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Conversation 659-002

TapeTape 659StartFriday, January 28, 1972 at 11:17 AMEndFriday, January 28, 1972 at 11:27 AMTape start time00:50:12Tape end time00:59:51ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss managing media optics and political criticism surrounding the administration’s Vietnam policy and upcoming diplomatic activities. Kissinger addressed North Vietnam’s use of selective record excerpts to manipulate the narrative on POW negotiations, and the pair planned a briefing for Ronald Ziegler to clarify the U.S. position on cease-fire terms versus the enemy’s demands. Additionally, they reviewed strategy regarding Rainer Barzel’s opposition to West German treaties, agreeing to maintain a neutral stance to avoid unnecessary involvement in German domestic affairs while leveraging the situation for future diplomatic gains with the Soviet Union.

Vietnam WarPOWsCease-fire negotiationsWest GermanyRainer BarzelPublic relationsSoviet Union
AudioNARA Description

On January 28, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:17 am to 11:27 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 659-002 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 659-2

Date: January 28, 1972
Time: 11:17 am - 11:27 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     Time magazine
          -Cover
               -Kissinger’s appearance

           -The President’s appearance
                -Kissinger’s call to Henry A. Grunwald and Hugh S. Sidey
                      -Kissinger’s view
                      -The President’s forthcoming trip to the People’s Republic of China
                      [PRC]

Vietnam negotiations
     -The President’s efforts
           -Kissinger’s talk with Sidey
                -Forthcoming story
     -North Vietnamese strategy
           -Meeting excerpt releases
                -Prisoners of War [POWs]
                -Response
                      -Selective excerpting of record
                -As issue
                      -Troop withdrawal
                            -POWs
                      -Record
     -Criticism
           -James B. (“Scotty”) Reston
                -Cease-fire
                      -Clark M. Clifford
           -Problem
                -Points made
                      -Compared to enemy’s points

Forthcoming meeting with Rainer Barzel
     -Opposition to treaty [West Germany’s non-aggression treaties with Poland and
          Soviet Union]
          -W[illiam] Averell Harriman’s view
               -Democrats’ support for Michael J. Mansfield Amendment
          -Kissinger’s view of strategy
               -US position
                      -[Christian Democrats]
                            -Relationship to the administration
                      -Lack of pressure
               -Pressure
                      -Deal with Soviet Union
                            -Willy Brandt
          -Backgrounder

     -Ambassador [Rolf Paul’s] reports
          -William P. Roger’s talks with Barzel, January 27, 1972
     -Neutrality
          -German domestic problem
          -Berlin
                 -Treaty
                      -Linkage
     -Brandt
     -US interests
          -Soviets
                 -Moderation of Barzel
                      -Timing

Criticism of cease-fire terms
      -Reston
      -Kissinger’s view
           -Leaders’ reaction
           -Kissinger phone call
                 -Discussion of cease-fire
                       -Surrender
                       -Reston
                             -Misunderstanding
                                  -North Vietnam’s position
      -Reston’s view
           -Vietnam as an issue
                 -Florida primary
      -Reston’s schedule
           -Florida
                 -Candidates
      -Los Angeles Times
      -Sidey’s view
      -Ronald L. Ziegler
           -Schedule
                 -Houston
           -Forthcoming briefing
                 -Barzel
                 -POWs
                 -Selective excerpting of record
                 -Proposals
                       -May 31, 1971, October 11, 1971
                       -North Vietnam

