Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 716 › Conversation 716-003

Nixon & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Le Duc Tho

Monday, May 1, 1972 · 5:31 PM–5:53 PM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation716-003 on Tape 716 (tape position 01:25:25–01:49:11)StartMonday, May 1, 1972 at 5:31 PMEndMonday, May 1, 1972 at 5:53 PMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 716-003 ↗

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss strategy for the upcoming negotiations with North Vietnamese representative Le Duc Tho, emphasizing a firm stance against the ongoing North Vietnamese offensive. They analyzed the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese military, noting significant tank losses attributed to heavy Soviet-supplied artillery, and debated the risks and potential PR fallout of intensified U.S. bombing campaigns. The President directed Kissinger to convey a clear, unwavering resolve to the North Vietnamese, asserting that the U.S. would not accept defeat or reward aggression.

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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 01:25:25 into the tape and ends around 01:49:11.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
1:25:35Okay.
1:25:36If you want to put all this in, it's going to take a long time just going over that record and feeling active.
1:25:49Don't, there's any other way to go over it with this.
1:25:51Just hand it over and here's the record.
1:25:58High five.
1:25:59I think the stronger they get, the more quickly to the point.
1:26:02Okay.
1:26:06It's been a record of when you talk by his seat, et cetera, et cetera.
1:26:11It's not going to go down.
1:26:35On page seven is where you get to it.
1:26:37Yes.
1:26:41See, I have here, you said I have in my possession, I actually have a record.
1:26:47It is a shocking record.
1:26:49And then put in here.
1:26:50It's a shocking record.
1:26:51I said, since we don't have enough time.
1:26:53It's not a waste of time, but you know it.
1:27:35What I will do here, Mr. President, is where it says would be restored, I will put wherever it says would, must.
1:27:49Oh, this is the announcement.
1:27:54Now, this is still history.
1:28:12The U.S. in 72 is about to fall from France in 54.
1:28:23I said, I put there, I put the goal, and I say, the president is prepared to do what it's told me to do, whatever is necessary to stop this invasion.
1:28:33He will stop at nothing, I warn you.
1:28:35You say that, he will stop at nothing.
1:28:40And I can assure
1:28:44P.O.
1:29:12What are the effects of what you're telling us is on our city?
1:29:17They have to go back across the D.C.
1:29:19They have to go back across the D.C.
1:29:21They have to go back all over the city.
1:29:41They must release prisoners.
1:29:46We then will reduce some of the additional forces we brought into the area and stop bombing the north.
1:29:53That's the first step that we would consider progress.
1:30:01And the second is, we can say that we started covering our January 27th proposal.
1:30:10And, frankly, what we have to stay away from now is the idea of a withdrawal for prisoners in the ceasefire.
1:30:19That's what worries me, is that they're going to come up with our matrix.
1:30:22Do they accept our matrix?
1:30:24Yeah.
1:30:24Due to the spigot leaks, you mean that, sir?
1:30:29Yeah, and because it might be favorable to them.
1:30:33Well, you can say it.
1:30:39that's fine to go back to the lines.
1:30:45That's good.
1:30:45Provided they go back to the lines, yes.
1:30:47Yes, you go back to the lines or we take you immediately, but we're not going to take you now.
1:30:53You cannot be rewarded for your aggression.
1:30:57What I will do, Mr. President, is first I'll make this stuff open and say that we shouldn't say anything, except show covenant.
1:31:04Then I'll say now I want to hear what you have to say.
1:31:07If he gives me a long recital, and this is where it's, you're right, if I'm not presenting the whole thing, if he's going to start a long recital, I've done, I've already heard that.
1:31:18And I'll be brutal.
1:31:19I know you will.
1:31:26If I be as brief as possible, come to the talk, take a look on the final, and say, well, we can't go without a balance, but we're going
1:31:40I just want you to know that the president will stop at nothing.
1:31:46And I just leave that as damn clear.
1:31:49Because it's absolutely true.
1:31:50We're prepared to sink the whole ship of this thing.
1:31:54These people are not going to get away with this.
1:31:58I agree completely.
1:32:00I'll say it.
1:32:03Maybe it's not as pessimistic as it is.
1:32:07Well, the truth is, Mr. President, we've taken our head over the NFC record.
