Conversation 659-003

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POW issued separately on May 31st.

They totally rejected it, insisting that it had to be up to the political solution.

From then on, we discussed on the basis of their own proposal.

It is their proposal, which we have...

Which all went into the ceasefire.

And secondly, on the ceasefire, it is their point seven.

So we are in good shape.

to keep the offensive line.

You see, what I see is that they are in touch with the American traders, giving them information and so forth.

That's what they're trying to do.

And of course, to put us into the position where I've told you all along, the one difficult wicket we have is that

They put us in a position where the POWs are in line.

We must not get on that with them, ever.

If we do, we're killed when the POWs are shooting.

See, the POWs used to say that.

You can't see what I mean.

So that's why that's why I want you to knock it down every time you get a chance.

Don't let them ever get off the town.

Now, the ceasefire thing doesn't bother me.

I mean, most people are for a ceasefire.

Well, if people say cease fire, that they will never attempt to cease fire, well, for Christ's sake, then, what the hell do they want the war to go on?

We want to end the war and the likes of aggression and the rest want to continue.

I said this to Clyman of the New York Times today when he called me.

And I said, listen, Bob, you've been saying the war has to end for not only for Americans, but for Vietnamese when we do Vietnamization.

You've got to apply the negotiation to we want to end it for Americans.

For all.

For everybody.

Good.

You see, that's the whole point.

Those who oppose the ceasefire, we're for a ceasefire, and it's ending the war for all of Southeast Asia.

Those who oppose the ceasefire...

But what is the disgrace, really, is how your opponents, instead of taking pride, are looking for ways of...

They are tougher on us than the North Vietnamese.

Well, Lindner says they've rejected the proposal for the North Vietnamese to...

They haven't rejected it yet.

Oh, there's dairy bleeding today.

They said, well, they were always ready to meet in November, but we can kill that.

Ready to meet?

Shit, they didn't tell us.

Do you mean exactly?

Oh, they said Swan Tree was ready to meet.

Well, it takes one, three years.

Well, you can't know it's already there.

Exactly.

That's interesting, though, what they're saying.

But you see, Mr. President, they have...

Which also means shows they want to use the...

Of course.

And yesterday they did not reject the proposal.

They vilified you personally and said it was a maneuver and so forth, but they didn't reject it.

And today, the task, the propter published an article from their task correspondent, Hanoi, saying Hanoi is giving the plan a tender consideration.

I think this year we're going to settle it.

We're going to get three out of three.

I'm really quite confident, unless they succeed in their offensive.

They haven't succeeded in their offensive.

If they don't succeed in their offensive, then if we don't drag this, we won't.

They haven't succeeded in their offensive.

That's for sure.

If our domestic situation holds, no problem.

No problem.

Our domestic situation is holding.

It begins to go with this bomb war.

That's what we're going to do.

Let me tell you, we've got to remember that on the first of March, or the first of May, we can bomb the hell out of them.

And we will.

Here, fellas.

Thanks.

Mr. President.

President.

Mr. Parcell.

I just argued with him, and I'm not even going to say anything.

Dr. Teta.

Good morning, Mr. President.

How are you, Mr. President?

Dr. Teta.

The two of us, this is the rest.

We won't need you.

I hate you.

We'll let you keep the record.

You keep the record.

Yeah, Oscar.

I'm very grateful that you invited me to the new presidential election.

And I'm also glad that you're happy to have our participation in the new election.

I'm glad that you've found a way to honor me.

And I don't want you to allow me, because you're not American,

But we are all aware of these things.

They would be happy to see what the military has done.

They know that everything is going to be more difficult in Europe.

They are happy to get America to take over the strategy in Vietnam.

I think they have set a very clear point that no one can overlook.

Well, first of all, I'd like to thank you, Mr. President, for having suggested to me to come over here and visit in my new capacity, and I would like to express my appreciation for you, sir, and for that of Russia, and for making my contribution and share the burden of the racial and communication I see.

I take this opportunity, even as a non-American, I may be permitted to congratulate you on what you stated to me recently concerning Vietnam, because this is a problem that affects all of us.

And I think the position you took gave us a little more freedom of thinking.

Of course, we are, over there in the United States of America, we are friends with the Americans.

We are friends with the Americans.

We also realized what was going to happen to Vietnam, so I can agree with you that you may will have this war.

Good.

Hans, I beg you, is there anything else you'd like to say?

I'm glad to have seen you at the late hour of the war.

I think it was important, because I had a feeling of frustration in Europe, because Europe is the shadow of the Soviet Union.

