Conversation 700-003

TapeTape 700StartMonday, April 3, 1972 at 9:18 AMEndMonday, April 3, 1972 at 9:59 AMTape start time00:39:55Tape end time01:31:24ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  White House operator;  Cox, Tricia Nixon;  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office

On April 3, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, White House operator, Tricia Nixon Cox, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:18 am to 9:59 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 700-003 of the White House Tapes.

-Donh Ga
      -Abrams's assessment
      -Press reports
            -Compared with Laos coverage
            -Soldiers' opposition to war
      -Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN]
            -Military Assistance Command, Vietnam [MACV]
      -Bombing
            -Laird
                  -The President’s recent trip to the People’s Republic of China [PRC]
      -Reports on possible attack
            -Kissinger's conversation with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
      -Haig’s call to Gen. Robert E. Pursley
      -Attacks over Demilitarized zone [DMZ]
            -David Kraslow
                  -Call to Kissinger
                        -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                        -Laird
            -Withdrawals
            -US response
      -Bombing attacks
-Laird
      -Promise to Abrams
      -Abrams
      -Pursley
            -Attitude toward war
            -Clark M. Clifford
            -Robert S. McNamara
      -Abrams
      -Call from Kissinger
      -Report to the President
            -Possible leaks
-US military operations
      -Kissinger’ schedule
            -Washington Special Actions Group [WSAG]
      -The President’s possible meeting with Moorer and [David] Kenneth Rush
      -Laird
            -Problems
      -Attacks on North Vietnam
      -Air attacks
            -Kissinger's conversation with John D. Ehrlichman

                 -Weather limitations
                 -Battle of the Bulge
                        -Bad weather attacks
      -Reluctance to attack North Vietnam
-Press reports
      -Defense Department
      -Moorer
      -I Corps
           -Helicopters
      -Transportation to combat zone
           -Restrictions
                 -Rush
-North Vietnamese attacks
      -ARVN losses
      -DMZ
      -Provincial cities
           -Hue and Da Nang
           -Kontum
           -Quang Tri
      -Assessment of gains
           -Retaliation
      -Rainy season
      -Kissinger's meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
           -Berlin treaty
-Soviets
      -Importance of summit
-PRC
      -US message
-North Vietnamese attacks
      -US bombing
           -Intensity
           -Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]
           -The President's meeting with Moorer
                 -Importance of attacks
                 -Direct orders
                 -Laird
                 -Rush
                 -News summaries
                        -State and Defense Departments
      -DMZ
      -Kissinger's meeting with John A. Scali

            -Ronald L. Ziegler, Robert J. McCloskey and Daniel Z. Henkin
                        -WSAG meeting
            -Public relations efforts
                  -Geneva 1954 accords and 1968 understanding
                  -Supply depots and anti-aircraft
      -Public relations efforts
            -Departments of State and Defense
            -Ziegler's statement
            -Gerald L. Warren's comments
            -Involvement of Americans
                  -Abrams
      -ARVN
            -Possible situation
                  -Consequences
            -Necessity of US response
                  -Japanese, Soviet and PRC cooperation
      -Air attacks
            -Delays
                  -Laird
                  -Weather
                  -Preparations
                        -JCS
            -Immediate action
-Briefing
-ARVN
      -Possible situation
            -Consequences
            -Soviet Union
            -PRC
            -Election
-Kissinger’s prognostication
      -May 1, 1972
      -Negotiations
-The President's trip to Kentucky
      -101st Airborne
      -Alternate schedule
      -North Vietnamese attack
      -US response
      -Press reports
            -US casualties
            -Hostility to US policy

                            -Vietnamization
                      -Distortions of ARVN strength
                 -Latest reports
                      -Tanks
                 -Briefing
                      -WSAG meeting

Kissinger left at 9:09 am.

                                                                  Conversation No. 700-3

Date: April 3, 1972
Time: 9:18 am - 9:59 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     The President's trip to Philadelphia
          -Plans
               -Uncertainty
          -Value
          -Announcements
               -Programs
          -George P. Shultz
          -John B. Connally
               -Judgment of value
          -Plans
               -Day and time

     The President's schedule
          -Problem with unknown activity
               -Publicity
               -Announcement
                      -Changes
                      -Invitations
                      -News reports
               -Cancellation
               -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew’s appearance

     -The President's visit to Kentucky
          -Vietnamization
          -Timing
          -Problems
                -Catholic school event in Philadelphia
                -Haldeman's conversation with Henry A. Kissinger
          -A speech

