Conversation 634-011

TapeTape 634StartThursday, December 9, 1971 at 3:57 PMEndThursday, December 9, 1971 at 3:59 PMTape start time01:22:10Tape end time01:24:13ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to refine the administration's response to the escalating India-Pakistan conflict, specifically regarding a letter to be sent to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. The discussion focused on discouraging Indian military aggression against West Pakistan and leveraging potential trade consequences to exert pressure. Nixon directed Kissinger to keep the communication firm and direct, explicitly avoiding a prolonged debate over the technical details of ongoing negotiations.

India-Pakistan WarLeonid BrezhnevSoviet-US RelationsForeign PolicyDiplomatic CorrespondenceMilitary Escalation

On December 9, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 3:57 pm to 3:59 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 634-011 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 634-11

Date: December 9, 1971
Time: 3:57 pm - 3:59 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger

     India-Pakistan situation
           -Backgrounder
                 -Ceasefire
                 -Resumption of East-West negotiations
                 -Possible Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] action
                       -India
                             -Possible military action
                 -Trade
                 -Yuli M. Vorontsov
           -Letter from Leonid I. Brezhnev

Kissinger left at 3:59 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Well, you can, as far as I'm concerned, we can skip this paragraph here.
I don't know whether you've had a chance to look at it.
On the resumption of the Swiss negotiations.
If you don't want to get that technical.
What do we want to say?
No, this is all.
I just don't want to restrain the Indians.
Yeah.
But you can say this is just, I didn't know whether you wanted to get that technical.
I don't know what else to do.
What do you want to get out of it?
That's the point.
I mean, I'll make a point that it's going to be very rational.
What do I want to tell them to do?
Well, now, this is all I had to tell him.
Well, I'm not sure you have anything else to tell him.
Well, first, they must attack West Pakistan.
That's right.
Let's get that over there.
And...
It imperils our nation.
It must not interfere.
It will affect, and you might say it will affect all these prospects of trade.
Well, I'd slip that in.
I'd slip that in.
And I would not let myself get drawn into a debate with... No, no, no.
No, I'm not here to discuss that.
I'll do it and then I'll want the Translator to go up and I'll stand up and then we can sit down.
I'll sit down and I'll tell people that's a very warm letter.
I'll do that first and then I'll say that I want this passed on and I don't want to discuss it.
This is not about discussing it.
I want to debate it in my feelings.
I've been in correspondence.