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Conversation 617-009

TapeTape 617StartFriday, November 12, 1971 at 6:22 PMEndFriday, November 12, 1971 at 6:37 PMTape start time00:38:57Tape end time00:56:15ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Rogers, William P.;  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Bull, Stephen B.;  Butterfield, Alexander P.;  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob")Recording deviceOval Office
AudioNARA Description

On November 12, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, William P. Rogers, Henry A. Kissinger, Stephen B. Bull, Alexander P. Butterfield, and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 6:22 pm to 6:37 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 617-009 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 617-9

Date: November 12, 1971
Time: 6:22 pm - 6:37 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with William P. Rogers and Henry A. Kissinger.
[The recording begins at an unknown time while the conversation is in progress]

     India-Pakistan relations
                                               9

                          NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. 10/06)



          -United Nations [UN]
          -The President's forthcoming trip to People's Republic Of China [PRC]
          -Military situation
          -Possible US diplomatic action
          -UN
                -Indira Gandhi's view
                -Pakistani view
                -Security Council
                      -PRC presence
                -Washington Special Actions Group [WSAP]
                      -Gandhi’s forthcoming speech
                -Resolution
          -US-PRC relations
                -Paris contact
                      -UN delegation
                            -Canadian ambassador
                -Huang Hua
          -Possible US action
                -Timing

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 6:22 pm.

     The President's schedule
          -Departure for Camp David

Bull left at an unknown time before 6:26 pm.

     India-Pakistan
           -The President's schedule
                 -Joseph J. Sisco
           -UN
                 -Security Council
                       -PRC
                 -Indians' View
                 -Agha Muhommad Yahya Khan's view
           -Gandhi's forthcoming speech
           -Military situation
                 -East Pakistan
           -US actions
                 -Timing
                 -Gandhi’s forthcoming speech
                                                10

                          NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                     Tape Subject Log
                                       (rev. 10/06)
                                                                Conv. No. 617-9 (cont.)


                -Messages
                      -Sisco
                           -Lakshmi Kant Jha
           -Rogers's conversation with Gandhi
                -Possible war
                      -Consequence
                           -US economic aid


**************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[National Security]
[Duration: 6s ]


     INDIA


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

**************************************************************************


     Vietnam
          -Troop withdrawal announcement of November 12, 1971
               -Withdrawal period

Rogers left at 6:27 pm.

     The President’s schedule
          -Meeting

     India-Pakistan relations
           -Rogers
                -Kissinger’s memoranda
                -Melvin R. Laird
                -Possible motives
                      -Talks with the PRC
                            -UN Security Council
                                               11

                               NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                        Tape Subject Log
                                          (rev. 10/06)
                                                                          Conv. No. 617-9 (cont.)


     Submarines

Alexander P. Butterfield entered at 6:27 pm.

     The President's signature

     National Security Council [NSC] meeting

H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman entered at 6:27 pm.

     The President's schedule
          -American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations [AFL-CIO]
          -NSC meeting

     Unknown woman

     Memorandum for the Cabinet

Butterfield left at 6:33 pm.

     India-Pakistan relations
           -Sisco
           -UN Security Council
                 -Possible action
                       -Ceasefire
           -PRC
           -Military situation
                 -Possible war
                       -Timing

     US relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
          -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] negotiations
                -Laird
                     -Submarines
                           -Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles [ICBM]
                           -US program
                                 -Conservatives

     PRC
           -Sisco
                                              12

                             NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. 10/06)
                                                                   Conv. No. 617-9 (cont.)


     The President's schedule
          -NSC
               -Sisco
               -John B. Connally
          -Cabinet
               -Connally
          -NSC
          -Press conference
          -PRC announcement
               -Timing
                      -Press conference
                           -Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon

     The President's previous press conference
          -Impact
               -North Vietnam

Kissinger left at 6:35 pm.