Vietnam
     -US propaganda efforts
           -Deficiencies
           -News summary
           -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
           -Predictions of losses
                -Cities
           -Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN]
     -North Vietnamese attacks
           -Need for US response
           -Kissinger
           -Media coverage
                -Bad news
                -Significance of loss of cities
                -Kontum
     -Laos and Cambodia
     -North Vietnam
           -Media departure
     -The President's trip to Kentucky
           -Welcome to Airborne Division
           -Timing
     -The President’s schedule
           -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
     -Propaganda efforts
           -Prediction of offensive
                -Timing
                -Criticism
           -Ronald L. Ziegler's involvement
           -The President's credibility
     -Kissinger
           -Talk with David Kraslow
                -Nguyen Van Thieu
                -Pentagon

                -Comments on offensive

Staff morale

John D. Ehrlichman's schedule
     -Editorial boards
     -Telecision events

International Telephone and Telegraph [ITT] case
      -Public attitudes
           -Interest
           -Concern
           -Hugh S. Sidey
                  -Howard R. Hughes case

Economy
    -Ehrlichman
    -Food prices
          -Connally
          -Decline
          -Giant Food Stores
               -Meat prices
                     -Government pressure
          -Publicity
    -Cost of Living Index
          -Release

The President's schedule
     -Vietnam
          -Amount of time
          -Meeting with Moorer, Melvin R. Laird and [David] Kenneth Rush
     -Domestic issues
          -Schools
     -The President's meeting with John N. Mitchell and Connally

Vietnam
     -William P. Rogers and Laird
           -Cambodia and Laos
           -Aggressiveness
           -Possible actions
                -Press conferences

               -Military action
           -Bombing campaign
           -Bombing
               -Weather
ITT case
     -George S. McGovern charges
           -Taxes
           -Effect on election chances
           -Publicity
           -Wisconsin primary
     -Peter Lisagor's report
           -Liberal bias
           -Honesty
           -Annoyance with Democrats
                 -John F. Osborne on 1970 demonstrators
     -Publicity
           -Dita D. Beard
                 -Interview on 60 Minutes
                 -Testimony
                       -Senate investigation
                 -Life photograph

White House staff
     -Schedules
          -Charles W. Colson
                -Meeting with unknown people

Edward M. Kennedy

1972 election
     -Secret Service coverage
           -Michael J. Mansfield
           -Kennedy
           -Connally's interpretation
           -Kennedy
                -Status as candidate
                -Protection

Agnew
    -Attack on Jules Witcover
    -Book on Agnew

          -Patrick J. Buchanan

The White House operator talked with Haldeman at 9:33 am.

[Conversation no. 700-3A]

[See Conversation no. 22-63]

Haldeman conferred with the President at an unknown time.

     Call from Tricia Nixon Cox

Tricia Nixon Cox talked with the President between 9:33 and 9:34 am; one item has been
withdrawn from the conversation.

[End of telephone conversation]

     Witcover
          -Criticism of Agnew

     ITT case
          -New York Times editorial
          -Conclusion of case
                -Decline in interest
          -Editorials
                -New York Time
                -Washington Post
                -Beard memorandum
                -Media efforts
                -Impact on Vietnam offensive
          -Public interest
                -Role of newspapers and networks

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -The president's statement
                     -Abrams
               -Initial successes
                     -Gains by North Vietnam
               -Cambodia
               -ARVN losses

                      -Press reports
                            -News summary
                            -Emphasis on negative
         -Negotiations
               -Chances
               -Weather
               -US bombing attacks
               -US election
         -Casualty rates
               -Distortions by press
         -White House staff
               -Morale
                      -Press attacks
                            -ITT
                            -Congress
         -Critics of the president

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 1m 44s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5

*****************************************************************

    Easter egg hunt
         -Noise
         -Weather

    Agnew
        -Gridiron Dinner
        -Trip to Kentucky
              -Greetings to 101st Airborne
              -Publicity
                   -Problems for Vietnam offensive

    The President's schedule
         -Speech to Catholics
               -[National Catholic Education Association]
         -Trip to Kentucky
         -Speech in Philadelphia
               -Connally

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 6
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 17s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 6

*****************************************************************

         -Camp David trip
               -Problems
                    -Gridiron Dinner
               -Time and day
               -Canadian trip
         -Gridiron Dinner
               -Importance
                    -Compared with Bohemian Grove event
         -Trip to Camp David
               -Departure
               -Return day
         -Trip to Kentucky
               -Agnew as substitute
                    -Arrangements
                          -101st Airborne division

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 7
[Personal returnable]

[Duration: 1m 10s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 7

*****************************************************************

Kissinger entered at 9:49 am.

