Conversation 664-006

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Well, I think also, let me say, well, it's a good test for us as to whether or not whenever we've got a tough one, it'll stand up.

We've just got to have sometimes somebody to stand up.

Well, we shouldn't certainly stand up on Ireland, Mr. President.

That's nothing to begin with.

We'll infuriate the British.

If we want to play politics with it, you ought to do it.

But I don't think it ought to be done.

And what is your complaint, Paul?

That that's the only... Well, his concern is, of course, his state is getting ahead.

You know, I mean, in ours, now there are inquiries from Botley and Bailey and the Irish over here as to what the hell our position is.

Well, we just say we're interested.

It's not a foreign policy project, sir.

It really is what I said the other night.

I don't even think he should step out with it.

Well, I thought that you had already announced it.

He called me.

Well, then he said he's bound to say something that's going to cause trouble with it, really.

Keating, whom you're going to be seeing.

I've given him, as I told you yesterday, a rather full account of everything we've been doing, because I thought we might as well take him into camp.

I told him if I saw Ja alone, I'd either back-channel him or write him a letter.

And he just wants this confirmed from you that you know about that and want it that way.

And secondly, he's going to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Ja.

He's going to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

And they have those cables, and he's been coached to say things which are not going to be very helpful to us by Cisco and others over there.

Like what?

Like, for example, Dave said, he said, what do I say when they ask me about why didn't you say war?

We didn't know what was imminent.

And Rogers and Cisco said, I don't know how he could say this because...

We knew what was imminent over here.

Well, if they knew it, they'd come down and never send it to us.

You remember, they always told us Mrs. Candy was a force for moderation.

For Christ's sakes, they hadn't even given her a day's labor.

That's not anything I told Mrs. Candy, regardless of the State Department talking points.

Of course.

The only point is that he shouldn't get the Anderson papers all churned up again.

Let me tell you something.

I was scared to keep with him.

They injured his wife.

I say, now, Ken, you indicated in down there that in case the state did something, I'm going to put out in front of the White House

the memorandum that you and Spade sent me before Mrs. Gandhi's visit?

Well, no, he didn't so much, but the state did.

But the thing to do is to say, we'll publish that record with the Indians, which will get us into more trouble with the Indians, and that is no good.

All right, go ahead.

Because the goddamn Indian ambassador, when he left on November 19th, said if you, if I got in touch with him by December 1st, it could still affect events.

All right.

Therefore, we had no reason to suppose that they'd go to attack on November 22nd.

Uh, I think that...

Uh, he just failed.

He said that's all past.

But I think he...

I think he... Well, he would like to tell the Indians we're considering recognition.

Well, we will accept recognition, but we can't announce it.

No, no, no.

That's right.

I told him that...

He, in my judgment, pending your confirmation, he might have to go as far as to say they're not going to challenge the facts of life there, which is not saying they're recognized.

Yeah.

And that we will go very slow on any armed sequence from Pakistan, which we'll have to do anyway because of our domestic situation here.

Yeah.

Well, I expect we can get to everything.

That's excellent.

What do we want to say?

It's a matter that we have under consideration.

We'll do some humanitarian relief.

What about humanitarian relief?

We are helping.

We'll continue to do that.

That's right.

You will get a paper this weekend, Mr. President, in which we propose that we pledge our percentage of the U.N. contributions, in other words, between 30 and 35 percent, to any humanitarian effort.

So it has other countries to put up or shut up.

Yeah.

It still makes a lot of sense.

What's the heating position on it?

Has the state written a paper urging immediate recognition of any leadership?

No, no.

The state agrees that nothing can be considered until after you've taken care of it.

All right.

Good.

So the state is not a cross-border.

What does he want to say with regard to this now being the restoration of India and India?

That would be that.

I don't know.

He was at the Foreign Relations Committee.

Of course, he should never have been the first to testify.

That's the first mistake we made when it was mentioned.

Because they sure as hell kept following him.

I'm sorry, Ambassador.

Go ahead.

Well, he could have been kept from testifying.

Let's leave that out.

Ambassador should have testified.

Go ahead.

So then... We had to get him back here to keep him from baffling in New Delhi before he had tripped.

What is the situation now?

