Conversation 711-021

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Yeah, I just, uh, talked to the president and slaughtered a normal man.

Oh, yeah.

But he's just been authorized to...

If we couldn't take him, they would like that best.

And they don't want me to travel across Soviet territory without a senior Soviet.

Do you want a book tonight of some of my preliminary papers?

They're not fully edited yet.

No.

Now, I have an opening statement, Mr. President.

Now, it's very conciliatory at the beginning because I want to handle the carriage, hold the carriage to him.

And then very tough on Vietnam.

The point is that I want to play a very, very conciliatory game.

It's always a Ture, you know, spear, Moscow statement.

But on the other hand, the price of Vietnam is cold drinking.

Exactly.

Straight linkage.

Exactly.

And you never know.

These sons of bitches could deliver something.

Mr. President, there is a chance that we come off with something.

We are running a certain risk by telling the Chinese that they'll start blasting.

On the other hand, if we don't tell the Chinese and it happens,

going, we're not going to do anything in secret that he doesn't know about.

And put it right that way, and that the President has said that there will be nothing said in Moscow that will in any way be derogatory, that he will meticulously keep his promise to the Premier, and we will inform him afterwards.

Incidentally, the North Vietnamese ambassador in Moscow has been home since Saturday.

But it's a little defensive, because you can't read it.

Well, I'm going to try and hold the committee, but we can't make a deal now.

We've got to make it later.

That's my deal.

You need it for your political strategy.

No.

I need it because of Vietnam.

That's what it means, the political strategy.

How are you?

Well, you had quite a trip.

I see.

That report was too long, I guess.

Oh, no.

Peter had mentioned two pages, and we couldn't get that on two pages.

Let me explain what was there.

very close to the vest.

They are in a position where they need several things from us.

They need our support on the German treaty.

They need, if possible, something of the East.

They would like, perhaps, to get a sovereign, and they'd like some trade.

They'd like this agricultural agreement.

Now, we, on our hand, of course, would like something

but as far as we are concerned it is nothing compared to what we're trained

What we get out of it, we don't know.

But the point is that it is just agriculture.

They aren't going to trade Vietnam for that.

But when you put the whole package together, it's a pretty big package for them.

One of the reasons why they are still actually

We didn't want you to say anything in, while you were there, because we didn't want to give away the counter that we had to hold to them later.

And I think you handled it just right in terms of discussing everything, seeing everything through.

We'll get, do they have to have credits in Lexington Bank, Favorite Nation, all these things they've asked us for in other channels, too.

And Brecht, you know, put it right on top of the table.

Yeah, yeah.

Well, naturally, you see, they, when people, the naive people talk about trade in this country, you know, the farmers and businessmen and the rest, they think, well, it's just like any ordinary deal.

It isn't that.

There's no trade with the Soviet Union unless you give them credit.

They've got lots to trade with.

The current Canadian...

of time, it's going to be incredible.

That's the point.

You see, the part, for example, that Peterson is working on, that Stan is trying on, that's a huge, there's a lot of credit, at least short-term credit.

Now, the point is that we get some cash, too, and they've got some things that they give us crony, for example, which they're just holding us up for, or we're holding us up for.

And Brecht embraced that, and I simply said that I was not familiar with it.

But you see, so the game you want to play, and I want you to continue to play it, because the brain will continue to see you, I would assume, between now and the sun, will it not?

Or how did you do that?

Or will anybody continue to see you between now and the sun?

Now we haven't said anything since I came back here.

Palmer came back Friday afternoon.

The press men are pressing for some time.

Let's give you something to say.

I was up on the hill at 11 o'clock this morning, and

said, actually, we're with Carl Curtis and George Mahon.

We launched this agricultural PR thing.

The president of their press first statement.

I just said no statement now.

But I do think that Pompey and I ought to meet with him.

Well, Henry, now we've got to get in something and say it.

I think we can play both games.

My feeling is that the Secretary should say, I have very extensive talks in the Soviet Union.

I also have a program.

It isn't like...Gresham was the chairman of the American Museum.

And the first American being said that he had seen, since he saw Glenn Seaborg in 1963, that he was not the general secretary.

For God's sake, that was a long time ago.

And Martin, you know, more important than you see, it's like, it isn't like Mao.

Mao doesn't see anybody except the top guy.

But almost, usually, usually, Gresham only sees the head of state now.

And that's what that's important.

There are, however, there are, and I would say, long run answer, there are, however, you can imagine, gentlemen, there are lots of details in this kind of an arrangement.

We put it this way.

We want to establish a period of time so that we and the Soviet Union can have a continuing relationship in this field.

