Conversation 627-004

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I think it's important, and I'm sure you agree, that we not appear to have a difference of opinion.

And two, we obviously have to work out a long-term agreement with Israel.

which will satisfy her in terms of her survival and her security.

And I think we ought to start thinking about that and discussing it with him right away.

Second, that would provide for phantoms, but the delivery would be sometime in the future.

Secondly, we can provide that if a contingency arises, we can get phantoms over there quickly.

They've got enough phantoms anyway.

They don't need phantoms now.

What they need is a supply of phantoms.

They're not short of airplanes.

So that we can give them assurances that they need for their security in a way that doesn't jeopardize the possibilities of negotiation.

Secondly, I think it's important to get her in the frame of mind so that she will agree to some negotiations after the General Assembly debate ends.

She's got to pay.

Now, if she has said that, in effect, I'm going to make the United States give a stand before I do anything, and I'm coming to Washington to make the President do this, and she's sent everybody down to see me, and the whole thing is geared up that way.

Now, if we let her do that, if she comes away from this meeting with that conclusion, then we've lost all possibility of working on negotiation.

If we can get negotiation... Oh, yes.

What it could do, Mr. President, would cross the doubt to say that he's been double-crossed, all doors are closed to a negotiated settlement, and therefore he might feel that he had a sign of war.

What I'm anxious to try to do is to work out some kind of negotiations after the General Assembly debate is finished, either under our auspices or under somebody else's auspices, which will continue.

hard to the campaign so we can say to everybody that negotiations are being held is just the way we're doing in salt.

There's an impasse.

Israel doesn't have to concede anything.

It doesn't have to give up anything.

The fact that we have a difference of opinion on some items shouldn't concern them.

If we didn't have a difference of view with them, we wouldn't be able to get the Arabs to talk to us.

And the fact that we've had the

The fact that we appear to be somewhat even-handed now has permitted the Egyptians to deal with us, and permitted the king to deal with us, and so forth.

So we've got to maintain that partnership.

She comes away and says, yes, the president gave me the pen.

Then the peace initiative is gone, our standing with the Arabs is finished.

On the other hand, we do have to recognize her security needs, and they are, as a nation, and she particularly, are very concerned about their future.

And they realize that this thing can shift, particularly after the election is over.

So if we can get her to be reasonable, understand your problem, understand the necessity for keeping a ceasefire in effect during the campaign, and give her the assurances that are necessary without having a great deal of visibility, that seems to be the best possible course to follow.

And this is what we recommend.

I think it's a pretty good summary of where we stand on it.

In the discussions we've had, I think that the Arabs are still anxious to negotiate.

Sadat doesn't want a war.

Despite all of them.

And I think the reason he's taken the position he's taken recently is because he's trying to generate the greatest amount of pressure for the General Assembly debate.

She'll have trouble, of course, in the General Assembly.

They just won't have many supporters.

They'll have maybe, you know, maybe the Congo, maybe Dominican Republic, but not very much.

The Chinese are likely to be violent against it.

Violent against it.

And we'll have a very difficult position because the resolution which will be proposed probably will be quite consistent with the policy that you stated in your statement of the message.

What will you say when you talk to her?

What will you lay down?

What will you in fact say if you hit the line?

Do you want to be sure?

At least participate in negotiations.

Unless we have some participation in negotiations in this period, we have no...

The possibility of it going up is there.

We should control our interests toward the end of the year.

And also the possibility...

The fact that what we gave it, we gave this for profit.

Our interest is not just building up their security.

We are very interested in that.

But our interest also is in trying to get them to do something other than just a continuing escalation.

Is that what you propose?

Exactly.

And then what would she say in return?

She'll say, I can't take that under that condition.

I'm not so sure.

I think that they'll consider that, particularly if you say it.

I think she has a feeling

that because of the political interest in the bans, that you will... We'll give her the bans and say it doesn't make any difference what you do.

Excellent.

Well, I don't have a problem with that.

On the other hand, we do have to realize there's a problem, and it's a hell of an emotional problem.

Well, it is a problem, because there has been a Russian build-up.

You know, they've done...

And that raises hell with her hawks.

That's right.

It raises hell with the hawks here in this country.

And she said, what are we going to get for it?

So, I don't see any way that nothing can end without her going out and saying, well, I've got my bag filled.

What did you get?

Well, nothing.

That would be the worst move for us.

Nothing to just be avoiding everything.

But I must say, I agree that if we just skipped the plants without keeping the heat on them to make some diplomatic move,

It will have also to pay the tax.

One, it will indicate that they can beat us down.

Secondly, it will hurt us, with the Arabs.

And thirdly, it will really sign our diplomacy, literally the Soviets and everybody else.

So I believe that we have to indicate to them that

that they must show some flexibility in negotiations, at least with respect to procedure.

Maybe they don't have to link it, but the two things have to happen sufficiently close to each other so that it doesn't look like a total American cake.

That's what I think.

Well, for the moment, I think it would be a mistake to have anything come out of this meeting other than agreement in principle.

If she was able to say that she's getting down...

It will happen.

The United Nations, see, they're lining up for a huge debate up there.

And, well, it starts next week.

I see.

So she came out and said, I've got that.

Then, then it would really... What do you want her to say?

We wanted to say that we have, we're pretty sure that the balance will be made.

She's had very constructive discussions that some of the matters that caused misunderstanding have been clarified.

Part of it was a misunderstanding of the language.

For example, they have sort of said that we said initially that an interim agreement would not necessarily have to be linked to a final agreement.

We never said that.

We've always said that obviously an interim agreement would be a step toward a final agreement.