What do we say?

On their direction of aid.

But if you will report next week, you're saying we are prepared to start discussions with India about the whole framework of our relationship.

And this will be one part of it.

Discussions.

My strong view is that we should not give it back very quickly.

Well, I couldn't agree more, but I just wondered what the chief was going to say.

OK.

I think Keating is not in a very rebellious mood right now.

Well, he shouldn't be.

The others we see, we see Bunker is a problem there.

The only thing about Bunker you may want to discuss is his leaving.

Yeah, yeah.

Now, he can't leave during the offensive.

And I don't really know if he'll be reprised.

He's a patient.

What a fine man, John.

Oh, boy.

I mean, you've got to do a message like that.

It makes it worthwhile for the others.

Well, this guy, Porter, I must say, is in Paris.

Yeah.

How are you?

He's the one foreign to his office.

Yeah.

Maybe not the one, but he's the one foreign to his office.

Yes, yes.

He's tremendous.

Great.

Now, with regard to the, uh, he's pushed apart.

I think you could see from him if you see.

He is?

Yes.

All right, do I have to see him to do this?

Well, that's impolite.

He doesn't have to be today.

Well, that's a dissent.

Well, I have to be there.

I've got to be gone.

The President won't be here tomorrow.

He's not here.

It says first through the fourth.

Well, we can keep him.

Well, we just have to.

I don't know what to say, though.

We've got about two people today.

And we can keep him.

Well, then you're stuck with him next week.

All right, I'll be better off getting him out of the way today if you have to see him.

Well, I made a decision to go to Florida today, but tonight's so much.

I'm going to screw up tomorrow.

Yeah, well, that's modest.

The assumption can't be gone.

He has to be seen.

I saw him last time for an hour, even though he was here.

Well, if you see Keating, then... Well, I know, but we're seeing Keating for other reasons.

I mean, Bartlett's a loyal...

It isn't, it isn't.

He's such a loyal man, he understands.

Why don't we schedule him for tomorrow, and then you go away tonight?

You can't do that.

What did you say?

Because for a long time, you're stuck with him.

No, no, you...

He's in great engagement.

Great engagement.

Schedule him for tomorrow, and then I'll call him this afternoon and say...

That is not important.

I can handle it, but...

I can't require you to schedule out too much room.

That's the issue.

I don't want to keep you on the job anymore.

Foreign service is important.

You know, there are only three things that are important.

It's important policy.

I don't want to grab her on this other stuff.

The other thing is this memo you sent in on the question of Yad Vashemko.

Rogers has fired a memo to you strongly recommending you not see Yad Vashemko.

We agree.

You see?

Oh, yeah.

Let me just give it back to him.

Oh, God damn it.

It's announced.

Of course I see it.

Why do you send a memorandum in?

I haven't read it out.

Well, that's what's really ridiculous about this.

He's known about it for three days.

We sent you a memo late yesterday without calling or anything.

Where is the memorandum?

It's with Andrew Rogers that I'm supposed to send him on that.

You'll have to meet him at the brink.

I'll have to do that on the floor.

Did Kister get to us a draft of a memo that I wasn't supposed to send to Roger?

I'll get it.

Here it is.

It doesn't make a goddamn bit of difference what state thinks.

What's the matter?

They think he's anti-Russian.

No, they think he has done things against Vietnam.

It's the people we want.

It is so...

It is so hot that I might make a few points with this.

Domestically, you know, I know the pressures that I think if we play a rather stage-in-the-mind role, not trying to exacerbate this terribly great problem, because, you know, it's really unconscionable what these people have done.

you know, burning down the dam, it's interesting, but, and, you know, and Sean can come over and all that, I understand, but I think if your line could be one of the, just,

not trying to make political hay out of the issue, and that we're just a peaceful settlement of these things and so forth, but it's not a problem that we're going to be decimated by trying to influence it from here.

It's kind of like them getting into our problems with the Negroes, you know.

so that the ball is on their side of the net if they want to help fly.

I don't think that's right.

Right, right.

And I was trying to think again what I told you.

And I just simply told him, you know, this and this.

And as a matter of fact, I used this and these as examples.

I said, look, we are not going to embarrass you.