                                   -Call for surrender, communist government in South Vietnam

Kissinger left at 11:27 am.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Time is putting me on the cover.
I called Grunewald and Seide last evening and said that in my judgment you should be on the cover.
And they said that they were putting you on the cover just before the China trip, and probably they said you'd be on the cover twice in the next six weeks.
Yeah.
Well, I just wanted you to know that this is very embarrassing to me.
Well, you can get across the... Oh, and how it was done.
Oh, well, that I have done at a moment's length with Sidi.
Sidi won't write the long story until next week.
Thank you.
The North Vietnamese are now beginning to release selected excerpts.
They said that I had said at one meeting, we won't settle it for POWs alone, which is true.
But our answer is, we won't go into selective excerpting of the record.
We stand behind what we said.
I think we've made a mistake.
Well, you don't want to hold on to these issues.
Well, we have to make up our mind.
You know, we can't always say we'll get out for POWs.
No, I mean that.
I'm not saying that we change our policy, but I'm just saying you simply, if you let them leave that out there alone, I'd find something in there to knock it down.
Because they have said at a later point that they wouldn't trade for them.
They have.
Oh, yes.
See, that's my point.
I mean, this... That's a good point.
We can say we won't go into collective extra things.
But let the record show that they recognize that we do that.
Right.
It was played at last Tuesday, and we have...
They never offered that.
to you, right?
That's the point that I make.
And I would say that I just wouldn't let that issue hang out there as one that they can hit us over the head with to say, well, that's Moonbush, and they've already knocked that out.
Because I have.
Well, they're beginning, your opponents are beginning to rally that now as a picking at its columns.
Oh, that we are asking for a ceasefire?
The ridiculous thing is they're making points for the other side that the other side isn't making.
On that meeting with Basel, Mr. President, the major issue is that the Germans, he's going to oppose the ratification of the treaty.
Harriman...
I had a dinner last night and told them that if they didn't ratify the treaties, the Democrats would support the Mansfield Amendment and would change their whole policy towards Germany.
I think this Basel party is essentially the party of our friends.
And we should just take the position it's up to them that we're not advising them anything.
If we want to bring
pressure on them for ratifying.
We should do it a little later as a result of the deal with the Soviets.
If the more domestic trouble Trump has, the more the Russians need us.
And also their ambassador keeps reporting that our
I don't know where he picks it up, because actually, Strauss didn't behave very well in his talks with Maslow yesterday.
He didn't make that point at all.
Well, I'll keep him.
In other words, the decision of neutraling him, I think.
Yes, I think so.
We're not trying to push it.
That's a German domestic problem.
That's a German domestic problem, and our friendship with Germany is not affected by it.
We're going to shoot in Berlin.
This is another problem.
Berlin, they're not attacking.
Yeah, I know.
But Berlin can't get ratified until the other one is ratified.
So that's a move that...
They got it pretty well.
Okay, all right.
one of those delicate things in some way to Frank.
Frank, in my opinion, has made a major error.
He's done it, but he's done it now.
Well, the only thing is, it is in our interest for the Russians to have, not to have Teflon completely clear and in truth.
And then we can tell them at the right moment.
and will moderate thoughtfully as it does.
But not now, it's much too early.
Couldn't agree more.
You know, I would be concerned into that of the, of the, the picking of the president.
It's inevitable that they're going to.
Oh, yeah.
The president needs to be arrested.
What in the world is he going to do with it?
Well, but it's really, what is discouraging, Mr. President, is the dishonesty of our leading people.
Well, some of them are.
That's right.
But instead of taking pride in what their president has done and saying, at last...
I had a call this morning from a professor at Harvard, one of the senior scientists there, said I should just tell the president for all of us that we believe he's done the right thing.
The only thing left for him to do now is to surrender.
At least he has offered everything.
They want to surrender.
Well, they probably want to surrender.
But nevertheless, that's as much as you can get out of these trances.
But what is the point of the ceasefire?
Well, that we push forward in possible conditions.
Ceasefire, when he misunderstood the ceasefire, we put forward.
Because it's their point, not our point.
I'll talk to him when he gets back here.
This was written from Florida.
But he also says...
that in Florida it was a tent strike, that it had taken Vietnam out of the Florida primaries.
And he said, well, afterwards things are going to get tougher.
But he does admit it has had a major impact in Florida.
Is he down there on vacation?
No, he's down there with a candidate.
Oh, shit.
And Los Angeles Times has been very good lately.
Can it come to be?
What the hell else can you offer?
No, fair-minded people are for it.
You, Saidi, is all for it, but of course he's more or less for us anyway.
I will be sure to get it to Zipper again.
He's going to be speaking in Houston.
And I'll be sure to get it to him before he goes.
And then hammer hard on that ceasefire point.
Let me do that before.
Oh, a minute and a half.
He's going to start breathing, and the Truman is going to be in in five minutes.
Yeah, well, what I meant is, I will worry about his breathing as well.
Tell me about this remark that I said we won't settle with the U.S. Oh, you want to ask about that?
Sure.
Now you are, you just, as a gentleman, we will not get into selective exhorting of things of a voluminous record making out of context.
We stand by what we said.
The other side has never offered it, has specifically rejected it.
We made the major reverse proposal, which is on the table.
We made the October 11th proposal, which is on the table.
With India's COVID-19 proposal, we have all the controls.
The other side has said that there is nothing they will agree to unless they have not surrendered and imposed their government.
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