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Conversation 622-001

TapeTape 622StartMonday, November 22, 1971 at 3:51 PMEndMonday, November 22, 1971 at 3:58 PMTape start time00:00:33Tape end time00:11:59ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Butterfield, Alexander P.Recording deviceOval Office
AI Summary

In this Oval Office meeting, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger coordinate U.S. foreign policy regarding the escalating military tensions between India and Pakistan. Kissinger expresses frustration with the State Department's perceived insubordination, advocating for a firmer stance against Indian military aggression while aligning more closely with Pakistani interests and Chinese diplomatic positions. The President directs Kissinger to issue sharp, clear warnings to both India and the Soviet Union regarding U.S. expectations, while strategically delaying UN Security Council involvement to better assess Chinese objectives.

India-Pakistan conflictForeign policyUnited NationsHenry KissingerState DepartmentDiplomatic strategy
AudioNARA Description

On November 22, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 3:51 pm to 3:58 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 622-001 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 622-1

Date: November 22, 1971
Time: 3:51 pm - 3:58 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Alexander P. Butterfield.

     The President's schedule
          -Letters

Rose Mary Woods entered at an unknown time after 3:51 pm.

                -Address

Butterfield left at an unknown time before 3:52 pm.

     Woods's schedule

     John F. Kennedy
          -Anniversary of assassination
          -Jacqueline Lee Bouvier Kennedy Onassis


*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 24s ]


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

*****************************************************************


Woods left and Henry A. Kissinger entered at 3:52 pm.

     Kissinger's schedule
          -People's Republic of China [PRC] officials
          -Nelson A. Rockefeller
                                         2

                         NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                  Tape Subject Log
                                    (rev. 10/06)
                                                              Conv. No. 622-1 (cont.)



**************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[National Security]
[Duration: 8s ]


    PRC


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

**************************************************************************


    India-Pakistan
          -State Department
                -Agha Muhommad Yahya Khan
                -Mujibur Rahman’s release
          -Yahya Khan
                -Tenure in office


**************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[National Security]
[Duration: 34s ]


    INDIA-PAKISTAN


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3

**************************************************************************


          -India
                -Popular view
                                             3

                            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                     Tape Subject Log
                                       (rev. 10/06)
                                                                    Conv. No. 622-1 (cont.)


                     -Kissinger’s previous trip to Cincinnati
               -John B. Connally's view
               -US policy
                     -Refugees
                     -Foreign aid
          -United Nations [UN] Security Council meeting
               -Possible resolution
                     -PRC
          -Kissinger's contacts with Pakistan
          -Possible escalation
               -Yahya Khan’s view
               -Possible White House statement
          -The President's meeting with Indira Gandhi
               -US efforts
                     -Suspension of foreign aid
          -Kissinger's meeting with David Packard and Thomas H. Moorer

     The President's schedule
          -Moorer
          -Connally

     Connally
         -Pay Board meeting

     Kissinger's schedule
          -Connally

The President talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 3:52 pm and 3:58
pm.

[Conversation No. 622-1A]

     The President's schedule

[End of telephone conversation]

     India-Pakistan
           -US policy
                -Packard and Moorer
                      -Department of State
                -Possible US action
                                               4

                             NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. 10/06)
                                                                  Conv. No. 622-1 (cont.)


                       -Message to India
                       -Message to Soviet Union
                 -PRC’s possible actions
                       -Possible UN Security Council resolution
                            -Kissinger
                 -India
                       -The President’s view
                 -State Department
                       -Messages