We're going to try to be as reasonable as we can.

So I don't want to be in a position where we are, frankly, and how it would come up.

I said, we're not going to embarrass you on this issue.

That was all we said.

Fine.

So I guess you can't be headed in that spirit, OK?

Good.

Yeah, yeah, well, I tell you, the, uh, way that, I don't know, he and the Regents, the M.W.A.

go over everything, but I, uh, you know, there's a lot of, a lot of children in the garden.

Oh, I don't know what you want to do.

Yeah, yeah.

Hold on a second.

Except the Russian.

Okay.

Uh, well, you have to get that Russian boy.

He says a lot of kids have been to that.

It's a grandstand play for the goddamn liberals.

Second place within ten minutes of your approving it last Monday.

That's what we're doing.

You know, the liberals can say you are open-minded and...

it's a i said it was pure public relations when we mentioned it he had requested it we go through this every day i notified them i didn't even have to do that as soon as you proved that this is the sort of thing that tax would be handled with a phone call to my office

Oh, forget it.

Forget it.

It's really not worth a memo to you from the Secretary.

Well, I suppose it may.

I'm just trying to prove it.

You heard my son-in-law.

Yes, well, I just said we aren't going to embarrass him.

He said, well, he was going to say that both, both, that he had discussed it with Cromer.

He discussed it with the foreign minister that we were not going to intervene.

We were, of course, in a peaceful settlement.

We would be glad to be in assistance if I asked or something like that.

That was all.

We're hoping it comes out all right.

I don't think so.

I'm going to check with Cromer.

I don't think the British would like that.

They won't think we kept him there.

can play any role.

It's like Eve getting up in Parliament and saying, when we have a race riot at ours, you'll be glad to be in town.

Ah.

I didn't mean to say that.

No, no, you didn't.

I mean, it's perfectly clear what you wanted to say.

I'm embarrassed.

Let's handle Parliament the way that I'd like to see it.

What would you like to take to keep escape with you?

Should I give you some of the books of the conversations now in the memoirs?

Yes, sir.

I'll have four books.

And I'll have four books for your biographical assessment of model and show a...

Let me get this, and then three others full of memos.

I just wanted to put into it, I had an analysis made, which I think you'll find interesting, of Marr's favorite novels.

Just to give you a clue to his mind.

Just three or four pages.

Yeah.

One of the marshes.

He's coming in at 10.

I just want to get the boat down.

He needs to go down to the bunker at 10.30.

You can raise the point that on your backup material and anything else on that, if you want him to do any marking up, condensation, or anything like that, or any articles or books you want,

I don't know what he wanted to do with it.

I don't know what he wanted to get in.

He might be very good at that.

And, uh, yeah, he might be better than Hammerstruck.

They're doing the Hammerstruck.

Well, he's going through the, he's just saying there must be a good volume of backup material, which he'll be reading in the present century.

I'll read it and mark it up.

We're convinced the volume can't be consumed.

So that's just to figure out, how about taking him with me to Florida, you know, so forth.

All right.

Okay.

You got a plan to go?

I think so.

We got to get just set up.

But if you want to go tonight, we got to get, you know,

Because that reception is at 5 o'clock.

Yeah.

You can leave at 6.

If you leave before that, you can leave at 5.30.

Well, let's say 6 o'clock.

All right.

You know, we didn't appear to give a shit.

Pissy-ass little bitch.

Departments didn't play.

You know, they proved their goddamn manhood or her.

We went through this whole thing, the whole thing on a peace proposal in October.

We went through the whole thing, you know, on a leg up to Cambodia, and Crossford, and Rogers, and Laird were just buying each other.

They were talking to God.

They were just playing ball, pit balls, and then so forth and so on.

Right up to the last, you know.

I suppose a lot of it is due to Henry's abrasive personality, but on the other hand,

Oh, I'm terrified.

He knows.

He says, be careful with me.

Well, then I learned to be careful before he heard the word.

Like, I never tried sex.

But the other side of that, although the other side of that is maybe right.

You know what I mean?

An argument that he knows.

Close to toss when Henry reads something.

So whether it's a good idea or a bad idea to see him.

It may be a bad idea.

I don't know.

I don't know what that thought is.

