Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 627 › Conversation 627-004

Nixon, Kissinger & Rogers on Middle East diplomacy and Israeli security

Wednesday, December 1, 1971 · 11:00 AM–11:29 AM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Rogers, William P.Conversation627-004 on Tape 627 (tape position 01:07:14–01:28:10)StartWednesday, December 1, 1971 at 11:00 AMEndWednesday, December 1, 1971 at 11:29 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 627-004 ↗

President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and William Rogers met to coordinate strategy ahead of an upcoming visit from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, specifically focusing on maintaining regional military balances and encouraging diplomatic negotiations. The participants agreed that the U.S. must provide security assurances and potential future arms deliveries to Israel without creating public, provocative announcements that could derail peace efforts. Additionally, the group discussed the timing of a future European Security Conference and potential summitry with the Soviet Union, as well as managing international monetary policy and high-level diplomatic scheduling regarding Italy, Canada, and China.

Download MP3 (part 1) · 167.6 MB ·Download MP3 (part 2) · 68.7 MB

This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 01:07:14 into the tape and ends around 01:28:10.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

Download transcript (.txt) · JSON data

· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
1:07:32I think it's important, and I'm sure you agree, that we not appear to have a difference of opinion.
1:07:44And two, we obviously have to work out a long-term agreement with Israel.
1:07:53which will satisfy her in terms of her survival and her security.
1:08:03And I think we ought to start thinking about that and discussing it with him right away.
1:08:09Second, that would provide for phantoms, but the delivery would be sometime in the future.
1:08:16Secondly, we can provide that if a contingency arises, we can get phantoms over there quickly.
1:08:21They've got enough phantoms anyway.
1:08:22They don't need phantoms now.
1:08:23What they need is a supply of phantoms.
1:08:25They're not short of airplanes.
1:08:29So that we can give them assurances that they need for their security in a way that doesn't jeopardize the possibilities of negotiation.
1:08:40Secondly, I think it's important to get her in the frame of mind so that she will agree to some negotiations after the General Assembly debate ends.
1:08:48She's got to pay.
1:08:50Now, if she has said that, in effect, I'm going to make the United States give a stand before I do anything, and I'm coming to Washington to make the President do this, and she's sent everybody down to see me, and the whole thing is geared up that way.
1:09:06Now, if we let her do that, if she comes away from this meeting with that conclusion, then we've lost all possibility of working on negotiation.
1:09:17If we can get negotiation... Oh, yes.
1:09:26What it could do, Mr. President, would cross the doubt to say that he's been double-crossed, all doors are closed to a negotiated settlement, and therefore he might feel that he had a sign of war.
1:09:37What I'm anxious to try to do is to work out some kind of negotiations after the General Assembly debate is finished, either under our auspices or under somebody else's auspices, which will continue.
1:09:51hard to the campaign so we can say to everybody that negotiations are being held is just the way we're doing in salt.
1:09:58There's an impasse.
1:10:00Israel doesn't have to concede anything.
1:10:03It doesn't have to give up anything.
1:10:05The fact that we have a difference of opinion on some items shouldn't concern them.
1:10:09If we didn't have a difference of view with them, we wouldn't be able to get the Arabs to talk to us.
1:10:14And the fact that we've had the
1:10:16The fact that we appear to be somewhat even-handed now has permitted the Egyptians to deal with us, and permitted the king to deal with us, and so forth.
1:10:25So we've got to maintain that partnership.
1:10:27She comes away and says, yes, the president gave me the pen.
1:10:32Then the peace initiative is gone, our standing with the Arabs is finished.
1:10:36On the other hand, we do have to recognize her security needs, and they are, as a nation, and she particularly, are very concerned about their future.
1:10:45And they realize that this thing can shift, particularly after the election is over.
1:10:49So if we can get her to be reasonable, understand your problem, understand the necessity for keeping a ceasefire in effect during the campaign, and give her the assurances that are necessary without having a great deal of visibility, that seems to be the best possible course to follow.
1:11:10And this is what we recommend.
1:11:11I think it's a pretty good summary of where we stand on it.
1:11:16In the discussions we've had, I think that the Arabs are still anxious to negotiate.
1:11:22Sadat doesn't want a war.
1:11:24Despite all of them.
1:11:26And I think the reason he's taken the position he's taken recently is because he's trying to generate the greatest amount of pressure for the General Assembly debate.
1:11:34She'll have trouble, of course, in the General Assembly.
1:11:37They just won't have many supporters.
1:11:38They'll have maybe, you know, maybe the Congo, maybe Dominican Republic, but not very much.
1:11:42The Chinese are likely to be violent against it.
1:11:46Violent against it.
1:11:48And we'll have a very difficult position because the resolution which will be proposed probably will be quite consistent with the policy that you stated in your statement of the message.
1:12:00What will you say when you talk to her?
