Conversation 613-006

TapeTape 613StartTuesday, November 2, 1971 at 5:25 PMEndTuesday, November 2, 1971 at 6:55 PMTape start time01:09:32Tape end time02:38:47ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Ford, Gerald R.;  Arends, Leslie C.;  MacGregor, Clark;  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Cook, Richard K.;  Ziegler, Ronald L.;  Bull, Stephen B.;  White House photographer;  Sanchez, Manolo;  Bull, Stephen B.Recording deviceOval Office

On November 2, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, Leslie C. Arends, Clark MacGregor, Henry A. Kissinger, Richard K. Cook, Ronald L. Ziegler and Stephen B. Bull, White House photographer, Manolo Sanchez, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:25 pm to 6:55 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 613-006 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 613-6

Date: November 2, 1971
Time: 5:25 pm - 6:55 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Gerald R. Ford, Leslie C. Arends, Clark MacGregor, Henry A. Kissinger,
Richard K. Cook and Ronald L. Ziegler; Stephen B. Bull and the White House photographer
were present at the beginning of the meeting.

     Ford
            -Schedule

[Seating arrangements]

     Arends's district

     Vietnam
          -Troop withdrawal
               -Political situation in House of Representatives
                     -October 19, 1971 vote
                                   12

               NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                           Tape Subject Log
                             (rev. 10/06)



          -Chart
               -April 1, 1971 vote
                    -Draft bill
               -Withdrawal deadline
          -Democrats
          -Republicans
          -Procurement Bill
               -Michael J. Mansfield Amendment
                    -MacGregor
               -Schedule
     -Rate
     -Numbers
-Need for secrecy in meeting
-Negotiations
     -Status
     -Troop withdrawal
            -Timing
                  -Announcement
            -Prisoners of war [POWs]
            -North Vietnamese strategy
     -US Air Force
     -POWs
     -Ceasefire
-South Vietnamese military capability
-Casualties
-POWs
     -Hanoi
     -Possible number
     -Missing in action [MIAs]
-Negotiations
     -Kissinger’s experience
     -North Vietnamese strategy
     -The President's cease-fire offer
     -Military aid
     -POWs
            -Deadline
     -Aid
     -Nguyen Van Thieu
            -Political settlement
     -Laos and Cambodia
-POWs
                                      13

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                              Tape Subject Log
                                (rev. 10/06)
                                                              Conv. No. 613-6 (cont.)


          -Possible military operations
                 -Blockade
                 -North Vietnam
                       -Bombing
                 -Escalation
    -Political situation in House of Representatives
          -Possible action
          -Rate of troop withdrawal
                 -Recent average
    -Status of the war
    -POWs
          -1972 election
          -USS Pueblo
          -Negotiations
    -Political situation in House of Representatives
          -Timing of vote
    -Negotiations
    -Political situation in House of Representatives
          -Speaker
    -The President's forthcoming statement
          -Timing
    -Negotiations
          -The President's opponents
                 -Historical record
                 -Activities
          -Possible House action
                 -Conferees
    -Political situation in House of Representatives
          -Carl B. Albert
                 -Possible delay in action
          -Lewis Deschler
          -Pending legislation
                 -Mansfield Amendment
                 -Rhodesian chrome amendment
                 -Gordon L. Allott
                       -Military pay raise amendment
                 -Charles McC. Mathias
                       -Government employees comparability pay raise amendment

Rhodesian chrome
    -State Department
                                              14

                          NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. 10/06)
                                                                   Conv. No. 613-6 (cont.)



     Vietnam
          -Political situation in House of Representatives
                -Pending legislation
                       -Rules Committee
                       -Appropriations bill
                             -Delay
                                  -George H. Mahon
                                  -Albert
                       -Otto E. Passman
                             -Foreign aid bill
                                  -Timing

     Foreign aid program
          -Possible continuing resolution
                -Albert, Mahon, Frank T. Bow, Ford
                -House actions
                     -Timing
                -Mansfield Amendment
                -Mahon and Bow
                -Allen J. Ellender and Mansfield
          -Appropriations bill
                -Passman's scheduling

An unknown person [Manolo Sanchez?] entered at an unknown time after 5:25 pm.

     Refreshments

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 6:22 pm.

          -Possible continuing resolution
               -Dr. John A. Hannah
               -Stuart Symington and Lowell P. Weicker
          -Frank F. Church's views
               -Humanitarian
               -Israel
          -Importance
               -National security
               -William P. Rogers
                     -Korea, Thailand
               -Treaty obligations
                                         15

                     NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                 Tape Subject Log
                                   (rev. 10/06)
                                                           Conv. No. 613-6 (cont.)


                -South Vietnam, Thailand, Japan
     -Mansfield amendment
          -Possible continuing resolution
                -Legislative strategy
     -Senate vote, October 29, 1971
          -Marshall Plan
          -Robert J. Dole
          -Administration efforts
                -Football analogy
          -George D. Aiken
          -Previous votes on amendments
          -Democrats on Foreign Relations Committee
          -Edward M. Kennedy, Edmund S. Muskie, Hubert H. Humphrey, George S.
                McGovern and Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson

Vietnam
     -Republicans' support of, 1960-68
          -Historical record
     -Views of the President's congressional opponents
          -Robert L. Leggett

Foreign aid program
     -Popular opinion
     -Marshall Plan
           -Arends's vote in 1947
                -Chicago Tribune
                      -Theodore Roosevelt
     -Democrats' views

Vietnam
     -Democrats
          -Responsibility
          -Actions
     -The President's actions
          -Reduction of forces, casualties
     -Leggett's speech
          -Democrats
     -Humphrey, Muskie and Kennedy
     -Ngo Dinh Diem's murder
          -John F. Kennedy
     -Troop withdrawal announcement
                                         16

                     NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                 Tape Subject Log
                                   (rev. 10/06)
                                                               Conv. No. 613-6 (cont.)


           -Rate
           -Forthcoming announcement
                 -Timing

Foreign aid program
     -Arends’s possible action
           -MacGregor
     -Possible continuing resolution
           -Forthcoming troop withdrawal announcement
     -Possible Senate action
           -Rogers
                 -Statement
                 -Forthcoming meeting with Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
                       -Bill
           -Senate liberals
           -Israel
                 -Aid
                       -Military compared to humanitarian
                       -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
     -Greece, Turkey, Israel and South Vietnam
           -US allies
           -Internal governments
     -Forthcoming troop withdrawal announcement
           -Timing
                 -November 15, 1971
           -Handling
     -Democrats voting for the President's program
           -Forthcoming election
                 -The President’s endorsements
                       -Republicans
                             -Mathias
                 -MacGregor's possible meeting with Robert C. (“Bob”) Wilson
                       -Republican National Committee

House of Representatives
    -Southern Democrats
          -Budget

Busing
     -Grand Rapids judge, Albert J. Engle, Jr.
          -Order
                                         17

                         NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                  Tape Subject Log
                                    (rev. 10/06)
                                                              Conv. No. 613-6 (cont.)


          -Father, Albert J. Engle
          -Order
                -John N. Mitchell
                     -Conversation with Ford
                     -Possible intervention
                            -Supreme Court
                            -Department of Justice
                -White House response
                     -Mitchell and John D. Ehrlichman
     -The South
     -Order
          -Suburban school districts
          -Number
     -Public opinion

Philip A. Hart
      -Recall petition

Busing
     -Possible Justice Department intervention
          -Grand Rapids case
     -MacGregor
     -Possible constitutional amendment
     -Democrats
          -Forthcoming vote
     -Grand Rapids case
          -Mitchell
          -Judge Engle
                -Discontinuation of order
                      -Possible consequence

Vietnam
     -POWs
         -1972 election
     -Negotiations
         -Mansfield Amendment
         -US options
                -Bombing
                -Cambodia and Laos
         -POWs
                                             18

                          NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                     Tape Subject Log
                                       (rev. 10/06)
                                                                     Conv. No. 613-6 (cont.)


     Foreign aid program
          -The President’s forthcoming conversation with Kissinger
                -Announcement
                     -Timing
          -Possible continuing resolution
                -Timing of vote

     Vietnam
          -Forthcoming troop withdrawal announcement
               -Timing
          -Troop withdrawal
               -Rate
                     -Impact
               -Deadline

     University of Michigan
          -Football game previous week

     [General conversation]

     Arends’s possible conversation with Peter M. Flanigan
         -Dean Burch

Ford, Arends, MacGregor, Cook and Ziegler left at 6:22 pm.

     MacGregor

     Vietnam
          -Forthcoming troop withdrawal announcement
               -Timing
                    -Foreign aid program
                          -Possible continuing resolution
                    -Troop withdrawal
                          -Rate
                    -Possible reaction
                          -Doves
                          -Ford and Arends
                          -Doves

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 6:22 pm.
                                               19

                          NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. 10/06)
                                                                       Conv. No. 613-6 (cont.)