Okay, but if it is, then he ought to call me or Henry or somebody.

I said, Jesus, you must be out of your mind putting this bullet on the schedule, getting him off.

And he could have done it yesterday before we put it out.

He knew it three days ago.

He knew it the day of the schedule.

I let him know that you've got to let us know if they want to take it off.

He sent the memo late yesterday.

And he says there's a formal memorandum to the president.

What it is, is it puts him on record.

He said, I told you so.

I've sent you the same number.

I know you'll scream about it.

Nobody's going to scream one way or the other.

I'm going to put it on the thing for the public.

Well, they put the word out because he put the word out.

But we are not putting it on for a photo or an impression.

Oh, no.

That whale reaction surprised me.

We want the press, the photo thing to be the drug story that anyone can't talk to.

But it tells you shit and shit, that's all.

There may be, you know, we've been worrying about Henry's character.

We may have a worse real problem with Bill than we think.

There's a, I didn't believe it, but I checked in the third channel that Henry's

He was telling me that he had lunch yesterday, I guess, with Ben Bradley.

No, Henry did.

And Bradley said, I just want you to know that we're very concerned about Bill Rogers, and Kay is too, that there's something wrong with him.

We had a four-hour session with him or a two-hour session with him or something, and he spent the whole time

telling us how he had solved all the foreign policy problems.

He said, you look at your paper now, there are no foreign policy problems.

I've taken care of them.

We had this, and I took care of that.

We had that, and I took care of that.

And he said, this is Bradley now, St. Ben Henry.

He said, for Christ's sake, Henry, we know Bill Rogers.

He was our lawyer until a couple years ago.

We know he didn't solve a goddamn thing because he doesn't know anything about it.

We know what's been done.

And we also know there are a lot more policy problems.

And if Rodgers had looked at our paper, he'd see there are plenty of them.

They aren't all solved by any means.

And he said, to be perfectly frank, both Kate and I were very concerned that something was wrong with Bill.

Part of this may be Henry, but I did a little checking back.

And it may be that there is something, too, that Bill is not acting rationally in his dealings with .

This thing on the Dobrynin meeting is not a rational way to do it.

He knows it.

He has been meeting consistently with the Israelis without saying so, even though he says he has.

In other words, he's not .

He's just panicking and fanatically concerned about .

He doesn't want to get the credit for everything.

I also picked up a clue on the economy thing that I think maybe, uh, I've been talking about tonight, putting a lot of loose ends together, I think maybe the principal core of our problem with him is Dave Kennedy.

well god damn it well we got a real problem because of this thing when you and henry decided you know to give him all these little plums to get him to take the native job and he's playing that and that's what he's

Kennedy falls off with the real possibility that he might resign.

And if he does, it's too goddamn bad.

But it isn't too bad at all.

We've done a lot for Kennedy.

We've done too much for him.

But he's playing this thing.

Now, he came in, Rogers and Coffey, I've picked this up from a whole circle of stuff, but Kennedy, for instance,

has used up his travel allowance, expense allowance, for this fiscal year, even though the year's only half over, and he's submitted a memorandum saying they'll have to give him an additional amount.

His travel allowance for the year was $100,000, and he has spent the whole $100,000 in the first six months, and he's now asking for another $100,000 for the second six months.

Well, he's standing on things.

Well, sort of, but he cranks them up.

He has spent himself on a lot of stuff.

And she still has to approve that, and the county has to pay it.

And they've agreed they aren't going to do it.

When you were planting it, you wouldn't plant it again.

Well, I think you'd better leave the county.

and do it, and said, now Bob, don't put this off.

You see, one of the things we wanted to do today, today, you said you had something you wanted to talk to me about.

Today, frankly, the president feels it's gotten out of line here.

He just said when he was ordered, he could, you know, have the opportunity to talk to these...

Yeah, well, I think we covered this one here.

No, I haven't had a chance to.

We think that this kind of concerns us and we have a major problem.

the columnist situation that Dave had.

Dave Kennedy was still on his way to the Chief Economic Spokesman for the President of Europe, which he never, never was.

You heard the conversation he had with him.

We said to him, Dave, when you're there, you'll have an opportunity to do this and that.

