Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 700 › Conversation 700-002

Nixon & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Melvin Laird

Monday, April 3, 1972 · 8:40 AM–9:09 PM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); [Unknown person(s)]; Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation700-002 on Tape 700 (tape position 00:21:14–00:39:55)StartMonday, April 3, 1972 at 8:40 AMEndMonday, April 3, 1972 at 9:09 PMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 700-002 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss the massive North Vietnamese spring offensive and their deep dissatisfaction with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's management of military reporting and operations. Nixon expressed frustration over delays in information flow and suspected Laird was obstructing aggressive military responses for political reasons. The two decided to exert direct pressure on the Pentagon to ensure a robust military counter-offensive, while simultaneously coordinating a public relations strategy to frame the North Vietnamese actions as a clear violation of international accords.

Audio

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Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
22:01Because I've now found out that Laird would not let the reports go forward until he had edited them.
22:09And this is the reason why we were 12 hours behind the news
22:14And we can't afford the, we can't afford the, the, it is clear that there's a massive attack.
22:26Oh, we know there is.
22:27They've now got 50 tanks near Dong Ha.
22:32I know this is fine.
22:33This is Abrams instead of the situation in Graham.
22:36which of course you can say.
22:38Of course, I've asked him to.
22:39And of course, the prosecution, he terms they didn't allow grout, disarray, and so forth, and so forth.
22:49I don't think it's that bad.
22:50Nevertheless, I don't know.
22:53G.I.s, they say, are poised in opposition to the war.
22:58And Abrams, or McVie, is saying, the Arabians, taken by surprise, on for Christ's sakes, we're targeting the goddamn intelligence up there.
23:09The military can't cop out on this one, Henry.
23:13The only thing I want to make sure is that Larry's going to say that you're sure that they've had the orders to do that bomb since we came back from China.
23:22Right.
23:23No, he's going to say that because he's been sitting on every attempt to do anything.
23:30No, the opposite is much more.
23:32They have not let over here any disquieting information.
23:36For example, I cannot believe that they did not have the information that they were building out right near the DMZ.
23:44But they were afraid to order an attack.
23:48And, uh, last week, on Thursday, I told Tate this is the attack.
23:54Uh, he called Bruce Lee, that Peacemic General Aid of Lear's.
23:58He said, oh, we just have a lot of alarmist reports.
24:01It wasn't until Saturday midnight that they confirmed to me that this was more than isolated attacks.
24:07I made a fool of myself with Dave Traslow, even, who called me.
24:12And I said, let me just check the Pentagon.
24:15He said they are coming across the PNC.
24:17I checked
24:18Mora and Glade.
24:19You told me the same thing.
24:20I told you the same thing.
24:22We were drawing bases that were under artillery fire.
24:27That's what I told you.
24:28I gave you the information.
24:30Well, there's no reason for us to lose our cool, Henry.
24:34If you lose your cool in the crisis, it'd be the first time you've done anything.
24:37I just want to be sure that they started the bombing attacks or not.
24:42That's what I want to find out.
24:46I have the uneasy feeling
24:49that Laird has called Abrams and told him that his promotion to Chief of Staff is coming, and that he'd better do what Laird tells him.
24:58And because he gave him the authority... What about Laird wanting to lose?
25:03Well, Laird himself isn't so bad, but he has his peacenik general.
25:07Yeah, Percy.
25:08Percy wants to lose.
25:09Basically, he's Clifford's protege, and McNamara's in prison, but above all in prison.
25:18I just sent a message directly to the person who gave it to us right now.
25:27We're not going to let there be witnesses.
25:30You called there this morning?
25:32Yes.
25:32Oh, no.
25:33I'm alive.
25:33You called him and raised some lines.
25:35I called as a matter of fact.
25:37I called you the experience you were interested in meeting.
25:40I raised holy hell.
25:41I asked for that this morning.
25:42And I expect you over here.
25:45And I won't run at all.
25:46I think, Mr. President, you should not call because if they start leaking, you ought to be kept out of it that you ran day-to-day military operations.
25:56No, we've got to run them.
25:58We'll run them.
