Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 685 › Conversation 685-002

Nixon & Kissinger on Vietnam War and 1972 Election

Tuesday, March 14, 1972 · 9:03 AM–9:51 AM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation685-002 on Tape 685 (tape position 00:11:37–00:59:37)StartTuesday, March 14, 1972 at 9:03 AMEndTuesday, March 14, 1972 at 9:51 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 685-002 ↗

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss foreign policy strategy, specifically focusing on managing the optics and political fallout of the Vietnam War ahead of the 1972 election and the upcoming Soviet summit. They deliberated on the timing of troop withdrawal announcements to neutralize Democratic criticism, the necessity of maintaining a residual force for POW protection, and the potential for a visit to South Vietnam. Additionally, the pair reviewed the success of the recent China trip and explored potential cabinet realignments, including the possible future roles of Nelson Rockefeller and Spiro Agnew.

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12:01Well, they, uh... And they're coming back this way to call on him.
12:20And the Chinese want the publicity.
12:22Yes.
12:24Why do they want it?
12:27Oh, I think they have made the commitment to indicate that they're getting closer to us.
12:35Also, I sent them a note two weeks ago saying it was important to show a lot of activity to quiet the criticism.
12:47They really played the game beautifully on Sunday.
12:50Are you going to speak in criticism, or are you going to use that Billy Graham outfit?
12:56Tuesday mornings at 28.
12:58Frankly, as far as criticism is concerned, the most effective moves were made underneath the pool water.
13:06Yes.
13:06And that background, that helps, too, because that shut out the press.
13:11Yes, the press, yes, sure, sure.
13:14But I had to go out and bring our spokesman, you know, because Jim Buckley, that isn't enough.
13:21But I think he did it.
13:22You see, they always need a front man.
13:24And if you cut off the two guys, Jim Buckley isn't heavy enough.
13:29And he isn't really attacking us.
13:32He's sort of nickeling away.
13:34He isn't criticizing what we did.
13:39He's criticizing the worries people have about it.
13:43And that's not much of a winning proposition.
13:46Yeah.
13:46Let me ask you a couple of things.
13:52The Indians came out a little sooner than we expected them to.
14:00And there they are.
14:01They're coming out this week.
14:03I think we should recognize them around April 2nd.
14:07I think I should tell the Chinese that... Why don't you do that?
14:12And... Is that the week of April?
14:22I think we should do it the week of April 2nd.
14:34that week, so it doesn't make any difference in terms of that.
14:40But in the case of Bangladesh, just so they're informed and they know that the Indian troops are out, that was the condition.
14:59I think it's about November 25th, we ought to tell the state.
15:07March 25th, we ought to tell the state.
15:13Well, that's only 10 days.
15:15Know what I mean.
15:28They're not coming.
15:30I don't think they're going to present.
16:04I'm going to make my trip to Japan.
16:20I'm going to make my trip to Japan.
16:23I'm going to make my trip to Japan.
16:34Oh yes, he's done a pretty good job.
16:36That's what you have to do.
16:59Of course, he really believes in what we've done, too.
17:04Yes.
17:04Yeah, he's such a weak bastard.
17:06I mean, he did a good job, though.
17:08You gave him religion that night, and why?
17:14Well, I wouldn't say it, but it's... Well, I know his basic attitude, and when he went through Cambodia, he certainly gave swank the word.
17:24Swank's reporting since then has been 100% better.
17:28than it was before.
17:31And also, one shouldn't underestimate, he saw you operating in China.
17:37And these guys like professionals.
17:38They may believe.
17:40Oh, yes.
17:41Yes.
17:41They are professionals.
17:43And that they can understand, handling these meetings and never making a false bet.
17:49Considering that this press corps was just waiting for you to fall flat on your face.
18:06You're going to be, I told you also you thought it would be time, so I wouldn't run it off.
18:13Right, well, I somehow got the impression you thought it was more useful.
18:18Yeah, well, it's more useful.
18:21Oh, well.
18:23But at this time, it's more right.
18:25I mean, you don't recognize the times too soon.
18:28Times do, sometimes.
18:33I don't think so.
19:02Because it's terribly important.
19:03It's terribly important to have many people that are damaged.
19:09We must deal with them.
19:11But you must not rush too quickly.
19:13None of us do them.
19:15They're enemies.
19:16You just sort of let them wait a little while.
19:18They'll appreciate it a little more.