1:12:02What will you lay down?
1:12:04What will you in fact say if you hit the line?
1:12:09Do you want to be sure?
1:12:28At least participate in negotiations.
1:12:30Unless we have some participation in negotiations in this period, we have no...
1:12:36The possibility of it going up is there.
1:12:39We should control our interests toward the end of the year.
1:12:43And also the possibility...
1:12:47The fact that what we gave it, we gave this for profit.
1:12:54Our interest is not just building up their security.
1:12:58We are very interested in that.
1:13:01But our interest also is in trying to get them to do something other than just a continuing escalation.
1:13:08Is that what you propose?
1:13:08Exactly.
1:13:09And then what would she say in return?
1:13:12She'll say, I can't take that under that condition.
1:13:18I'm not so sure.
1:13:19I think that they'll consider that, particularly if you say it.
1:13:23I think she has a feeling
1:13:24that because of the political interest in the bans, that you will... We'll give her the bans and say it doesn't make any difference what you do.
1:13:32Excellent.
1:13:33Well, I don't have a problem with that.
1:13:36On the other hand, we do have to realize there's a problem, and it's a hell of an emotional problem.
1:13:41Well, it is a problem, because there has been a Russian build-up.
1:13:45You know, they've done...
1:13:48And that raises hell with her hawks.
1:13:50That's right.
1:13:50It raises hell with the hawks here in this country.
1:13:54And she said, what are we going to get for it?
1:13:59So, I don't see any way that nothing can end without her going out and saying, well, I've got my bag filled.
1:14:03What did you get?
1:14:03Well, nothing.
1:14:05That would be the worst move for us.
1:14:06Nothing to just be avoiding everything.
1:14:11But I must say, I agree that if we just skipped the plants without keeping the heat on them to make some diplomatic move,
1:14:19It will have also to pay the tax.
1:14:20One, it will indicate that they can beat us down.
1:14:26Secondly, it will hurt us, with the Arabs.
1:14:32And thirdly, it will really sign our diplomacy, literally the Soviets and everybody else.
1:14:40So I believe that we have to indicate to them that
1:14:45that they must show some flexibility in negotiations, at least with respect to procedure.
1:14:53Maybe they don't have to link it, but the two things have to happen sufficiently close to each other so that it doesn't look like a total American cake.
1:15:02That's what I think.
1:15:03Well, for the moment, I think it would be a mistake to have anything come out of this meeting other than agreement in principle.
1:15:10If she was able to say that she's getting down...
1:15:13It will happen.
1:15:15The United Nations, see, they're lining up for a huge debate up there.
1:15:20And, well, it starts next week.
1:15:21I see.
1:15:22So she came out and said, I've got that.
1:15:27Then, then it would really... What do you want her to say?
1:15:31We wanted to say that we have, we're pretty sure that the balance will be made.
1:15:37She's had very constructive discussions that some of the matters that caused misunderstanding have been clarified.
1:15:43Part of it was a misunderstanding of the language.
1:15:46For example, they have sort of said that we said initially that an interim agreement would not necessarily have to be linked to a final agreement.
1:15:55We never said that.
1:15:57We've always said that obviously an interim agreement would be a step toward a final agreement.
1:16:01What we have always said, though, is that an interim agreement didn't
1:16:05wouldn't require the Israelis to say what the final agreement was going to contain.
1:16:11that the interim agreement would merely say this is the first step and we're going to continue to negotiate a solution, the final solution under the terms of the Security Council resolution.
1:16:21Some of these things are just misunderstandings, whether they're deliberately done or whether they are genuine misunderstandings, I think is beside the point.
1:16:29But I think she can come away saying we've had some misunderstandings that have been cleared up.
1:16:35I'm satisfied that I'm going to have
1:16:40for the United States in terms of our security.
1:16:42The President has reassured me that the military balance is not going to shift.
1:16:46We are going to work with the United States together in discussing these matters, but not say anything about the Phantoms.
1:16:54What we can do then is to get some discussion started about military supplies fairly soon, and then if we make any announcement, which I hope we don't do,
1:17:08We can do it in January.
1:17:09Because the damn Russians are sending in supplies.
1:17:13I think what we have to get off in the long term is building up to these crunches every six months to a year.
1:17:22The Russians keep sending in supplies without ever making an announcement.
1:17:25It just happens.
1:17:27And if we do that, then if we want to, we can always shut off the supplies.
1:17:33But if we make the announcement of a new supply program a traumatic event, then we favor that, we favor the tariffs, and I think that's what Bill has to do.
1:17:43Well, as a matter of fact, this is what the Israelis understand.
1:17:49They know that if we have that kind of announcement, that destroys all hope of negotiation.
1:18:00And I don't think that
1:18:01They'd like to face up to the prospect of a negotiated settlement.
1:18:04I mean, she's coming to the end of her term, and she's wipe on it.
1:18:11She set her off to just the land, let somebody else worry about it.
1:18:14Furthermore, it's a real problem.
1:18:15She has a problem with the Knesset, she has a problem with her own cabinet.
1:18:18There's a fight between the dogs and doves and the hawks in her own cabinet.