1:32:15You remember Laird sitting in there in February telling you you needed no reinforcements?
1:32:21The Vietnamization is succeeding.
1:32:23These guys can do it without American air power.
1:32:26And the Vietnamization was always a gamble.
1:32:35We knew it was a gamble, and if it holds, it will be because of the additional stuff you've got out there, because of the heavy tanks you've got out there.
1:32:44We are sending new heavy tanks now to replace them out of Japan and Okinawa.
1:32:49Are they using the present heavy tanks at all?
1:32:51Well, they're using them, but they don't have enough people trained.
1:32:56Even the ones we got out there?
1:32:57Well, not those they're using, but we've suffered enormous casualties of them.
1:33:00We had 60 to start with, and they're down to 21 now.
1:33:02They have lost 40 tanks?
1:33:03Yeah.
1:33:07mostly in military reasons.
1:33:13Why have they lost the sanctions?
1:33:17That artillery is just .
1:33:18That Russian artillery is just .
1:33:20Russians have always been good with artillery.
1:33:23Russians have always been good with artillery, these guys.
1:33:25I like these guys.
1:33:29Not French artillery, but the Russians have had massive artillery.
1:33:42Oh, it's another intelligence failure, too.
1:33:51I mean, when they shoot 1,400, about 4,400 into Quantree, about 1,400 into Amlok day after day, that's 150 tons of ammunition, 100 tons of ammunition a day.
1:34:04We had no idea.
1:34:05And that's just ammunition.
1:34:07You have to add food, and you have to add weapons.
1:34:12No.
1:34:14I thought of it last night.
1:34:16I opened my mind, read this thing, got us into these difficulties.
1:34:22Mistaken, for which I blame myself last year, we had sat on top of the Cambodians at Laotian Operation last year, the way they're sitting on top of this.
1:34:33We would have won.
1:34:35But basically, they wasted the Cambodian Operation tree set, nearly.
1:34:39That was a disaster.
1:34:41Yeah, because they just fooled around with that.
1:34:45They just didn't pick up the stockpile, I'd say.
1:34:50So that gave us this capability.
1:34:53Oh, yes.
1:34:54Oh, without a doubt.
1:34:55Well, in 1972, we didn't have an offensive action.
1:34:58And every year, we had an offensive action.
1:35:02There was no offensive.
1:35:10So, uh...
1:35:15They're not good on the offensive.
1:35:21They must be pretty good on the defensive.
1:35:26But we've been full-fledged about their capabilities.
1:35:29They're pretty good on the defense.
1:35:31They're useless on the offense.
1:35:34And do you remember when they were telling you the Vietnamese could have done Cambodia alone, how they wouldn't be five, they'd still be five miles from the border?
1:35:47But the other side must be hurting very fast.
1:35:50We can't berate ourselves too much.
1:35:52We've done more than almost the human spirit can bear as it is.
1:35:59But the point is, right now, if we're prepared enough, I want this goddamn military to come up with some ideas.
1:36:05I mean, I'm only going to do everything.
1:36:16No, I remember only too well that you came in and you pleaded with Abrams to come up with some new ideas.
1:36:31No, we've done superhuman things in keeping this thing alive.
1:36:43Right now, there would be a hell of a depression for the American people.
1:36:51If after this offensive began so late, it is like losing earlier.
1:36:57The South Vietnamese were defeated.
1:37:00We got run out of there.
1:37:02Now, by God, don't ever underestimate what's happening at any point.
1:37:06There would be a hell of a depression if we got run out of business.
1:37:09The American people don't want to lose.
1:37:11The American people got confused there for a year or two because we were trying to win and the opponents were shouting from the rooftops.
1:37:20That's what screwed them up.
1:37:23It's – I don't think the American people – I had dinner last night with a number of people, but Roland Evans and Tom Braden were there.
1:37:35Evans is hawkish as hell.
1:37:36He said the president has the power in North Carolina.
1:37:38He said we can't take this.
1:37:41Braden is beating around, but – He would.
1:37:44He would.
1:37:45You'd expect that.
1:37:46He's savage.
1:37:46Yeah.
1:37:48Not as much.
1:37:49Evidence, evidence is...
1:38:22I just want to be sure that pilots and stuff are well selected.
1:38:27I mean, I don't want to select them, but I just want to be sure that it's worth doing.
1:38:33I'll get myself a full briefing from Abrams.
1:38:35I think on almost any conceivable...
1:38:37I've got to say it through this time.
1:38:40All right, we'll get you a briefing.
1:38:43On almost any conceivable...
1:38:44I've got to see some options, too.
