Conversation 716-004

TapeTape 716StartMonday, May 1, 1972 at 5:57 PMEndMonday, May 1, 1972 at 6:47 PMTape start time01:49:11Tape end time02:39:59ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Butterfield, Alexander P.;  Sanchez, ManoloRecording deviceOval Office

On May 1, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, Alexander P. Butterfield, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:57 pm to 6:47 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 716-004 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 716-4

Date: May 1, 1972
Time: 5:57-6:47 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     Henry A. Kissinger
         -Final instructions for meeting with Le Duc Tho
         -Schedule

     Vietnam
          -Ronald L. Ziegler
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -Ceasefire
                     -Kissinger's statements
                           -Tone
                                 -Compared to the President
                           -News summary
                           -Haldeman's notes
                                 -Murray Marder
                                 -Meeting
                                       -John A. Scali, Ziegler
                                       -Kissinger
                           -Discussion with President
                     -William P. Rogers’s statement
                     -Kissinger's statement
                           -Differences from President
                           -Rogers
                           -Scali, Charles W. Colson and Ziegler
                     -State Department
                     -Richard M. Helms
                     -News reports
                           -Distortions of Kissinger's statement
                           -Le Duc Tho
                           -President's approach
               -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.'s briefing
               -Quang Tri
               -Kontum

                                         (rev. Dec-01)

                -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                -South Vietnamese losses
                      -Scali
                      -Abrams
                -US bombing
           -Negotiations
                -Plenary session
                      -Walkout by William J. Porter
           -North Vietnamese offensive
                -US bombing

Kissinger entered at 6:01 pm.

                      -Opposition
                            -Charles H. Percy
                      -Nelson A. Rockefeller
                      -Percy
                      -Poll results
                            -Release
                            -Breakdown
                            -Public support
                                  -Use in negotiations

     Soviet Union
          -Leonid I. Brezhnev's letter
                -Meeting with President
                -Vietnam
                      -References
                      -Differences
                      -Soviet visit to Hanoi
                             -Democratic Republic of Vietnam [DRV]
                      -DRV readiness to negotiate
                      -US military action
                             -Bombing
                                  -Haiphong
          -President's visit to Soviet Union
                -Arrangements
                      -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                      -Leningrad
                      -Television appearance
                             -Text for translation

                                (rev. Dec-01)

              -Dwight L. Chapin
              -Church service
                    -Scali
              -Public knowledge
         -Church service
              -Publicity
                    -William F. (“Billy”) Graham
         -Soviet plane
              -Agreement
                    -Chapin
              -Trip to Leningrad
              -Trip to Kiev
     -Summit
         -Cancellation possibility
              -Soviet intentions
              -North Vietnamese offensive
              -Blockade
                    -Prisoners of war [POWs]

Vietnam
     -North Vietnamese offensive
          -Victories
                -Quang Tri
          -Abrams's report
                -Army of the Republic of Vietnam's [ARVN] performance
                      -Abrams’s view
                -Military leadership
                      -Gen. [Forename unknown] Thieu [sp?]
                      -Gen. Ngo Quang Truong
                -Hue, Kontum
                -Ellsworth F. Bunker
                      -Nguyen Van Thieu
                -Prognosis
          -ARVN
                -Morale
                      -Abrams's report
                -US air support
          -Battle zone
                -Air action
          -Abrams's report
                -ARVN morale

                       (rev. Dec-01)

-ARVN losses
      -Kontum
      -Hue
            -Impact of possible loss
      -Casualties
-Number of refugees
-Military Region [MR] One
-Abrams's report
      -ARVN morale
-North Vietnamese losses
-US air support
-ARVN performance
      -Cooperation among commanders
      -25th Division
            -Activities
            -An Loc
            -Comparison with Quang Tri
-Planning
-ARVN performance
      -Compared with previous situation in Laos
      -Coordination
            -MR Three
            -MR Four
-Weather
      -MR Three
      -MR Two
      -Hue
-Abrams's report
      -President's evaluation
      -ARVN morale
            -Leadership in MR 1
            -Quang Tri
                  -Loss
            -MR Two
                  -22nd Division
            -An Loc
-ARVN performance
-North Vietnamese losses
      -Calculations
      -US air power
-ARVN losses