1:18:22She's got Satir, and maybe Alana on one side, and Diane on the other.
1:18:27So she just doesn't, you know, she'd prefer not to have everything happen, except...
1:18:31The time to build that cabin has to be another meeting, which is 25 people.
1:18:35Yeah, right.
1:18:38Sapir came out in the report the other day, he looks as if he might be a successor over on the database, came out with his financial report saying they couldn't afford to spend as much money as they're spending on military equipment.
1:18:51And that caused quite a flap.
1:18:54I've got a speech here.
1:19:01I've got a speech I'm going to make.
1:19:04I'll leave it with you tonight.
1:19:05You might take a look at it.
1:19:07It's on this European Security Conference.
1:19:09I think it's quite consistent with what we talked about.
1:19:11It's anodyne.
1:19:12Well...
1:19:53Miss Brennan, I think also that, first, I'm not as concerned about the outcome of the conference.
1:20:11I think it has to be unimportant.
1:20:20But I think we have just as good a chance of coming out of it in a satisfactory way as they do.
1:20:26Secondly, if the conference could be decided upon in 1972 as a reality in 1973, it would make it clear that the Russians thought you were going to be president in 1973.
1:20:40I think it's a good thought.
1:20:41Well, it could be, for example.
1:20:44What could it be?
1:20:52Well, I talked to the man the other day when I saw him about this.
1:21:06Just as I said, you know, we're anxious to have the meeting a success.
1:21:11He said, you know, we were very embarrassed about the Eisenhower one, and Khrushchev wants this to be a great success, and we're going to do everything we can to make it a success.
1:21:21And I said I think it's important to have some announcements that come out of it that clearly demonstrate its success.
1:21:30And I said I don't think we'll do anything very much on a conference except talk until President meets us in Moscow.
1:21:37I think that's a very good thing to hold out on everything.
1:21:43I think the basic strategy that Bill mentioned, that we agree to something at the summit that won't happen until after the election, is a good thing because it gives them a vested interest not to take over the traces during the summit and to symbolize that they expect to deal with you.
1:22:01What do I mean?
1:22:01I think that's, for my money, more of that we can do with the federal government.
1:22:06It seems to me that if you add about the time of the summit meeting,
1:22:11or at the summit meeting.
1:22:12We've got to be a little careful about our allies, because if it looks as if it's just a deal with the Russians...
1:22:17But on the other hand, as I would understand it, before that there would be Allied instructions.
1:22:23Oh, sure.
1:22:23But if we go through the process...
1:22:28They would ask us probably to go to European security.
1:22:34We agreed at the summit or around there to prepare for a meeting to start.
1:22:42The important thing to do is the meetings we have with the Europeans.
1:22:51That'll be a problem I have, couldn't it also?
1:23:06Yeah.
1:23:06We had a problem with that problem.
1:23:13But I think that if the European Security Conference would be held early in 1973, it would be a clear indication that the Russians thought they were going to win.
1:23:24And I think that's helpful.
1:23:29A very, very hopeful sign.
1:23:31If we could avoid this, we could avoid this.
1:23:36I think we can.
1:23:37I think we can do that.
1:23:41I'm going to stop in Iceland on my way to NATO because of the importance of that military base.
1:23:47So I'm going to miss the meeting with Trudeau.
1:23:48I'm lucky.
1:23:49I'm lucky.
1:23:53I'll have Jack Rowan around.
1:23:54I'll have him around.
1:23:55Oh, you know, you don't have to handle it.
1:23:58You can do it.
1:24:01And, yeah, we'll do it with Trudeau.
1:24:06And the Italians, apparently...
1:24:10No, no, but that's been...
1:24:11They were complaining to Conley, to Cindy, don't Conley if you want it to be.
1:24:18Then, now the situation says presidential election won't be over till the 29th, and their government has to resign.
1:24:27So they don't want an invitation, because they don't know who would accept it.
1:24:33So they don't want...
1:24:35They don't want it.
1:24:36They don't want it.
1:24:37Until there's a new government, they don't want it.
1:24:39I suspect that for them to form a new government will take as long as to get a president, because especially if Moro becomes president, it means one of the key figures will be out of the capitol.
1:25:02I see them after China.
1:25:03You don't want to run into something.
1:25:06You don't want to learn anything in February.
1:25:10I'm glad you came to mind that, Pat.
1:25:11I think that was a good decision.
1:25:13I think it would be a real asset.
1:25:16Well, it's just that...
1:25:24On Latin America.
1:25:25On that exemption to Latin America, there's going to be a long delay on the monetary payment.
1:25:32You shouldn't consider that exemption to Latin America, Mr. President.
1:25:39You mean the exemption to the surcharge?
1:25:42Let me say it.
1:25:44Michael, the reason for that is mine.
1:25:47The reason is that I have a complex fact.
1:25:51We can't make a deal.
1:25:55with the Europeans, Japanese at this time, and go the whole deal, then we have to take a look at going the other way, and I don't think there's any dollar on any idea, and I'm going to have a long delay.
1:26:08Okay, well, we have eight guys, and I hope you don't have to talk to John about it, and I think if we go through that, we don't have to.
1:26:14We don't have to.
1:26:15We don't have to.
1:26:15As a matter of fact, in my opinion, we make a deal with the Europeans, and it would be well to get a last-minute deal.