     Vietnam
          -Pentagon briefing of Kissinger
          -Kentucky event
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -Destruction of ARVN regiments
               -Superiority
               -Defensive line
               -Sense of urgency
                    -Moorer
               -Lack of US reaction
                    -Laird
                    -Stakes of war
               -US bombing
                    -Air sorties
                           -Number
                           -Limitations
                                -B-3 area
                    -Purpose
               -North Vietnamese forces
                    -ARVN re-enforcements
                           -Marine brigades
                                -Saigon
               -ARVN defeats
               -US reaction
                    -Moorer and Rush
                           -Meeting with the President
                                -Arrangements
                                      -Washington Special Actions Grip [WSAG]
                                -Talking points
                                      -Informing the President
                                      -Moorer

                                            -Responsibilities
                 -Air strikes
                       -Number
                             -Limitations
                       -B-52s
                             -Orders
                             -North Vietnam
                                  -Dong Hoi
                                        -Importance
                                        -Moorer
           -Military
                 -Current attitudes
                       -Abrams
                       -Ellsworth F. Bunker
                             -Return to Saigon
                                  -Conversation with Abrams and Thieu
                       -Abrams
                             -Promotion
                                  -Laird
                             -Gen. Robert E. Pursley
                             -Aggressiveness
                                  -Message to Moorer
                                  -Message To Laird

Haldeman left at 9:55 am.

           -Publicity
                -WSAG meeting
                -Problems with public relations
                -Predictions of losses
                      -Cities
                -Public relations efforts
                      -Abrams
                      -Anticipated Losses
                            -Abrams
                            -Kissinger’s talk with Ziegler and John A. Scali
                            -Cities
                                  -Quang Tri and Kontum
                                  -Supply problems