     White House staff
          -Charles W. Colson's views
               -Secret Service
                     -Herbert G. Klein
               -Unknown person
               -William E. Timmons

     The President's schedule
          -Departure

The President and Haldeman left at 6:37 pm.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

It's a very serious situation, and if it looks worse, it looks dangerous.
It seems to me somehow we've got to get the United Nations in the act, because if it should break out, the trip to China would be jeopardized.
And if you've seen, I guess, some of the reports, the PAC Army now is in a state of readiness, and the Indians are certainly behaving badly, and we don't.
So what I'm saying is that I think we've got to get prepared to take some action diplomatically if it looks as if the war is imminent.
And I think one thing we can do is get a little more public attention focused on it so that if we have to go to get some, we don't have to necessarily, maybe we get somebody else to do it, but if the United, we want to get the United Nations and the acts that we get out of them in the middle.
uh they've been oh sure oh yes they've been very active in it and this is uh gandhi has resisted any attempt to have the united nations in it you know pakistan has been quite favorably disposed to it well all i'm saying is i what how do we go about it well it's a little complicated because the security council on the chinese are there uh we have to
Check it out pretty carefully, but you have no trouble getting a Security Council meeting, have you?
Well, we had a basic meeting today, Mr. President, and the general feeling was that perhaps we should wait until Monday to hear that speech.
The problem is... Oh, I agree.
We don't have to do anything now.
That's the problem is we...
One would have to know exactly what the resolution is, so that the resolution doesn't help the Indians, give the Indians an even better basis for bringing pressure.
And secondly, we have to move carefully with the Chinese.
Our trouble is that our Paris contact won't be back till Monday.
We shouldn't approach their delegation in New York until we get away from Beijing, how they want us to play there.
We've cleared them.
How do you want us to handle it?
We haven't told you what to do yet.
And they haven't told us what to do.
Tell them they're telling us what to do?
No.
Tell us how to deal with their New York delegation.
They have, for example, like, for example, the idea, you know, that they had said they didn't want us to deal with their Canadian ambassador.
Specifically, we had asked them, we had told them, right, that it'd be a lot simpler for us to deal with our new ambassador.
And on both occasions, they said they did not want us to deal with Juan Juan.
Now, for that reason, it would be a little complex.
I would recommend that we wait until Monday.
I'm not suggesting we do anything now.
I want the president to know I think it is developing into a serious situation.
Secondly, I think...
Excuse me.
If you'd like to start at 6.30, we can start at 6.30.
635, 635 science.
No, he doesn't do that.
Let me ask you this, sir.
Could we have a discussion on this next, in fact, seven, two, three years?
Yes, well, let's, let's...
Okay, fine.
Right.
Oh, fine.
No, that's why the Security Council action is very attractive to me if we, obviously, we've got to do it carefully, we've got to consult with everybody, but they... Yeah, right, because Mr. President, the Indians...
Well, I don't think we answered this right.
The Indians don't want it.
The Indians are very reluctant to have the United Nations involved at all.
Yaya has been quite relaxed about the United Nations presence.
The fact of the matter, if war breaks out in that part of the world, the Indians are going to win.
The Paks have only got 60,000 men in East Pakistan.
They have one hell of a time.
And the worst thing that could happen, seems to me, would be to have a war break out and India win.
And I don't think we should do it.
I don't think we have to make any decisions now except to say that if it looks as if it's getting to the crisis stage, and it may very well when she makes her speech next week,
that then we've got to be ready to move, and I think the United Nations is the best place to do it.
Should any messages go either to India or Pakistan at this point?
Yes, we've consulted with them.
We've been after them.
I think if we do more than we've already done, then we look too nervous.
And so that's here.
And also, we've sent a message today in the U.S. And Bill, I'll tell you, if it breaks out, just call us out in terms of future conferences.
Well, we've made that decision.
In my discussion with Mrs. Gandhi, all I told her in no uncertain terms, I took her, you know, I was much more frank than you, right to the point.
Because I can talk plainly, but I said the President just told me, made it clear that if war breaks out,
All bets are off.
We're not going to provide anything.
Well, Pat, I don't know how they reproduce.
I thought the announcement worked out really well.