And this, of course, requires consideration in the matter of credits and a lot of other things, which we have not yet worked out, but that you are continuing to work on the matter.

How does that sound to you, Henry?

Did you get a chance to read the transcript of the press conference I had in Moscow?

I'll send it to you.

He'll read it.

He could read it.

But this is a sense of, plug the application for you there.

This is a sense of what I think there.

I don't think.

What can he say?

He's got to give the press something.

We can't give him anything.

So that would be one to avoid, Mr. Secretary, is the impression that the deal is all set.

Oh, I'm sure.

or is even close to being said.

The second thing we want to avoid is that we are sort of panting after it.

I don't know what he thinks the words are that go with these things.

The third is if we could throw in a little hooker that, for example, credits, of course, depend on the general political.

Well, I would put it this way.

I would put it this way.

Here's the way I would put it.

I'm afraid, and particularly good credits are concerned, and we're in a Congress that's also

the two countries.

The animal state of international relations between the two countries.

And that it is that as far as trade in and of itself, that that is not something that we can go by itself.

that the better the relations between our two countries, the less tensions we have on the international political front, the more chance that we'll be able to move up.

I would say, on the one hand, that you think the possibilities are very great, but that there's still some very significant problems involved in this that have to do with credits and the rest of it.

Very significant problems, and we're working on those problems.

But I think it's that we don't want them to think they can have us

They can't think that because our farm block is so anxious to sell grain to the Soviet that they've got us in the balls.

They must not think that they've got a name on the other hand, that, well, we're very interested in the deal.

We'll be very forthcoming.

But, fellows, you know very well that you've got to start acting right in some other parts of the world.

There's no deal.

Now, we didn't discuss other parts of the world.

This is essentially a real estate trade discussion from there.

They want a 10-year credit at 2%, which is completely out of this.

That's good, that's good, but you've got some...

Absolutely unrealistic.

And after the first, well I met with the group the first half hour, maybe it was the same time I went from Palm Beach to Colton.

At one o'clock that day at lunch, I was there, and Mr. Kuzma, who takes in negotiating with the English Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Sharp, he said, he came out, he said,

and said, what do you want?

He said, your terms are completely unrealistic.

We've got to have 10-year credits.

He said, we can compromise to six now.

He said, well, I'll compromise between six and hand-made.

He was compromising between his two and six.

At 2%, I said, well, you can set your interest rate wherever you want to.

I said, in our country, we get our money in the open market.

And the government pays the same rate anybody else does.

At that point, Kuzma said, I can save you money.

He said, I read your papers.

I don't know what it costs you to store your credit.

He said, you can make a deal with us at 2% and I'd say, you're so-and-so.

He's a sharp critique.

But this is where we're going to end it there, that we're giving you the same terms we're getting any other nation.

And the Russian has brought up this most favored nation.

And again, I'm told that our opportunity to win this right thing is identically the same as any other nation.

Yes, you are getting the most favored nation treatment.

The respect is.

But can we get to the 68 credits like we wanted to?

XM could, I think, but I don't think we should.

If we do that, that destroys our relationships with the Japanese.

And I don't think we should.

Our position is we should stick tight in our present position.

If we change it up, we've got to change with everybody in it.

Right.

And hold tight.

Furthermore, it's an animal conceivable, and you shouldn't have a 10-year place on an animal conceivable.

Right.

Because this is a fundamental thing.

Well, you see, we have two different problems.

On the one hand, you want to encourage...

I understand this.

You want to give some encouragement to the agricultural interests that are so anxious to sell the grain.

On the other hand, you don't want to, we don't want to let the Russians think that we want it so much that we have to pay a price for it.

In those circumstances, I think you're in a very good position.

You say you have longs and that you think there is a possibility.

But there are very significant problems on the credit side and so forth.

And I have to say that you would anticipate that those matters would be discussed at a considerable length with the president.

All right.

Now, Gresham.

Now, he brought up a question over there in the long run.

how they can pay for it with trade.

And he's really anxious about it.

And he's anxious about trade.

And he recognizes that the great bulk of their trade is in the communist bloc.

This is soft trade.

And he wants to trade with the hard currency countries.

Now, this is obvious.

You'll find him a very frank individual.

I don't know why you're acknowledging something like this.

Well, that's a different picture.

But that was the conference.

And in his office.

Yeah, in his office.

Now, Mr. President, he's got... Well, this was in the party headquarters.

Now, he's got an office in the Kremlin.

He's their party secretary.

Yeah, he's over here.

Now then, this guy, I sat right across the table from him.

He was here, the interpreter here.

The table was about this wide.

He gives the impression of personal power.

Now he's big, physically.