Kissinger left at 9:59 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Nobody really has, they all think it's a good, the problem is everybody thinks it's a good thing for you to do, but there's nothing for you to say.
I don't think you should go, but you shouldn't say anything.
with the language in it.
And that's what they're working on.
And that's what they're gonna see is whether they've got anything to keep it.
Well, the only way to do it is to do as long as you can.
And I should think we should be able to get... And what are you thinking about Dave, Bob?
Well, you said Wednesday, and there's maybe some problem working it out on Wednesday, but I think we can do it.
There may not be a general discussion
We have a problem on this .
And I don't know what you can do about it.
What have you done in regard to that again?
But we put out a .
We have not announced it, but we have confirmed it to them.
They changed the date and moved the date to .
They haven't put it out, or they haven't announced it because they haven't confirmed it to us.
shifted their invitations and they told their own people that you're coming and it's gone now.
And there was a, something, a wire service story or something that said you were coming.
It's just not a confirmed.
thing they can say it was a tentative thing we can we can get out of it yeah i know there's some like it's always offered but it's more often sometimes to do things uh do you think we could get ahead and do it probably
I do not think it's a good idea.
I mean, I can't really anticipate what the situation is, but I do not think it's a good idea for me to have to go down there and talk about Vietnam on any basis.
And you say, well, it's great for you.
They're going to say the boys are coming home.
the time that they're fighting over there.
But the point is, this is all on re-indemnization, see, and that sort of thing.
Now, I think it's going to work out.
And maybe within three weeks or so, it'll be all right to say, I don't want to hypo it this week.
That's really the problem we've got.
I think we've got to see such things very soon.
Now, we can't let them get out of hand.
We've got to do another thing.
Not exactly the same, but what I'm getting at is, we've got to make hard decisions.
Let's make the goddamn things and just take the heat on them.
the uh actually if you drop that you can hear the catalyst going down thursday which is that's right what we were thinking about that they do have a section on thursday but for the catalyst
I raised that with him this morning as to whether I thought this was a, he seemed to think it was.
Well, Henry had changed his mind when I talked to him.
He didn't realize what I had to say.
I said, what do you want to talk about?
And he sees that you're in a hell of a spot, and that's the point.
All these people that want me to make speeches don't realize that you've got to, when you finally get there, you've got to say something.
and it has to relate to at least the general subject of what this thing's about.
Well, this, we've talked a little, and I'm glad that somebody else has said yes, but
I don't think we're going after propaganda or our own line on this Vietnamese thing right at this point.
In that, we're letting it look as if we think everything's going to go fine.
where it seems to me this is one where we ought to, and we still have time to do it, because we can still say, we've been waiting to see if this was the events that we had been expecting, and well, within the next year, so we can say, let's say that we think that, I don't know, so I heard the news somewhere, and I think that sounded pretty well, in a sense, because Averitt says the situation is grim, you know, and all that sort of thing.
Okay, but I think we ought to say, I think we should predict loss of some cities.
Oh, hell yes.
And I don't think we have.
I think we're still saying we hope that what we're letting is we call the test of the arm and of the immunization.
If they lose such and such, it will be a problem.
If they lose so-and-so, it will be a disaster.
Well, why say that?
That's why I mean if we don't get 37% of the vote, I don't know what we're going to do.
We're going to be able to do about it.
It's sort of the same thing.
It's lost.
Well, it counts what happens.
But we can try.
No, the question is, the point of this is that they're going to have to talk about it and so forth and so on, but the real question is how it all comes out.
And if this thing can be finished now, this is the time to finish it.
We have an outcome to use.
How it comes out, the real question, if it comes out the way Henry says, then that comes out fine, but I think that can be, by our media coverage, the way we get treated by the media, can be covered as coming out bad, when it really comes out good.
Yeah.
I mean, we expect to lose it in some cities, because I understand.
We don't care who's, they're not cities.
Like, one or three, you know, things like that.
And there'll be some cities lost, and they'll be retaken.
At a later time.
Well, it's one of those things you can't do a goddamn thing about.
I'm not so sure we can't.
It goes back to Laos, where we didn't do anything about it.
That was our mistake.
Yeah.
In Cambodia, we did do something about it.
We're doing something here.
At least by God.
Reporters come out of the goddamn place.
Yeah.
And, you know, we're doing a few little things, and I'm raising some money.
But my problem is going down to Kentucky and whispering in the dark about it.
See my point?
When I walk these guys back, I'm gonna go back and say, gee, things are grim in Vietnam.
That's the problem I've got.
And that is what the way we really want to play this week.
This is a serious situation, you see.
But it's something that we can...
I know exactly what you mean.
They've got to play this as an insurance, and they're taking a few whacks.
What do you expect?
That doesn't mean anything.
Well, four, five, six weeks ago, we were built up, the public was built up that we were expecting a big offensive.
Things were going to, you know, the Vietnamese were passing their troops and all this stuff, and this kind of thing.
Then it didn't happen.
Then we were attacked with that.
Remember?
Yeah, some of it.
But it didn't happen.
But that, from a public viewpoint, came out well for us.
I mean, the fact that we didn't materialize.
Now it has.
We can gain from it.
I will try to get a few of them.
I can do it, don't you?