19:19It's like they put their heads on their foot.
19:21That's all time.
19:22Except, like India, see, other times they're enemies.
19:25And if they can figure that they can have us any time they want us, just because they're out all the time, you can come in.
19:34I'm not going to let that happen.
19:35You can just simply...
19:36I can't break hold of them for another couple, three weeks.
19:39Then about the first, between the first and the beginning of May, go up there, and I want you to convene at times.
19:47All right, I'll go.
19:49And tell them that you've checked with me, and I said so.
19:52I'm not thirsty.
19:53But I want you to be sure that y'all don't get you back after the night.
19:56I can prove it tonight that all right, you might be up.
19:59One sign of how times have changed.
20:02The head of that group that came in here during Cambodia from Harvard to resign from the government and all this sort of 30 professors and to go back and come back, he came in yesterday for lunch and he said he wanted me to know they were wrong and you were right.
20:21And I never thought I'd live to see the day when a bunch of Harvard professors would admit Cambodia was right.
20:28He says Vietnam is a dead issue in the campus.
20:32He said, if we get down to a volunteer for it, I got to know that I couldn't imagine.
20:40My sole concern is first, brilliant rights.
20:43But at this point, remember, we had a talk some several months ago, and I don't think you may have known it, but because you had no reason to, I said, look, there will come a time, because before the Democratic Convention, where it's got to be us rather than you,
21:02And where we've got to say, where we've got to do something, but where we've got to indicate that everything is over, that we're everything on a game plan, haven't taken a leap for a little while, due to the fact that otherwise we may be forced out.
21:15The point that I made here is that the Democratic campaign helped us in everything we have done in the nation of Kansas.
21:23But it's 30, 35 percent.
21:24That's what they always get, everybody.
21:25And they're against the war and the military and so forth.
21:30But there's no reason, actually, any reason to include Henry.
21:34For us not, at that point, to say something.
21:37At least we're sitting with you all the way.
21:39We're helping.
21:40We're doing.
21:40You know what I mean?
21:41And he's just got to be put in a continuum.
21:45And at that point, we've got to find him.
21:47Wait, I don't know why I don't let you say, oh, long term.
21:50I don't know what you can say.
21:52Oh, yeah, you say, well, I don't know.
21:54Don't tell Larry God.
21:56But at that certain point, at a certain point, we must make a dramatic announcement that, which in effect will say about something like, well, we've got to keep our people there.
22:08We've got to imprison them or something like that.
22:10Now, as a matter of fact, it'd be quite interesting to see.
22:20three at this point having started with two as long as we have.
22:26If they can, maybe.
22:28then it's a bad environment and we just can't stick around on the ground and it's going to affect ourselves all over the world.
22:35You know what I mean?
22:36I think they can if that's my view.
22:38But if we stick around, I'm not speaking about getting up now, but I'm speaking about saying we'll stay another five years with air power and all the rest.
22:48It just doesn't go over.
22:49It won't wash.
22:50It won't wash as a use of American strength.
22:56No, but I think that
22:59The five years is ridiculous, but I think it is safe, though we have to balance.
23:06But first of all, my judge, I think the April announcement ought to be a nothing announcement.
23:12I agree.
23:12Just say nothing.
23:13We may not even make one.
23:15Oh, just a few thousand.
23:16Just two.
23:17Well, I guess I'm just saying, well, basically, the withdrawals will convince you we'll have another announcement.
23:24Right.
23:24All of us do it.
23:26When you give a number, because there would be draws that would be continuing
23:33I won't say anything.
23:35Because we are, I think that should be a nothing one.
23:38By the middle of June, or the Moscow trip, or even later in June, depending on how you need it.
23:44It depends whether we need it is the question.
23:47It has to be.
23:48You see, you know how the political conventions work?
23:51Two weeks before the democratic convention begins, they start hearing on the platform.
23:57If it's there, they will make the issue on Vietnam.
24:00Now, the issue isn't worth a damn, but they can make it worth a damn.
24:04You know what I mean?
24:06You can say, well, all the Russians in there, well, now, we still have 50,000 in Vietnam, and we're still bombing, et cetera, et cetera, and then we run over each other to say, after four years, Nixon still got us in Vietnam, hasn't ended the war.