25:58I'll take care of them.
26:00I'll fight it.
26:01By the end of the day, these guys are going to be shaved up.
26:04I have a 10 o'clock record meeting here.
26:07If you would consider letting me bring in Rush and Mora, say 10.45 for five minutes.
26:13If you could tell them you'll hold them personally responsible or something like that.
26:21Rush won't do anything.
26:25I'll go to Laird.
26:26Well, I'll get Laird under control.
26:29Once Laird knows what's going, that if we go through this, by the end of the day, they'll get it done.
26:36I'll have them shaved up, and I'll get it done.
26:39They'll be attacking by tonight, I guarantee you, if they have to walk over.
26:43There'll be something that he had...
26:46There'll be something.
26:47What in the name of it will cause what the curse is?
26:50Well, I talked to John Ehrlichman this morning, and he asked me what the situation was.
26:55I said, why don't they fly it?
26:57I said, because of the weather.
26:59He said, hell, they flew all over the Battle of the Bulge, dropping bombs during blizzards.
27:05And he's right.
27:06Yep, there's something wrong.
27:09Something wrong here.
27:12That's all right.
27:13It's a loss.
27:13It's just a question.
27:15Oh, it's really...
27:16They're withdrawing, and they're having the attack, and they've got their press.
27:20The press is just reveling.
27:23It's not a...
27:24I didn't program it, but you left the press up there, I see.
27:28There, see, of course, they're reporting that to some of the President and others.
27:33Are you sure that it was the messenger that you sent through the DOD?
27:39Did it get to the knockoff of this business of having the President be carried up there by American helicopters to cover this thing?
27:49I'm sure they're not carried by American helicopters.
27:52I'll check.
27:53But I think, Mr. President, that so far they've lost 10 miles, 15 miles.
28:01This is their new division that was only fourth last year.
28:07It's a third division.
28:08Why the hell do they have a fourth division up there?
28:15No one expected them to come across the TNC in Fort St. Guttivision.
28:19It's protecting Hue and Da Nang.
28:22We've always expected that they might take one or two or three provincial cities.
28:27We could lose Cancun City.
28:29In fact, I expect us to do one.
28:31And we might lose Guantanamo.
28:33But in a way, they're attacking close to the centers of, close to their own border.
28:42Shows how far they've been pushed out.
28:45And I think we shouldn't panic now.
28:47In a way, it's a godsend.
28:49We should give them a tremendous punishment.
28:51I believe...
28:52It's a godsend because they could have done this.
28:54What they've done now, they could do next October.
28:57It would be as good as that now, wouldn't it?
29:01Well, in October, it will be about like now.
29:03It will be the end of today.
29:04Right.
29:05They can do it in October.
29:06It's just as good.
29:07Well, I have it right now.
29:09It's just as well.
29:10We can now precipitate.
29:11I'm going to get the opinion in, and I'm going to tell them.
29:14I'm just going to threaten him with the non-ratification of the Berlin Treaty.
29:18I'm going to say now that this is it.
29:24Mr. President, they can no more afford to not have that summit.
29:30No, that's going to not.
29:42Or as soon as I get them on the phone, they'll get somebody up there to deliver them.
29:49Oh, I see.
29:58I think we could play this into an end of the war.
30:01I think you're right.
30:03I think it's a... Maybe you're right, but I'll tell you, it will, provided this bombing effect we put on is one of the best, is the finest goddamn thing that's ever been done.
30:15Should I get the chiefs in for his help?
30:18No, if you'd just let me bring Mortar in for five minutes, and just tell him you'll accept no excuses, you want a massive effort.
30:25Come on.
30:28That's good.
30:29No, if you get rough and more rough... Yeah, but they need this so that they can say they're carrying out your direct order.
30:36Then Laird won't challenge it.
30:39You get Laird in, he'll give you so much bullshit that you won't ever be...
30:56You know, just take your half an hour to pick up.
30:58I didn't say that.
31:01I didn't say that.
31:03From either state of defense.
31:04That's coming today.
31:06I've got that.
31:07That's the archive.
31:08That's the archive.
31:10We ought to be schooling by coming across the DMC.
31:14That's right.
31:15That prepares the way for our homings.
31:18Exactly.
31:19I've got a meeting with Kelly.
31:22I've got a meeting with Kelly and
31:25I had a meeting with Gary and Ziegler this morning.
31:27I've got McCloskey, Henkin, and Ziegler in right after the Wessig meeting, about 10.45.
31:35What we are going to do, we are going to get State and Defense to say this is a complete abrogation of the Geneva 1954 Accords.
