Nixon, Vorontsov & Kissinger on India-Pakistan War and US-Soviet relations

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I know.

It was only a surprise that I'm here alone.

Yes, but...

I didn't mean to get you involved.

I'm sorry.

Oh!

That's my guess at the time.

That's right, that's right.

This was in the exhibition.

I remember, yeah.

They didn't have time to know at that time.

Very, very interesting memory.

I am very grateful that you have had time to listen to this brother's question.

That's a good one.

Several days before he left here, I was invited by his brother.

Oh, yes.

Mr. President, I have a question.

I have a question.

The official remark was that he personally asked me to convey his heartfelt greetings.

He said that he is looking forward to meet you.

and he is confident that this meeting will serve a very good purpose for our two countries and for the whole world.

That's official.

Now they are confident that the Minister is not a member of the Littoral, but he is a member of the Central Committee.

But he is the very old personal friend of Garcher.

He didn't allow me.

He asked me to give it to you.

He will be in charge.

He said that...

That, during the meeting, he had an inked horizon.

Do you think that that was the case?

He is looking forward to talk to you about that.

President, I just told you.

I, President, Mr. President, said that he asks you not to mention this anywhere, but he is looking forward to exactly this.

And to convey this to you, that you'd like to deal directly with the...

On my part, I have a great respect for you, Anna, and we have met before.

I'd like to tell you that Brezhnev is in a kind, in a way, a special man.

He has a very good human heart.

He is somewhat maybe out of date, but he's a very noble man at heart.

And he didn't ask me personally to tell you this, but I'm just going to tell you.

And this is the message that we all have great hopes that the media can tell you.

will have a very good impact on the future.

Please.

I look forward, of course, to my meeting with the chairman.

And I just want to tell you a strange story about this.

I believe that this meeting could be the most important meeting to take place between the heads

representatives of major governments in this country.

Speaking in personal terms, you can be sure the chairman and I

He approached the meeting with the same feeling of the heart that he has as the head of each of us leading the two most powerful countries in the world.

We open our hands to the future of all the world.

If we fail, it will be damaging to our people, to the Russian people, but to the people of the whole world.

We are protesting the loss of spirit.

One problem, however, that is a current problem that I would like to discuss very frankly with the Minister, is the hand that our friend the Minister runs off.

It is a problem that greatly concerns us as it concerns our church in Russia.

It is a problem of India and Pakistan.

I don't want or expect the Secretary of Agriculture or the Minister of Agriculture to comment or charge me because, as you know, we are in correspondence with Mr. Gresham.

I believe that you as one who is very close to the chairman, and of course you as our top ranking ambassador, representative of the embassy at this time in Washington.

I want you to know how strongly I feel personally about this issue.

And it may be that as a result of this conversation, you can convey to Chairman Gresham a sense of urgency that may lead to

I began first with the positive side.

In the past three years since I've been in this office, great progress has been made.

I thought it was a blip.

And I don't think that three years ago that anybody would have predicted that

The Soviet-American relations would have made a lot of progress if they'd made it.

Speaking white-handedly, most people said Nixon is a strong cataclysm.

The Russian leaders don't like this.

They can't get along with him.

As I said to Mr. Gromyko when he was here,

that when you have two powers, we are equal today.

We were not.

We met before on that picture.

And the secret for success in the relations between those powers is total respect between the two.

I respect the Soviet leaders, and consequently it's in that spirit that I want to convey my views on our relations.

So what I'd like to say is that we have made progress on assaulting

We have agreed to a meeting at the highest level.

We also have discussed the possibility

working out in the future European Security Conference, and of very, very great importance to both sides.

We have begun through our special channel, and between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Negrin, and Mr. Pressman's suggestion,

I see it right now that we have an opportunity for a totally new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We won't agree on anything.

But if we can agree on Berlin, on limitation of armaments, on the Mideast, on the European Security Conference, and then, finally, I say, if we can make progress in the field of trade where Secretary Stans received a very warm welcome, I was grateful for, this will mean that the United States and

The Soviet Union will be as close together as we were during the Great War.

to nations with different, which we must recognize, different objectives in the world.

Your objective in the Middle East is different from ours, but I think it is possible for us to live in peace

And they're my areas of cooperation, and that's what I think our meeting in May is going to accomplish.

But now, speaking very frankly, a great cloud is the problem in the subcontinent.

As far as the outcome of the present conflict is concerned, the Soviet Union is going to win.

The client of the Soviet Union is India.

India has 600 million people, and 600 million people are going to win over 60 million people.

So that's the sort of thing that we will do this.

So certainly, you know, in the city now, we don't know the next week, but we'll do it.

If events go forward as they seem to be moving at the present time, Pakistan, which lined up with... Pakistan, which lined up with...

China will be cut in half.

And so, consequently, looking at it in the short range, this whole series of events in the subcontinent is a case of the Soviet Union.

It's a name for India.