Are you sure you're trying to do it, Bob?
I don't want that in the White House.
That's the point.
I've got to keep Sigler out of this, and I've got to keep the president out of this, because I don't want to get any goddamn credibility crap over here on this.
I don't know what's happening.
See?
trying to keep Henry away from the phone, too, and when he got screwed, he apparently crashed on the phone.
Minds of hell, he tased every one of his calls.
I don't know.
That Jew business again.
And he got suckered because he called him on Saturday morning, and the Pentagon wasn't giving him the full information.
And he said they were children in bed.
You shouldn't comment on this matter.
You shouldn't try to tell them what it means.
I'm talking about that today.
Well, he sure should.
He should.
I'll do it.
Well, did everybody have a good weekend, I hope?
Yeah, I think so.
Did you have a good experience?
How about John?
Did he get a vacation?
Or did he get a vacation?
Well, he got a little time off.
He did a lot.
He did all the editorial boards, TV things, all that stuff.
Now that is not true.
That we know isn't.
As far as we can determine, it sure is.
Although some people say that, you know, we've gotten some reports that people do say they're interested in it.
Like, as Cide put it, like in Howard Hughes' case, there's interest in the ITV case, like there was in the Hughes book name.
So what the hell is it?
There sure isn't any level of concern.
What I meant is that Cide's point was not that they were interested in it.
His point went much further than that.
You know, it was a mutual...
But John said what they are, the one that they may get on everywhere at every level, who's loot prices now?
He said that's the one they really are.
Did the comics vary across at all?
A little, I guess.
But what's going to get across there says loot prices go down.
Sure.
Well, if they don't go up, that's what we're doing.
Well, they're actually going down.
All the chains are pushing this now, and they're all running on the same stuff.
That's all I'm saying.
have a variety of giant foods here.
Like they were out on the radio all the time pushing buy fish and poultry.
Now they're saying, we've got the prices down due to the government pressure
That's very big help.
Job opening helps you know if something happens.
It doesn't help if nothing can happen.
But this one we knew something was going to happen.
I know, that's why we did it.
But also if they're coming down, they started down last week, they're going to come down apparently some more this week.
Right.
And the point of the interesting coincidence, this is the week they do the cost of living extension.
Yeah.
For next month.
For next month.
So that'll happen.
The thing is that we have to...
The more I think about it, though, you just can't have everybody get in an uproar about every goddamn thing about Vietnam.
Actually, that's something I'm going to have to work on this weekend.
I'm not going to spend any time on the domestic stuff because I've got to get a motor over here and a letter for us, the whole goddamn bunch.
You know what I mean?
The only thing I can work on is that school thing.
If you get that ready, I'll do something on that and the other things.
It makes no sense, you know?
I don't know how to check this one.
But if I get any time off, I'll get Mitchell or Conley.
And Conley, I mean, in the next couple of days, I've really got to get a hold of this thing.
And shake him up a bit.
It's really too bad that I have him.
And Robert and Blair are two very weak and vacillating men.
Every time we have anything like this,
It's true in Cambodia.
And their attitude is just wrong.
They just don't step up to it.
They don't step up and hit the goddamn ball.
I mean, they should be calling the press conferences, shouldn't they?
You're getting right.
I shouldn't be asking them.
They should be saying, what can we do?
What can we do?
How can we help?
Or it should be calling and saying, I think we've got a chance here to make a positive out of this.
Here's what I propose to do.
I'd like to go out and say ding, ding, ding, ding.
I'd like to trot so-and-so out.
And I'll keep it up, and I'd like to get our goddamn bombers in there and start hitting stuff for a change.
Bombers.
The colossal joke, huh?
Can't hit anything unless the weather's perfect.
Zoom.
Unlimited.
It was a curious thing about what government might do anyway.
First time we got a break rate with the charge.
All I just got had to do was say it, other than denounce any taxes.
I said, no, I don't draw.
And I really bounced on that.
I'm sorry to say it happened.
I wanted to see if I could do well, but it didn't happen.
Well, it won't hurt McGovern.
No, very good.
Because Harold, he got it across the television and not denied it on the newspapers.
So he's got his money.
Well, it ran heavily.
Well, he got it across the television on just a talk show.
By the time it got to the evening news, it was running as a two-way story.
Well, they fucking charged him in the news.
I don't think we're going to go to Wisconsin.
He might help me.
I was interested in that.
That was a very interesting point.
He says until they get something concrete, you know, and what happens, not very often,
He has a terrible, terrible bent on the liberal side.
But he also is so intelligent and basically has, deep down now then, has press honesty.
And he just says, well, you've got to get something concrete or they're going to...
He gets annoyed with them in the same way that John Osborne in the campaign in 70 got mad at the demonstrators in Wisconsin that night and was saying, for God's sake, you're killing yourselves.
Remember?
His point was, he was for what they were trying to do.
He was mad at the real actor.
That's right.
Okay, I think that's Westergaard's motivation here.
He's just saying, hell, you gotta play it right.
You can't screw it up or it's gonna backfire.
I think that's what's bothering him.
He'll probably be smart enough to read some of those things between the lines.
Sure.
He knows what's going on.
He knows that the thing's turning to, you know what I mean?
And, you know, it is.
I mean, I don't, on ITT, I'm not going to be apologizing to you about the chariot knocking around, but we sit all too close to it.
You have to realize there's a lot of stuff coming out.
The beer was on 60 Minutes.
That was a good thing for her to do.
It turned out.
That's been a 10% fluency.
It's all right.