24:18We mustn't give them that issue.
24:20We've got to detune them to the point where it's a nothing issue politically, you can see.
24:24And that's a very different thing from being a nothing issue with an honest, but critical thing, as you talked to me the other day, you can see.
24:32Yeah, but I think my own view is, first of all, we can get all one of here.
24:40We can set a figure, which can be almost arbitrary, 35,000, 30,000 of the residual force.
24:48I think we ought to announce going to that in the middle of June rather than now.
24:53Sure.
24:54And say we'll have reached that by the middle of July or something like that, or 1st of August.
25:01and have it all volunteered, it doesn't make a hell of a lot of difference whether it's 40 or 30,000 at that point.
25:09I saw something in the News Center where it obviously leaked out of Abrams' place where it said, our real problem now is hardly going to defend the remaining Americans.
25:19Now, that's bullshit.
25:20Look, here we can't defend them now.
25:22You well know, okay, they, with less than 100,000 there, we don't have any combat forces to defend people there.
25:3110,000.
25:31So that is, all right, so that can be done.
25:40also we can then see i share your judgment almost certainly the negotiations are going to bring any i'm going to bring anything but there's just a slight chance absolutely if they don't produce anything then the only thing we have to balance is not to let the thing unravel before november
26:02because that's not the problem.
26:07That, I think, would make us more vulnerable than a small residual force of volunteers.
26:12I agree.
26:12You understand, nothing needs to be done in the cause of unraveling.
26:17On the other hand, we mustn't go overboard in terms of every time he sneezes and we get a cold.
26:25But Hugh has been pretty good.
26:27I know, but we must have him.
26:29He must have him.
26:30But if we can get it, I think that would also draw attention to Vietnam.
26:41I'd rather take a trip out there.
26:43The best way to do that is to just go out there.
26:47Yes.
26:48I think that it's better if I go there than if I don't.
26:51It will make a difference.
26:52The issue that I'm getting at is, Jude has got to stand firm on any kind of an announcement.
26:57We make heavy in mind the fact that don't give the Democrats an issue.
27:00That's right.
27:02That don't give the anti-war people an issue.
27:04That's all we're saying.
27:05I couldn't agree more.
27:06But if we can, I think you'll... We might have to negotiate.
27:12We'll come out, if things break dry, we'll come out of Moscow
27:18in a very strong position.
27:19It isn't just about Moscow.
27:22You know, underline all is not whatever right of Moscow or China.
27:27That helps us a great deal.
27:29But in terms of a political issue,
27:32Henry, it's like a, well, in various incidents like the ITT, and nothing's a damn thing at all.
27:38ITT stock went down 12 points in general recovery as a result of the trust settlement we imposed upon them.
27:45But they made an issue.
27:46And that's what this is.
27:47See, and they can't name, you know, we made issues, not real issues.
27:51So we must not look at the merits.
27:53We must look at the politics of it.
27:54Well, I mean, it's the strong position, not because people understand the issue,
27:59I think peaking has put you into a strong position because it changed the image of you.
28:04No one will remember a goddamn second whether you didn't be communicated.
28:10It's a good communication.
28:15But that's not the point.
28:17Could I just suggest one thing?
28:20Lower somebody from your high.
28:22Or you could even have Alan's office.
28:25goddamn to get the best positive things that have been said about the Communique Abroad and about the trip abroad.
28:33You know, when I asked Rogers to do that cabinet meeting, it was a goddamn disaster, you know, for the leaders.
28:41But you know what I mean?
28:42I get what's said about it abroad is really fantastic.
28:44And you told me about a broader program and a lot of other things.
28:50And I said it's a masterpiece.
28:52You see, what I'm getting at, Henry,
28:55The world has changed.
28:59The present time has changed.
29:01But I need to try to communicate.
29:04Everyone knows you opened China and you did it with great birth and skill.
29:11I think you'll come out of Moscow, not that people will understand one of these reasons.
29:16But really impressive.
29:18Here is a man.
29:20who for three and a half years has done everything right on foreign politics.
29:26That makes it harder, in my judgment, to say how wise would you screw up Vietnam when you've done everything else right.