1:38:49Right.
1:38:53I want to see about the Dykes, too.
1:38:55The only point, I'll be careful about, Mr. President, is if you order them to use the B-52s and they'll do it, they're apt to get the Korov.
1:39:03If one of these clusters of B-52s hits a populated area, you're going to have 5,000 dead.
1:39:09My man, that could be...
1:39:15They'd have every camera crew in the world.
1:39:17They'd have a new atrocity.
1:39:20They'd beat your brain.
1:39:20I'm aware of that.
1:39:22That's why I asked the question.
1:39:26I know there's a difference.
1:39:28Yet that's the gamble we always trade.
1:39:29Well, within rational limits, we should take the gamble.
1:39:32But I think these...
1:39:35I think... We had the intelligence report last week that Haiphong had still not recovered from our last strike.
1:39:42I think this next weekend we have to lay a tremendous strike on them.
1:39:48and get as close to the pier as we can and burn out the rest of the P.O.L.
1:39:54This time we're going to lose some planes because there's some that did that.
1:39:58Why would you lose B-52s?
1:40:06Well, they found a loose one somewhere there.
1:40:09Oh, so we lose.
1:40:09Yeah.
1:40:10It's war.
1:40:15But we can't wait much longer.
1:40:16We can't wait longer than that.
1:40:18You know, the thing that concerns me about all this is Russians.
1:40:29This raises a great question about all that good texture crap over there in England.
1:40:33Doesn't it to you?
1:40:35Don't you think so, Mr. President?
1:40:36I think we get the shit kicked out of us in a conventional operation.
1:40:41We have to redo our military establishment as soon as the election is over.
1:40:47Because by 77, it won't be worth being president of this country anymore.
1:40:52You know, really, that's the thing.
1:40:55If he'd do it.
1:40:56In defense.
1:40:57If he would do it.
1:40:59That's what he ought to do.
1:41:05I don't know if he'd do it.
1:41:05He'd be superb as Secretary of Defense.
1:41:07He'd be outstanding.
1:41:29Well, I've looked at some of those pictures, and we are, you know, with TANWA and so forth, we are getting to them, but of course it takes a while.
1:41:44I mean, we've dropped the bridge, and now they're moving a lot of stuff through the Bunker Eye Pass, and they've been really shooting that up.
1:42:01It takes a hell of a long time.
1:42:08Do you remember when this offensive started in military region one, you and the AAC said we should wait until the weather clears.
1:42:13It's not as clear.
1:42:16Now the Carthaginians are not fighting, unfortunately.
1:42:19That's really the problem.
1:42:20They couldn't have fought much.
1:42:45They've got to keep their spirits up.
1:42:53The spirit is going to determine this thing in the final analysis.
1:42:58Even lousy, lousy armies that are still defending can survive.
1:43:09When you look at those boxes of B-52, if they were anywhere near the front lines, they just must inflict some enormous casualties on them.
1:43:27Because then, after they hit, it's obvious the nation would advance.
1:43:34That's war.
1:43:34They don't advance.
1:43:35After they stopped them, they should have moved up.
1:43:39And they had this great scheme of an offensive.
1:43:43And they showed us the plans.
1:43:45And if they had actually done it, they wouldn't have lost our power, to speak of quantity.
1:44:25I don't mind your telling the staff.
1:44:29I think we've got to call our own.
1:44:46We've lost now only one provincial capital.
1:44:47I think that's what we've got to say.
1:44:48And so forth and so on.
1:44:48But we still have to bear in mind, I can honestly say that this is a hell of a message supported by the most sophisticated weapons.
1:44:51And we're going to suffer some losses.
1:44:52But in the end, the enemy will not be allowed to succeed.
1:44:53Now, that's the line to take.
1:44:54Don't you agree?
1:44:54And tell them and say, sure, we're going to suffer losses.
1:45:15As I say, the only problem with pressurizing an enemy is not... ...is the effect on us, but it's the effect of his general positive power becoming discouraged.
1:45:32If night after night they get the impression that we're going to lose, see, on the other hand, we just keep going.
1:45:40It is difficult to blouse.
1:45:42We got that pounded in and pounded down, and we did lose, at least the polygon.
1:45:48Yeah, but because when it was all over, it looked as if we had lost.
1:45:52I don't think this was handled that way.
1:45:55It was by the end of May.
1:45:59We had lost only one more political capital, or two.
1:46:05Uh, I just want to get to three times, see if I can handle that.
1:49:13First of all, I don't even know what he had when he did it.
1:49:15I'm excited to find out.