It's a tragedy for Pakistan.

And it's been interpreted, of course, as being a setback for, uh, for, uh, for China, because they backed Pakistan, the loser.

What it concerns me, Mr. Minister, is that, uh, it is certain

that what is happening in the subcontinent will be a tragedy for Pakistan.

But what would be far worse in the standpoint of the future of the world is that if we continue on a different course, the Soviet Union going one way, the United States another way in the subcontinent,

If he could poison this whole new relationship, which has so many problems, it could be a disaster for us.

So what I would like to suggest is that I do not believe that the gains that the Soviet Union may get from India winning over the center of Pakistan, gains which are probably certain, are worth jeopardizing the relationship with the United States.

I think there is a better way.

A better way is for the Soviet Union and the United States to find

a method where we can work together for peace in that area.

Now, the first requirement is that there be a ceasefire.

The second requirement is that, and this is to carry the Dignityians who already have pretty much

to overcome the resistance in East Pakistan so that the Indians desist in their attacks on West Pakistan.

If they drown the Indians after wading out East Pakistan, if they then move their forces again to West Pakistan,

then the United States cannot stand by.

Now, so the best way is the ceasefire.

And then, since the idea of withdrawal, the chairman has suggested that there be political negotiations, I would say a ceasefire, and then negotiations within the Pakistan framework in which Yahya will negotiate with the

And then he had written back the negotiations to withdraw.

Now, this we meant as a fair settlement, recognizing he understood everybody's concerns.

The key to the settlement, however, is in the hands of the Soviet Union.

They can restrain the Indians.

If the Soviet Union does not restrain the Indians, the United States will not be able to exert any influence with Yahoo to negotiate a political settlement.

Having said all these things, right now is the critical point.

The critical point is that if the Indians continue to wipe out resistance in East Pakistan and then move against West Pakistan,

We then inevitably look to a confrontation.

Because you see, the Soviet Union has a treaty with India.

We have one.

And in some way, it seems to me that it's very short-sighted for two hundred of us to allow what happens in South Asia

to interfere with these great new initiatives that now have so much promise.

So what I would like to do is simply to suggest that you behave through the camera.

That is my concern as to why you ask questions.

I'm very reasonable, but it is important that you recognize the urgency of restraining the Indians at this point.

They are going towards the expires at a public center.

Having said that, may I say that I know that there are lots of arguments that could be made against the United States.

Mr. Brown suggested it, and Mr. Gresham had covered some of it.

But my purpose is not to argue those main debating points.

My purpose is to say, look, we have a difference here, but we must not allow the differences there and the opportunity for one or the other to gain.

the relations are far more important.

And the people of ours control the peace, which is far more dangerous to egos and more important to egos than anything that happens in any other country.

And not to mention, what I think is also terribly important, the long haul trade in Europe.

So there is

I'm sorry that I know us in another field, that we have this term precious, but I know my Russian friends always like candor, and I speak that way in that spirit.

I am grateful for your very kind reproaches.

I wasn't there, but when I was with him in Russia, they abandoned us.

That's why I didn't talk to him.

We don't know what the problem is between us, at least Europe, and of trade.

I have this understanding that trade was proposed to look just at a distance, and I'm looking forward to meeting with you.

And we are plotting to get you to the United States to appeal to you and the United States to have some kind of agreement on the cultural matters that you need to solve.

And of course, for you to decide on what level you are going.

I wouldn't want the minister to comment on it.

I wouldn't want you, Mr. Kerry, to comment on it because you haven't had a chance to instruct your government.

But this is moving so fast.

that I want to, particularly the parents, good friends, and you to know that we see this as a crucial test of our relations.

Now is the time to move to settle this thing before it blows up into a major...

For the last time I see a person of my own convey the spirit and then the death report to service.

May I make a preliminary discussion?

I know that Russia took very many steps

to avert the war between India and Pakistan and appeal to them.

Now, as he understands the situation, of course, this war must be stopped and the root of the problem should be eliminated.

In the long run, it's not just taking into account the will of the eastern people.

I wish, I think I would like the minister to convey before he returns to Moscow our feeling about this.

So, Craig, I want him to read my reply in the context of what I said to his friend.

I will do it today, and the Secretary of Congress will have to take the chance.

Well, I look forward to it.

I hope we meet again in May.

We're very glad to have you.

I understand.

The Metro.

We always get to distinguish the capital, seriously, most of the time.

It's a signal before the president can come.

Thank you very much.

That's a good remark.

Thank you.

Goodbye.

Have a good night.

I...

I think that's better than that.

I think it will at all.

It will help.

They're not safe.

That will help.

Now, I'm going to send that over to the state.

That's the closest that I can get.

I'm going to say this is what you said to the remnants of that record.

Two thousand soldiers at a time.

Give me a whistle.

I agree with you, but when I said what happens to Pakistan will be tragic, but what happens to right-wing Americans' relations could be disastrous for the world.

