Nixon, Haldeman & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Peace negotiations

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But the next morning they ought to be ready to charge.

I don't think they should battle that day because they'll get it confused.

This is going to be so surprising that I think if we can feed the TV people and the news people for that night story, then the...

Others ought to be ready to try.

The problem, and I agree on that, is this.

How many senators and or congressmen of our side are going to get questions and blow that night?

That's what I'm worried about.

I don't know about maybe they don't get any questions that night.

Well, then I'd rather brief them because the one time we briefed indirectly when Scali briefed after the India-Pakistan thing, he sharpened it so much.

that it may, but let me tell you what I have done.

Sure, sure, sure.

I have no, I don't know, but I, but I was thinking last night after reading the news summary this morning, you know, really, if we handle this correctly, some of the Democrats are walking right into this, aren't they?

Manfield, Washington Post.

Manfield, we've already answered an all-in with China at this conference, haven't we?

Yeah.

We said we want them all.

In fact, that we proposed publicly.

But last year, we said we'll have all three discussed.

They said no.

But then they agreed to include all three in the final guarantee.

So with that one, we can show.

But

The thing, what we have to avoid is that some seemingly authorized person battles away something and then becomes part of the... Part of the iron wall.

Of the record.

I understand.

I don't want to do anything to screw it up, except that I do want to be sure that we are able to...

It's a tenet against somebody that's on just levels.

On my plan, it's when it follows.

We have...

I have...

We'll have to get a text to Ziegler around noon, I guess, or 1.

Why?

Not for me.

Not for you?

No.

He's got to reproduce it at some point.

He can reproduce the text by 6 o'clock.

No problem, then.

But Ziegler and Scali, when do we have to bring them?

Now, I have to tell you, our experience with Scali is that he leaves...

I don't know.

Ziegler doesn't.

Ziegler, absolutely not.

That means you've got to include Ziegler, Scali, McGregor, Klein, Colson.

Those are the ones I'm thinking of.

Well, what I thought is... Yeah, we normally would.

And normally we have a briefing of those people.

But could we have it at four?

Well, now, you can't...

I do it as late as we can.

I don't see any... All right, well, I'll do it whenever you say.

Well, if you think so, if you really think so, sir.

I know he leaves, Mr. President.

Well, he doesn't...

He breaks it too often.

And he often does it with the best of intentions, so this is not...

He...

I think he probably talks.

But once your speech is announced, Mr. President...

And he'll get called.

What is it about?

He will die if he knows.

Well, then why don't we go there and display it at 6 o'clock?

All right.

That way he can leave.

And say, look, it's essential from the Spanish border policy standpoint to take no calls, Joe.

All right.

I will have that.

We'll tell him when we announce it.

We'll say there will be a meeting at 6 o'clock.

All right.

Relax.

All right.

I'm all for that.

I've got to be.

But one thing I was going to suggest, and we can just go ahead and do, is that as soon as you're finished with Sapphire, it would be very helpful if he gives some thought.

Because he knows all the content and everything.

He's the one PR guy we've got that we can get started in.

Well, he may.

The only reason that I thought, actually,

The only man I think you might be able to deal with.

You need somebody who will know what kind of questions to ask, that will be asked.

And maybe you've got a count on cigarettes for that.

Well, you're not running much risk.

There's no risk.

Ziegler is pretty good at what you're doing.

I think you could call Ziegler again and say, all right, now.

And Ziegler would say, well, Henry, I did it.

This is the kind of questions that are going to come up.

And I have a long list of questions which my staff prepared with answers for me, for my briefings.

I would have no hesitation giving those to Ziegler.

Ziegler, I know, is totally frustrated.

Why did we make all these things?

Why did we fight those bloody fights on the hill?

To avoid exactly what we were already doing.

Well, because that created the danger.

Well, we have a good answer.

Sure.

That's what I mean.

No, I think Ziegler would be very good, as long as he doesn't get one of his girls to tie him.

Ziegler, if Ziegler, I would have complete confidence in Ziegler.

in the early afternoon or late morning or something like that.

I think first thing in the morning.

Ron, we're going to have to tell Ron.

Ron's going to have to go to the network pool, guys, first thing in the morning.

It might be better for him to go tonight, but I don't think it's necessary.

And I think we can do just as well in the morning.

Because we're not asking for, we're not demanding a fixed time slot.

We're willing to give with the networks on what works out as the best time.

You think they'll give us the time?

Why?

Oh, they don't have any choice.

What's he telling us?

That we request time?

Not that we request time.

From the foreign policy point of view, it would be best if we knew it.

I think we've had as little time as possible for speculation, particularly if you ask... You see, when we go to the network pool, they don't go to the news department on that, and they have never...

Networks have never played that.

But they have tried once, but they have never... You see, the advantage of doing it in the morning is...

I don't know.

At first in the morning, why don't you call the network pool and say the president wants to try to do a presentation tonight at 9 o'clock.

And then they'll say, Jesus, 9 o'clock screws up everything.

Would you do it at 8 o'clock?

Say yes.

The only thing is I'd like the time as early as possible because huge speech depends on us.

