:05 AM · 1 hr 7 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Josip Broz Tito, Lijana Tambaca, Alexander Akalovsky, Stephen B. Bull, Thelma C. ("Pat") (Ryan) Nixon, and Emil ("Bus") Mosbacher, Jr. met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:05 am to 11:12 am.
609-008 11:16 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:16 am to 11:19 am.
609-009 11:19 AM · 38 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:19 am and 11:20 am.
609-010 11:20 AM · 49 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:20 am to 11:21 am.
609-012 12:07 PM · 22 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:07 pm and 12:09 pm.
609-013 12:09 PM · 32 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Charles W. Colson, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, unknown person(s), and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:09 pm to 12:37 pm.
Conversation 609-011, October 30, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/609-011 (accessed November 14, 2026).