     Oval Office
          -Rose Mary Woods
               -Paintings

Bull left at an unknown time before 6:53 pm.

     Vietnam
          -Troop withdrawal
               -Deadline
                     -Consequence
          -POWs
               -The President's conversation with Josip Broz Tito
          -Hawks
          -Recent meeting
               -The President’s allies
          -Forthcoming troop withdrawal announcement
               -Timing
                     -Foreign aid
                     -Mansfield Resolution
                     -Negotiations
                           -Le Duc Tho
                                 -W[illiam] Averell Harriman's possible action
          -Negotiations
               -Le Duc Tho
                     -Paris
                     -Senate's possible reaction
               -US options
                     -Publicity
               -US strategy
                     -North Vietnam
                           -Dilatory line
                                 -USSR
               -September 13, 1971 action
               -US strategy
                     -Congress’s actions
                     -Timing
                           -Meetings
                           -Draft
                     -William J. Porter
                           -Liaison office
                                 -POWs
                                  20

               NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                          Tape Subject Log
                            (rev. 10/06)
                                                          Conv. No. 613-6 (cont.)


           -Blockade
                -The President’s forthcoming trip to PRC, USSR
     -POWs
           -1972 election
                -North Vietnamese strategy
     -Soviets
           -Communist Party talks
                -Transcript
                      -Summit
                            -The President’s reelection
-Previous US actions
     -Cambodia
     -Withdrawal
     -Negotiations
     -May 14, 1969 speech
     -February 1969
           -Bombing
-Possible US military action
     -1972 election
           -Bombing
           -POWs
     -Timing
     -Options
           -Bombing
           -Blockade
           -Timing
                -1972 election
           -Blockade
                -USSR
           -Bombing
-Negotiations
     -Le Duc Tho
     -Foreign aid program
           -Possible continuing resolution
                -Senate
     -Xuan Thuy
     -Prospects
-Mansfield Resolution
     -The President's Senate opponents
           -Actions
                -Compared to the President’s 1952 comments
                                           21

                     NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                Tape Subject Log
                                  (rev. 10/06)
                                                                 Conv. No. 613-6 (cont.)


                -Frequency of introduction
     -Mansfield
     -Pentagon Papers
     -Ngo Dinh Diem murder
          -Thieu
                -Election
          -John Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Dean Rusk, Roger Hilsman and Henry
                Cabot Lodge
          -Rusk
                -Cables
                      -Harriman
     -The President's opponents
          -Demonstrations
                -The President's press conference of September 16, 1971
                -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.'s trip to South Vietnam
          -State Department
          -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]
          -The President's September 16 press conference
                -Significance
          -Bureaucracy
                -Reaction to the President’s successors

UN vote on Taiwan, Republic of China
    -The President's statement
    -The President's opponents' reaction
    -US activities
    -News magazines' coverage
    -Edward Kennedy's speech
    -US popular opinion
          -Reaction to UN conduct
    -The President’s reaction
          -Ronald L. Ziegler’s statement
    -Kissinger's previous trip to the People's Republic of China [PRC]
          -Timing
    -Foreign aid
          -Continuing resolution

The President's successes
     -Kissinger's staff meeting
          -White House action
                 -Number of participants
                                        22

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                 Tape Subject Log
                                   (rev. 10/06)
                                                              Conv. No. 613-6 (cont.)


          -Press
          -Bureaucracy

UN vote on Taiwan
    -The President's statement
          -Press reaction
    -Ronald W. Reagan

The President's opponents
     -Liberals

Possible Presidents
     -Nelson A. Rockefeller
           -Views regarding John W. Gardner
     -Democrats
           -Jackson
     -Reagan

Vietnam
     -Negotiations
         -Foreign aid program
                -Possible continuing resolution
         -Kissinger's previous trip to the PRC
                -Backgrounders
         -Alternatives
         -The President's note to Tito
         -Kissinger's forthcoming meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                -Content
                     -Tito
                     -POWs
                     -Thieu

Middle East
    -Kissinger's negotiations
          -Timing
                -Dobrynin
    -State Department
          -The President’s possible handling
          -Israel
                -Phantoms
                     -USSR
                                        23

                     NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                Tape Subject Log
                                  (rev. 10/06)
                                                          Conv. No. 613-6 (cont.)


                       -Diplomatic leverage
     -The President's forthcoming conversations
          -William P. Rogers and John N. Mitchell
     -Kissinger's forthcoming conversations
          -Dobrynin
          -Mitchell
          -Yitzhak Rabin
     -Kissinger’s forthcoming recommendations
          -Timing

World War I
    -Australian casualties
         -Gallipoli
         -New Zealand
         -World War II

Vietnam
     -Casualties
     -1970 election
          -Senators
                 -Indiana
                 -George A. Murphy and Robert H. Finch
                 -Ralph T. Smith of Illinois
                 -John V. Tunney
                       -Murphy
                       -Finch and Reagan
                       -Murphy

The President's foreign policy
     -International monetary policy
     -UN vote, foreign aid vote
           -Press reaction

Kissinger's schedule
     -New York Times Editorial Board
           -John B. Oakes
     -Washington Star

The President's forthcoming trip to the PRC
     -Kissinger's schedule
          -1972 election
                                               24

                           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                       Tape Subject Log
                                         (rev. 10/06)
                                                                Conv. No. 613-6 (cont.)


                -Television
                     -Chicago

     New York Times
         -Pentagon Papers
         -Oakes
         -Kissinger's schedule
         -William McMahon's comments
         -Editorial Board
               -Daniel Schwarz
               -Abraham M. Rosenthal
         -Kissinger's schedule
               -Oakes

     The President’s schedule
          -Forthcoming state dinner for McMahon


*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 14
[National Security]
[Duration: 8s ]