29:32Particularly, you see, well, let me say about that, before you say something, I need to remember everything.
29:37I don't want to...
29:40What we have got from a public standpoint, and Pew's got to understand that, we've got to let it appear that we've got to keep a reserve force there because of POWs.
29:51That's the only justification.
29:53These volunteers are staying there because of their buddies in the Army.
29:57People will support that.
29:58Even McDonough had to come to that the other day.
30:01Even Humphreys had to come to that.
30:03But yet they say we are keeping a reserve force there for the purpose of survival.
30:09of assuring the survival of the Jew government.
30:13That is a very risky thing.
30:14That is the real deal.
30:17I don't include Mr. President, that is true, not to lie.
30:21We could just offer this total withdrawal for the POWs.
30:23We could do that, and I didn't put that in there because I don't want to, I do not want to do anything that will push the government down the tube.
30:32If we could do that, knowing that that's a straight POW for that, I would do it.
30:38But you've always said, and I agree.
30:39Yeah, but that was a year ago.
30:41You have always said, however, and I agree,
30:44And once we offer that, they'll say, yes, we'll do that provided you stop the bombing.
30:48And that we can't do.
30:49On the other hand, if in June there, if that was solved, I don't care.
30:54It could be 50,000.
30:56You could lease 50,000 there if you could save in June.
31:00We're now down to this force.
31:01We will retain this force until, and as soon as we get the POW, we will remove the force.
31:08Period.
31:08All right, thank you.
31:09Would you say that?
31:10That would be enough.
31:12I would need to think more.
31:13Well, let me take that.
31:15Volunteers in order to get the view that it's not.
31:17Let me say that.
31:20The other side of that, I mentioned in the last one, which is I thought this would be safe.
31:27You remember, we don't have to live with that for three months.
31:30In three months, we let that be the position.
31:33And then in November,
31:37win or lose, will bomb the hell out of the Bastions.
31:41Now that's exactly the way I feel about it.
31:42There's not going to be any more stirring around.
31:45Well, you see, we've gotten since then another year.
31:49I frankly would like an offensive to take place now, Mr. President, for this reason.
31:54Because if we had the offensive now and we didn't lose, we would be, we would know they couldn't do one in October.
32:04My nightmare is that they're not spending all this stuff, and even though October isn't a good year, a good month, that they'll take it on in October.
32:14Although it's a hell of a gamble for them to take, because if they don't tip you over in October, then they've had it.
32:22And it worked.
32:23You might not say it, but they paid me the wages because they meant that if we were to lose the election, that we should lose the election because of their fancy.
32:33But I'm just going to roll over and play it like they're crazy.
32:38I'm still president until January.
32:41And I'll do what I can help with it, I'll stand for whatever it is.
32:44You know what the minister's writing about?
32:46The price they'll pay if you, if you don't, if you wait this late, is, if they'll pay, is your convictions as a leader will be, in foreign policy, will be so tremendous that they may be putting themselves away in an isolated position.
33:05It's a miracle that we have held on given our domestic opposition.
33:10If you had said on... Two.
33:34We have had fewer casualties all these years than in any week last year.
33:40Than in any week in the first six months of last year.
33:55and less than 1% of the casualties we had when we came in.
34:0070% of all the casualties in your administration were incurred in the first year.
34:0748% in the first six months.
34:08In other words, I think we should draw on the offensive.
34:12We should say these people, every war, every area in the world when we came in was in turmoil.
34:19required them all down if you had said that you could pull 520 000 troops out of vietnam which is what you'll have done and not lead to collapse i i think it would have been considered unbelievable all right
34:39And the only thing I'll add is the prisoners are good.
34:43Don't tell anybody.
34:44The only one you can tell is Kate.
34:46Don't tell anybody anything.
34:47Shut up.
34:48The reason is I want no leaks.
34:49I don't want any leak out of the leg.
34:52But what I want to do is to wait until after Moscow for the announcement.
34:55Now, here's my thought about the announcement in April.
34:58And I'll just say it.
35:01I don't want to get into the business of selection and so forth because it brings us down too low.