You are right.
I think I've got all the nuances that we talked about.
We are now ready to go for the two months necessary.
Well, the other two, or six, is a busy question.
Let me count.
It's very interesting to me that the president is so crooked on freedom that he goes to the left of you on this thing.
I get it, too.
It's a matter of what somebody keeps positioning himself to the right.
It hits you hard.
No, no, no.
I'm going to get later.
I don't know what he's up to.
He wants to get a big negotiation started in New York so that he can talk to the Chinese.
Oh, shit.
You don't want that.
I think we should schedule, if you agree, the NFC on Thursday, then we'll put a trim on them for four days, or they'll be at you.
Can you do that?
Is that NFC?
Yes.
That's fine.
Thursday?
Oh, wait.
No, about the, uh, those who, uh, you know, have to go to the UFC.
No.
I said on Thursday, if I do, the NFL.
Isn't that the point?
It's not the NFL.
No.
Well, let's try tomorrow.
I know, but I wouldn't go to Pearson.
You go, you have to go to Pearson.
That's my point.
You have to meet Wednesday then.
Wednesday.
You have to see you have to have Wednesday.
I mean, except for the preparation after the day of the ballot.
I don't think it's really, uh, about that.
What's that?
I don't think it's really about that.
I don't think it's really about that.
I don't think it's really about that.
I don't think it's really about that.
I don't think it's really about that.
I don't think it's really about that.
Basically, it's this maniac sister-in-law who wants to take over.
What the Security Council would do is to order all firing to stop.
Then if the Pakistanis fire at the guerrillas, they'll be in the wrong and the Indians will actually be carrying out Security Council resolutions.
I frankly would prefer to wait until after the 20th, when we can get word from Peking what they want.
And have it the necessary week from Monday, or...
If there is, it won't be stopped by going to the security council.
Actually, I don't think you'll be able to do that.
That last performance in there was unbelievable again.
Where?
On the goddamn submarines.
If we don't have a submarine, then...
then we are not any better off not having an ICBM than because we're not going to have ICBMs anywhere.
The question you put was absolutely right, and my mind is going in the same direction as yours, whether we are not better off pushing our own submarine program than trying to constrict theirs.
And it would also help without conservatives.
But you won't even get me close to having to make that decision for six weeks.
I think it would be better not to have an M.E.C.
meeting on Tuesday.
There's nothing you can say at this meeting that Cisco won't use to run wild.
So what do you want to do?
Have it the week after.
Say, a week from Tuesday or Monday.
I'll talk to Connolly.
I think he might prefer to have a week of that length.
You have a cabinet thing on Monday where he's supposed to just say briefly what he's doing.
Do we have a cabinet meeting yet?
We just had one.
I mean, another one.
Last week.
He said, remember, you divided that, and that one was the purely political one, and then you put over whatever the other thing was, so the 15th, and you wanted Conte to come right back off his trip with a, oh, you've got to get the book out of that cabinet somehow.
How's it going?
I think we could line the thing up better for an NSE meeting a week after next, if you would agree.
Whenever you think 22nd, 23rd.
That's your other arm.
If you're going to do a breast arm, submit it at 23rd.
If you want to keep it, 27th.
I can do it at 24th.
The Chinese haven't agreed yet to the announcement being made at 7.30 at night.
No, but what could, the way you could, I thought of what would happen, because you see their newspapers come out at 7 in the morning, they want it in their morning paper at 7 in the morning.
Then you could still, the announcement we've agreed to is only a one-line announcement, which we could make it four.
And the president, if he had a press conference, could still say, Mrs. Nixon is coming along with something in three cities.
He could still explain the amount of work that we have to put into people more than the day.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Well, I think that's it.
Well, I thought that first conference today was extraordinary.
We did a good job.
Maybe we'll get a good picture from what's happening on the 20th.
It was ideas.
It was what part of the impact was from Hanoi.
Yeah, it could have been.
Yeah.
Yeah.
But we'll think about this on Thursday.
It's a long story.
Okay, Henry, we'll see you.
I don't know.
That's the thought I've heard so far.
I don't think they have.
That's what I think.
I don't know.
Would we know?
I don't think.
Unless you did, I haven't described to a degree your religiousness and your irresponsibility in mind.
It's a little deeper than that.
It's outside.
And he's overestimating the quality of his evidence at this point.
You going up there?
I'm good.
Ready?
Yeah.
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