     AUSTRALIA


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 14

*****************************************************************

The President and Kissinger left at 6:55 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Thank you, sir.
No, I didn't.
I looked that one up and I didn't drink.
I was out there that week for three days and I didn't drink.
I ran around looking down, in and out of the cornfields, talking to those good old people.
I went into the new district, you know, I lost, out of my seven counties, I lost five and picked up eight new ones.
It's unbelievable.
80% of people are new to me now in my district.
80%, 80% of people are new people to me now in my district.
It's crazy.
Did you want to ask?
What?
Yeah, I was waiting for you to come.
You were waiting for me to come right now.
No, sir.
All right.
What is wrong?
Anyway, I'm glad to have come down here to talk to you.
It's very comforting to have you here.
Mr. President, last night I talked to you about the situation over a long period of time, but we, after this vote was done on October 19th, we thought we ought to come down and show you the situation as we see it in the House.
And let me preface it by saying that we think the withdrawal plan, the Vietnam program overall, has been extremely sound, and it's going to end up all right.
But we see a growing problem legislatively in the House.
And we think it would be just terrible from the point of view of the country as well as the administration if the persistence of these people ended up with them winning.
in the house after we stood firm and held off.
And we, I had my staff prepare this chart, which I think is easily understood.
It goes back to the Negro One vote, greater amendments to the draft bill, and runs through three other ones, including the one on October 19.
What it shows is that the top line
The House votes for a Vietnam deadline, currently first 122, 32%, gradually increasing to the last one, 193 to 47%.
Now, the interesting thing is, and this is something really beyond our control, is that in the next line, it shows the deterioration of the Democrats.
Look it, from 97 to 161.
And the Republicans, I'm proud to say, in the House have done very well.
We've had a low of 25, 23, and a high of 33.
That's a fantastic job.
We could have, and this last one is less than I agree, five or six that would have stood with us, changed their votes if we had needed them.
Boy, this is a really great record for the Republicans, I realize.
I know it was good, but, you know, Sandy, you've got 75 Democrats.
So it's over.
Those are all Southern nations.
No, you get it up.
More than that.
More than that.
More than that.
More than that.
More than that.
That's right.
You know, it's Republican down there from 136 low to 140.
That's pretty good.
That's pretty good.
Now, we face this thing again tomorrow morning, going back to conference on this bill.
We face this very thing in the Mansfield Amendment.
Now, how we're going to get around it, I don't know.
I just talked to Clark today about whether or not we can accept the Mansfield Amendment that they've written into the bill.
except that we're just fast on this, and Eddie is too.
We're just fast on this.
Except, except the deadline.
It has nothing to do with the deadline.
I don't know whether the rest of the language is bad or not.
It's this time, it's policy instead of the sense of the Congress.
We can change it in the draft of the sense of the Congress, which is better.
But whether we can make them, just again, back to policy of the United States.
Now, we don't like that, I know.
But whether or not we have to finally trade that thing off to keep the six months out of that thing, I don't know.
This is where we are tomorrow morning when we go back to Congress again.
Well, what do you, uh...
What do you propose?
Well, what do you propose?
You're just asking, huh?
I'm just asking without...
I would just say this.
At the moment, Mr. President, if I had to swallow the policy of the United States, I'd swallow it.
If we could be sure we keep the six-month document.
I don't like to.
I mean, if we get to that desperate point.
We're not there yet.
Let me ask this last question.
Maybe this is really... We've got some stuff we want to talk about, Mr. President.
You could delay the, that conference for some time.
No, not, not very long.
Not very long, Jerry, because after 20 days after you put them in the concrete and the house, under the house rules, they can discharge, after 20 days they can discharge the concrete, and that 20 days is up next Tuesday.
Is that up next Tuesday?
Next, I mean, I don't know whether they're smart enough to think of that, some of these guys, but they could discharge us by next Tuesday.
So we live a little bit and hope that we could finish this thing at the very latest on next Monday.
And that sort of highlights what I think Les and I would like to urge.
The most you could do in time and numbers, accelerating the withdrawal rate in time and numbers, would be extremely helpful to protect us from getting a loss in the next time the war comes out.
I mean, that's just it.
If we had an announcement that .
What I'm getting at is this.
The reason we .
What I mean is if you were to get up and say,
regardless of what the enemy does.
What happens to our main forces?
What happens to our people?
It's all down to truth.
Now, with regard to numbers, that's another problem.
But you may have to do, let me say, I've done a lot of thinking on this, but in particular, I'm concerned about what I'm going to do with assistance.
Do you remember the last time we had a discussion, you went out and blew it a little.
Do you understand?
Now, the rest of you are not making any notes.
Just shut up, all of you.
It's extremely important.
It's all right to make notes, talk about this, but if this is part of the discussion about this, it's got to be that you just never heard of it.
But you'd rather not say it.
Well, now, let me say it.
No, I'd rather say it for your guidance only.
I've got to tell you this.
There is some movement on the negotiating part.
I would like to say that it was the means only.
But at this time, that's why I say we're just coming right down to the wire.
Now, I've told you folks before, look here, fellows, just don't throw it all out the window, because here's the whole thing.
It's very easy, it would be very easy for us just to announce that as of a date certain in the future, maybe not six months, but maybe nine months from now,
All Americans would be gone, right?
And who the hell's going to argue about whether it's six months or nine months?
You'd have it involved, wouldn't you?
And so I'd say, well, we'd rather have it six months.
Nobody says it's nine months.
So, you know, let's just talk about that.
Or maybe it should be ten months.
Or maybe six or eight.
But there's that.
Now, the thing that does, though, is the moment that is done, as you see, there ain't any chance at all
any option at all or any pressure at all upon the enemy to negotiate with regard to frankly pw's it's down to for the reason that they we have nothing hanging over their heads that we might go out now let me tell you what else we might do uh this is uh
This is a very big play that's going to have to be only after the negotiating track comes to an end, which it will very soon.
By that, you can gather what I mean.
We know we're coming near the end.
It doesn't make no use talking about negotiating.
As our, we're on a withdrawal path.
As we go on that path, and you all know, the enemy says, well, what the hell?
Why should we negotiate when you're further down?
We only got 184,000 there now, you see?
And each month, 14,000 come out.
So you get down to, then they'll say, well, why do we negotiate?
They're gonna get on it.
So even if I didn't announce it, say three, four months from now, what possible,
uh, what possible, uh, uh, incentive does the enemy have to negotiate?
None.
Here's what I want you to know.
Except, this would be a very big incentive for them, looking at the fact that there still is the presence of an army before us, looking at the fact that there's still very, a very big American air presence.
they would have in a sense say, well, God says, let's at least at this point get the damn Americans out of here.
And that means including Mary Erin in the house as soon as we possibly can.
Now, on that basis, then,
If they want us out of there, then they've got to pay the price.
What is the price?
Well, one of the parts of the deal, of course, is the prison.
And it will cease fire while we continue the deal.
That's the minimum deal that we can make.
I've acted to be very attractive to them now.
It's interesting that it becomes more attractive at this point, when we have less Americans than it was earlier.
And the interesting thing is, the fight is that, at this point, when we have less Americans, while we have less Americans, the South Vietnamese are infinitely better able to cope with their own defense.
They're in a very pretty damn hope at the present time.
For example, with our caches, there were four.
We had a helicopter off Saturday, you know.
We had a helicopter that was down at four.
And it's an aerial lesson.
And it's over.
Now that, that, and we are moving out of the rest, but believe me, sitting up there in Amarillo, there are at least 400 Americans.
Now, or whatever the number is, there may be more, and my age is older.
Now, we have to think of those people, and we've got to keep every possible leverage good.
If we can have any chance, I think you'll both agree,
to have a negotiation with them that would get those guys back, rather than announce, well, as of the next visit, all Americans will be gone, and we'll keep a residual force until we get our prisoners and so forth and so on.
You can see how much more it would mean.
Now, that's how big the stakes are at the moment.
Now, you might like to comment on it, if you agree with me.
Well, I think you have summed up the immediate situation very well.
I would like to make one general comment.
The history, I have lived with these negotiations since 1967.
Every time the skill of Hanoi is to dangle something in front of us, where in return for our doing something irrevocable, they promise to talk.
Last year, I remember, a number of people came to the President and said, Chuck's offer is ceasefire.
It's the only thing that your opponents still want that you haven't done.
You offer a ceasefire and she'll be all right.
He offered a ceasefire, cut in three weeks of peace, and they were out after something else.
As soon as we get the deadline, they're going to be after military aid.
So we're not going to be easy.
Well, they accept that.
We're not going to be easy.
For example, when you talk about deadline for prisoners, what many of our, one of the people, and I'm taking notes now on this, this is all mine.
But when you talk about deadline for prisoners...
They won't make that deal.
They see their deal is that they have, if we've got this both public and private channels, their deal is, ah, okay, you give us deadline for prisoners, then how about,
stopping their aid to South Vietnam and a political settlement that would get rid of June.
I mean, that's the next price they're going to keep the prisoners.
Now, what we have to do is, and this is where we return, the very hard line we might have.
If worse comes to worse, and if they refuse, if they're absolutely entrenched, then we have to get fairly tough on them.
You have four prisoners.
I agree that that would be supported.