Animal, minimal power.

No.

You mean animal power?

No, no, I just mean personal power, self-confidence.

When he talks, those blue eyes, look in your eye.

He doesn't talk to the interpreter, some people just...

When the interpreter is talking, he's interpreting.

He's watching you.

Sure.

Not the interpreter.

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

He just gives the impression of tremendous personal power.

He's perceptive, he's got a sense of humor.

uh when i got in there and i started the conversation well first we met we had these pictures taken first here and where we focused and he made some remarks about uh when he sat down and he suggested to see him and he made some remarks at some point and i i made some remark that i was hearing the invitation of minister

When Mascovich was in this country 17 years ago and landed at Kennedy Airfield, I was the first American with a leash of hands on American soil.

I was an assistant secretary.

And then he turned to Mascovich and said something about that.

It was in the previous regime, something like that.

And they both laughed.

He said he interpreted and said that.

And I know what he meant was that he...

Both previous regimes.

Yeah.

I know what he meant.

said that Matskevich is a great actor, despite where he is.

Now, two or three things of interest to you.

One, he said, I met Mr. Nixon.

When he was here, the Vice President said he won't remember me.

But he said, I was never a poet until at that time.

And I remember the kitchen debates with Matskevich.

And at that point, the Ambassador and I had different interpretations of this.

The Ambassador thought that he was being critical

At that point, the ambassador and I disagreed, but he made some remark that the interpreter talked about light conversation or frivolous conversation, something like that.

And he said, I hope when the president comes this time, it will be serious conversation.

At that point, I said, well, I'm sure that that incident just arose incidentally in the conversation back there with Khrushchev and President Nixon.

And I said, President Nixon's a great student of history, a great political leader, and I'm sure he will engage in serious discussion.

And he said, well, I hope so.

He said, at that point, he turned toward Ambassador Beam, and he said, I would make a poor diplomat.

He said, I believe in putting it on the table and telling the truth.

And Beam said, well, diplomats can do that, too.

So he brought this up, and this kitchen thing rankled him.

I could tell you the tone of his voice.

He was rankled somewhat by it.

Now, our discussion covered a wide range.

It started in agriculture.

And he knows that they're going to have to import grains.

He knows the condition of winter wheat crop.

It's bad.

They had no snow cover in the steps, zero weather, and they reclaimed their winter wheat.

They make no bones about it.

And Matskevich knows this.

And they've publicized over there that they want to raise the animal protein component of their diet by 25%.

And they know to do that.

They've got to import coarse grains and soybeans.

He understands this.

He puts it right on the table.

And he wants it.

I think you're absolutely right that these folks, they want our stuff if they can find some way to pay for it.

Now, near the end of the conversation, he brought up this Vietnam thing.

He only brought it up twice to me the whole time I was there.

Everybody else avoided it.

But near the end of the conversation, he sat there and he had three of these ballpoint pens here, the GIAC kind.

He kind of kept playing them a bit during the conversation.

And he looked right at me when he talked.

But near the end, he brought up this Vietnam thing.

And I could pick out just enough words.

I knew what was coming.

And I turned to Bing.

I said, you have to listen.

So I came to the interpreter.

And he said, I want you to take a message back to President Nixon.

He says, I don't want any answer here from you.

He says, I don't want to embarrass you.

So he took that chance because he knew that the ambassador thought he couldn't answer back that he was bombing your equipment.

But he said, take the message back to President Nixon that I can't understand why he's bombing innocent people in not North Vietnam, but the People's Republic of Vietnam.

My government can't understand.

My people can't understand.

At that point, he quit fingering his pen and his

He was kind of pensive, you know what I mean?

He stopped staring me right in the eye.

He was kind of looking down and thinking in a thoughtful manner.

And he went through this in some little way.

Again, he said, I don't want to embarrass you.

And he did.

It was not abrasive the way he did it.

And I started to get back in to toss it to the ambassador.

And he wouldn't let us back in.

He didn't want an answer.

And again, he said, I don't want an answer.

I don't want to embarrass you.

He said, this is a matter of deep concern to our people.

Well, I think I can understand how it is, because all the people get fed is one line.

He ought to give intelligence reports that are accurate, but I doubt if he does.

I suppose that people, you know, you think he does.

He knows very well when you're just pulling your leg.

Okay.

He knows the reason we're bombing is because they've furnished all the tanks and all the guns and everything else.

All right, well, he brought this up, and he said, take the message back to your president.

So he's going to bring it up again, and my advice, whatever his words would be,

that uh put your shopping list right on the table right with him and i think he'll respond to it because the guy the guy is tremendously perceptive he looks like he's dressed like a russian worker here he's not he had a neatly blue shirt he had a blue shirt the black guy he was well dressed you see but he was very well dressed his offices

His office is adequate, but not ornate.