31:45It's a total violation of the 1968 understandings.
31:50They created an anti-aircraft stream on their own soil.
31:54They put all their supply depots on their own soil and they're now in violation of the DMC.
31:59Then Ziegler will confirm it at 3.
32:02We want State of Defense to say it first.
32:07And then State of Defense will say it at noon.
32:11Ziegler will say it at 3.
32:14Warren at 11 this morning is going to make some very general comments so that the departments have been out first.
32:27Well, at least his little heart of mine could seep into the story, something to the effect that we were, that Americans are not involved in it.
32:39That should be, this is a, could be a neighbor who said to me, what does that mean?
32:46And if to no reason, if the island collapses, we've done everything we can to save it.
32:50If the island collapses, that's just a, that's a,
32:56That's the question that we can't even think about because there are collapses and all other things that collapse around here.
33:03If we were going to collapse, we had to do it a year ago.
33:06We can't do it this year, I think.
33:08Yeah, there are going to collapse.
33:09You see what I mean?
33:10We can't take it.
33:12I agree.
33:12That's why we've got to collapse and let the diseases out of us.
33:17We will gain nothing for restraint and defeat.
33:19That's right.
33:21I think if we suck the diseases out of them, we can get to them.
33:26Well, we can get Russia and China to help us, because they cannot want to have this whole thing, but we've got to get them to move now.
33:36Yeah.
33:36And Laird is already saying the 48-hour strike won't be done now until Friday.
33:41We've got to hit Paris.
33:44Why?
33:44Well, partly weather, partly because he says he needs the air assets and the combat zone.
33:50But if we've built enough of a fire under the trees, they'll get it done.
33:55Maybe...
33:56Can wait till Wednesday, but we ought to hit soon.
34:04I'll go and get that briefing now.
34:05Bye.
34:06Well, like I say, let's not talk about what the argument can and can't have.
34:11That's fine with regard to this, but we're playing a much bigger game.
34:14We're playing a Russian game, a Chinese game, an election game, and we're not going to have the argument left.
34:20In other words, this kind of attack is going to hurt us, provided we fight back in the argument.
34:27Mr. President, if I may, I think it would lead to a negotiation.
34:32It was a situation in that.
34:37I've got a sort of stuck, I'm afraid I'm starting to go down to the Kentucky Dwell in the Hunter and Burkitt Airport and back.
34:43I think that's a hell of a poor thing to do right now, isn't it?
34:48I thought I'd mention it at this moment.
34:53Well, let's wait till tomorrow morning and see.
34:56By tomorrow morning, we're going to have a very big ceremony.
34:59Well, what the hell am I talking about?
35:00In other words, we're talking in the midst of this thing that's going on in Pollyanna, and you don't have good.
35:06You see what I mean?
35:07Do you not agree?
35:08I agree.
35:08I think... We're not going to do it, but we'd better get the hell out of it some way.
35:11If you can get out of it, it'd be better.
35:14Sure.
35:14I scheduled something here late on Thursday.
35:29I should find some excuse.
35:39Bob Kelly, this is the time to really get tough and say it's true.
35:44But I'm not.
35:45And I don't, I'm not going to be down on that.
35:52Miss Ferguson, I'm after, I'm confident.
35:56You don't expect some, some nice, but it's just what I told you, you've got this.
36:00It's an unusual situation with the press trying to play with us in Vietnam.
36:04It's a tall banana and a hard thing for the press to play against Americans.
36:08Americans aren't getting killed there, you know.
36:10What they're saying is that, well, this proves Vietnam's elitism doesn't work.
36:13It doesn't prove anything of the kind.
36:15The crisis is in the north of the country.
36:17There's no way anybody's been to Vietnam.
36:20The crisis is there are not enough Vietnamese up there to go to the goddamn temple.
36:24There are only a few thousand.
36:25Mr. President, it is impossible to defend 600 miles of a frontier
36:29against every attack without giving ground somewhere.
36:34The attacker always has the advantage that he can concentrate.
36:37Finally, what does your report show this morning?
36:40Is it still good?
36:42The report this morning shows that they're ordering in a lot of tanks and artillery.
36:46Yeah.
36:47No, I don't think this is what I am looking at on there at all.
39:59Nobody really has, they all think it's a good, the problem is everybody thinks it's a good thing for you to do, but there's nothing for you to say.