By that I mean, not against Laos, and not against Cambodia, but against North Vietnam.
And I understand now that option, I can't give away.
That's the point.
Basically, it's... Let me say, as far as those prisoners are concerned, we'll do anything.
No doubt about this.
We will blockade.
We will bomb military targets in North Vietnam, unceasingly, until we get it back.
That we will do, if that is the only issue remaining.
It isn't time yet, but you see what I mean?
Because that's an escalation, but the escalation in the name of that, the American people would support, in my opinion.
What I'm concerned about is the House and the next vote, I guess it was 10 days or two weeks, preempting what we don't want to do.
And then that hardens our attitude.
It doesn't make it better.
Let us suppose, let us suppose, Terry, that some increase in the rate of withdrawal were announced, but not a final date.
Would that help?
Yes.
With acceleration in numbers, a present rate would be helpful.
And let them guess as to how many will be there to take certain.
They can figure it out mathematically, but you don't say it.
Well, it might be sooner.
It might be sooner than they think.
Because who knows?
Who knows what the rate is going to be?
And who knows what negotiations will produce?
I mean, that's the whole point of this game.
The average the last six months has been 14,000.
I'm just pulling this out of the hat, but I think it's a number that would catch the headline and the public support would be 20,000.
And I think the best thing for you to do is to take, if you will, is to say absolutely no speculation, whatever, but this is where our casualties are down.
What the hell are these people crying about?
And so forth and so on.
The war is ending.
But what do they want to do?
Do they or do they not want to give us
to finally destroy the last chance for, frankly, getting the POW thing.
Let me tell you, those prisoners are still in handling an election next year.
Believe me, we're in trouble.
You members will.
And we all talked about it, and we should have talked about it.
But for Christ's sakes, if there are 400 prisoners and I don't care, every American's out of Vietnam, we have a political issue that's a hell of a lot worse than this one.
That's an emotional issue.
That's why I say, and they know it.
They've been told.
Anything will be done to get them back.
Anything.
But you, what are your dates?
How soon do you have to have your meeting?
Well, I was just saying, we thought that we would have to wind up by not later than Monday, or some smart aleck will remember this.
They can remember this.
They will remember this.
When will you have a boat?
We can't afford this.
When will you have a boat in the house?
We can delay bringing you back over there a little bit, yeah.
Do you want to give us an idea as to what area, what I'm getting at with this?
I'd like to, I mean, if you're thinking that you could say half a dozen votes.
No question, yes.
I think we could.
Even though you're not going to have it, even though, listen, I'm not saying we're not going to put the announcement, we'll do it, whether it be final or not, except I simply tell you that at this point,
At this point, until we see whether these nipples in the negotiating track amount to a dam, I've just got to pull.
I just can't give it all.
I wish you could.
I mean, if you called Stone, I'd like to, nobody would like you to do it better than to say, all right, Mike, that's what you've been trying to do this, and now we're going to get out in ten months or next year.
If they discharged you next week, assume they're smart enough to figure this all out tonight.
If they discharge you, they couldn't move right away.
The speaker could, I think, cooperate and postpone it, delay it, particularly if he knew your announcement was coming the 15th, I don't remember.
Is that the date, Mr. President, the 15th, the most time you can remember?
was handed back by the newspaper.
For her, it's a negotiating problem.
The 15th is the best date.
I had thought about moving it up, maybe, to the least previous, but, Henry, you feel strongly that the 15th is best?
It would be the best.
You see, Director, I really, let me say that just because I don't want you to forget anything you've ever heard about negotiation.
I trust these are things that have been happening that nobody knows about.
One day the record will be published, and it will be a hell of a record.
Right, Henry?
uh they've had us when they thought
They had us on the run, so, uh,
You know, I'd rather have the House say it than the President say it, if it comes down to that.
I mean, if the way to avoid getting the House to say it is the President to say it, then I'd rather have the House say it.
That's right.
That's why I can't say it.
But we don't want either of you or the House to say it.
Frankly, though, his point is, though, if I'm just trying to see what could affect you in the course of events, let me ask you this.
If we haven't announced one, then I don't think that that's going to happen for you.
Well, I'll have to double-check the parliamentary situation, but let's assume they're smart and really on the ball, and if they could force the discharge of the conferees, if they did that, I'm not categorical, can I immediately force the appointment of new conferee and a motion to be instructed?
I don't know if that will come to next year, whether they instruct the conferee or not.
Could you do this, or could you go back to the, could you go back and say that, I suppose if they, I don't know, if you tell them that there ain't any that you'd like to delay past the 15th, are you going to try to jump?
No, Carl would not cooperate with anything.
Well, he would cooperate the other way around.
If you go back and say, look, Christ saves us, don't do it before the 15th, not because of the committee, but just because there might be another announcement potentially after that.
What do you think?
I think we could absolutely trust Carl.
What do you think?
I wouldn't want to give away, you know, if it's getting spread around.
Even if I went to Lou Dechler and said, you know, if they move to discharge, how soon do they force instructions?
I mean, that, I know that, well, Lou Dechler would...
That's why I didn't go to Luz, because the minute I had done that, that's why.
Mr. President, Les and I talked about this.
If there is evidence of progress in the committee of conference on issues other than the mask government, it tends to reduce the chances of somebody thinking about its journey.
There are five or six extraneous amendments adopted in the Senate that are the subject of difficult negotiations in countries.
You have a Rhodesian Chrome Amendment, you've got a Gallup Military Pay Raise Amendment, you've got a Mathias Government Employees Comparability Pay Raise Amendment.
If progress could be made, less on some of those, and the story is...
That might force a move to discharge the country, incidentally.
Regardless of what you may hear from the State Department, do what you did in place of accreditation for all.
Yeah.
I would like to note that down here.
All right.
Just do what you please.
I trust the judgment of the House.
We run into this one difficult situation.
This is a difficult situation.
If we come back to some kind of language that still is not germane,
Well, let's if you, for the next week, made progress but didn't get to a solution in these five or six areas.
The fact that you were making headway but hadn't resolved these matters would dissuade some of these people from pushing to discharge the country.
I think that's your point.
So don't solve them, but get to the brink and sort of keep everybody going.
I think we can postpone it until after the 15th.
George may come and the Speaker will cooperate in that.
The Otto's bill on Part A, if the present schedule goes along, will not come up until
two weeks from today, which would be the 16th.
What about the plans on the continuing resolution?
Well, we have decided, the speaker and the contract, and the others, they're going to mark up the foreign aid and subcommittee this Thursday.
And they'll take it next Tuesday, they'll take it to the full committee on Thursday,
or Friday of next week and bring it to the floor on week, which would be the 15th or 16th.
Jerry, the length of half of 15th or 16th is what they need, a continued resolution.
And they will also ask for a continuing resolution possibly sooner.
to be applicable until signed and done.
There are two of them signed and one to be applicable, signed and done.
Well, the present expiration date is the 15th of October.
Now, George Mahon, Frank Bone,
Speaker and I have agreed that we will seek to get a continuing resolution for all departments that are not covered by appropriation bills signed into law and would end on the sign of the adjournment of the conference.
Now, some people wanted, I guess you talked to me, Clark, about trying to get it two months after it's signed.
It can't be done.
It won't be done.
Yeah, we want to keep the pressure.
We want to keep the pressure on the Senate.
So I think we can get this through.
And if the Senate wants to amend it, why then do we have to argue it out?
But when we should get this through?
I tried to get the Senate to pass it.
I met with them this afternoon, and that's when Frank Lowe and George Mayham both wanted to put the 15th seat.
And now they're of the opinion that they will make it to 15th.
And Heller and Mansfield said they're going to put Shiny Dye on there December 1.
They're going to move it up.
They're going to do it.
They're going to mend it by making signage out.
But ours will be signage out?
No, ours will be just the extension to December 15th.
December 15th.
30-day extension.
That's a change.
Well, that's a change.
Now, George, I mean, Larry, Jerry, they may be doing it like this again this afternoon, but that all happened quickly this noon when I was over there.
But in the meantime, the foreign aid appropriation bill...
has agreed to, was there any change in that?
No, no, no, no.
Not in that, not in that.
How are they going to bring them out?
Uh, that the auto-passman would mark up the Foreign-Nation Appropriations Bill next Tuesday.
That takes the full committee on Friday and program them, no flags.
the week of the 15th.
That's where they could try to put on a Mansfield Amendment.
We could make it later in that week, which would be 16th, 17th.
I don't know if we'll operate on the 12th of May now.
But they could try a Mansfield Amendment on the continuing resolution.
Now, how about the law?
They can't try a Mansfield Amendment, but they have to do it all by themselves.
In several talks with several senators who voted in the name of Friday, they virtually all agreed that there has to be a continued resolution.
She can't face the firing of all of John Hammond's people.
The only people who said they won't go along with a continued resolution was in the live talk with the New York Times.
And I can't wait to answer it.
And I can't believe that Massville really wants to see the whole aid machinery.
I'm trying to stay with others' question.
Then what about on the legislative, what about on the legislation side, the government side?
You're still going on that thing we approved this morning?
Yes, sir.
We talked to the secretary about the Senate.
Screw around with that.
Biden is something, Senator.
We are not.
And most of the senators have foreign relations.
I haven't had second thoughts.
And you'll remember Frank Church made a speech, a liberal says goodbye to this guy.