You don't get this in his office.

And he's got his office and the cabinet room combined.

So you come in this long room down here, and his desk sets up here.

And right here is this long table, which is his cabinet table.

I presume that's where we're sitting here.

So that his desk was right back here.

And it's a plainly furnished, but adequately furnished office.

Well, I think the...

Now, he said, he said, tell the president that we'll extend every courtesy to him.

We'll keep him in the Kremlin.

He turned the beam.

One of the palaces in the Kremlin.

He turned the beam and he said, we'll provide transportation wherever he wants to go.

Now, I understand you want full communication.

He said, we're putting that in there.

He filled me, he said, damn, I'm full of cognac.

I got enough to lash the rest of my neck.

Then on Sunday, we flew down to Yalta down there.

And vodka and cognac.

Nine times we sat down at these tables.

Every place you stop at these receptions.

We got this damn thing, DoDNA.

It's D-O-D-N-A.

It means bottoms up.

I got to the point where I had my coffee cup and I saw it coming and I didn't know much about it.

They were courteous to us.

There was one more place that they brought up in Vietnam.

Just as we were leaving at the airport, they got an agricultural paper where it goes out weekly to seven and a half million people.

One of the reporters was at the airport and wanted to interview me.

I said, okay.

One of their reporters.

Yeah.

And he was asking my impression of the collective farm and the state farm and that kind of stuff.

And I was doing that.

And then he got home.

He said, now, we get many questions from our readers.

And they all want to know, why are you killing innocent people in North Vietnam?

And the media shifted like that.

And I said, well, I said, we're buying the restricted military targets there.

And then he came back with another one.

He said, at that point, the Russians knew what he was doing.

They said, it's time to go in there.

And they picked me up and took me away.

Because he was strictly doing something he was not supposed to do.

What I'm saying in that case, and I hope he very well, is that he should immediately take me and say, Mr. Chairman, let's get it straight.

You know very well what's happening here.

You're responsible for what's happening in Vietnam.

You are furnishing the arms.

You are furnishing the rest.

That's what he's going to hear from me.

Even Dane is such a mild one.

Well, perhaps I should have done that, but I didn't.

No, you didn't.

Never.

I didn't.

Never.

I didn't want to argue.

You couldn't do it.

You couldn't.

You've got to stay in your own field.

I didn't want to argue.

The ambassadors in a case like that should never let him get away with that.

No, you couldn't.

You were right when it turned hard for me, but then James, instead of sitting there in his mile away, he should have spoken right up and said, well... Well, this was his first time in the Secretary's office, too.

Was that right?

Yeah.

First time defense.

Oh, that's right.

The way you got him in to see Brezhnev.

That's right.

I don't think he's seen him.

Brezhnev doesn't...

He's seen Brezhnev, I think, twice at recessions.

You see, Khrushchev used to be very rigorous.

He saw a lot of people.

He'd go to the parties.

But he gets more power.

Well, Mr. President, I feel that even though we didn't come back with a contract on it, we're a long ways from it.

I think we did.

Oh, I think it's an argument.

I mean, you said you've got their tongues hanging out.

You set up the game exactly the way you want.

And now, if they do something for us, we're going to do something for them.

Well, and I think we'll have a press conference of Pompey and myself, perhaps in the morning.

Fine, sure.

Is that all right with you?

All right.

But the business is great.

We don't want headlines that have to come from the... Oh, well, obviously.

I would simply say we have very extensive discussions.

There are major problems with regard to financing.

And I will also say that the Kinnish, when we craft this such, they're going to have to import wheat from someplace.

And if they go through with their announced program of increasing their livestock production, they've got to import coarse grain.

I think you can say that this is a matter that will probably be discussed either by the president or the president.

I think that's a good thing to say, and that you discussed that, and that frankly there are problems of credit and other things that simply couldn't be resolved at this point.

You're not in a position to say that they will be resolved, but it is something I'd like to talk about.

It's very likely something's going to happen, because it's very likely that we'll make a move, but we're not going to let them think it's going to

report to you since i've been here four months i think we've turned this agricultural thing around

He tells me you're just going like gangbusters out there in the greater plains.

Looking like you all over the place.

That's right.

Well, of course.

Well, you know, we've got to think about the problem on the food prices.

You've got to fight that slowly.

But you just continue to talk about the farmers.

Kick the middle of it.

Kick them off.

And the retailers.

Fair game.

Good to see you.

But be nice about the farmers.

Thank you.

Oh, I've got to go again.