If she can go on television for an interview, why the hell can't she be interviewed by that?
Because she got sent back out.
Interrogated by a senator.
She got across.
White has a big picture of it today.
In the interrogation room, big colored photograph, she's got these damn tubes up her nose and called the senator sick.
Kind of gruesome thing.
It is.
It's a pretty funny look.
Yeah, it's a, he's a fighter.
I gotta hand it to the mall CEO.
I was cold for a few, did he get any time off at all?
Yeah, he put in some time lobbying for this camp and the rest of the time.
He's a, oh gosh, yes.
I was hoping he would leave him alone for a while.
Well, we left him alone, but he didn't leave us alone.
Well, in a sense, to be granted, you can't be completely away from it.
They are.
They could be.
They could take two weeks off.
But for four or five days, actually, they've got to be a little bit in touch, or they're going to do it.
Well, it's got to happen.
It's not a fire that you've got to tend.
You can't fire it.
It takes a while before someone else picks them up.
You can't just walk away from it.
It can't be done.
calling for Secret Service coverage or, I mean, Nansfield or Connolly again.
Well, he has been on the law.
I know.
Why would he raise it knowing that Connolly had been on the law?
That's the law.
I'm the general commander.
Well, some of them, Connolly kind of did it.
He, Connolly interpreted the law as being
saying that that's one of the candidates, and that Kennedy is declared to be some kind of or not a candidate.
Yes.
And now, of course, the risk is that somebody's going to shoot a candidate, and they'll say, why are you going to attack him?
But he's not a candidate.
He's the one that's going to hit him.
Can we protect the candidates for the rest of their lives?
Well, that's the point.
And how do we help?
You know, we've got to take them at their word.
If a guy says he's not a candidate, if he wants to seek a service protection, then he ought to be on all those ballots.
Yeah, right.
Out there, but not like everybody else.
Yeah.
Well, I see somebody let Ed go get to Whitcover.
Was there a reason for that?
I haven't any idea.
That came as a complete surprise.
Did he talk to him?
He must have.
Apparently, Whitcover did a book on him.
A book?
I didn't know the book was coming out.
Do you think you can let him do that?
Oh, I don't think I can.
Why don't I?
No, Whitcover used to hang around a lot, you know.
And I cut the son of a bitch off when I didn't see him.
See, no good.
This is part of the problem.
Just a second.
Well, he is bad news and a real action man, but anyway.
He slips, not just whining actually, he slips in, hits a hole in his skirt.
Doesn't make any sense.
So at the time I sent an editorial, he did an editorial.
I don't know, my feeling there is that it's pissing its wells all the way.
I think so, unless there's another, I should go here, big revelation of some kind.
These editorial records are picking it up a little late.
Well, the Times, obviously, they don't want to see a guy that may not come in.
The Washington Post does the same thing every once in a while.
They had another editorial saying the committee must not be deflected by the fact that Peter Beard's memo is discredited because that isn't the point.
The point is not a memo.
The point is the wrongdoing and the ties between government and big business.
You know, they're pathetically afraid that they're going to lose it.
Which it has to.
And they are doing everything they can and will to keep it alive.
That's my feeling.
And I think that's what you've got to go in there.
And I think you're going to have a point for a while.
But they can't do it.
The networks can't keep it alive if they figure out a way to do it.
But they don't.
They do have the word of call if they decide to do it.
I have the feeling that they're not really...
I'm not interested in it anymore.
I think, and maybe Vietnam for some reason is of some interest.
You know why they're not interested?
They've run out of people.
There's a lot of raw meat.
People are not that interested.
They haven't found the story to be of that great public interest.
Networks don't keep things on unless they play to the public interest.
They play to the audiences.
Don't you agree?
The newspapers, they don't give a shit.
The networks have to.
You know, the way I handled the death, that offensive, in my mind, it was about right, where I said that Abraham said that in the South Vietnamese line, the offensive might come, that their lines would bend and that they would not break.
And that was all I said.
Now that's the way it moves.
You don't say that you're not, everything's gonna come out right or anything like that.
The lines always bend in war.
You lose.
Christ did.
That's what we want, though, it seems to be, is that as far as I expect to lose a few, we're not worried about it there.
We'll go on and on.
The ups and downs.
Rather than saying we have full confidence they're not going to lose an inch, they'll kill all those dirty companies.
That hasn't been in anything.
No, it hasn't.
The only thing is, this is part of an evaluation that had been used, and this is the press doing it.
If you lose city, it's the same damn thing as an election thing.
If you get 78%, that's good.
If you only get 75, then that's bad.
They're saying, we'll lose this city.
It'll be all right.
But if we lose the whole province or lose the next city, we're in trouble.
And if we lose the third one, then it's a disaster.
And we keep setting up measuring scales.
We don't want a measuring scale on this.
What you want is a mushy thing.
It says we've started some losses.
This is one of the times where there is some chance that because of the intensity of what we're going to do, you may get a chance for a negotiation.
Having in mind, they see the election coming up.
Having in mind, we will demonstrate when the weather clears how goddamn tough it's going to be after the election.
Now, if that happens, of course, they'll wash it all away.
In the meantime, we just sort of have to see it through.
Now, we have to find a way to fight the press all the time on these things.
That's right.
Well, we're in a ridiculous position.
If we're in a war where our normal casualty rate is two a week, and when it goes up to ten, they'll say casualty's
I wonder about five times what they were the week before.
We know that.
But we've survived it.
We've survived it some more.