He said hello to Corny and yesterday.
And he's talking now about a general for a humanitarian aid for Israel.
God damn it.
And he felt like that's going to be vetoed.
The instinctive thing was to press it out just like that.
A liberal called it.
The liberals think that only people on the far right can do it.
They were repeatedly outvoted by the 7th or 8th.
Wait a minute.
We can get along without the humanitarian aid.
We prefer to have it.
It will not affect the national security of the United States.
If we don't have it, it affects the national security of the United States beyond belief.
We've got Korea.
We've got Thailand.
What do you want to do?
We've got treaties.
We've got the treaties with Thailand.
And we've got a treaty with Japan.
So what in the hell do you want to do?
Do you want to quit hating them?
And you quit hating them.
They're just friends of our Americans, so that's what you have to do.
That's really what it is.
I think we would do better in the circumstances required in beating them on a Mansfield Amendment on a continuing resolution.
I think the circumstances would
get us to get more Republicans.
And get us to get them better.
On the other hand,
How the devil can you do that, Mr. President, when they pass a mandate, a resolution, an amendment, which they will in the Senate?
Well, all I'm saying is that when the bill came up in the House, Mr. President, some of these people could offer an amendment that said none of the funds appropriated here could be used beyond six months or whatever it is.
But I think in the House, we could make that more easily last on that kind of a...
than we could on any other probe because the emergency of getting an extension of funding for five or six departments, you see.
So it's a better vehicle for us to win on, even if it comes before the 13th.
Mr. President, if this is a fair question, how much of this action for the Senate the other day in Washington on the foreign aid deal was profitable?
This is what I mean.
I mean, we've lived with this business.
Some of us who stood up and been counted on the Marshall Plan for 1947 are still standing there and doing this thing.
And then to see this happen over the years.
First, there were some honest Republicans for it.
There's Bob Dole, for example, that voted for it.
And it's hard for him.
And those are basic, mainly, those are separate Republicans for that.
Some of the other Republicans, the other issue is just what it does.
But the other part of it, basically in the Democratic side, was so political to go on a social event, talking to fans now, because we fought hard all week, and Jesus Christ, you know, I was invited to hear the announcements, like the football game.
We just knocked their brains off, time after time after time, and just left out little things, except their hats.
They were naked.
Even naked.
Now, what?
Naked.
And they even got drunk.
They're all there and tired and all the rest.
Yeah.
And in that 41, they're half of us.
We have been there.
But we didn't ask you to.
We didn't .
We fought .
We fought like hell on the internet.
We won everyone who was critically important.
We lost that 38 to 48.
But you can ask if there's politics.
16 members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, not a single Democrat.
recorded as bullying, uh, for the bill.
And also, as far as the, as far as the, Chris and Nick, you can't put these words together.
Where the hell were they?
They were gone.
Muskie wasn't there.
Muskie wasn't there.
Humphrey wasn't there.
Montgomery wasn't there.
Was Jackson there?
Jackson wasn't there.
Jackson was announced before.
Muskie was, uh, not recorded at all.
Yeah.
And, uh, Humphrey, that's their leadership.
Here we are, and I just, we are out.
And I just...
in the period between 60 to 68, I defended this goddamn war and everything else.
We all did.
We voted for it responsibly.
Remember those court meetings where we did dorsal goddamn things time and time again?
You know, we did, and we're on the record of it, so they can never tell.
Any dorsal foreign aid, that's purely sexual.
You can't just have it the other way.
And you need to know it.
This is your moment.
It's a matter of when, where I think you must move to Greece
about whether we're getting out.
They don't have to say it to the President.
They know very well.
But why do they want to vote for it?
Why do they want to vote for it?
Because they want to be on record as forcing the President to get out.
She's just cold as ice.
Well, Lincoln from California, Tiffany Sand, during this debate on the bill in Florida, he said we ought to get out 30 days ahead of time so that Congress could get the credit for getting out of Vietnam.
He put it out there.
The last four years or so, you and I stood there under the foreign aid authorization bill, and if you and I had gotten four more people, the foreign aid bill would have been beaten four years ago.
That's right.
That's right.
And basically foreign aid has always been less popular in the House and in the Senate.
I know.
Those guys go back to the House and they don't know about any foreign aid.
And you really come down to it.
That's when I almost went out of Congress, when I voted for the Marshall Plan in 47.
And we came back.
And how did you go to tribune with what they called me a second Teddy Roosevelt?
That's right.
Yeah.
That's a curse to them.
But anyway, it just shows you it's about them.
Also, don't you agree, Jerry, that the Democrats here on this board, they have no illusions about you, whether we're getting a thing or not.
These bastards got us into this war.
And now they're trying to sabotage our efforts to get us out in an honorable way.
It's just cold turkey.
And that ought to be said.
The party that got us in is trying to sabotage it.
They want to put it in party terms.
I don't think you better do that.
But I said those that got us in, those that got us in are trying to sabotage the efforts of the president to get us out of this war.
And we're doing it.
Tell them.
Who's reduced forces?
They won't increase them.
Who's reduced tensions?
They won't increase them.
in the records for every day.
And we don't want anyone stopping from the house top, peeing on the balls.
Every time, Mr. President, I hear guys like Langdon and these others make these political speeches, I'm sure, as well as myself, want to get out there and say what you've said.
But the minute we say that, we erode those other 75 Democrats who have stood so good.
I'm going to think through that.
Then we do get a clown.
That's the real problem.
I would say, I've always referenced it, which of course you do, is to say we thank you for the bipartisan work, but it's very, when you look particularly at the presidential candidates on the other side, those who, I mean, you were not musty in this speech.
Her cry said it was Teddy Kennedy, brother, I mean, with the murder of Dan.
That's what started the whole thing.
They ordered it from the White House.
If you can, I guess, help us a little on numbers as well.
Let me ask you this, uh, on this day thing, that troubles me a little.
You say the, the, the, the,
Well, I think we can postpone it.
This is right on the inside as a member of the conference.
I don't think we're that concerned.
I'll talk about it.
I don't think we're that concerned.
We're that stumped that came by.
We didn't know much before.
For us, it would be best on the 15th, but that is not.
But if we find it, I don't want to be in a position where because of the vote that's impending, we appear to be jumping in there.
And that's the other problem.
That's why I've got to be confident.
I want to be awfully sure that you don't think they're going to come up with something before.
Now, not the Senate.
I don't care what they do.
Now that we do, in fact, the Senate's done it.
If we increase the way of withdrawal, and I don't know that we can, but if we do,
The Senate is on a spiel that's not enough.
That's all there is to start the comments.
Well, Mr. President, I would be able tomorrow morning to get in there and get a little more sense of feeling in that conference tomorrow morning.
I'll get back to Clark.
Well, it's a continuing resolution, but I am of the judgment that we can do better on that in the House just because of the fact that it's a continuing resolution and
People aren't going to screw that up because I don't.
I'd rather not actually.
I'd rather that be the case.
I'd rather get the continuing resolution out of the way of the parking house.
Do you think so, Andy?
That would be the...
It looks otherwise.
It's true.
It might be best if that portion...
If we could do better on the continuing resolution, if they've got the guts to fight it, if we could get a better vote than the 23-slip charge that we had last time, if you've got strength in your hand rather than... Well, you know...
no no the other thing he thinks he can do better without the announcement on a continuing resolution because of the nature of the resolution regardless of an announcement yeah and therefore you don't need it for that my judgment now is no i think we can do better let me add work
Let me ask a question there, Jerry.
Clark, you probably know more about this than I do.
Is there anything that the Senate will put something together in the way of a foreign aid bill prior to this matter?
No.
Bill Rodgers said, well, he met with you and talked about it.
I don't know.
I don't know what he said.
Well, the statement that he made to the president was excellent.
I talked to him and I know what he said.
He was going to say that we were going to be...
The statement was excellent.
It was excellent.
Right on track.
Right on track.
Bill Rodgers.
with the Committee on Foreign Relations.
And he is going to say in somewhat stronger terms than he said out here, we have got to have a bill that contains these vital elements.
That's right.
Is this something against separation?
Yes, it is.
Well, no, the bill does not leave the economic side of the dream.
And Mr. President, Bill Riders is totally in agreement
So the curious thing, the curious thing about the interruptions is that the Senate will bounce the economic side because they're a bunch of lean, hard liberals.
And the House will bounce the liberal side.
Now, God, isn't that awful?
Really, the Senate, it's a disgrace.
It is a disgrace.
It's unbelievable.
The liberals suck.
It's unbelievable.
Now, let me say this.
Now, you all, we all, if you take the...
The idea that they're trying to get the Israeli aid out of the military and putting it in the economy should do it.
We ought to have Israeli aid.
God damn it.
It does involve our position in the United States, but it should be put on that basis and not its documentary.
It's called Turkey, and the Russians understand that.
God damn right.
I just have a list of politics to do something about it.
Well, I'll fight.
In other words, if you've seen her, the true, the true letter of the place, the child that we, uh, help.
I've heard any creeds.
made for South Vietnam.
I made it for anybody on our side.
I don't give a damn what their internal government is.
I care.
I wish they had different ones.
I wish they were all perfect, as we are perfect.
What in the hell?
When are we ever going to get that kind of thinking in this country again?
We just can't survive if we continue this kind of crap.
The one thing that could hurt, Mr. President, would be any speculation that the November 15th would contain something dramatic.
No, no, no.
It's a matter of fact.
I think I'd low-key say, well, I think the thing to do is not to build up November 15th.