35:06But I would say that we'll have another announcement in June, but in the meantime, withdrawals will continue on some sort of basis.
35:16You know what I mean?
35:17I think if you otherwise announce that you're reducing your rate of withdrawal, why don't you do that too?
35:22But when you're down to 69,000, you've got to look at it.
35:24I mean, we can't just say we're in a different ballgame now.
35:27Yeah, well, the announcements now, I can say that there will be, you know, they've just done a brief basis or something like that.
35:37And it will be announced from SACA, something like that.
35:40See, that's the kind of announcement I'd like.
35:43And it will make another announcement in June.
35:46Okay.
35:48How's that sound to you?
35:49That sounds good.
35:49But you see what I'm trying to do is to use the June announcement, Henry, for political purposes.
35:54Now, the way to use it for political purposes is to bring you into the game with that and say, look, this is what we're saying, this is what we mean, and you've got to hang on for three months.
36:04I think after you're back from my staff, it should be on the version A, Joe.
36:09Joe?
36:10Yeah.
36:11I think it's 31st, I think.
36:12I think I'm checking.
36:14Right.
36:15May 31st, probably.
36:15Yeah.
36:15What's June 1st?
36:17I think then we ought to review the situation because then they got there.
36:23Yes.
36:24And...
36:26That's what it is.
36:27It's their convention, I'm concerned.
44:59Well, the point is, I think, I've given some thought to the whole situation after the election.
45:24So no decision has to be made.
45:29I think for the first year Rockefeller would be no major problem.
45:36I could help him.
45:59I could handle him for a while.
46:00My plan would be, if he comes in, is to tell him right away that I'm staying for a limited time so that he doesn't have to take me on.
46:08And then phase out.
46:10But I could handle him.
46:11But that might have to happen in any event, because almost anybody who's bringing in a Secretary of State will have to prove his manhood by taking me on.
46:19I mean, that's now...
46:23Unfortunately, I've given this a lot of thought.
46:25I don't know.
46:26I was just waiting to see.
46:29But that is...
46:31I would be good.
46:33The only thing that I think about is seeing.
46:37I know you don't think much of the idea that it would not be in that category to be rushed.
46:42Yeah, but I want to watch him a little more.
46:45I was very impressed with him in Bond.
46:47Oh, no, no, no.
46:50But he doesn't strike me as very strong in this first draft yet.
46:54But I want to reserve judgment on him.
47:00Because he started slow and... We're not looking for a very strong man, except that, look, I'd like to have a low-life malignant undersecretary.
47:13I don't mean malignant.
47:14Somebody has got to clean it up now, but it's not... No, I think I could handle Rockefeller.
47:22No, I think he'll take defense, but I think he'd probably Thursday...
49:39He might.
49:40I think Jack will want money.
49:44That'll be very easy.
49:47And I think he's an honorable man.
49:50I agree, but he doesn't have any money.
49:53And another thing about him, we're just talking to the church here.
49:59We both have a considerable amount of energy.
50:06We both work like hell.
50:08We both campaign like hell.
50:12And who believes, believes a very easy life.
50:17You know, I mean, you go three or four days and you play golf three or four days.
50:21What I mean is, I think Dr. Bailey, he knew this was one way of doing it.
50:26Could probably be helpful in arranging a very rewarding financial exit for Agnew.
50:32Thank you, sir.
50:32Do you think that he wants money from you?
50:40Yes.
50:41He's mentioned to me once that he wanted... What did he say to you when I asked why?
50:46I don't know that, but he said he wasn't very eager to run again, and so I said... Oh, he didn't mention money?
50:52Yes, and he wanted to make money, and this was his last job in making a lot of money.
50:57Well, I think he likes a good life, you know.
50:59He likes going out and playing golf with Bob Wolfe and Frank Sinatra and all the rest of the things that I adore.
51:06He loves, huh?
51:08But if you ask yourself quick times about that, you know, would you give him any senior cabinet position?
51:12The answer is probably no.
51:15And maybe he can't.
51:16You could give him...
51:19but yes you can get in defense because the defense department runs the secretary that's the way it worked out but i don't think he has the capacity to be president later than that no matter the fact you'd be very concerned if we were here in this chair oh yes
51:44No, I don't know whether you would take defense.
51:46Of the foreign public defense, defense is the only one.
51:53Right.
51:57Oh, you mean to move him from here, from Vice President to defense, or something like that?