But 12 hours is plenty of time.

We need to know, in other words, when... Well, we can go to the pool tonight if you want.

No, no, no.

I'd rather not.

Is it likely to be later or earlier than that, do you think?

It'll be 8.30.

No, 8.30.

No, I told you it would be 9 or 9.30.

It makes no difference.

If we go earlier, that's even better for us.

As far as I can see, there is no chance of our going to get any time except 8.30.

All right.

The way the network schedule is set up, tomorrow night...

Well, that's fine.

Well, that's good for us.

If it isn't later than 9.30, I don't think... All right.

Well, then, these are not people that will help you very much.

I'm going to have breakfast with Leah.

Good.

So that he can...

But now I want you to tell Laird now, keep it secret, tell him about that.

Tell him to talk to Stennis and all of the armed services types and line them up for what we're doing there.

Then I'm going to get a group... Well, not before, until after the meeting.

That's right.

You're going to get a group of what?

Then I'll get a group of cabinet people, Richardson, Connolly, Mitchell, Vice President, in the afternoons,

And give them a briefing at 4 or 5 o'clock.

I wonder if he should include any of that.

Maybe wrongly.

Oh, I don't think so.

Well, maybe he wanted to remove that cabinet.

Well, it isn't right for me to brief the whole bloody cabinet.

Yeah, I guess you're right.

I'll test the people.

Well, no, no, no.

He's got the right to run.

Yeah, we'll talk about that.

No, you can't.

Don't bother.

Just get a few of them in.

Do you know who they have?

Oh, Todd's dropped Romney.

He doesn't know.

No.

Except he has a sort of proprietary interest in me now.

Well, if you have him in control, it's quite easy.

Well, then let's drop him.

I'll call Romney.

You call him.

I'm just telling him.

He'll be in the present and knows he'll be very interested in this because of the why he's here.

Then I thought I'd call Rockefeller and Reagan so it's the speech time.

And Billy Graham and President Johnson.

These are just... Billy Graham, I'm not... At this time, I don't need to worry about Graham.

He's in the Virgin Islands, so pass him.

In fact, I wouldn't, because that's a radio call.

Johnson is your airport.

But Rockefeller and Reagan, I think... Then...

I have a list.

No, about an hour before.

I have a list here of ambassadors to be notified.

I won't bother you.

Why don't you leave that on stage?

That's right.

That's what we'll do.

I'm having Michael Green come in late today, and he'll send out the cables so that they'll be informed two hours before, or Alex Johnson, one of them.

But we have the text of the cables, and we have the schedules.

And they'll be the only ambassadors I've ever personally talked to of Plimsoll.

I'll give him 24-hour warning in Tetford-McMain on your wire and tell him State will also get in touch with him directly and he shouldn't act.

Good.

How about the Japanese?

They are on the other consultation.

They'll get it two hours before.

Those bastards have leaked us to death since Antrim, haven't they?

They've been revolted.

Then I have a letter to Dubrynin, to Brezhnev, to be handed to Dubrynin with a speech a half hour before, and a message to the Chinese with a speech and the plan to be handed by Walters Wednesday morning in Paris.

Then I thought at 7.30 I ought to greet the TV people.

They...

They in the past have given it right back to us.

That's what I thought.

If you think seven is better, I'll do it at seven.

Seven to eight, well, yeah, it's no problem.

Except on the...

Do it at 7.30.

And, uh...

The writing press, I thought I'd brief at 8.30 for 15 minutes.

Oh, well, everything has to slide back a half hour.

If you go on at 8.30, we have to do the TV people at 7.

And, uh...

And the writing press at 7.45 a.m. Now, what I will do at the briefing tomorrow is go into none of the details of the negotiations.

I will just explain our proposal.

And I'll do it on a background basis.

I will not...

I don't think I should... And at the TV...

I'll just say, gentlemen, this is only to explain the proposal.

Tomorrow morning I'll brief again.

on the record, and gives the whole history, meeting by meeting.

But for tonight, we just want to explain our proposal.

And then I thought, I'd leave again the next morning at 10, at great length, about the thing.

And the next morning, your plan would be that there's no objection to that in places?

No.

In other words, you just brief on the...

I would do...

I don't... You know, I wouldn't put out... Well, we've already... You've already said it.

We agree.

We wouldn't put out the whole record.

We don't want to have...

Absolutely not.

We should just go back and get...

Exactly.

I'd say...

They'll also want to know how the hell he did it now.

But I'll say, look, we may use it again in that way.

Sure.

That's what I call the story.

Did you explain the part to me?

Yes.

And I won't release anything they gave up.

If they say, can we have the nine points they gave up, I say, if they want to release them,

They're welcome to it.

We won't release their documents.

We'll just release ours.

Here are the highlights, but they are free to release it.

We have no objections to it.

But we don't feel we can properly release their documents.

We just release ours.

See, that shows some concern for the channel.

And I'd go through and say, this is what happened on May 31st.

This is what happened on...

I'd just go...

in some detail to each of them.

And it doesn't matter if I bore them a bit, but it would show how we've adjusted our positions to theirs.