And if you look at it for a long time, it is important that you, Mr. President, once again, as at the beginning of your time here, stay in Europe.

I would like to add that I was very delighted when you last year took the initiative and invited European heads to meet with you.

I think that's a very important step, since there was a feeling of frustration in Europe that has of the Soviet Union, of Europe, in Europe, right?

And, from my point of view, this is the most important thing at the moment.

Perhaps in this year or later, very closely organized cooperation between the community and the USA as a stable, lasting factor in world politics

I know that in a few years there will be no orientation.

From my point of view, it's extremely important that, perhaps not this year and the next year, but based on cooperation between the European community and the United States of America, organized and structured in a very visible way so people can see that based on cooperation between the United States and the United States.

European community as a stable and enduring element of world policies.

Of course, this would enable us also to discuss together such problems as development aid, environmental problems, all those problems which would come under what I would call domestic, global domestic policy.

And I think it's important that there should be

Thailand should be made visible, perhaps not in an election year.

I understand that no new subject will be introduced in an election year, but I think the problem should be kept silent.

Well, of course, the initiative must come from the Europeans, and that will be the subject of what we're going to work on in the coming weeks and months.

And this European policy is therefore important because the Moscow people know it.

I was very surprised that Moscow said such harsh words to me against the European community.

Of course, I expected something different from what my government was preparing for.

Of course, the Moscow people will not be absent from the European community, but the Russians told me that it would be a hostile thing to do in this business.

Well, this European box is very important, as the President said afterwards.

Of course, the Russians are fighting this tendency towards very European unity, and I was well surprised at the toughness of their words when I spoke to them in Moscow.

They didn't like the idea at all, and I had expected something different from the base of what our government said.

But the country was true.

They were one hostile and antagonistic as opposed to the European economic community.

And that is why this is very important.

And when I say this at the end, I feel your political presence here.

I think it's great to be here.

And I would like to say that you will of course see the other side of the East.

personal words.

I personally feel a particular impact of the policy you have initiated with regard to China.

Of course, I came to contact people approaching me on behalf of the EU, and they said, not intentionally, they were already considering

recognizing the European community, standing in advancement there, unlike the Russians who wouldn't do that.

Well, so this is an expression of things starting to move, because things are starting to move, and I think the European policy in Canada is not going to bypass this.

I think we ought to know how it relates to the international climate of Beijing.

But all this, I feel, is the result of the policy you have been initiating, Mr. President.

And that's a very good result.

You will be in Beijing soon, and I will be in Moscow.

I hope this will be a success.

But I believe that I will be in Moscow if the intentions do not change.

and the tone became more pleasant.

And the war in Germany is in progress.

It's indisputable.

And because I speak so frankly, I fear that the goal of the people is to neutralize Germany.

And to create a mood in Germany now is so exciting that you don't need any money for soldiers, or any money for the people.

Yes, I feel it.

Because this relaxation is not specifically measurable.

And if you have nothing else to say, if you don't want to ask, you can do it yourself.

Mr. Kosinski said to me when I was shooting in front of the wall, that he was a normal person.

But I don't have any questions about reading the book at all.

You will soon go to Haiti and Moscow and I hope your business trip will be successful.

Though I believe that there has been no change whatsoever in Russian intentions, the tone has been more friendly, but I think the fight for Germany is underway now.

Since we're speaking frankly, candidly, I say the objective of the Russians, their intention is the neutralization of the Federal Republic of Germany.

First, they want to create a move in Germany that has enough detail and relaxation of tension where there's no government necessary.

to spend as much money on services, on armaments, and so on.

And this, they're aiming to ruin the alliance, and this is a very dangerous, frightening problem, because you cannot measure data.

You cannot measure it.

I'm sorry to give you one example, unless you have a question in that nature, Mr. President.

Mr. Cassini said to me when I had read the war in Berlin and the shooting that was still going on along the wall, well, he said, this is an ordinary frontier.

This is an ordinary frontier.

Obviously, he had read the book, How Can We Know the Rest?

The President's attitude was extremely hard.

Despite the change, and there is some change in tone of Soviet students, as far as substance is concerned,

There has been no change in their attitude toward the free European community.

They consider it antagonistic to their interests.

And the heart of that community is a republic.

Their goal is to try to weaken the Federal Republic's ties to the rest of freedom and to, in their eye, weaken the community.

This is the Soviet...

had been a Soviet policy for the last 20 years and continues to be a Soviet policy.

Well, I'm sorry to say I have to agree with what you say.

