Nixon & Kissinger on India-Pakistan War and Soviet-American relations

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He said it was totally unnecessary.

We got the message loud and clear from the president yesterday, and he said, I can tell you informally, if they're not working through the night in Moscow now, they're not doing their duty.

Was he not our friend?

We're going to get it.

Well, I think that was the way to treat this fall.

I mean, they got it.

It was good to have Ron's office and Gresham's office, a little department, to see me in operation, because they only had it from the other fall.

They had it from Gromyko.

Now, Gromyko's seen it.

But with Gromyko, that wasn't the case.

That's why I had to lay anything out for him.

They've never seen each other.

They've got to know every little thing.

Well, Ronson said he couldn't have been stronger.

I showed him the secret treaty.

I said, now, I hope you understand the significance of this.

It isn't just an obligation.

It will completely defuse the Democrats because they are not going to attack their own president.

So I said when the president yesterday spoke of an obligation, he was speaking of a Kennedy application.

Oh, yeah.

He said within an hour this will be on Mr. President's desk.

And I told him we're moving some military forces, but it will not be visible until Sunday night.

So you have to, in effect, it was giving him a sort of a veiled ultimatum.

Well, if the impression is not enough for good judgment, not precious at all on this miserable issue, we just may as well forget the sign.

Well, now, something that I have to do, Mr. President, I have to give State a brief summary of these exchanges.

Otherwise, they'll go crazy at the UN with this immediate tactical situation.

And I can do it with Alex Johnson, and he'll keep it quiet.

Well, what do they want to do with it?

Well, what is the situation now?

You're going to urge the Chinese to take action.

Right.

What I think is that by Sunday,

We're going to have the ceasefire Sunday night or Monday.

And the Indians will agree?

Yeah, I think the Russians would agree with us to call for one.

Look, the Russians, the ideals, the Russians agree with us, but I don't, but don't leave the Chinese out and let me out.

No, I'm seeing them tonight.

Then you've got to sell them on the idea so that they don't attack us for drinking with the Russians.

No, because we got Yaya.

What we were proposing to the Russians, Yaya gave us.

See, I got in touch with Yaya yesterday after you had talked to Matsikevich.

I sent him extracts from the Brezhnev letter.

I said, now, here are the pros and cons.

We know what the Russians are after.

On the other hand, the failure craft announced to preserve your army.

This may be a way of doing it.

We are saying this as a friend.

We're not pressing you.

or urging it, what do you want?

Now, he came back with a formulation, which is very close to ours, and which is very close to what we can live with, and I've now given that to the Russians.

We've paid him the way he gave it, saying we're willing to support that.

I didn't say it came from Pakistan.

I said that's ours.

It's very close to what you said to this fellow yesterday.

Because if I had said it came from, I said, we'll support this with Pakistan.

I said, we'll support this with Pakistan.

Now the question is what they're going to do.

Now the main thing is to keep State of the Hell out of the act now in the U.S., right?

Yeah, but that's the only way I can get that done is to tell Johnson not to school it.

And you're going to tell them we're talking to the Russians, is that what you're going to tell them?

That's right.

Are you going to tell them we're going to talk to the Chinese?

No.

No talking, fine.

We're talking to the Russians, and we've got this.

Okay, fine.

And we want to handle it that way.

Now, Rodgers is going to get back tonight.

He's going to raise hell, but that's going to be too late.

Well, then raise hell hot on the ground.

Well.

What's happened to him?

Did he raise hell hot?

No, no.

It's great.

It all happened while he was gone.

That was good.

That was the point.

That's the reason I'm pressing to get it done.

I don't want to have to explain it all to him.

So we can put it all on the basis that he was gone and we didn't trust anyone else to know.

And I got Alex Johnson in just enough so that he can control the situation while Rogers was gone.

So I think this will work well.

Well, I don't mind having the Russians say no after they've had a chance to consider it, but we don't want to get them to say no before.

Now, I talked to the ambassador here to the park and told him just cool it now for 24 hours until we get the Russian reply.

and he's getting his man in New York under control.

And it's going to work out, Mr. President, unless the Indians, you put it well, if the Russians are determined to humiliate us somewhere, they can now do it, except it's a cheap area to do it.

We are not that closely tied into it.

It's not our obligation.

We've never, but then we might as well know it.

That's a hard lesson for them to learn, because we might just let the Israelis do to the Egyptians what, you know, this is going to be the ball game.

In the Middle East, our ally is stronger than theirs.

I think we've got that across.

Yeah.

They know that.

They don't, we don't have to paint any pictures there.

No.

We don't have to paint any pictures there.

How about in the gold domain, or how about, is the drill there, then?

Well, the major thing with Golda Meir I want to get done is to set up the train for Nicaragua.

What I want to get done with her is that supposing the Russians are not going to help us settle this, then we ought to go back to that negotiating track along the line you discussed.