I would just say, well, there'll be another announcement.
We don't know what it's going to be.
And we don't know whether it's going to be dramatic or not.
The idea of whether we're going to do something or we're going to try to beat the scent of the punch and so forth, I just don't know.
I don't know and I don't think we should.
Anything you can do to help that way would be very, very helpful.
But when we do say something, it will be to the extent that it can be as well accepted as possible.
Nothing is going to be dramatic until it's over.
You know, Jerry, I've told you a lesson.
I've told you a lot of your faults.
You're going to look, we're going to look good on this.
I intend to name the guys that have stood up like giants on this, including our Democrats.
That's an endowment, Jerry, even less.
I want you to go over the list of the Democrats that stood with us on this.
I want you to go over the list.
And I want you to go over the list.
I want the Democrats that stood with us on this to keep.
And I don't want us in any of those states to run a Republican against them.
I will not endorse any party against any one of the Democrats' students on this issue.
Is that clear?
That's good.
Not one.
That's good.
Now, I'm not going to have this crowd having some goddamn liberal public life.
Bye.
of a good Democrat.
And I want this fairly understood.
I will not support any Republican running against any Democrat who has had the guts to stand up with us on this critical aid to putting the country first here.
When we got to tonight, we should have stayed in the Senate and the legislature.
But it's true.
But our guys.
Well, I told you that.
I want you to make up the list.
He's got a list.
Let me say this.
Let me say this.
You, Clark, you sit in there with Bob Wilson, and it's cold turkey.
I don't care what the National Committee says.
I don't care what the rest of you look to.
Oh, yeah, me too.
We may find a way to the end, I hope.
We ought to.
How could you run the house?
How the devil could you do it unless you had those Southerners?
Oh, you couldn't.
That's why I'm going to support the Southerners tomorrow.
We're going to hand out buses.
We've got a judge out in Grand Rapids who's ordered 13 suburban school districts to get in.
He's one of ours and I would recommend him.
He's Al Gabriel's son.
But I talked to John Mitchell.
John Mitchell will intervene in that lawsuit and say, this goes beyond the Supreme Court decision.
The Department of Justice and the President don't agree with this cross-busting.
I want you to call.
I want you to get a hold of Mitchell.
And it's out of hander.
I mean, it was just an important thing to do.
You give them that thing and tell them that there's any way we can intervene, they should do it.
Provided, you know, the real problem I imagine they have is what they're doing in some of these damn southern districts and everything.
But I don't, no, no, this is, see, neither Mason nor southern districts, this is some, no, no, no, this is, don't get it, this is the fact.
This is, this is, we're telling you, stupid, disgust.
Yes.
He's issued a preliminary order, 13 suburban schools... We can't intervene.
It does go beyond.
It can be done.
All right.
Because there is no issue, believe me, in the country in which there is more unanimity of opinion than on buses.
I am utterly convinced.
You should also, Senator Previn, urge us to do the same thing.
Here it is.
Yeah, well, I don't know.
I extended $250,000 in a recall petition.
Well, if the Department of Justice would just intervene in Grand Rapids, Grand Rapids, particularly.
Well, Art, I want you to tell you what your congressional documents say to you.
Now, don't ever come in here and ask me, Jerry can, but just say that in all these cases where we can find it, where we can legitimately do it, we can do it, because, you know, basically, there's this great push for constitutional amendment.
We're not sure if that can be done, constitutional or a right or anything.
But this old car is very important.
I'll bet you never heard any friends are running fast enough.
Do they want to vote on that?
No.
Mr. President, John mentioned a reason in this Grand Rapids case, and Albert Engel, a judge out there, said after considering the arguments, he discontinued his order of 13 cases which being involved as co-defendants.
It would be a 10 strike.
Well, can we leave this this way that we will, first, we appreciate your sturdiness and the rest, I know it's tough.
I would, for a moment, believe there's nothing I'd rather do than trip up our enemies here.
aren't our enemies in the political, because I know there are plenty of politics with this thing.
But on the other hand, the states are extremely high.
In my view, there's almost more than anything else.
I have got to have that much leverage on the people of Washington.
I've just got to have it.
Because I say, if we're sitting here in November of next year,
400 POWs, and I don't give a damn if there are no American generals and no Americans.
Of course, there will be some Americans there.
But that's going to be one hell of an issue.
It's going to be more emotional.
And that will be the only issue then.
Now, I'm not suggesting that that is the only thing we're negotiating on, is ceasefire and the Rio de Tras.
But as you see, if you can go two ways,
There's a lot more pressure on a gun negotiation than if you're going to go one way.
Now, the minute that the HOP, through the Mansfield, the Congress, indicates that the only way we can go is that we'll get out and we'll reach our tail between our legs if you give us our prisoners.
First of all, they won't make that deal.
But if that's the only way you can go, the pressure for gun negotiation is infinitely less.
And if they think, well, we've got an option other than getting out, we might stay.
And we might bomb the hell out of them.
And we might.
Now, that's what they've got to understand.
Now, the only reason that's credible is because the Russians have moved to Laos.
But believe me, it's credible as hell, because I can assure you, anything will be done to get those guys back.
So there we are.
In the meantime, Jerry, I want to say on this thing.
Let Henry and me, I want to talk a little bit, as you understand, let me talk about the 15th day.
I get all better tomorrow.
I'm getting back to a situation where it looks like we're doing it for that reason.
On the other hand, on the changing resolution,
When will that be loaded on the left side?
My guess would be the latter part of next week, Mr. President.
Actually, this is finally recorded.
All right.
Wouldn't it appear?
Wouldn't it appear?
Mr. President, even though the 15th is the end of the continuing resolution, we've had experiences in the last five or six years where it's gone past.
And there hasn't been any action politically.
What do you think, though, will be announced to take up, say, the middle of the previous week?
I would be a little concerned about that if we could win in the House by a better margin.
And I think because... Well, you're going to have a crack at it.
I think we have.
All right, we'll keep our decision open then.
Right.
Until you're ready to vote in the House.
Fair enough.
And then we'll take the next year in the House and we can look and see what happens.
We'll see what the Senate's decision is.
Mr. President, why did nothing match?
A lot of people are expecting your announcement on Friday the 12th, or Saturday the 13th, or Sunday the 14th, as well as Monday the 15th.
We've been very loose on it.
Oh, I know.
Well, we've made announcements for a week in advance.
We've made them for a full seven usually.
Usually we have made it from the 7th to the 15th.
So we are in a position to do that.
But the 15th is the best date for us this time for other reasons.
Well, Mr. President, I agree with you entirely.
If we could step up, appreciate the number of guys that we can return per month, I think this will have a real good impact on the country.
All right.
Thank you.
What's the matter with Michigan?
They only have one player.
Why a touchdown?
I told you, if you want to see the best football game, you're going to have to shoot for about a season.
Oh, that's great.
Oh, that's great.
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
I don't know what you do.
I don't know what you do.
I don't know what you do.
I don't know what you do.
I don't know what you do.
I don't know what you do.
I came to tell you one time about, uh, uh, Mr. Farquhar.
He, uh, he, uh, he, uh, he, uh, he, uh, he, uh, he, uh, he, uh,
Can you do me a favor?
Can you do me a favor?
I'm going to talk to the client about the team.
Have you talked to the team yet?
Not about this.
Well, this is a special deal, and I think the client could be...
I walked into my client and said, I was just talking today to the client about this.
We're just like this, man.
That's how it happens.
We do that.
I'll talk to the team tomorrow.
The team is very technical, and I told him to look into the thing.
All right, Bob.
No, I didn't blame him.
I mean, he knows about it.
That's why I'm talking to you.
Yeah, yeah.
Well, we appreciate your support.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Would it be better if, let's, I didn't want to tell them, but maybe we should move the data.
You know what I mean?
I, I'm just starting to think that, I'm just starting to think that, anyway, it's true, it's massive.
It is seriously, it is seriously what is happening.
These guys, who's all, both of them, what do you think about it?
Would it be better to throw my voice at you if you did something like that?
On the other hand, the reaction among
The does might be one an outrage that we've hit them, the other the other.
By leaving until the 15th, we sort of keep the pressure off.
So that's why I was brokering here, to keep that in mind.
I don't think, Mr. President, that I thought that you didn't know that, too.
Well, my own reasoning is very diabolical here.
I think that they, I think that Jerry and Les would be pleased
with the two-month announcement.
I think they will.
Yeah, but the does, but the does will never be pleased.
We found this out every time.
They will say, they will say, well, that's nine months away.
It ought to be four months away.
Why not April?
See?
The message you gave at that time, the same thing with that.
If you said July, that's it.
You said... No, the argument that you didn't make, though, is that I think it's very cold in here.
It's a lot colder in here.
What do you think?
That is.
I hear a deadline.
We have it.
Yeah.
Excuse me, Mr. Stafford.
Rosa Woods has a couple of papers down here.
You've been asking about it in your office.
Oh, in your office.
Yeah.
Well, thanks.
Thank you.
Uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the deadline.
I hear a deadline.
It is frankly worse than if the Congress did it.
Oh, if I could get the whistleblowers to clear it.
But if I did that, then I'd have drawn the towel.
And also, I think it was just as well for me to take them down the same line I took the field.
If I had got to take Colonel Strickland through the bomb, they'd block it.
I put a hard time on that.
I read it was our hawks.
Oh, they, uh, well, I thought it was a mast that we'll need it.
I thought you had it in the mast.
Well, here, these are our friends.
These are our friends.
Now, I thought you had them beautifully.
My worry is that if you do it too early, not sleeping inside, they're going to make whatever decision they're going to make in May.