I'd prefer to say it's a Soviet policy.

Yes.

I think what we have now is a situation, however rare,

the Soviets' change in combat, and looking toward the future, possibly some change in substance, possible, but uncommon, is greatly influenced by the threat of the East.

They are very much concerned, they're paranoid about the

the Chinese on the eastern part, or just as the Chinese are very much concerned about the Soviet on the western part.

And so each of these two great powers must make its accommodations in other areas.

Accommodations they don't even consider in order to

deal with what they believe is the Patriot drug, which is the Soviet, the East, the Chinese, and the Chinese and Soviet.

That's the overrunning fact in foreign affairs today.

I think too that the, looking at the Soviet, that their desire for a taunt,

if there is such desire, with Europe, and with the federal republic, has a lot more to do with China than it has to do with Europe.

Deep down, they consider the free European community as their opponent.

And it is their desire to fragment it.

On the other hand, tactically, at the present time, they don't want trouble in Europe.

They don't want trouble in the Middle East, another area of possible confrontation here with the United States.

And so,

But the reason they do not want trouble in the Middle East, the reason they do not want trouble in Europe is not because of their desire to have good relations in the Middle East and in Europe, but because they do not want to have another front.

At a time that their primary concern is China.

Now that's one analysis that may be wrong, may be fresh and unseemly at all.

looking down the road field at the top of Europe is a good end in itself for them.

As we may consider it to be a good end in itself for us.

You consider that too.

But that is the great unanswered question.

And certainly as far as I'm concerned in my travels to both Beijing and Moscow, I will go there recognizing that

They are seeing me for their reasons.

And I will be seeing them for my reasons.

Some of our naive Americans, unfortunately, and most American intellectuals are hopelessly naive.

Because they're very good for the best of reasons.

They're just, peace is wonderful.

Everybody should love each other.

The only reason people have differences is that they don't know each other.

We all spoke the same language.

We all were as well educated as we should be.

That's true.

This is not true.

Of course, there will always be conflict in the world.

There is a chance that in our time, that conflict

as far as major powers are concerned, will never escalate to arms because of the loss of power in the nuclear weapon.

But we must have no illusions that even among nations, three nations,

And with common philosophical ideas, we'll have competition.

Competition which will be bargain-hard with regard to devaluation, bargain-hard with regard to trade, and so forth.

It's inevitable.

And not bad.

So I come back to the proposition that

that currently now finds itself in a very delicate position.

We understand that position.

When I spoke to the Chancellor, and I will say to you what I said to him, we, I speak now of the United States, have of course a great interest in the world itself.

we believe that that settlement, looking at it apart from the German treaty, which is another matter, that that settlement, if adhered to carefully by both sides, may be beneficial, wouldn't it?

So we won't have a Brazilian crisis every three or four months.

And if so, that's a step forward.

On the German treaty problem,

This is something else.

This is something which is basically a terminal problem.

Our attitude, therefore, is that it would be improper for us to try to influence the outcome of the debate on the treaty.

We realize that, very honest to people,

the Federal Republic, with whom we are trying to be frank and we try to be frank with all of them.

But very honestly, we have very sharp disagreements about the treaty.

But that is a matter that we feel that you and

your colleagues in your party, and perhaps his colleagues in his party, have got to debate, find it out, and then make a decision.

When the decision is made, we will accept the will of the majority, even whatever it is.

But we have, we realize that it is a very big problem.

We also know that

And like all those questions, no one can be really sure.

Ron, I'm sure, believes that he is absolutely right on the course he is taking.

And I think after you had your conversation with Mr. Sagan and found him to be so tough that you have raved out because you see it first the Russians,

are in no way picking up on their total opposition to the European community and their refusal to recognize it.

And the federal republics are in it.

And also, it's your view, and after your conversation with him, that the permanent division of Germany is now

after the treaty would be a foregone conclusion.

Nothing, from that I don't know of.

Now, it is not for us, here in this place, to try to judge that question.

And we will not judge it.

All that I will say, and I have said this before, and I will say it to you, is that

The Germans are the most productive and the strongest people in freedom.

The Germans are our close friends and allies.

A strong, healthy, free federal republic is essential for the survival of freedom.

And we would hope that in this great debate that goes on, whatever comes out of it, that that fact is recognized by all people, that they need to maintain the federal republic's firm ties to freedom and not to pay a price so great

in order to have take on the East that you weaken your ties to free America.

That's our position.

But again, within that framework, honest men can disagree, and we understand that.

And we'll stay out of that battle.