On December 1, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and William P. Rogers met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:00 am and 11:29 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 627-004 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 627-4

Date: December 1, 1971

Time: Unknown between 11:00 am and 11:29 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger and William P. Rogers.
[The recording begins at an unknown time while the conversation is already in progress]

     Middle East situation
         -Forthcoming talks with Golda Meir
               -Difference of opinion
               -Need for a long-term agreement
                     -Essential for survival and security
               -Phantom jets
                     -Proposed delivery in the future
                           -Contingency plans
               -Security
                     -US assurances
               -Meir
                     -Possible attitude during negotiations after General Assembly debate
                           -Potential pitfalls
               -Anwar el-Sadat
               -Rogers’ plan
                     -Negotiations after General Assembly debate
                           -Timing
                                 -Presidential campaign
                                 -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
               -Israel
                     -Possible concessions
                           -Differences in opinion
                                 -Possible advantages
                                       -Egypt
                                       -[Hussein, King of Jordan], Hussein ibn Talal
               -Meir
                     -Recommendations
                           -US recognition of Israel’s security needs
                           -Concern for future
                                 -Possible shift after Presidential elections
                     -Recommendations
               -Arabs and Sadat
                     -Eager for negotiations
                           -Sadat’s position
                                 -Creating pressure for the General Assembly debate