NARA Description

On April 3, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, unknown person(s), and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:40 am and 9:09 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 700-002 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 700-2

Date: April 3, 1972
Time: Unknown after 8:40 am and 9:09 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with an unknown person.

     Tape for Rose Mary Woods to transcribe
               -Personal file

Henry A. Kissinger entered at 8:54 am.

     Vietnam
          -Briefing
                -Melvin R. Laird

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 9:09 am.

          -Kissinger's order on reports from Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                -Kissinger's conversation with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
                -Delivery to the President
                -Laird
                     -Editing of reports from Abrams
                           -Delays
          -North Vietnamese attack
                -Scope
                -Tanks
                     -Number

            -Donh Ga
      -Abrams's assessment
      -Press reports
            -Compared with Laos coverage
            -Soldiers' opposition to war
      -Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN]
            -Military Assistance Command, Vietnam [MACV]
      -Bombing
            -Laird
                  -The President’s recent trip to the People’s Republic of China [PRC]
      -Reports on possible attack
            -Kissinger's conversation with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
      -Haig’s call to Gen. Robert E. Pursley
      -Attacks over Demilitarized zone [DMZ]
            -David Kraslow
                  -Call to Kissinger
                        -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                        -Laird
            -Withdrawals
            -US response
      -Bombing attacks
-Laird
      -Promise to Abrams
      -Abrams
      -Pursley
            -Attitude toward war
            -Clark M. Clifford
            -Robert S. McNamara
      -Abrams
      -Call from Kissinger
      -Report to the President
            -Possible leaks
-US military operations
      -Kissinger’ schedule
            -Washington Special Actions Group [WSAG]
      -The President’s possible meeting with Moorer and [David] Kenneth Rush
      -Laird
            -Problems
      -Attacks on North Vietnam
      -Air attacks
            -Kissinger's conversation with John D. Ehrlichman

                 -Weather limitations
                 -Battle of the Bulge
                        -Bad weather attacks
      -Reluctance to attack North Vietnam
-Press reports
      -Defense Department
      -Moorer
      -I Corps
           -Helicopters
      -Transportation to combat zone
           -Restrictions
                 -Rush
-North Vietnamese attacks
      -ARVN losses
      -DMZ
      -Provincial cities
           -Hue and Da Nang
           -Kontum
           -Quang Tri
      -Assessment of gains
           -Retaliation
      -Rainy season
      -Kissinger's meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
           -Berlin treaty
-Soviets
      -Importance of summit
-PRC
      -US message
-North Vietnamese attacks
      -US bombing
           -Intensity
           -Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]
           -The President's meeting with Moorer
                 -Importance of attacks
                 -Direct orders
                 -Laird
                 -Rush
                 -News summaries
                        -State and Defense Departments
      -DMZ
      -Kissinger's meeting with John A. Scali

            -Ronald L. Ziegler, Robert J. McCloskey and Daniel Z. Henkin
                        -WSAG meeting
            -Public relations efforts
                  -Geneva 1954 accords and 1968 understanding
                  -Supply depots and anti-aircraft
      -Public relations efforts
            -Departments of State and Defense
            -Ziegler's statement
            -Gerald L. Warren's comments
            -Involvement of Americans
                  -Abrams
      -ARVN
            -Possible situation
                  -Consequences
            -Necessity of US response
                  -Japanese, Soviet and PRC cooperation
      -Air attacks
            -Delays
                  -Laird
                  -Weather
                  -Preparations
                        -JCS
            -Immediate action
-Briefing
-ARVN
      -Possible situation
            -Consequences
            -Soviet Union
            -PRC
            -Election
-Kissinger’s prognostication
      -May 1, 1972
      -Negotiations
-The President's trip to Kentucky
      -101st Airborne
      -Alternate schedule
      -North Vietnamese attack
      -US response
      -Press reports
            -US casualties
            -Hostility to US policy

                            -Vietnamization
                      -Distortions of ARVN strength
                 -Latest reports
                      -Tanks
                 -Briefing
                      -WSAG meeting

Kissinger left at 9:09 am.

Also recorded on April 3, 1972

  • 700-001 8:40 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:40 am and 8:54 am.
  • 700-003 9:18 AM · 51 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, White House operator, Tricia Nixon Cox, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:18 am to 9:59 am.
  • 022-063 9:33 AM · 1 min — the White House operator, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, President Richard M. Nixon, and Tricia Nixon Cox talked on the telephone from 9:33 am to 9:34 am.
  • 700-004 9:59 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:59 am and 10:06 am.
  • 700-005 10:06 AM · 15 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, [David] Kenneth Rush, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:06 am to 10:20 am.
  • 700-006 10:20 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:20 am and 10:23 am.
  • 700-007 10:23 AM · 1 hr 14 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:23 am to 11:35 am.
  • 022-064 11:39 AM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:39 am and 11:46 am.

All 31 conversations from April 3, 1972 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 700-002, April 3, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/700-002 (accessed October 11, 2026).