But if you do it too early, one of the things can happen.
Either they'll stay
That shows what that RNA test does to you.
Or, more likely they'll say this shows, if we don't pass an entry resolution and they hold us to the left side, they get to us.
If you can hold out, say, till the 15th, and Lee Duck Toe shows up after.
I admit the public don't know who Lee Duck Toe is, but Harriman is going to be running all over the hill and saying, Lee Duck Toe always shows up when there are important things going on.
Let's not blow the chance, and so forth.
And Lee, you see what I mean?
So a lot of these guys may think that this diabolical president has something up his sleeve, because by now they aren't that silly.
Also because of the surprise element that we had before.
Exactly.
We've had just enough to do a surprise for these guys.
So when Lida Coe arrives in Paris, the sophisticates, which is after all what we're talking about in the Senate, there are only 10 or 15 sons of bitches, are going to wonder whether you are not going to yank the rug out from under them as you did in July.
And, of course, if the thing blows up on the 20th, we are under no restraints at all.
We can go public any time.
It's your program.
Yeah, if it blows up on the 20th, in my view there, the exercise on the 20th is, of course, a little bit more interesting.
not just have a dilatory action on their part.
They will be playing a dilatory line.
Well, I'm not so sure.
I'm not so sure that they, it's in their interest to play a dilatory line.
The good thing we have going now is the thing that worries me after the blowout on the 13th of September was that we didn't have anything going.
Right now, supposing, if Russia came to Russia, if you could say while the North Vietnamese negotiator was heading for Paris,
These bastards did the foreign aid thing and ten other things.
If you wanted to go on the attack, you could do it.
And we have an overwhelming record.
On the 20th, I agree with you, we ought to force it to a clear-cut decision at the most in two meetings.
We can't get a decision in two meetings.
I frankly think that in your accounting in January or whenever you trust it to be in your best interest, you will then announce the end of the draft, but also you ought to call court on that.
You ought to say we are no longer playing this game.
We're keeping the leaders in office there for the prisoners.
And... We've got to leave and go start something.
I think we've got to consider the... we've got to consider the blocking.
That's right.
Just really do not...
I wouldn't do that on the last I've been in China because it's only four weeks away then to China.
Before Russia.
I'd do it before Russia.
I wouldn't play it on the beach.
No, maybe not.
Maybe not.
We'll get the Russian thing out of the way and then do it.
We'll do it during the summit.
Sure.
And just say, now we've pissed away here and we've still got our prisoners.
That prisoner, he's coming.
He's not this issue.
As the withdrawal can proceed, you understand that?
Because all of us, you know, see our men gone, the American, and they've still got the prisoners.
And if I'm not here...
Yes.
I'm going to try to see whether we can.
The thing we have going for us is that they're afraid of your election.
And that's why I believe they're going to settle before your election.
And the Russians, we've gotten the transcript of the secret Russian talk in a high-party organization where one question was, doesn't the summit re-insure Nixon's re-election?
The answer of the party official was yes, but we'd rather deal with Nixon, who's a known quality, who's proof he can deliver, than with a new man.
And that is true.
The North Vietnamese know that if the war isn't settled after November,
You are free of all restraints.
With a mandate, you can do anything.
That's the mistake we made last time, that we let the first year go by.
We had that first year back.
That's right.
We should have... We got that withdrawal track, negotiating track.
We were also doing this May 14 speech.
There's a bunch of bullshit.
No, no, we did well, but we... Heard all about the war.
Yeah.
No, we should have used that.
Partying around with all the negotiations.
Remember, we all folded there and lodged there and jackass-ing around.
It was terrible.
Basically because we weren't talking about it.
We should have found them when they started their offensive in February of 69.
That's what we should have done.
But they know damn well, if you come in with a man, it doesn't matter how much of a majority, you're home.
If we win the election by one vote, you and anybody else who's going on, I'll bomb the shit out of them.
I mean, I'll take the vote.
There will be nothing left.
I mean it.
That's right.
I wouldn't give one finger's death.
But anyway, the other part is, you may go ahead.
This is just a re-election.
I'm willing to risk that.
I really am.
If we have got to bring it back in order to bring that prisoner in here, that prisoner could be an issue.
In other words, we've got to determine what to do.
We may have to just start bombing.
Well, we've got to think about the options, either bombing or blockade.
What's your present thinking as to what you should do?
Blockade.
But it depends.
If you do it after the election, aren't you bound?
Not after the election.
Everything.
Everything until, yeah.
Before the election.
Before the election.
I would do something.
Blockade will get you into a confrontation with the Russians.
That's the... Yeah, I'd find them.
I'd give them a lot of, a few heavy bombing blows, and then right after the election I'd blockade them.
I'm not sure yet that they won't sell it.
Because if they didn't want to do something, why is the leader still coming back?
Why are they sending us a message?
Of course, to your point, though, as well, David, maybe he's misread the tea leaves again and things were on the ground and all that.
On the other hand, it is reassuring to know that before your meeting takes place, the continuing resolution will have passed.
That day is turning.
Yes.
You know, if they say to the Senate that they're going to pass the board, and so we will, that will be pretty clear indication that the Senate has turned around for two reasons.
Absolutely.
So that was positive when you got there.
Oh, yeah.
The fact is that I can change the press release.
And I don't see, if they wanted to turn it down, they could have just sent us a message saying, hey, there's nothing new in your proposal, it's not worth meeting.
Or they could just say, so I'm free, it's perfectly capable of handling this negotiation if they don't want to take
White leader Coe coming back.
But it's slightly less than, I think it's about 45, 55 now.
But if it's ever going to crack, it's going to crack now.
If those thumbs are pitched in the Senate, it is really the treason
May I ask you what you said about them in 52 was mild compared to what these bastards really are.
I cannot understand one man's field resolution, but to bring it in on every bill, every three weeks, is unkind.
He's, they're harassing the president.
They're harassing the president?
They're trying desperately to end the goddamn war.
They've got to send you.
Not France, you know, I agree, but the Democrats don't send his party.
But it is also unconscionable for a majority leader that once he's elected...
I feel a little tired of this girl.
Ravishing with money and talking to him about it and all that.
All it does is really make a gentleman.
I mean, he is not assaulting as much, but I don't think he would anyway.
I think we've done it pretty much.
I think if we should succeed in ending this war, we ought to put these people to the tour.
I couldn't agree more.
And we are always too generous.
Now the Pentagon Papers have dropped out of sight.
And not to be used in the present time.
For example, you well know you couldn't use the whole Jim controversy before the Jew election.
That's the reason, sir.
I've now read that.
And it's... Did you?
Oh, it's awful.
Jim.
Bundy.
Bundy.
Russ.
were in it, up to their necks, and lots of possessions.
They carried rust a little less than most.
I mean, rust signed a lot of cables, but they were really drafted by iron.
But they went out there, and they ordered a crew.
Oh, yeah.
And they carried it out.
And that's that.
It's the goddamnedest thing you ever saw.
And they were doing it to you in September, except you went the other way.
It is, after all, fascinating that until September 16th,
There were street demonstrations.
Everything was cranking up after your press conference.
And after we sent ACAR's data and passed the word, they magically stopped.
There hasn't been a street demonstration.
Don't you think?
Don't you have a feeling that our State Department assholes out there may have conserved some of the votes?
Not a feeling, I'm certain.
Really?
Oh, yeah.
Not CIA at the moment.
Well, CIA was beginning not to stir it up.
When CIA listens to cool talk without saying, go to hell, that's, in a way, stirring it up.
In other words, you think that September 16th, they're cool on that?
The September 16th was a historic press conference, Mr. President.
It turned the whole thing around.
Why is it necessary?
Why didn't they do it before?
Do you think...
because they are basically, this bureaucracy is basically solved, liberal and democratic.
And you have the terrible disadvantage that they just cannot stand.
Your successes, your successes infuriate them even more than your failures.
But if you think
What did you say last Wednesday?
You said their behavior was bad.
That's right.
And it might hurt.
And it might hurt the United Nations.
You went out of your way not to attack February.
So forth.
And they're playing this as if it had been a major international event.
They've covered that UN so-called defeat, where actually a sophisticated understanding should show
that it was high order of statesmanship to play it this way, that we made a clear record, we fought hard, but we didn't break the China with the communists.
That wasn't easy to do.
But they played that into, if you read the news magazines this week, you might have thought that this was the most important event in the post-war history.
Indeed, Teddy Kennedy in his speech, which I've now gotten the carpet text of,
said the most momentous U.N. vote in the whole post-war history, and yet in a shattering U.S. defeat.
That implies that nothing was more important to us than keeping Taiwan in.
You have a right to say that, but not Teddy Kennedy.
He was against keeping them in.
No, but it shows what you have to get.
I don't know what the news magazines are predicting.
It's predictable what they will do.
They're going to play the U.N. that way and press.
But on the other hand, I can assure you that I think I have a fair intuition about American public opinion.
American public opinion has disgusted with that U.N. conduct.
I have no question about it.
Because that's what people think of.
They've got reactions that way.
And frankly, they had to use some excuse to take it on.
I understand that.
I think you did the right thing.
I understand that.
They tried to take it up here to the president, and they agreed on it.
And they agreed on it.
I didn't say anything.
I didn't even say it.
They reported it, as I know them to.
That was my reaction.
I mentioned it only as an example of what we had to do.
Well, the way you do it, the crappy stuff that they're taking about how to try to get the time to do it.
But the way they're trying to say that we made a great station, a tragic station, the timing of your trip, not anybody in their goddamn mind knows when could we have time to do it.