You did the work.

Weren't you there, at least?

Because I haven't had a job.

Does he have any reason to think that he's representing the United States as our economic spokesman?

No.

No, he has reason to think that the other conspirators there in Brussels and Geneva have some relationship to him.

I know, but that isn't the way, that just ain't the way he's getting it through to, or at least the way it's done is irritating Conway terribly, and we've just got to get, we've got to cut, we've got to get Kennedy down, that's all, on this point, because of the Conway problem.

Yep.

Conway cannot have another guy.

You know, screwing around in his thing.

How do you think it's going to happen?

Let me talk to Dave Kennedy.

No, sir.

It won't work for me.

Well, I think that... Well, I think we've got to talk to Kennedy, too, though.

Yeah.

Kennedy's got to know that he's... You'll find him in history.

You'll find him.

I think it's better, I, I'm delighted to have Flanagan there, but I think I could do it better alone with Conway.

Because he doesn't, he trusts me, I think.

Yeah, but get Flanagan into it.

Well, I think it's going to be Flanagan that's got to take it.

Okay.

I, uh, I'm doing it with, uh, I just didn't want Conway to dig himself into a hole.

Well, the point is, Conway has got to be in charge here.

Well, but even if Kennedy were the chief spokesman in Europe, he could still be under Congress.

And that's who's at the problem, if Kennedy's the chief spokesman.

We want him to be the chief spokesman.

But even if he were the chief spokesman among our European ambassadors,

but he would still clearly be under Connolly.

I mean, he is not independent of the direction of Connolly.

That's the point to make, and that would never give him any reason to believe.

See, you put Connolly in a very odd position.

His predecessor is Secretary of the Treasury.

You tell him he's under him.

Kennedy doesn't put himself under people.

And he doesn't?

No.

And Kennedy is a guy that pushes his own position very hard, as you know.

In all these things, he's pushed himself in very hard.

I think...

Our problem is the guy that matters to us is Cosby, not Kennedy.

I don't care about Kennedy.

If he quits, it's OK. That's what I think you've got to understand.

That's why I think it is important, incidentally, you better get Flanagan.

See, Flanagan is going to be the economic man.

Getting Peterson out has been a hell of a thing, because he doesn't have a hand in the ass in this field.

But I think that, uh, will you arrange this today, that, uh, I want Connolly to be sure that Connolly is, no matter what the problem Connolly has, see, if he sees the problem with Kennedy, and whatever Connolly wants, he gets.

That's what we have to do.

And Kennedy must be told about the day, that's, that's understandable.

Jesus Christ also, he can't, uh, be waddling around, uh, he ought to get over the hell there, too, you know, is he?

We made a mistake there.

We didn't try to get him.

We were trying to give him a job.

Well, we did tell him that the other ambassadors there would have

that he has some supervisory role.

That has nothing to do with his relation to Conlon.

I mean, it's the idea that an ambassador has an independent position and that he conducts his own economic policy over there is just nuts.

No ambassador conducts his own policy, period.

I mean, he thinks he has six other ambassadors under him.

See, Kennedy is, that's the whole point.

Kennedy is not just an ambassador.

Kennedy is also a

member of the president's cabinet, you know, all those kinds of things.

Well, the thing that needs to be spelled out is... And he's retained his ambassador of arms.

Yeah, well, but that becomes him.

No, that becomes him, Mr. President, that there was an exchange on.

But that's not the problem.

The problem is to get into Kennedy's head, that he's under Connolly, and to get into Connolly's head, that he is in charge.

If that is established...

How, how Kennedy feels respectful in the church we have in Geneva is really so unimportant.

The OECD ambassador, or the, it isn't the OECD, it's the guy we have in Geneva with that trade party.

I don't, we have ACP reports of his.

Well, why don't you do this?

Let's, let's plan it and try to sort out the doses because we've got to have, we're replacing church with, or they're supposed to, but the main thing is

First, what Connolly thinks of the whole thing, you understand?

Well, apparently what Kennedy did was a goddamn stupid thing.

He went over to Connolly as a sort of an equal, and he was going to make a treaty with Connolly as to how they were going to share their responsibilities.

Oh, is that right?