52:07Yeah.
52:07No, that's right.
52:13I don't know who tried it, but that's what was said.
52:15I don't know whether that's true.
52:18Well, it was said that this is what some people were trying to do.
52:22No, I think it's best for us to go out.
52:29If he doesn't go, he should go outside.
52:33The difficulty is not to have that.
52:42He's talking about if he doesn't mind.
52:45But I think he should voluntarily, he should indicate early, well whenever he wants to, I can't say before, but some months before that he doesn't want the nomination.
52:56I don't, I think it's time for you to be in the position.
52:59Why can't he then?
53:00Because the way you did one hell of a job for us.
53:07Yeah, I'm going up for them.
53:11Very big bunch.
53:13Strong.
53:13I left on that just for that.
53:15I had to go up and see the ambassador before.
53:21Watson sees the other guy again, and I wanted to tell him about the Soviet move.
53:29What did you want him to talk to you about?
53:32I mean, that the Soviets had access about three things.
53:34Yeah, the three dimensions.
53:38i think i should mention something like that well how about how about third the board uh yeah and uh do you also take care of uh do you want to mention that too no i think i've eaten them honestly
54:05Well, if the subject comes up here and say, well, there's nothing really we can discuss, but if there's any kind of a wheel they have to action, their narrator is the president, so I think they know.
54:14I think they've always got to have that in the back of their mind, so that there's no damn surprise.
54:21You don't think there's actually no surprise on that, do you?
54:26I'll tell the North, we've been just screaming at them every day, they must have done something to annoy them.
54:34You think so?
54:35Yes.
54:36What infuriated the North was on top of, first they object daily, the North, that the Chinese in their side of the, on their side of the communique didn't mention our bombing of the North, didn't ask for a fixed withdrawal date, didn't ask for the overthrow of Jules,
54:55and just made a pro-forma statement, we support the North, because the North will convince people in the attainment of their goals, but they didn't say what their goals were.
55:04So, literally, there hasn't been a day.
55:07Then the second thing they object to is that they gave you so much television coverage, they say, the way they say it is, President Nixon, the archangel, under strange circumstances, made the following statement.
55:21Then they'll quote something you'll get in China, like on the Great Wall, all couldn't divide people, which for some reason is infuriating to know that we can reach beyond description.
55:31And they keep lambasting you for that statement.
55:35Now you make a thousand statements like that.
55:38But they want to get it to Chinese.
55:39On the other hand, the North Koreans are showing light with what they are making.
55:49So now they all say, stunning progress.
55:53And of course...
56:00And if this person's schedule holds now, uh, lead on code, it's still going to show up in Paris in about three days.
56:06Make sure, sir.
56:09Well, we don't really want them there to have done that.
56:13Because it creates too much speculation.
56:15Price and schedule would be fine.
56:22By April 20th for the meeting.
56:25What I would do is go over to one of these Facebook meetings and
56:29See you all from the Gilbertburg meeting.
56:32Are you going to the hospital for your vacation?
56:35I'm thinking of it, yes.
56:46The Mexican foreign ministry has offered me a house anywhere I wanted to go.
56:51I don't see that that could create any political problems.
56:54By all means, they do that every time.
56:56And if you go to Google, it's very important because the hotels that are crowded, it's like Miami Beach.
57:03Because I think the drivers in this theater are cool, and they're just absolutely beautiful.
57:09And you're damn right you did it.
57:11Also, could I suggest one thing?
57:13Let's get the maximum vision set and announce it.
57:17What do you think?
57:20I think it's a good idea.
57:22I was thinking that he may raise his hands up, but he knows very well where we are.
57:42You have to have a place.
57:44Now the other thing that we've got to think of is what we're going to do to the grave.
57:47He doesn't want to say it's government.
57:51Oh God, no.
57:53I'm sure, I'm sure he'll say it will.
58:01I'm not afraid.
58:04Could you just pass?
58:08You might like that.
58:13He is, of course, a night guard, but he's not an administrator.
58:20Well, he kind of works for his name, Mr.
58:21Administrator, let's face it.
58:23Well, I can make his name, but I'm a little, actually, Mr.
58:27Administrator.
58:27He's like, I don't know much about him, but that's what I need to know.