                                  (rev. Dec-01)

               -MR Three
                     -25th Division
                           -Tai Nien [sp?]
                           -An Loc
                     -21st Division
               -Units in action
          -Abrams's report
               -Laird
                     -The President’s view

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
      -Previous meeting
           -Laird’s performance

Vietnam
     -Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam
          -Kissinger's impression
          -Haig
          -Laos operation
          -Abilities
     -North Vietnamese offensive
          -ARVN
                -1st Division
                      -Performance at Firebase Bastogne
                            -Haig’s view
                -Northern Group
          -Hue area
                -Quang Tri
          -B-52 strikes
          -Abrams's report
                -Flexibility
          -Air strikes
                -Impact on ARVN morale
                -Flexibility
                -Psychological effects
                      -Hanoi and Haiphong
                      -Saigon
                      -Hanoi
                -Schedule
          -Blockade
                -Kissinger briefing

                           (rev. Dec-01)

                  -Washington Special Action Group [WSAG] meeting
            -Implementation
                  -Necessity
                        -South Vietnamese collapse
                        -POWs
                  -Impact on Soviets
            -Soviet Summit
-President's speech
      -Mail response
            -Max Ascoli
                  -Contribution to President's campaign
-North Vietnamese offensive
      -Abrams's report
            -Impact
      -ARVN performance
            -Provincial capitals
-Bunker
      -Meeting with Thieu
            -Purpose
                  -Abrams’s briefing
-North Vietnamese offensive
      -Losses
      -B-52 raids
            -Impact
                  -Compared to World War II
      -Losses
            -Extent
      -Air strikes
            -Tactical air [TACAIR]
                  -Impact
                  -Number of planes
                        -Compared to World War II
      -Abrams’s view
      -Strength
            -Israel
                  -Phantom airplanes
                        -Performance in Middle East
      -Dien Bien Phu
            -Viet Minh
-Negotiations in Paris
      -Kissinger's return to US

                                 (rev. Dec-01)

          -Announcement
              -Time

SALT
    -President's meeting
          -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
          -Rogers
          -Gerard C. Smith
                -The President’s view
    -Brezhnev's proposals
          -Contents
                -Rogers’s view
                      -Moorer’s view
                -Smith’s acceptance draft
                      -Kissinger’s view
          -Dobrynin's response
          -Smith's proposals
          -Submarines
                -Limits
                -Moorer
                      -Haig
                -Laird, Helms, Moorer
                -Smith
                -Rogers
          -Submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs]
                -Rogers
                      -The President’s view
                      -Congress
                      -[Arms Control Disarmament Agency]
                      -Kissinger
                      -Brezhnev
                      -Smith
                      -Comments compared with those relating to Berlin Agreement
                           -John J. McCloy
                           -Gen. Lucius DuB. Clay, Jr.
                      -Motivation
                      -Kissinger's position
                           -Brezhnev proposals

Vietnam
     -North Vietnamese offensive

                                        (rev. Dec-01)

                 -ARVN performance
                 -US bombing
                 -North Vietnamese attitude
                 -Bombing
                       -Hanoi
                       -Haiphong
                       -Soviet Summit
                             -Possibility of cancellation
                       -Press
                       -Kissinger's position
                       -Soviet Summit
                             -Cancellation by Soviet Union
                             -Intentions
                                   -Dobrynin
                             -Cancellation by US
                                   -President's initiative
                                         -Ziegler
                                   -Press campaign
           -Cambodia
           -Laos
           -Possible end of war
                 -Timing
           -North Vietnamese offensive
                 -ARVN capabilities
                       -North Vietnamese resolve
                       -A helicopter
                             -Losses
                                   -Missing in action [MIA]
                                   -Prisoners of war [POWs]
                 -US retaliation
                 -ARVN morale
                       -Limit of endurance
                 -Artillery capacities
           -Kissinger's trip
                 -Message

Alexander P. Butterfield entered at 6:41 pm.