Oh, sure.
I mean, I think, don't let the staff get what they're prepared to do.
They're not.
They're not.
They're not.
I can't tell you how strong they are.
I can't go here.
No, I think it's good they have the test now.
It's good they've had the ITT in that sense.
It's good they have this in that sense.
These boys are all going to grow up now.
They're going to have one hell of a battle.
You know what I mean?
They'll just go back and forth and surge and this and that.
I mean, it's not sufficient to be attacking them.
You think this is rough.
Wait a minute.
Wait a minute.
These guys are after blood, right?
The press.
So keep them.
Keep them out there.
Keep them out there.
Well, probably are, and they should be.
It's the Congress.
Those guys, those are the ones that are going to go out and call the front line.
I guess people generally fall out of this, you know, having to go, you know.
It's just never better.
There's no way.
We're going as well as we possibly can, fighting a terribly difficult battle, you know, as best we possibly can.
Everybody's going to keep us cool, fighting effectively.
Let me come to the other thing.
Can we, could we just get ahead?
He has done much for us, you know, when we've asked, you know, left the gridiron, turned that down and the rest.
Could we just get him to go do the 101st Airborne?
But from our standpoint, we were doing it for a very fundamental reason.
It was a good story on the war, who Vietnam was leading and the rest.
This week, Bob, there ain't going to be any good story on the war.
It is going to turn around by that time, you know.
It's going to ebb and flow.
And if we change it tomorrow, it's too late.
Now, maybe we'll go down there.
And my view is that, why don't you just...
and see if we can do the Catholic thing on Thursday, if you get my mind.
I know we've got an irreconcilable contract with the Catholics that I have to have this education, and I've just gotten to it.
And I just think we have to write it out, and I'll find another time to go to Kentucky, as far as going to Kentucky is concerned.
Well, this has nothing to do with going to Kentucky.
I really feel that way.
No, we better cease.
We better cease this.
But I do think that, uh, find something that, that we can get by calling on the language.
And, uh, and then I think I ought to,
Give that a pop.
Give that a feel.
I don't feel there's a problem with what you were concerned about.
Oh, about the gridiron?
Oh, yeah, I see.
The other side.
I do think there's a problem to a degree in being around here this weekend, yes.
Well, I don't think it's an inspirational one.
If you hear it, you just hear it.
That's all.
Go to Camp David.
Well, David, we wouldn't look.
Go to Camp David Friday night.
Yeah.
So you're not around here at all on Saturday.
And don't come back.
I just wonder if the fact that I'm at Camp David is not too bad an excuse in any event.
What the hell is that?
It's not.
It's not a way, but...
Camp David compared to a Canadian prison.
It just won't, it's, you don't play the away thing.
You just, you're at Camp David, you just, that's all, you turned it down.
Right.
Why wasn't he here?
Because he didn't come.
That's the way to do it.
Don't give excuses.
You don't say, because he was away, you just say he didn't come this year.
It's a way that we play it anyway.
And there isn't anybody other than those thousand people or 500 or whatever it is that gives a good god damn whether you do it or not.
It's like a boy and a girl.
Not quality, but laughs.
But we'll play this one out by ear.
If we get some sort of a break, things may be at a point where you don't know if you can do it, but if we get some sort of a break that it begins to turn some, can you ever go?
I can.
I'd rather take the chance to go if you can do it.
I know that.
That's where I belong.
But if you can't do it, why not?
And if you can't, and just, and my view is that I might.
even take the chance to go Friday.
And all I'm doing is I can go Friday at noon, which of course is a less high profile.
I've been going down for a couple of days.
That is something I thought might work in any event, if I go Friday at noon.
I could get down there in time for, you know, a good swim.
And, uh, maybe eat about one o'clock or so.
We could do that.
And, uh, and come back Sunday night.
You have to come back Sunday night.
Oh, I understand that.
But that's, that's, that's a good time, huh?
Just to live your day and a half.
Do you come after dinner Sunday night?
And we can see, right?
The 101st, by the way.
We gotta get in.
As a matter of fact, if you don't mind, we might set it up in Portland, Virginia, just to check to see whether they've got one over time.
And they will know until we make a plan as to whether we do that or not.
It was exactly that.
I had a breathing problem.
I tell you, it was really total sabotage.
I finally, they gave me a half-hour breathing when they were getting us.
Henry, I told Bob now that I was thinking that he said that he'd talk to you about a few things.
I said, I thought we should just get out of it, and we could.
Well, it really could turn bad this week.
It now turns out, which they hadn't told us, which I found out by the purest accident, that two residents of that division up there have been destroyed, of the northern of the South Vietnamese division.
I found that out simply by factoring them
This is the sort of information they should flash over here.
We can't be kidded.
Now, of course, there's a 3-1 North Vietnamese superiority against the new division.
It should be expected.
All of this is right.
They have formed a defensive line.
There's a chance of holding it.
But what the military have to get, my instinct is, as it was with Nansan,
There's some blight on that operation.
And Mora has to know that there's an enormous sense of urgency here and that we want this thing.
I think Laird has drilled into their heads so much to do nothing that they just don't react.
I completely agree with you.
We cannot afford to lose now.
We will not get any awards for restraining this deceit.
No, you didn't talk to me.
The press said lies.
The press is lying.
They flew exactly.
We gave them new authorities yesterday.
They dispatched 500 soldiers.
They flew 136.
It's interesting to know why they didn't fly more.
And we can't... Well, then why don't they fly the others in the P3 area?
Why don't they do what you... Why is your instinct always for...
When we talked yesterday, you said, let's fly with them somewhere.