If Connolly, if Kennedy had gone over there, Minato, on each of the negotiations with Kennedy...

He was never told anything like that.

No, and I talked to Connolly before we appointed Kennedy, and Connolly was perfectly happy.

In fact, Connolly thought Kennedy could play the same role there as he did in the trade negotiations with Japan as our guy against the State Department.

It's when Kennedy started putting himself on the level of equality in Congress that I think that... Bob, now this is one you can't throw off till tomorrow, today.

We've got to hold this.

I think we can handle this.

Work out a deal, huh?

And how then?

I'll be glad to help with that, because we can work out.

The major thing that has to be worked out is the Connelly-Kennedy relation.

If the other thing gets into abstruse, I'm on this one.

Hi, how are you?

Presley, how are you?

I should tell you about Arthur.

Yeah.

Right, right.

And all that.

I watched what he did.

A fantastic job.

And so I'm going to carry that to the phone.

And you ought to hit it.

It was just great.

Oh, it was a prayer.

A prayer.

I told you to sit down and pray.

Well, here I go.

But you really, it was really fantastic, I must say.

Thanks very much, let's see you again.

Well, you've been through a hard time.

Well, I think it hasn't been easy, but it's a terrible time.

Well, it's a terrible time.

It's a terrible time.

I trust some of the tragedies of those countries down there.

These are what you basically thought these countries

And so they fight each other.

They fought each other after the Slovak invasion or partition, at least.

They fought again in 1962.

Now they fight again.

I guess it will never end.

They just continue to fight.

Well, what I think is about to happen is

have some kind of combination of the three countries, something like the European Community.

I've, uh, I've been told that I could be talking about it, well-earned about the tax, you know.

Well, they make noises, you know, wanting food on that, and wanting to eat bread.

And Mujib, I'm trying to think of his, uh, it's not the, some favorable reaction from

the people I've talked to, and not, not necessarily, but the Indians must be terribly, and even though they know that they are so big today, particularly the help of Russians, not over the past today as we, but on the other hand, they must be

concerned about the relations of their neighbors.

And also, looking down the road 20 years from now, they've got that great, big, honest crowd of China hanging over them.

The Chinese may sometimes forget, I'm not sure, but they never forget.

They live too long.

And they hate the Indians because of the 1962 war.

It's a mutual... Oh, it's a mutual...

It's more a fear on the part of the Indians, I think, than hatred.

They're really afraid of China.

And there's a reason to be awful.

China, not now, won't do anything.

But looking down the road, any sense of history, they need to have that mutualism.

So India needs to...

It needs particularly not to waste its substance.

to fight Pakistan when they got China in there.

That's their problem.

They don't consider Pakistan a problem.

China is their problem.

They've got to maintain quite a force for that.

I don't think that we deterred them.

Let me give you a little feel of

at this point.

I know you've talked to, you're going on the committee today.

Yeah, 2.30, and I'm looking for a lot of experience.

Well, I'll tell them on Andrews' papers the rest of the time.

Are you a lawyer?

Well, I can't give a splash example, but

I've got it conceded, but what my general approach is to be that this isn't the way I looked at it in India.

And these were sincere cables that I sent.

I have to admit, gentlemen, I didn't know all of the ramifications.

No ambassador knows all what's going on.

Everything happens so fast.

And I know Boston was also here to tell the wrap-up cases.

So I think with regard to the Bangladesh thing, as you know, we cannot do anything on that until after the Peking visit for reasons we're all aware.

I think it's important for, if you would, to say that you're back there, well, we've discussed this matter, and it's a matter which is under discussion in Washington, but we cannot indicate that we've made a decision, or will make a decision.

I would keep it loose.

You can, of course, say that they're all...

which is true that the President is one who recognizes his assistance to China and indicates the practical facts of international life.

He recognizes that.

But the question here as to what should be done, what I think would be bad would be to have the Indians, in order to embarrass us in China, leak out a story.

The president has made the decision to recognize Benjamin Echler as not a political actor.

That's right.

That's what you have already said.

I'm afraid they'll leave.

That's the problem.

Well, I do.

And what you said is an improvement over our previous formulation.

I wanted to be able to go back to something.

The previous formulation, as you know, has been it is not now under consideration.