Kissinger left at 6:42 pm.

     Rose Mary Woods

                                         (rev. Dec-01)

     Items for the President’s signature

Butterfield left at 6:45 pm.

     Woods
         -Talked with the President about Quang Tri

     SALT
         -Smith
         -Rogers's performance
              -The President’s view
              -Reason
              -Soviet submarines
                    -President's response to proposals

     Woods

     John D. Ehrlichman

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 6:45 pm.

     President's schedule

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 6:47 pm.

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -Capabilities
               -Kissinger
               -US public opinion
                    -Support for bombing
                          -Haiphong
                          -Kissinger’s view
                               -Press
                               -Haig
               -Soviet Summit
                    -Impact
                    -Kissinger

Haldeman left at 6:47 pm.

                                         (rev. Dec-01)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

We shouldn't be bothering about such fucking comms.
The reason he got the impression is he, I had, did he talk to him?
No, I had marked up the mid-assembly.
There's eight of these pilots in here.
Yeah.
And it's just Murray Carter.
It's from all over.
No, he said they were about seven.
He said Murray Carter named another.
I don't even know who they were, but I had marked them when I was flying through them.
I said, wrap up mid-assembly.
I had marked Kay on it, you know, because I was going to talk to him about it.
They were on my desk.
He came into my office.
I had a meeting with a group of people in there.
He reads everything that's on my desk.
I try to keep everything turned over because he reads all my notes.
He read this and went through it all and then walked out.
We talked about some other things and then he walked out and I realized
He was already in here, that he would come in here and raise it with you.
And I told him, you had not seen this news summary, that I had no intention of raising these points with you.
I told him that.
I told him you had to afterwards.
I said, I hope you didn't raise any of that stuff with the president, because I had marked those to talk to you about.
Because not to accuse him of having said anything, but to raise the point with him that we have a problem with somebody trying to play a split between you and the president.
And he said, well, I've already raised it with the president.
I was very upset about this.
And I said, well, I think maybe you've got reason to be upset, because there is a building thing here that we need to look at.
But I had no intention of raising it with the president, had not raised it with him.
We don't intend to.
He said, well, I already did.
I explained to him that I would never do something like that.
that nature of thing.
I would have never had the matter of fact just as well if you get people that you're very involved.
And we're better off to keep thinking the strong than to keep thinking the weak.
Oh, that, I agree.
Oh, you see, I get it.
See, that's the point that we got there.
We don't really, we can't rewrite the story.
His tone is different than your rhetoric and that sort of stuff.
But you don't care as long as the beat isn't abrupt.
I don't think he wants to be in a position that could handle anybody, and nobody else is.
And that's part of what I was going over with Scali and Colson and Ron and all this is the thing that we've got to maintain the very hard posture and the tightness.
And they detect no...
withering anywhere.
I just want to be sure.
Henry did not intend to.
He didn't really in his briefing do it, but I do think that the state is sort of trying to solve it.
And also, maybe Linda Collins is trying to make this up, too.
Sure.
They want me to be there in the sense that he was talking about a different subject than you were.
He was talking about the doctor and all that bullshit.
But I think the last thing you want is to get any feeling that there's a weaving of resolve within the White House as to taking a tough approach.
Yeah, I see your point very well.
Abrams.
Trying to get the local Abrams, I guess, for you today.
No, he didn't do it.
I don't think so.
You see, he could also have gone crazy and probably lose his contract.
I think those are the two he can't lose.
So that's that.
But for Christ's sakes, if Scali and that bunch can't get across, if I had stated that as well as anybody, and clearly, you know, I did not say we would lose the battles.