And... Now we were working on it all night and day.

Remember I said I worked night and day on this problem.

Now they didn't find out what the crap we were doing.

That's right.

We were just sitting there.

I think it's a hell of a story.

Well, they do, too.

Of course, there is all the possibilities, as I said, will be raised.

Well, there's no question that our opponents will have to find some way of describing it.

It will be a test of whether there's any honesty left.

That's right.

Well, there can't be any honesty unless there's too much of a group.

Sure.

Well, I think about it.

I think about it.

We talk about it later.

And we'll have some ideas and things.

I mean, I think what they'll really... What they...

We'll try to see, as I told Henry last night.

Did you reveal the inside murder?

Yes, yes.

By that point?

Yes.

You didn't see?

No question.

I'll say this.

Madman has been running.

Crazy president's down here running Henry Kissinger around behind the curtains doing all these things.

Well, the answer to that is, first of all, all the trockers in the previous administration was made at secret meetings.

Secondly, I think we'll get much more flack for blowing the secrecy than we will for having it secret.

I'm not sure.

Nevertheless, that's fine.

Not politically.

Not for the political.

The average person, I think, Henry, is going to try to attack us for being secretive.

Look, Mr. President, the truth of the matter is, speaking in this room, we could never have moved you to this position if we had not simply gone ahead and done it.

Now, any knowledgeable newsman in town will...

I think our problem at the moment is the one I mentioned, the reason why it's so hard to strengthen that discussion.

The reason I mention it is that

It comes in the climate of Pentagon and Anderson, and everybody sort of thinks there's something wrong with these.

In other words, like the Anderson thing, the Pentagon.

Well, we were keeping, we had a lot of secret things going on that the public didn't know about.

Yet, it didn't hit the climate that I was talking about, the public's right to know.

Well, God damn it, the public has the right to know only what went off the public.

We know that.

You know what I mean?

You're not on unfavorable ground there, because that hangs and bounds.

There's as much argument in favor of secrecy, especially as this stuff is law and order.

There is.

And I think that's the reason it does need... For example, at that lit dinner the other night that I mentioned to you, Chavez...

Travis made an all-out defense of you.

I was absolutely astonished.

Henry, you should punish yourself night after night for going out with your liberal friends.

Well, I, no, I frankly did it for very cool reasons.

I figured for Travis to put himself behind me.

Was he there?

Oh, he is.

Yes, he did.

Oh.

You know, I'll give you an interesting point before we have to go on here.

You know Atwood, the great young friend of Stevenson's, who's now in the United States?

Father Atwood was in his house at the time, I think, in Cambodia for one of his speeches.

And he said, not his house, but Frank's house.

Frank lives out there in Long Island.

And Bob was there.

And it meant the son of a bitch.

He said, he was the worst son of a bitch.

He was making the most vicious remarks as we were talking.

He says, it got me so mad.

I had to get up and walk out of the room.

He said, the next day.

You go to Tom, because the effect of Prescott's speed was so bad that at a party that this observer attended, that he and his friends had to get out and walk out of the room.

Yes.

Did you mention that son?

Isn't that son?

Oh, no, they are.

They are patients, aren't they?

They are psychopathic.

I mean, Harrison Saltzberry's wife and a few others there, I mean, they were literally incoherent with rage.

What were they raising about?

Well, we sort of discussed foreign policy and secrecy and so forth.

On secrecy, strangely enough, to support Bob's point, 90% were on my side.

I said, look, how can we run the government this way?

How can you have foreign governments trust us?

And then, because that went so well, she suddenly said,

Well, but that's not the issue.

The issue is when are you going to stop murdering in Vietnam?

And they don't care about murdering in Vietnam.

And then it really got emotional.

They had a decoder.

And then it got really wild.

I slammed it all over the place.

I said it was safe.

horrible double standard.

She cared only about North Vietnamese that were being killed, but not about South Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians.

And I said, what kick do you get out of the fact of believing that your government is run by murderers and that your president is a liar?

What weird satisfaction do you get out of this?

And what are you doing to the American people?

uh, by spreading this idea.

If you say you disagree with us, that's one level of discord.

So if you're interested, then help me.

But he's such a coward that he didn't dare to help us.

But that much we can't appease.

Never.

I swear you cannot write to them.

That's what you do.

That's what you always have heard.

On the secrecy issue, I think I agree with Bob.

It's, it's divided.

And we have a damn good case...

It's about the only thing they can jump on.

It's a damn good case that we wanted to bring peace, we wanted to take positions... Well, the other thing they can jump on is why did we oppose the Senate's adoption of this proposal?

Well, of course, the answer is simple.

Because, gentlemen, Congress's proposal was not this proposal.

Correct?

In other words, a deadline without getting something for it is a disaster.

So we here are setting a deadline for the purpose of getting something for it.

And what we can say is the whole point that the North Vietnamese have pressed on us is to set a deadline which runs regardless of what else happens.

We didn't want to confuse them.

I'll get the, uh... All right.

Good.

I guarantee you from now on, every day.

Nixon, Haldeman & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Peace negotiations

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on January 24, 1972

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