President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss strategy for the upcoming negotiations with North Vietnamese representative Le Duc Tho, emphasizing a firm stance against the ongoing North Vietnamese offensive. They analyzed the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese military, noting significant tank losses attributed to heavy Soviet-supplied artillery, and debated the risks and potential PR fallout of intensified U.S. bombing campaigns. The President directed Kissinger to convey a clear, unwavering resolve to the North Vietnamese, asserting that the U.S. would not accept defeat or reward aggression.
On May 1, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:31 pm to 5:53 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 716-003 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding AidConversation No. 716-3
Date: May 1, 1972
Time: 5:31 pm -5:53 pm
Location: Oval Office
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.
Vietnam
-Kissinger’s forthcoming meeting with Le Duc Tho
-Public record
-Statement by President
-The President’s view
-Wording
-An announcement
-Statement
-Strength
-North Vietnamese offensive
-President's response
-Public support
-Polls
-Bombing
-Extent
-Negotiations
-US demands
-North Vietnamese action
-Demilitarized zone [DMZ]
-March 29, 1972 status quo ante
-Prisoners of war [POW] release
-US bombing
-US proposals
-January 25, 1972
-Withdrawal
-POWs
-North Vietnamese response
-Negotiations
-Kissinger's opening statement
-North Vietnamese [Le Duc Tho’s] responses
-Tenor of Kissinger's remarks
(rev. Dec-01)
-President's Intentions
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Alexander M. Haig, Jr.’s view
-National Security Council [NSC] meeting
-Melvin R. Laird's previous predictions
-Vietnamization
-Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
-Risks
-Success
-Reasons
-US aid
-Tanks
-Japan
-Trained personnel
-South Vietnamese Losses
-Military Region [MR] 1
-South Vietnamese tank losses
-North Vietnamese artillery
-Soviet weapons
-Effectiveness
-North Vietnamese artillery
-Number of rounds
-Estimates
-Quang Tri
-An Loc
-Cambodian operation
-Kissinger’s view
-South Vietnamese response
-Offensive capabilities
-Defensive capabilities
-South Vietnam
-Cambodia
-Offensive ability
-US support
-North Vietnamese offensive
-US response
-Lack of new ideas
-Laird
-Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
-Abrams
-South Vietnamese defeat
(rev. Dec-01)
-US public response
-US public opinion
-Kissinger's dinner with Rowland Evans and Thomas W. Braden
-US response to offensive
-The President’s view
-North Vietnamese offensive
-North Vietnamese targets
-Selection
-Kissinger’s forthcoming briefings
-Abrams
-Moorer
-Briefing of President
-Options
-Dikes
-B-52s
-Populated areas
-Problems
-Press coverage
-Risks
-Haiphong
-Recovery
-Air strikes
-Piers
-Petroleum, oil and lubricant [POL] dumps
-B52s
-Air strikes
-Soviet weapons
-Quality
Soviet Union
-Military capabilities
-North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
-Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster
-Compared with US military capabilities
-The President’s view
US military establishment
-Reorganization
-1972 election
-John B. Connally
-Appointment as Secretary of Defense
(rev. Dec-01)
-The President’s view
Vietnam
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Air strikes
-Connally's opinion
-Support in Texas
-Destruction
-Thanh Hoa
-Weather
-Kissinger, Haig
-South Vietnamese performance
-Abrams's evaluation
-Laird
-Morale
-Air strikes
-Impact
-B-52s
-North Vietnamese casualties
-South Vietnamese actions
-Counterattacks
-Plans
-Dong Ha, Quang Tri
-Ronald L. Ziegler's statements
-Stance to press
-North Vietnamese offensive
-South Vietnamese losses
-Public stance
-Press reports
-Impact on US public
-Laos operation
-Provincial capitals
-Memorandum [?]
-Retyping
Kissinger’s schedule
Kissinger left at 5:53 pm.
(rev. Dec-01)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.