On March 14, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:03 am to 9:51 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 685-002 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 685-2

Date: March 14, 1972
Time: 9:03 am - 9:51 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger..

       Kissinger's schedule
             -New York
                   -People's Republic of China [PRC] ambassador
                   -Wall Street Journal
                         -Lunch

       Busing

       Foreign policy
             -PRC
                   -Arthur K. Watson
                   -Relations with the US
                          -Publicity
                          -US critics
                                -Kissinger’s note
                   -Kissinger’s meetings
                          -William F. (“Billy”) Graham
                          -Barry M. Goldwater
                          -Backgrounder
                                -Press
                          -Ronald W. Reagan and Goldwater
                          -James L. Buckley
             -Bangladesh
                   -India

      -Possible recognition by the US
            -PRC
            -Timing
                  -California
      -Indian troops
      -Recognition
            -State Department
-PRC initiative
      -Japanese
      -Indians
      -Soviets
      -Statement
-Marshall Green
      -Schedule
      -Performance
      -Cambodia
            -Emory C. Swank
      -PRC
            -Press
-Kissinger’s forthcoming meetings
      -New York Times
      -Wall Street Journal
      -New York Tiimes
            -The President’s forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union
-Cambodia
      -Group from Harvard University
            -Meeting with Kissinger
            -Unknown man
                  -Vietnam
                        -As campus issue
                        -Volunteer force
 -Vietnam
      -Democratic National Convention
      -Nguyen Van Thieu
      -Melvin R. Laird
      -Announcement
            -Prisoners of war [POWs]
      -Thieu
      -Continued US presence
            -World
            -Duration

                   -Air power
       -Continued announcement
             -Withdrawal of US forces
             -Timing of additional statement
                   -Forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union
                   -Democratic National Convention
                         -Troops
                         -Bombings
       -Volunteer army
             -Deadline
       -Combat forces
             -News summary
             -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
       -Negotiations
             -Forthcoming presidential election
                   -Volunteer army
                   -Thieu
       -Kissinger's possible trip to South Vietnam
             -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
       -Thieu
             -Announcement
                   -Democrats
       -Negotiations
-Forthcoming US-Soviet Summit
-PRC
-Political Issue
       -International Telephone and Telegraph [ITT] comparison
       -Campaign
-PRC
       -Image of the President
       -Shanghai Communiqué
             -Winston Lord
             -Lyndon K. (“Mort”) Allin
             -International comments
                   -William P. Rogers
                         -Cabinet Meeting
                   -[George R.S. Baring] Earl of Cromer
                   -West German Ambassador to the US
                   -World image
                         -Change
 -Forthcoming US-Soviet Summit