What we have always said, though, is that an interim agreement didn't

wouldn't require the Israelis to say what the final agreement was going to contain.

that the interim agreement would merely say this is the first step and we're going to continue to negotiate a solution, the final solution under the terms of the Security Council resolution.

Some of these things are just misunderstandings, whether they're deliberately done or whether they are genuine misunderstandings, I think is beside the point.

But I think she can come away saying we've had some misunderstandings that have been cleared up.

I'm satisfied that I'm going to have

for the United States in terms of our security.

The President has reassured me that the military balance is not going to shift.

We are going to work with the United States together in discussing these matters, but not say anything about the Phantoms.

What we can do then is to get some discussion started about military supplies fairly soon, and then if we make any announcement, which I hope we don't do,

We can do it in January.

Because the damn Russians are sending in supplies.

I think what we have to get off in the long term is building up to these crunches every six months to a year.

The Russians keep sending in supplies without ever making an announcement.

It just happens.

And if we do that, then if we want to, we can always shut off the supplies.

But if we make the announcement of a new supply program a traumatic event, then we favor that, we favor the tariffs, and I think that's what Bill has to do.

Well, as a matter of fact, this is what the Israelis understand.

They know that if we have that kind of announcement, that destroys all hope of negotiation.

And I don't think that

They'd like to face up to the prospect of a negotiated settlement.

I mean, she's coming to the end of her term, and she's wipe on it.

She set her off to just the land, let somebody else worry about it.

Furthermore, it's a real problem.

She has a problem with the Knesset, she has a problem with her own cabinet.

There's a fight between the dogs and doves and the hawks in her own cabinet.

She's got Satir, and maybe Alana on one side, and Diane on the other.

So she just doesn't, you know, she'd prefer not to have everything happen, except...

The time to build that cabin has to be another meeting, which is 25 people.

Yeah, right.

Sapir came out in the report the other day, he looks as if he might be a successor over on the database, came out with his financial report saying they couldn't afford to spend as much money as they're spending on military equipment.

And that caused quite a flap.

I've got a speech here.

I've got a speech I'm going to make.

I'll leave it with you tonight.

You might take a look at it.

It's on this European Security Conference.

I think it's quite consistent with what we talked about.

It's anodyne.

Well...

Miss Brennan, I think also that, first, I'm not as concerned about the outcome of the conference.

I think it has to be unimportant.

But I think we have just as good a chance of coming out of it in a satisfactory way as they do.

Secondly, if the conference could be decided upon in 1972 as a reality in 1973, it would make it clear that the Russians thought you were going to be president in 1973.

I think it's a good thought.

Well, it could be, for example.

What could it be?

Well, I talked to the man the other day when I saw him about this.

Just as I said, you know, we're anxious to have the meeting a success.

He said, you know, we were very embarrassed about the Eisenhower one, and Khrushchev wants this to be a great success, and we're going to do everything we can to make it a success.

And I said I think it's important to have some announcements that come out of it that clearly demonstrate its success.

And I said I don't think we'll do anything very much on a conference except talk until President meets us in Moscow.

I think that's a very good thing to hold out on everything.

I think the basic strategy that Bill mentioned, that we agree to something at the summit that won't happen until after the election, is a good thing because it gives them a vested interest not to take over the traces during the summit and to symbolize that they expect to deal with you.

What do I mean?

I think that's, for my money, more of that we can do with the federal government.

It seems to me that if you add about the time of the summit meeting,

or at the summit meeting.

We've got to be a little careful about our allies, because if it looks as if it's just a deal with the Russians...

But on the other hand, as I would understand it, before that there would be Allied instructions.

Oh, sure.

But if we go through the process...

They would ask us probably to go to European security.

We agreed at the summit or around there to prepare for a meeting to start.

The important thing to do is the meetings we have with the Europeans.

That'll be a problem I have, couldn't it also?

Yeah.

We had a problem with that problem.

But I think that if the European Security Conference would be held early in 1973, it would be a clear indication that the Russians thought they were going to win.

And I think that's helpful.

A very, very hopeful sign.

If we could avoid this, we could avoid this.

I think we can.

I think we can do that.

I'm going to stop in Iceland on my way to NATO because of the importance of that military base.

So I'm going to miss the meeting with Trudeau.

I'm lucky.

I'll have Jack Rowan around.

I'll have him around.

Oh, you know, you don't have to handle it.

You can do it.

And, yeah, we'll do it with Trudeau.

And the Italians, apparently...

No, no, but that's been...

They were complaining to Conley, to Cindy, don't Conley if you want it to be.

Then, now the situation says presidential election won't be over till the 29th, and their government has to resign.

So they don't want an invitation, because they don't know who would accept it.

So they don't want...

They don't want it.

Until there's a new government, they don't want it.

I suspect that for them to form a new government will take as long as to get a president, because especially if Moro becomes president, it means one of the key figures will be out of the capitol.

I see them after China.

You don't want to run into something.

You don't want to learn anything in February.

I'm glad you came to mind that, Pat.

I think that was a good decision.

I think it would be a real asset.

Well, it's just that...

On Latin America.

On that exemption to Latin America, there's going to be a long delay on the monetary payment.

You shouldn't consider that exemption to Latin America, Mr. President.

You mean the exemption to the surcharge?

Let me say it.

Michael, the reason for that is mine.

The reason is that I have a complex fact.

We can't make a deal.

with the Europeans, Japanese at this time, and go the whole deal, then we have to take a look at going the other way, and I don't think there's any dollar on any idea, and I'm going to have a long delay.

Okay, well, we have eight guys, and I hope you don't have to talk to John about it, and I think if we go through that, we don't have to.

We don't have to.

As a matter of fact, in my opinion, we make a deal with the Europeans, and it would be well to get a last-minute deal.