Which I think the words are.

I can say it's being discussed, but there's no decision to make about it.

with him, the rest, and he's looking at it in a very pragmatic way.

I'll just put it that way.

Does that sound all right to you now?

Yeah, I think a better way to put it is to say we are not challenged in reality.

Yeah, that's my way of saying we're pragmatic.

We don't challenge the realities, but we are.

I'd say now we haven't made a decision as to when or how or what, but it's under active discussion.

See, I understand.

You know what we're going to do.

Oh, but then everybody knows that.

The problem is the Indians are leaving it out.

The deliberators are destroying the Chinese.

That's right.

I never wanted to do that.

The Chinese are leaving it out.

I want you to know, and I realize, it is much more important than anything to do with India.

Uh, it's, uh, India's in this long range, and this China thing must take precedence in that direction.

So if you'll resolve that.

Yeah.

That's all.

That's the formulation that I'll... Now, the other point is, on the, which you may be asked about, the press,

I think, Henry, if you could give Ken the, not before he's seen it, but if you've got the world report, I think, pretty well formulated.

That's pretty outstanding.

The interview?

No.

We have the world report that we're going to put out.

Oh, you have a report.

It's coming out next week, but that sort of takes up basic principles, which is that we will open discussions of the

Well, the other thing is we are prepared to have a serious dialogue with the Indian government in which we will make our contribution and then have them prepare us to put our relations on a new foundation.

Yeah, and that new foundation, that's our good relations.

Can I have a formulation of that before I leave the meeting?

I have it in my office.

Now, is that something that I can tell the foreign secretary?

But look, it's going to be published next Tuesday.

Can you wait?

Oh, yes, sure.

I'll wait to see.

You're going to be asked for the Congress to date on the 7th.

I think you should say, well...

What should you say to that?

I'd be very conciliatory that, well, we're in the same situation, and that after all the iffy that you know in Pakistan, it's practically nil.

Now, I mean, as far as India is concerned, that it is the policy of this country to...

to stop aid when military action is being undertaken by any country, running or not.

Now that that military action has subsided, that we are, we can now re-evaluate our relationship and work on the relationship.

I think the other point that I, Howard, so for purposes of your talk, Secretary, your friend Mrs. Kennedy,

First, a little background in regards to why we're in this state.

And second, it's entirely different from what the accepted wisdom indicates.

I don't suppose anybody's got a world report.

But the data state we made in the United States, there was a big mistake.

And there were probably several of them.

was in my reassurance when she was here.

I remember, you know, we, at the dinner, we all bought that Memorandum.

Henry approved the Memorandum.

They came for me.

And in fact, the talking points I used with Mrs. Gandhi came right out of the State Department's box.

It was there that I reassured her in London.

She arrived in the state, you know, that I made at the, out here in South Lawn.

I reassured her in the coast.

You know, I said what a great lady she was, not an heir to his daughter, but a great woman, a great leader in her own right.

And when she was here, I said, Mr. President, Mr. President, Prime Minister, you reassured her we're going to get $500 million in aid.

We'll get Yaya to withdraw unilaterally from the border.

We'll do all these things.

and indicated at no time in my conversation that a war came.

That it would be necessary for us to read that.

In other words, my feeling is that that probably led her on.

Led her on.

She probably didn't need to know a lot of these, but I think that if the United States, if we were to restrain her at all,

uh that probably we should have i haven't told her that uh well we we we want to help you with this refugee problem we've got 500 million dollars committed and so forth and so on and so on but if war comes we didn't take their computer uh which we didn't say now uh that's past history however

At the present time, I think the things that ought to be emphasized, and you, when you're talking to the Indians, is this, that they should not make a greater mistake than to take me on as one who's mad, and this has got to be your bad, and hell, I'm not mad at this kind of thing.

I'm sucking her under too much, as it turned out.

The point is, I just didn't want a war, but the main point I want you

They haven't had a better friend in this country than I. I, as a congressman, as a senator, as vice president, and when I was out of office, have made speeches for Indian aid, have always voted for Indian aid, $750 million.

They don't like to call it aid, but they have won a lot.

I have supported India.

I have taken the line that India is the largest free world country, must have an opportunity.