Stay out of it, recognizing that you're going to have to debate with me.

Have a vote.

We'll watch you with great interest.

I would say, too, that

So you will know, as I go to Moscow and in our discussions with Saul and all the rest, you can be sure that nothing will be done unilaterally on our part, or bilaterally with the Soviet Union, which would in any way weaken our commitment to NATO, to the alliance.

For example, we have refused, we will continue to refuse to discuss any reduction of forces in the Native community apart from and over the heads of our Native allies.

That's not a subject at this time of consideration, so it will not be a subject that I will discuss when I go to Moscow.

The other point that should be made is that we will, with regard to something like the European Security Conference, we're not going to walk into that door

And to use an American quote or expression, I've taken a poke.

What we are going to do, I've taken a poke.

It's a, it means a, you know what I mean?

So we've had some stuff in the last few years.

Yeah.

Anyway, I'll be with you.

I don't know if you can see this, but anyway, it's an expression that's used primarily in the South.

The farmers aren't a farm.

You use it with your farmers.

It's a great thing to understand.

Take that forward.

We will consider it.

We will discuss it with our friends.

But to just say, well, it's not the European Security Conference is not the line to take until we've had a chance to see what the conference is going to be about.

That's our position.

I mean, I see that you were in the front.

You were not in the front.

I think I have stated very clearly what our policy is here.

I told the chancellor I was going to talk to you, and so he knows that we're trying to stay out of our internal human problem.

What you've been making in the meetings with the other heads of government, and I think that's what you also made to the chancellor,

The Soviet tactic, as the President pointed out, is to achieve through this moment what they have previously tried to attract.

The only way he can resist it is to turn the old industry to complete opposition.

The European Security Conference, as long as it is not invented and struck, creates the illusion of progress without the reality.

And therefore, it will convince us all the country that name was no longer necessary for America.

So our policy is, as the President pointed out to all the other heads of government,

that we are intrinsically not against this encounter.

But we want a precise agenda, and we want to agree with our allies ahead of time what the agenda should be.

In order to avoid this,

It was a rather meaningful meeting, so to say.

And this is why being unasked was a monster for me.

When he was sitting in this chair a few months ago, I said, you know, Mr. Boardmaster, he said, well, can I say we're a board conference in principle?

And I said, uh,

I said, no, because we can't say we're for anything in principle.

So we know what the thing is.

And basically, our position is that we could have a situation that's .

I said, however, we will consider it.

provided we find that it would serve a useful purpose.

But I always use the term, we are not for any conference for the sake of a conference.

That means not just because when you have a conference for the sake of a conference, it creates great illusions.

The danger, come on, exists.

And what keeps the West together is the fact that the danger really exists.

And that makes sense.

We hope it does.

But it will influence on the part of our Soviet friends.

Not because of love, because of fear, necessity.

And it would be a virtue to say that.

I mean, they're very pragmatic people.

I mean, we must admit that a lot of it has distinguished from some of the American idealism.

Our communist friends quite deliberately try to get their opps to the end.

Now, that doesn't mean that we consider them enemies.

That term is no longer going to be used.

But it does mean that we recognize that our interests are different.

And wherever our interests lie,

Each for different reasons, but we'll work together.

Like, we think it's an average scenario to have a Berlin Agreement.

And these constant flare-ups are too dangerous.

We think it's an average scenario to have a Mideast Agreement.

It's too dangerous.

Europe is another matter.

It's a matter that, first of all, is a German problem, which the Germans must decide.

So I'm interested in getting at this.

Uh, I think it's safe to say that the president is probably the most unsentimental national leader who to have dealt with it.

And when we came in, we were flooded with advice.

The president was under great pressure to make these changes.

It was a cultural exchange and so forth.

The president has always stated to you, he just explained to you, there must be concrete progress on various things here to go.

In fact,

We have made more progress on an agenda of concrete items.

I think that any American post-war administration without great fanfare and without great sentimentality and pretense of good personal relations.

Well, they are basically, and I think this is a part of individuals.

Individually, take Mr. DeBringer, the ambassador, for being black and under, and being controlled and all that.

I have no illusions about what they're up to, and they have no illusions about what I'm up to.

That is not the point.

It is a situation where they are, insofar as there are changes to their concern, totally unsettled.

The technology of too many leaders in the West, particularly of this country,

is that we have felt that they have, some of our leaders have felt that if you have good personal relations, talking about your grandchildren and all that, that that can be translated into good relations on substance.

So my whole philosophy is you best have the best possible personal relations so that they can talk about substance in a friendly atmosphere.