Because it has the advantage that if you could settle it at the summit, it would guarantee you a quiet year from the Russians until after the election.

We've got to come out of the summit not with things settled, but with things that I have to deliver later.

Exactly.

And then they have the vested interest in keeping things quiet.

I had a nice talk with Packard.

He's going to be a great loss.

He's a fine man.

He's a decent man.

He's a fine man.

Damn it.

I'm sorry.

You know, I always accept straight defense.

But the problem is that he has already lost $20 million.

I know, but it's quite a...

I don't know what I meant.

It's too bad he didn't take Secretary of Defense when I offered it, rather than waiting until Laird got it and then having Laird give it to him and give it to Undersecretary.

But he's been a tremendous soldier.

He was enormous in firing in the bayonet lines.

He was Henry on the budget, if you make a note.

He believes that they sent over something.

If you know what it is, I thought the damn thing was stunning.

Patrick believes.

He didn't come to the lobby with me about it, because I asked him, I said, now what about you?

He said, well, he says the 79-5 figure, which will print out at 77-5, he says, really is the figure you ought to go for, because of your domestic problem, and you've already thought it would buy.

George's figure is 76-5, print.

Yeah.

Now...

It seems to me that you've got to try to do what you can to give Georgia State your copy of the 77-5.

I mean, it's one thing and more, and it will break his heart, but we've got to get through this crisis.

Oh, he'll do that.

He'll do it.

It's got to go from 76-5 to 77-5 now.

And I told him, in fact, he gave me a confidential number, and if anything would have a job impact, he said buying some F-111s would be $140 million for the help of both Texas and California.

And he said another thing, he said Airborne Command, which I don't believe they're going to have any help with Boeing.

It's about a $100 billion job.

He thinks it's very important.

Now, I understand the latter two items are

But the main thing, I think, is that Packer believes that 77.5 is the number we have to have to satisfy our domestic banks.

We shouldn't have a debate about national defense for $1 billion.

I agree.

Absolutely.

But you will have to put up with some complaint from Schultz.

That's right.

But he's done that before to him.

He's had a talk with me about it.

You were not there.

He's had a talk with me about it the other day.

He said, I've, you know, 76-5.

And I said, now, is this all clear?

He said, yes.

But, see, my point is, so is it okay?

So, so is it at the wrong level.

I want layers.

enthusiastic support for you, Mr. President, doesn't do us any good to browbeat Laird, which is what Trudeau wants to do, and have him leak all over the country that you screwed defense.

All right.

I don't know whether you agree.

Seems to me it's 77-5, sir.

Now...

We've got to say that from a political standpoint, it's pretty well set up in the sense these conservatives were coming in here today.

This will be a signal to them if you go to 76.5.

Packard thinks 77.5 has to be the number he wanted.

The defense has not got it on the record.

And that's that.

In other words, 79.5 in terms of the...

It's not really necessary because the items they're protesting are not good items, but...

I frankly feel, my experience with layers, I am satisfied with the Schultz budget, and we worked hard on it.

But if you feel, I think...

I think we have to do something, David.

I don't want him to catch me.

How could you handle this thing before he prints?

I'll just tell him that you accepted the, that I was unabound to...

I'll support Laird.

I'll say to my judgment that Laird is right.

I'll do it.

But would you take the heat on it?

Absolutely.

I don't know.

No, no, I'll take the heat on it.

On the meantime, there's nothing more we need to do on any of that.

I don't want to be...

I don't want to be caught in any sort of a practice on this stuff.

I want to go up to Camp David tonight and study the materials for tomorrow.

We have some breathing materials.

Yes.

When are you coming back?

Oh, you're going from there to the plant?

I'll come back here Sunday morning.

I'll have it for you this evening.

Yeah.

Well, I don't need it.

Well, that's fine.

Any time.

It's just some talking, some pictures.

If that makes any sense.

I don't actually need it until tomorrow noon.

It's plenty of time.

Mark, can I suggest that you, you talk to, uh, I don't know, to Rogers.

Well, there won't be, I don't think there'll be a problem after all.

Tell Rogers we told him to talk to the Russians and we're talking to the Russians.

And, uh, he just got to stay on with that song.

Is that what you're trying to say?

Is that what you mean?

No, but tomorrow's thing will be so much interesting that there's nothing left to do.

You really think so?

Unless the Russians just come back to the Alamo.

They may have to talk to the Indians, you see.

What can the Russians do, though?

I think if the Indians are obstinate, they're going to have a hell of a decision to make whether to kick us over for the Indians.

That's right.

Well, then we just go the other way.

If they're willing to do that, Mr. President, then we know they were never going to pay a price for any of our elections.

That's right.

I think they won't do that, though.

All right.

Absolutely.

Nixon & Kissinger on India-Pakistan War and Soviet-American relations

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on December 10, 1971

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Nixon & Kissinger on India-Pakistan War and Soviet-American relations

AI Summary

Audio

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on December 10, 1971

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Cite this conversation