Kissinger left at 3:58 pm.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Well, this is what it seems.
You know, I had not thought of it, but just...
It was hot today, but it didn't die that day.
They didn't say so.
Yeah, they did.
Remember, she flew back with me that night with the body.
as we're talking about the scheduling and so forth.
One thing I wanted to see is if either David and Julie might want to go to New York and that's where you're going to be going up there once.
Well, uh... Yeah, go ahead.
This is David Erwin.
One second.
Hi, sir.
I believe I'll have a check back in a minute.
Oh, all right.
We're going to have to work on it.
Yeah.
All right.
All right.
All right.
Uh...
I'm meeting the Chinese tomorrow night.
So I'm trying to stall off New York, yeah.
I said, Rockefeller, things are too complicated, so I'm using the CIA, yeah.
Now, we've got a case of almost total insubordination from the State Department.
They want to go to Yahya and ask him to release Mooji.
Now, we do this in the case of an attack by the Indians on Pakistan.
It's going to be considered.
This is something that, as you know, we have got to move on, but not at this point.
I think the time to move on that, Mr. President, is Yang Yang stepping down the first week in January.
He is?
Yeah.
One could do it with his successor, pretty much.
a hell of a lot easier than Lieutenant.
Secondly, I don't agree with the Aga Khan on this.
As soon as Moojib is released, the Indians will find something else.
We've given the Indians a hell of a lot.
This is a clear case of military aggression.
And above all, the Chinese have just sent us a note.
That's one of the few issues on which we are more or less on the same side.
We don't have to go as far as China.
Well, now what is this that the Indians are downplaying?
Well, they're downplaying it to some extent, but we have the numbers of the division.
In my view, I have found that that doesn't prove anything.
But when I'm in Cincinnati, for example, somebody asks me, when nobody likes the Indians,
And I just laid into them, I say, on refugees, we are helping them.
We are giving more than half of the aid.
What we do not want is a military aggression by them against their neighbor in such a way that the whole country is integrated.
What I would recommend, we are meeting again at 8.30 tomorrow morning.
First, I'd like to stall off the Security Council resolution until Wednesday so that we can find out what the Chinese are planning.
The Security Council resolution?
The Security Council meeting.
Because the strong probability is that we'd be caught between the Soviets and the Chinese, between the Indians and the Pakistanis.
And there's nothing in that lineup.
They're going to pass a resolution urging a political accommodation more likely than condemning India.
Probably not.
But we haven't taken position.
Well, I've got a back channel to Yaya saying if he could wait till Wednesday.
It would help us, but he has to leave.
Well, he's asked for a security comment.
Not yet.
So that they don't ask for one.
Now, those are told their ambassador here, who asked my advice what they should do.
They're saying it's war.
Yeah, they're saying it's war.
It's a naked case of aggression, Mr. President.
There's absolutely no...
They have been back exactly one week.
You cut off arms.
You told her we were going to try to move them politically.
She doesn't even know yet what the answers to these various proposals are that you made to them.
That we said we were going to take out the Xiaoyang.
Unilateral withdrawal.
So we've done everything that is humanly possible.
I think if we, uh...
I think if we line up with India and the Soviet Union...
I don't worry.
What I think we should do is to send a staff note.
Well, Packard and Moore said...
They asked to see me in my office afterwards.
They said it was unbelievable.
No.
If you want, I'll see you there.
Okay, I'll get it done.
Now, I slipped up on that, Mr. President.
Oh, I have some idea.
I hear you were tied up in service.
I'm having a meeting with Conley Hall very soon anyway, sir.
Yes, sir.
You're seeing him this afternoon?
Yeah, they're all meeting now on the domestic thing.
Oh, I'm having a meeting with Conley in about three minutes, in fact, on the international economic one.
I don't know.
You may not.
Maybe it's in East Georgia somewhere.
He's hiding.
He's hiding.
In my view, this is better.
What if I can warn you?
Well, if I can warn you, it would be because you didn't even take that in the office when you delivered what you wanted.
Act as you please, but think about it.
Oh, no.
Neither practice.
I don't want to.
Act as you please.
Sir, there's nothing to do, Mr. Chairman, with my use to send a very sharp note to the Indians, reminding them of all that history has done, and saying that repeating what you've said simply will not be understood in this country.
Without any threats.
And that's what I want to do.
So?
Point two, we should get a note with the Soviets along the same line.
Right.
Point three, uh, come over to the two things you're going to be asking me.
All right.
To find out what they'll do with the Security Council.
It may take you to the Security Council, but we have to leave.
We don't have to go as far as the Chinese.
But I would leave...
I would go damn near as far.
I understand.
I don't like the Indians.
We ought to leave pretty close to the Chinese and make it... And I also must remember the Pakistanis have been our friends for this late two days.
And that is not... You know, I don't see what we gain by helping out the Indians.
Well, how about these notes?
You have Army men now.
Uh, Tommy, you have to clear those things, uh, because we've got to tell the state, of course, what's happening.
No, no, they're coming from the state.
Uh, the state is going to have to.
Good.
You tell them, you tell them the president wants these guns.
Okay.
Good.
And I want them dead.
And tell them to get rid of them.
If you want to see them, good.
You shark them off.
Good.
Shark them off.
Good.
Okay.
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