                           -Potential trouble for Sadat
                                -Lack of supporters [Congo, Dominican Republic]
-US position
      -President’s State of the World message, February 25, 1971 [?]
-Rogers’ forthcoming talks with Meir
-President’s recommendations for Israel
      -Negotiations
      -Security
      -Political interest
            -Phantoms
            -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] build-up
                   -Proposed sale of weapons
            -“Hawks”
-Kissinger’s view
      -US pressure on Israel
            -Potential diplomatic problems with the Arabs and USSR at the General
                   Assembly
-Rogers’ view
      -Importance of agreement
            -Phantoms
            -Future debate at the United Nations [UN]
                   -Timing
-Meir
      -Reassurances
      -Interim agreement
            -Relationship to final agreement
            -Potential misunderstandings of US policy
      -No shift in the military balance
      -Working together with the US
            -Phantoms
            -Military supplies discussions
                   -Announcement
                         -Timing
            -USSR
                   -Military supplies
                         -Upcoming announcement
                              -Arabs
-Israel
      -Desire for a negotiated settlement
      -Meir
            -Problems

                      -Knesset
                      -Cabinet
                      -“Dove and Hawks”
                      -Yosef Saphir, Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan
                      -Saphir’s financial report
                           -Military equipment expenses

European Security Conference
     -Rogers’ upcoming speech
          -USSR
               -Future meetings with the USSR in 1972 or 1973
                     -Advantages
     -Rogers’ meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
          -Dwight D. Eisenhower and Nikita S. Khrushchev
               -Past meeting
                     -Dobrynin apology
     -Summit with USSR
          -Timing
               -Carefulness with US allies
                     -Future discussions in Hawaii
                          -Deputy foreign ministers meeting
     -Timing

Rogers's trip to Iceland
    -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
            -Iceland military base

President’s schedule
     -Pierre F. Trudeau
     -Italian meeting
            -John B. Connally
                 -Upcoming Italian elections
                      -Aldo Moro
     -People's Republic of China [PRC] trip
            -Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon

Monetary issues
    -Latin America
          -Surcharge exemptions
    -Connally
    -Europeans

           -Japanese
           -No potential deals

Kissinger and Rogers left at an unknown time before 11:29 am.
  • 084-015 9:57 AM — President Richard M. Nixon and members of the National Security Council, including William P. Rogers, Melvin R. Laird, Gen. George A. Lincoln, John N. Mitchell, Richard M. Helms, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, John N. Irwin, II, Martin J. Hillenbrand, David Packard, Philip J. Farley, Henry A. Kissinger, Col. Richard T. Kennedy, Philip A. Odeen, Helmut ("Hal") Sonnenfeldt, Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., William G. Hyland, and Lt. Col. Walter B. Ratliffe, met in the Cabinet Room of the White House at an unknown time between 9:57 am and 11:59 pm.
  • 015-178 11:00 AM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:00 am and 12:15 pm.
  • 627-005 11:29 AM · 8 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:29 am to 11:30 am.
  • 627-006 11:30 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:30 am and 11:36 am.
  • 627-007 11:36 AM · 7 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Richard W. Mallary, Raymond H. Nutter, Harry S. Dent, Alexander P. Butterfield, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:36 am to 11:42 am.
  • 627-008 11:42 AM · 48 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:42 am and 11:46 am.
  • 627-009 11:46 AM · 37 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, White House operator, and James Harvey met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:46 am to 12:26 pm.
  • 015-179 12:15 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, and James Harvey talked on the telephone from 12:15 pm to 12:20 pm.

Conversation 627-004, December 1, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/627-004 (accessed October 9, 2026).