                -Image of the President
                     -Vietnam
          -Vietnam
                -Thieu
                -Reserve force
                     -POWs
                            -George S. McGovern
                            -Hubert H. Humphrey
                     -Survival of the Thieu Government
                -POWs
                     -Withdrawal
                            -Exchange for bombing halt
                     -Retainment of volunteer force
                     -Thieu
                -1972 election
                     -Bombings
                     -Offensive
                            -Kissinger’s view
                            -[Forename unknown] Thompson
                     -The President's image
                            -Leadership
                -North Vietnamese leaders
                     -The President’s view
                            -North Koreans
                -Domestic opposition to Administration
                -Casualties
                     -Percentages compared to previous years
                -Memorandum from the President
                     -Haig
                     -Laird
                     -Forthcoming Soviet trip
                     -Announcement
                            -Withdrawal rate
                                  -Timing
                            -Thieu
                            -Timing
                     -Haig’s possible trip to South Vietnam
                -Democratic National Convention

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 8m 12s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

*****************************************************************

      Nelson A. Rockefeller
            -Possibility as Secretary of State
                 -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
                 -Relationship with Kissinger
                 -[David] Kenneth Rush as Secretary of State
                        -Bonn
                        -Frederic V. Malek
                              -Under Secretary
            -Secretary of Defense

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 2m 11s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3

*****************************************************************

      Agnew
           -Finances
           -Rockefeller
                -Compared to the President
           -Financial arrangement
           -Leslie T. (“Bob”) Hope
           -Francis A. (“Frank”) Sinatra

      -Secretary of Defense
      -Chances as President
           -Kissinger’s view
      -Secretary of Defense
      -Movement from Vice President to Secretary of Defense
           -Compared to the President as Vice President
                 -John Foster Dulles
      -Nomination for Vice President
      -Decision

Foreign policy
      -Kissinger's schedule
            -Visit with PRC Ambassador
                  -Watson
                  -Soviets
                        -Briefing
                  -Bangladesh
                  -Gerald R. Ford’s and Michael J. Mansfield’s forthcoming trips to the
                           PRC
                  -Vietnam
                         -Mao Tse-tung
                         -North Vietnamese
                              -Shanghai Communiqué
                                    -US bombing
                                    -Fixed withdrawal date
                                    -Thieu
                              -Television coverage of the President
                  -North Koreans
                        -Chou En-Lai
                        -Nicolae Ceausescu
            -Paris meetings between the US and North Vietnam
                  -Le Duc Tho
                  -Timing
            -Vacation
                  -Acapulco
                  -Mexican Foreign Minister
                        -Accommodations
      -Announcements of trips
            -Luis Echeverria Alvarez’s forthcoming visit to the US
            -The President’s forthcoming trip to Canada

       Rockefeller
            -Talk with Kissinger

       Ronald W. Reagan
            -Defense Department
            -Administrative experience
                 -Compared to Agnew

       Agnew

Kissinger left at 9:51 am.
  • 685-001 8:24 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon, John D. Ehrlichman, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:24 am and 9:03 am.
  • 685-021 8:24 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:24 am and 9:03 am.
  • 685-003 9:52 AM · 1 hr 56 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, Manolo Sanchez, Ronald L. Ziegler, Stephen B. Bull, unknown person(s), Edward L. Morgan, John D. Ehrlichman, and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:52 am to 11:49 am.
  • 685-004 11:49 AM · 25 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, Emil ("Bus") Mosbacher, Jr., Nassir Assar, Nazmi Akiman, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:49 am to 12:15 pm.
  • 685-005 12:15 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:15 pm and 12:18 pm.
  • 685-006 12:18 PM · 16 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Wes H. Bartlett, Darrell Coover, Jack R. Miller, Jaynie K. Miller, William E. Timmons, Henry C. Cashen, II, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:18 pm to 12:32 pm.
  • 685-007 12:32 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:32 pm and 12:36 pm.
  • 021-063 12:36 PM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 12:36 pm.

Conversation 685-002, March 14, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/685-002 (accessed October 12, 2026).