On May 1, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:31 pm to 5:53 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 716-003 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 716-3

Date: May 1, 1972
Time: 5:31 pm -5:53 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     Vietnam
          -Kissinger’s forthcoming meeting with Le Duc Tho
                -Public record
                     -Statement by President
                           -The President’s view
                           -Wording
                     -An announcement
                           -Statement
                           -Strength
                -North Vietnamese offensive
                     -President's response
                           -Public support
                                 -Polls
                           -Bombing
                                 -Extent
                     -Negotiations
                           -US demands
                                 -North Vietnamese action
                                       -Demilitarized zone [DMZ]
                                       -March 29, 1972 status quo ante
                                 -Prisoners of war [POW] release
                     -US bombing
                -US proposals
                     -January 25, 1972
                     -Withdrawal
                     -POWs
                     -North Vietnamese response
                -Negotiations
                     -Kissinger's opening statement
                     -North Vietnamese [Le Duc Tho’s] responses
                     -Tenor of Kissinger's remarks

          -President's Intentions
-North Vietnamese offensive
     -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.’s view
          -National Security Council [NSC] meeting
     -Melvin R. Laird's previous predictions
          -Vietnamization
                -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                -Risks
                -Success
                      -Reasons
                -US aid
                      -Tanks
                            -Japan
                            -Trained personnel
                            -South Vietnamese Losses
                                  -Military Region [MR] 1
     -South Vietnamese tank losses
          -North Vietnamese artillery
                -Soviet weapons
                -Effectiveness
     -North Vietnamese artillery
          -Number of rounds
                -Estimates
                      -Quang Tri
                      -An Loc
     -Cambodian operation
          -Kissinger’s view
     -South Vietnamese response
          -Offensive capabilities
          -Defensive capabilities
-South Vietnam
     -Cambodia
          -Offensive ability
     -US support
-North Vietnamese offensive
     -US response
          -Lack of new ideas
                -Laird
                -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                -Abrams
     -South Vietnamese defeat

                -US public response
     -US public opinion
          -Kissinger's dinner with Rowland Evans and Thomas W. Braden
                -US response to offensive
                -The President’s view
     -North Vietnamese offensive
          -North Vietnamese targets
                -Selection
                      -Kissinger’s forthcoming briefings
                            -Abrams
                            -Moorer
                      -Briefing of President
                      -Options
                      -Dikes
                -B-52s
                      -Populated areas
                            -Problems
                            -Press coverage
                      -Risks
          -Haiphong
                -Recovery
                -Air strikes
                      -Piers
                      -Petroleum, oil and lubricant [POL] dumps
                      -B52s
          -Air strikes
          -Soviet weapons
                -Quality

Soviet Union
     -Military capabilities
           -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
                -Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster
           -Compared with US military capabilities
                -The President’s view

US military establishment
    -Reorganization
           -1972 election
    -John B. Connally
           -Appointment as Secretary of Defense

                      -The President’s view

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -Air strikes
                     -Connally's opinion
                     -Support in Texas
                     -Destruction
                           -Thanh Hoa
                     -Weather
                           -Kissinger, Haig
               -South Vietnamese performance
                     -Abrams's evaluation
                           -Laird
                     -Morale
               -Air strikes
                     -Impact
                     -B-52s
                           -North Vietnamese casualties
                     -South Vietnamese actions
                           -Counterattacks
                           -Plans
                                 -Dong Ha, Quang Tri
          -Ronald L. Ziegler's statements
               -Stance to press
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -South Vietnamese losses
                     -Public stance
                     -Press reports
                           -Impact on US public
                           -Laos operation
                     -Provincial capitals
          -Memorandum [?]
               -Retyping

     Kissinger’s schedule

Kissinger left at 5:53 pm.
  • 716-002 4:11 PM · 1 hr 22 min — President Richard M. Nixon, William P. Rogers, Henry A. Kissinger, Ronald L. Ziegler, Stephen B. Bull, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:11 pm and 5:29 pm.
  • 716-004 5:57 PM · 51 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, Alexander P. Butterfield, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:57 pm to 6:47 pm.
  • 716-005 6:48 PM · 30 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 6:48 pm to 6:49 pm.
  • 023-095 6:49 PM · 8 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 6:49 pm and 6:53 pm.
  • 716-006 6:49 PM · 1 min — United States Secret Service agents met in the Oval Office of the White House at 6:49 pm.
  • 023-096 6:53 PM · 12 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Manolo Sanchez talked on the telephone from 6:53 pm to 7:06 pm.
  • 023-097 7:06 PM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 7:06 pm and 7:07 pm.
  • 023-098 7:07 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 7:07 pm to 7:08 pm.

Conversation 716-003, May 1, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/716-003 (accessed October 9, 2026).