I said you can win, you're going to win, India's going to win, you're going to embarrass the Chinese, but you're going to poign the relations with the United States.

You know, he's...

But the point is, what would be natural?

I think what you outlined, cease fire, promise of withdrawal.

Send that ambassador to Iran, so they can get him over to Turkey.

Outland.

In fact, outland isn't the right word.

It was, this is one of the, I think it will, we will lose 70% of this enterprise.

The question is, if we can say 30%, that's 30% more than the situation permits.

And we will come out with some dignity.

And... What did you tell the man last night?

Well, I told the pacifist that I read him a few paragraphs from the president's letter.

I said, here we are.

And then I said, my personal view as a friend is, and then gave him more or less your program.

I said, it will give you time.

It will stop the Indians.

It will change world opinion.

If there's another war, it will be a clear war of aggression.

It's an agreement.

All that you're asking them to do is to agree to negotiate with Iwami, but you've said it.

That's right.

They have no choice, though.

Well, they could be totally obstinate and say it's their country and they're not going to discuss it.

But... Let me get the printed paper.

I think, Mr. President, it's one of these situations again.

I think we're going to have, if Yahya gives us a positive reply, well, then we may have to do it without him.

I just hate to do it without him because of the Chinese.

That's a big problem.

But then we may have to let him get raided.

Then we can just, you know, start running.

then we can just say, all right, we did what we could, and then he's just going to lose.

You know, I use the word of confrontation with us in this thing.

I said, we have a treaty with Pakistan, you've got one with India.

There's a lot of hard language in this.

Oh, it will end now.

It will end.

We'll lose 70%, but that's a hell of a lot better.

We were losing 110% yesterday.

I don't know what to do about it.

At least they'll stop the Godhead Indians from going to the West Wing.

Do you think they will or not?

Yes.

I think they will.

That's my question.

We have another talk with Barranzo.

He says, of course, he'll convey this message right away.

Mr. President, the thing I have learned in my association

If you push chips into the pot, you might as well push a lot in.

You're not going to lose...

I think this will end.

You've come down the side of the carrier.

Yeah.

It doesn't have, it won't be noticed for two days and we can look at it again, Mr. President.

They say they never moved the helicopter ship without the carrier.

There won't be any publicity until Sunday when it goes through the Straits of Malacca.

All we want to tell the group today and this group is to move and carry your task force for the purposes of the contingency in the event of evacuation is required.

And that we want an assurance from the Indian ambassador that they intend no annexations.

No what?

That they intend no annexations beyond existing lines.

Do you mean no annexation in West Pakistan?

Well, I'd say no annexation because whether there's a tank attached or not, the Indians will see this as another step of us to try to put them in the wrong so that we can brand them aggressors.

See, even if that's Bangladesh, that's not an annexation.

Yeah, so we want to ask them, tell them that we want an assurance of UNO annexation.

But Christ, is there any, why do I have to tell this group that?

Because I can't get them to do it.

Yeah, you should call in the Indian ambassador and tell him why.

But you should tell them what you're... And I heard of it.

No, of course it's a UNO annexation.

The Indians can't possibly take position without an annexation.

No, the major point is the first one, which they must hear from you.

That it's your policy that you do not want the dismemberment and defeat of Pakistan and that you want them to act in that spirit.

Well, they'll probably say the way to accomplish this is to...

The way to accomplish this is to get Pakistan to yield.

But I think this is going to be... No, I would just tell them there seems to be... that you want to have your view clearly understood.

I just give them a tough position very similar to what you gave Anne.

I wouldn't use the word confrontation because they're leaky.

The President, it now looks, it was a bold move, it was a courageous move, and I think it will

The other thing would have been a slope leading to death.

This way we'll find out.

They won't risk all these things, the goodies you mentioned to them.

You did it very skillfully.

Why should they risk a European security country and the Middle East thing and solve the dream and then trade for what?

I said to you this is the test of our relations.

Correct.

The test of our relations.

I'm sorry.

They won't do it.

I will...

You know, we're gambling again, as you've done 20 times.

If we could shut up our bureaucracy now, that's the toughest job.

How about it?

Tell him, show him the Indian ambassador that we have a vaccine.

Ask them.

Tell them you're prepared to do it if they think it will reinforce it.

They're free to do it.

I'd be reluctant to order it.

But they say it must be.

Should I mention it?

I would not yet mention it.

I'd do that in the next week.

I'd do that in the next day.

We'll get it leaked if everything comes to work.

Because it is a video system.

There's an agreement.

The major thing to get across to this group, rather than tactics, is your attitude.

Attitude is what?

We're not going to be general all the time.

At the defeat of the Pakistan army, and that you want the bureaucracy to approach the thing in this spirit.

That's the major problem.

I don't know that we have a law that we can do to avoid that, no.

Nixon, Vorontsov & Kissinger on India-Pakistan War and US-Soviet relations

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on December 9, 1971

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