And, I mean, we can pull this one out, but we've got to drill into their head that the purpose is not...
to hide things from the White House, and the purpose is not PR.
The purpose is to get this damn operation stopped.
Of course, now they're coming up against the First Division.
They have moved up two regiments.
Well, can't they move some divisions over there?
This idea that they live on the ground, how about it?
No, no, they are moving.
They've got more men south than they've got in the north.
They have moved.
They cannot get their ass out of there.
They've moved one of the strategic.
They've moved two.
Marine brigades up from Saigon into that area.
They've moved one division from Catalda to Saigon to replace the division.
So they are doing it.
And if they are... What happens if you're able to see that they're destroyed or are they surrounded, captured, or while they're... Well, of course... Or did they run?
I've asked them to find out.
All I've mind extracted from them is that they're combat ineffective, which means...
But we have to, the major thing is to build up enough of a fire on the moor and rush to make it absolutely clear that this thing is...
I want to see them in the four-year Western Committee.
That's better.
Are they coming in?
Are they coming in?
I'll bring them in.
I'll bring them in.
Actually, you should knock his date with him.
I'll just tell him.
Five minutes.
That's all.
I'll get them up here.
Because that will affect the whole situation.
You must be informed in a timely fashion.
There's no excuse that if you are not kept, that you must be kept currently informed and that you send an order over to that effect.
Second, that Moore is responsible to see that the command conducts itself in the most aggressive fashion possible.
And then when they don't use their maximum resources, you'll want to know why.
We're 500 sorties authorized.
Why was it limited to 500?
Why not 5,000?
That's their capacity.
That's all they got.
Why?
That's all.
I guess I've ordered there to make you have only 500 sorties.
About 550 is all they can do.
Why?
That's all the resources left there.
A little under.
130, sir.
About 100.
And I would trust
do that, and that will get them the message and say this, we will... What about the T-52s and that 25-mile donkey?
Have you put that order out yet?
No, because I asked them to give us a paper on what could be done by noon today, but they haven't gone in with the 25-mile belt with the automatic flanger yet.
In fact, we should make that belt a little further.
We should go up to Dong Hoi, which is a major transshipment point, which I think is about 30 miles.
Make it 40 if necessary.
Because Dong Hoi is the best place.
And also, that's about 30, 35 miles.
Have we got the order out yet?
No, I'm getting it to them.
What about the B-52s that, in other words, you want to... You might ask.
You might ask more of us.
We ask, and you'll have a long time to answer, but I think it's time.
No more of you.
Well, let's wait with it until they do the other strikes in there.
They can't do anything now anyway before the end of the day.
But, God, we've been through... What's the attitude of the military?
Are they panicking?
No.
I think what is happening, Mr. President...
I mean, what's Abrams at?
Is he in a panic?
No.
Can't you get a hold of that fellow?
We've got a ambassador out there.
Is he off seeing his wife?
He was off seeing his wife, but he's on his way back.
He's on his way back.
All right.
Get Whitehouse in.
As soon as Funker is back, I'm going to send him a message to speak like a Dutch uncle to Abrams.
Thank you.
Thank you.
I think that the...
It doesn't need to be awesome.
You know that.
I think that the problem with Abrams is that Laird must have drilled into his head that he owes his promotion to Laird.
And this general atmosphere didn't land so much as this son of a bitch did.
Well, I'm going to tell the, I'm going to tell the lawyer today that Abrams from the link hangs on this.
If he knows about it, yeah.
That's right.
That's right.
That's right.
Unless he becomes more aggressive, I want him to know that I cannot perform as promoted as his promotion.
I'm going to be tough and tough.
I want you to tell Larry that.
I will tell him that.
You tell Larry that I have been very disappointed in Abrams' conduct, that he's not been aggressive, he has not reported things, and he used to tell him that he should stop training, put this down.
He used to stop training for the balance of this thing.
and it's to be an instrument of aggressive operation.
Well, that scared the shit out of us.
And I'll admit you that they forgot to give hundreds of updates.
But we've gone through worse than this, Mr. President.
This is the last for us.
Oh, Henry, one other thing that I stated to you in your Wednesday that you ought to cover.
Haldeman made the point, and I sort of thought that Indy was, that New York had this in mind.
He said that he thought he had to get into the publicity on this, and it was being badly handled in this town.
He said that we ought to predict that there would be lost cities.
We ought to predict we're going to be lost in territory, because as we predicted in the fencing a few months ago, and it didn't come to help us,
So we ought to predict that rather than saying that they are going to hold and all that sort of thing.
Now, you see, my line was the right line where I said the lines would bend, but that General Akers said that he felt they would not break.
All right, now, we can say that.
We don't want to predict any.
We just predicted, well, this is an offensive.
The offensive will gain.
We anticipated that.
We anticipated that this will happen.
And what are you doing on that kind of public?
I have a question.
I don't see Ben Scali to put that out.
You said that you expected to do something.
And we expect a little bit more.
And we may expect a little bit more.
We may.
And I told them, I told your client this morning that I thought we would, we might well lose one tree, we would probably lose one tree, we could easily lose time and just as example.
Yeah.
And that this, we can always expect.
That's right.
I personally don't believe they can hold these places except one tree if they take it.
the North Indian nation, that can't open.
Because they can't run out of supplies.
Get your bomb and hell of a supply line.
Get up here.
Are you ready to get out of the water now?
Yeah, right over there.