Impossible.
Because the Chinese wouldn't accept it.
Nor did the Chinese know the vote was going to take place.
And, of course, we were misled.
We were told the vote would be...
But my point is, Henry,
They're only seizing on this thing because they ain't got nothing else.
And it will pass.
Oh, I have no doubt of that.
It just shows...
The continuing resolution will pass.
No, it just shows what you're up against and what you have achieved in the most improbable circumstances.
I told it in our staff meeting yesterday.
I said every good thing that's been done on both the domestic and international side and your administration has been done by a tiny group in the White House against the press, against the bureaucracy.
That's right.
And that is what makes your administration so complex.
We can survive.
Well, I think we can survive, Mr. President, because this is a minor
It's exercised compared to what we've been through.
Oh, I don't, I don't consider this, and I, as far as they're yakking about the UN vote, and they, uh, you know, they were raising hell because we criticized the conduct of that.
That's all, they, they, these report that we criticized.
Although some of them, uh, meshed over and say it was the vote we criticized.
No, I didn't criticize the vote.
Four, four weeks from now, no one will know what they voted.
Well, so you don't know that I thought the U.N. put on a bad show.
But that's very important.
Another thing they have, they don't have a plan.
How the hell are you going to keep ready for a loan of interest?
And he thought ready.
He was.
And this was a pretty poor business.
Very small prices to pay to keep it good.
But, of course, they like to have a loan of interest in us.
President, there's no disaster that can befall you that those bastards won't win.
I mean, I'm talking about the liberals, not about the healthy Americans.
The liberals know you are the only thing that stands between them and the control, because any other Republican would really be under their control.
Much as I like Nelson, if Nelson were President, John Gardner would be a welcome...
visitor in the White House, all these bleeding hearts would be in here all over the place.
Well, no, he has no intention.
No, but what I meant was, the reason they hate you so much is because any other Republican
that could be elected, would be more susceptible to them.
Reagan couldn't be elected.
And so they want a Democrat.
And that's what's killing them.
But I don't think, I think... We'll just have to see now what happens.
It is...
highly unhelpful that everything is turning up now again.
But the one thing working in our favor is that Hanoi has seen us in worse shape, in much worse shape, and we've always come back.
Well, Hanoi, too, as I see, before you see that, there's a particular resolution passed.
Yes.
And, of course, they've killed the stories of my trip, which would have not that they made any difference to us.
They would have made a hell of a lot of difference to Hanoi.
We could have done a week of backgrounding, how we were received, and how you were involved in all of this, and that.
That's, of course, all down the track.
Is it worth trying now?
It's too late now.
I think so.
It is too late.
We'll make that bigger.
Well, that'll come, too.
We'll have our day there.
I mean, if we could have given them the uneasy feeling that a hell of a lot was going on.
But that's no disaster because they know we were there.
Well, the facts on NRI and all the other ideas are so that they can look at this and that and the other thing, but it's going to be down to that kind of proposition.
They want to make a deal or they want to run the risk that I can do them on.
Now, that's what they think necessarily.
That's why I dropped that little note to Tito.
And I'm seeing the freedom on Thursday for lunch.
And I go, I don't want to watch.
I just want to get back to being true to you.
What do you think?
I think that's fair.
And so it doesn't appear we're trying to block.
I just simply say, if you accept to do it, you can say you can.
If anything, as far as this has happened, you might just throw the line at me when I was in the kitchen and read it.
But look, we're going to go.
If this doesn't go, then the President particularly wants you to go.
He feels that our meetings are very, very important, but he must act to protect our interests, including the interests of our prisoners, and that any actions that he chooses not to be misinterpreted as being directly against you.
Let's put that in line.
Why don't you say that to him?
I think that's a very good line to follow.
What do you think?
I think that's good.
I think I ought to do that.
By the end of next week, we have to make a decision on how you want to go on the Middle East.
Because we have to tell the Russians.
I'm just stalling him now in exploratory conversations.
I'm not committing us to anything.
But we don't have to do it this week.
We can wait until...
I promised them an answer by the 22nd.
Not that we'll say yes, but that we'll try to negotiate it.
Thank you.
The problem is we'd then have to throw the state off.
We'd have to throw the state off.
Their enterprises are not going to be touched.
We can't do that.
Just tell them it's a political year.
You don't want any more pressure now.
See, my nightmare now is they're so eager to get the Israelis to start negotiating that they'll give them the fandoms
Just for the start of the negotiation, and I feel having held out this long on the fandoms, we ought to see whether we can use them in what the Russians propose.
Because once they've given them the fandoms, we have no leverage at all, let alone the Israelis.
I would never have done what they did.
I would have given them the...
I would have said we'll give them fandoms and held back on deliveries without...
But that's...
But I'll review the whole thing with you next week.
We don't have to decide it.
Well, we're going to go that way.
We've got to keep this way, this thing.
Well, I'm not sure, Mr. President.
I've got to take, it's going to be a tough session to get into it.
I've got to talk.
I've got to find my own way of bringing her out of this.
Right.
Well, I'll have, I don't want to.
Well, I don't want to.
recommended to you, Mr. President, I'd like to have another talk with Mr. Breeden to be sure that we have a chance.
Well, he's all aboard.
He called me twice a week to complain.
What I would like to do is have one more talk with Mr. Breeden to see what his real offer is.
Then I'd like to have a very
uh i'd like to have a talk with rapine to find out what we're going to get into with that on part of it and uh and because you shouldn't get your prestige involved in a negotiation unless we know we can make it go but i can make a recommendation to you within two weeks on that
They lost a lot in Gallipoli.
In Gallipoli they lost a lot.
And they lost...
Australia and New Zealand, yeah.
Australia lost a lot in Gallipoli, and in World War II, they lost a lot in the desert.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
It was one great battle for a war of honor.
The Austrians just, you know, they were fought back.
That's right.
Just got that, got that fall shot.
Well, of course, everybody did that, but their casualties were unbelievable.
We had to protect the war.
I mean, the war.
What we are having is a total moral collapse of our leadership.
That election last year was a disaster from this point of view.
If we could have picked up four or five Senate seats, we would have scared the others.
They were so close.
If we could have got it in the end, that could have been one.
That could have made a difference.
Even that one.
I'm sure.
I'm sure.
Exactly.
I mean, we have these two disastrous candidates, Smith in Illinois and the two big states.
Because anybody, I think, could have beaten Tunney, except Murphy.
Murphy would have raided the coast.
There was too much jealousy there.
He's dumb and then has no voice.
He makes people uncomfortable.
And so Finch, if we had had Finch and... Well, anyway, that's...
But on the other hand, more collapse or not, we're still here.
Well, and we're still in a strong position, and everyone...
still recognizes that this is a revolution in foreign policy and in international monetary policy.
It is a revolution in foreign policy, and it's going to continue to be.
And there's a little bit of squeak, a bunch of whining around because of the UN vote, the foreign aid vote, and so forth.
Oh.
God, we've met at worst.
We've met at worst today, and sometimes you read it.
Now with respect to the New York Times editorial board, John Oakes called my office, said he'd like to have lunch with me.
Now I loathe the son of a bitch.
Not the right time.
There is a time.
There will come a time.
Not for me to go up or him to come down?
No, never.
Never.
I've never seen that.
That would be a reward beyond belief at this point.
There will come a time.
There will come a time.
But you, you're the big guy here.
I don't mind you as a star.
I think that's going to be useful.
And, uh...
But, uh...
But I would not give John Oaks a thing at this point.
Let me make a note.
I'll make one further check.
I have another source that I'll check this with.
I just want you to be used.
I have a thought.
I have a thought.
I've got a plan.
After China, then everything is off.
By that, by hanging all the lids off.
Then we have got to go out and talk to every son of a bitch that we can.
But I will want you to undertake at that point, that is the time to go, not before, but after the election, to be closer to the election.
Then, it's then that I decided, well, I want you to go on the television and do the key thing you did in Chicago, which is how you build better programs than you had there, going to the car groups all over, living the times and the rest of it.
At the present time, the problem with the Times is that I don't want to reward them too soon after they give items in the Pentagon Papers.
That's the problem.
I find Oaks repulsive.
This is the Pentagon Papers.
Yes, that's the Pentagon Papers.
So I...
I don't think...
I don't think we'd be home, but at this point, if you do get in his head, he runs around town and all this, but if you do do the times, what I would have you do is what I would want, and it may be, it may be that if you go off, that it would come at the right time.
You heard what the little Australian said.
He said it there.
That they would like to improve their relations with you.
Yes, yes.
Well, that's a silly concern to say, but nevertheless, it shows we're going to do it.
The point is, if you do the Times, it should be at the editorial board where he's got one friend there.
Schwartz.
Huh?
Schwartz.
Yeah.
Schwartz is all right.
That's right.
There are a couple other guys that are all right at the Times for it.
Foley used to be in Poland, so their city editor is a good man.
Rosenwald.
Rosenwald.
That's very good, man.
You know what I mean?
They're good men at times.
They just can't speak out.
But I want you to go there where you get a chance to hit them and post and be one of them.
The hell will kill them, especially at this point.
I just don't want you to do it.
I won't do it.
No, I'll do it.
No, no, no, no.
That wouldn't be an option.
Let me see what I can say about you.
I'll screw you.
I'll screw you.
Yes, sir.
Good night.
You say that whites are going to wear skirts split to the head and center, so do I not take a look?
No, they won't see you next to me.
I'll let you sit by her.