But on substance, it's totally impersonal, totally practical.

That's what they are, that's what we are.

That's what we're going to do every day.

I am very happy that you are listening to all this from the Deadline.

It is a great relief for you.

And I hope that in the future, the separation and the spreading of forms that you have brought with you or that you can do, that you can do.

It's a different thing.

We have tried a little to evoke the impression that our responsibility is in a different position.

That's what we could say.

Maybe it's only important to say something about Narkosik.

We had a very careful conversation, where we touched on a lot of things.

He told me, war in Europe is madness.

And then something should come to mind.

I think it's a surprise.

It's a fact.

It's going on right now.

And then you change the subject.

But it's not your fault.

It's your fault.

Well, I was very grateful to hear that from you, and that comforts me very much, and it was very kind of you to separate between the birds and the green, and we're kind enough to appreciate the share I had to bring this about and other things.

Well, sometimes it tends to happen that you really take the impression, I say, that Washington was looking differently in the situation, but after this conversation,

and how long it would be maintained.

As regards to Mr. Castigliani, I would like to make one point, and maybe have some reports next to the airport, have a visit.

We had long talks, very carefully phrased and worded into each word and manner.

And he said the war in Europe would be a folly.

And I said, everywhere in the world, war would be a folly.

Because that was just the title of the war in India program.

He talked the subject.

He changed the subject immediately.

Much of that was a very indisputable reaction.

But the thing is, war is a folly.

It involves you in one that can be detrimental to your income.

But where war serves their purpose, I'm speaking of, I think I'm trying to look into his mind and accept it.

Maybe the war in India, they felt served their purpose.

Certainly they think the war in Vietnam serves their purpose.

But war in Europe, as long as we

Solidarity would not serve their purpose, because the cost of the risk is too great.

And on the same token, I think I would say that war in the East would not serve their purpose.

That's only provided we keep a solid line.

That's the way we have to look at it.

And in the meantime, however, we do have hopes that this conference with the Russians will produce results, mainly because it did not sound that way.

We're going to talk about a number of very important subjects, arts and education, trade, and so forth.

And it will be good if the two featured authors can begin to make some progress.

Because of necessity, not based on sentimentality.

Sentimental in our personal relations, but totally pragmatic on substance, as I follow.

but it's allowing me a lot of attention to hide.

I think he should not be a cop, but it's not enough.

I don't get it.

Why?

I don't get it.

I'm not talented enough to pursue a seasonal policy.

And, uh, the caricature of mine now, which I carry on now, is that I believe I am the leader of the Western Party in the federal republic, and that is what I will continue to do.

Well, I, uh...

I said this in the presence of many who were in the Army, but there were a few giants, and he was one.

And he was also my personal runner.

And I remember in that connection, and it's of you leaders to know that

Two men who both of them, I would think, we'd have to arrange a chance, had an army call independently in 1963 when I visited them, and again in 1967 when I visited them.

I asked about Soviet-American relations and American-Chinese relations, and these two wise men both said,

Well, obviously, we can't tell the United States what they ought to do, but we think it would be a great mistake to have an associated American condominium, or for that matter, an American-Chinese condominium.

He says, where you have these two great powers, you should seek to have relations with both.

You're right.

That's what he tried to do in 1958.

The first time I met Arden, he said to me, America must make a opening towards China.

Did he?

And China and Russia are not a natural relationship.

And I frankly thought he was a little bit mad because at that time, everyone thought that they were always getting out of it.

Well, I had a good time.

It was great.

It's the possibility of a break-washing glass, and I thought it was so fair.

But what's the matter?

You hear that?

Oh, God.

Don't make any comments to that.

I thought it was going to be larger than it was supposed to be.

What did he, what did Harrison say?

I don't know.

If I am, would I take seriously what is said in the independent constitution and declaration of independence of this country?

and that is respect for human rights and human dignity.

That was my answer to this question.

But it's like a client force, as you mentioned.

It's kind of a problem, as you mentioned, but it's in my mind.

I think there will be a time when we can claim that was even modest progress for the human being.

Our policy must be made for the sake of human beings.

at least to achieve something comparable to what the four parties have achieved in favor of Berlin.

But I don't think it was very successful.

I think that there's more a question of natural problems, not so much one of the political problems.

And you said you gave me a coin.

There's the money, but for you.

Well, we give my best to all of our friends.

The main thing is that we

The federal republic must survive.

It's a free, strong country, and it's a part of the free world.

That's our goal.

Now, how do you work that out?

It's your business.

Thank you.