But I said it.
He said it.
And I said it again last night.
We're going to lose.
It's going to be
They're not going to be able to succeed.
That's going to be our line, certainly.
But what do you do with it?
Yes, sir.
They don't run with it.
We have us run with it.
I told Henry, he couldn't understand.
No, I didn't want to.
We can't bomb them.
We can't bomb them, right?
Well, I didn't see why.
We've got a goddamn primary session Thursdays.
Well, the lawyers got to walk out of that first.
Well, that's not the bad news.
Well, it takes, you can't set it up to, to say, see, because then you might agree with it.
There's, there's already, or, got it all somewhere.
You just want Bobby with the bomb, right?
Let her know.
He's pleased.
He's ready to give up.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
To stop the bus?
Yeah.
That piece, that shit is really something.
That's it, isn't it?
Yeah.
Well, and if those are not pieces, I mean, I'm not saying anything's on the wrong side.
You've got to hold it there if you decide to hold it for next week.
Sounds okay.
All right.
Do you always feel that it's a good thing to have?
Or not?
Do they understand?
Yes, they all do, certainly.
We had to figure it out without putting a whole list of books in.
That really works out okay, because it looks like it has some substance in it.
It covers all the various demographics and all that kind of stuff.
So it looks pretty good.
And they leave it with the 7 out of 10 Americans approved, and it's a decision to continue on.
That's a good thing.
I agree with you.
I think that's one area where he had no problem.
Is that a letter from Krasnov?
It's another one.
Why is it this time?
I didn't have one.
Oh, it's thanking you for sending me, and as a result of these conversations, we have been taking into account all the other negotiations underway.
It can be definitely said that quite a bit has been done to ensure the success of the meeting.
Yeah.
that matters to you, then he goes into Vietnam and he says, however, and I want to be frank here, too, both you and I cannot have 100% assurance that everything will go just the way it is desired that matters.
As soon as the President realizes that at Vietnam, this question is, of course, not a simple one.
As I already told Dr. Kirchner on the turn, that the developments in Vietnam will take very much notice, depend, irrespective of our visions.
You are undoubtedly aware that a delegation headed by the Secretary of the Party's Central Committee visited Hanoi after Dr. Kirchner was in Moscow.
In the talk with the DRV leader, the delegations touched upon the questions related to the political settlement in the advance.
This indicates that it's something special.
On the part of the DRV, their readiness to solve the problems by fair negotiations was, in principle, confirmed.
At the same time, as all the previous military actions, strength discrimination of the Vietnamese to continue the struggle.
Therefore, of decisive importance,
Uh, and the rest is just garbage for, garbage for the way in which it's a treasury, not what it will do.
Who do they say is going to do the trash and then leave work?
Well, we're going to get there.
We're going to find out.
That's why this is a problem.
That's how it's all going to be made.
Exactly.
There's not going to be any of this business of our little Jackie.
Oh, on, on to what the president told me, they have to agree to everything.
on the technical arrangements except the plane.
They let you go on Saturday to Leningrad.
They let you go on live on television, although they've never done that before.
The only thing they ask if you go on live is to give them the text an hour in advance so that they interpret it and do a good job.
Well, I'm just telling you what they have to do.
And every other technical issue, I forget now what it was, I told him to get in touch with Church.
All right, he told you about Church, yeah?
Church is okay, so Church is good.
Really?
Yeah.
Don't tell me about it.
I don't want it.
Now, that's one thing, on one scale, hearing those people and all thinking about it.
If I want to go low-key, much the better way, I'll just go that day to Church, not with a great big hullabaloo, because after all, I am, I mean, that's what I do on Sunday.
and all those years and all those really great times.
So they gave you a favor plan, so all of that.
But on the plane, they said the humiliation to them.
I told Bob, I'm sorry.
Let me ask you something else.
So if I may call him tonight and say the plane is okay, then he will call.
Then they will call Jason tomorrow and confirm it.
Is the plane for Leningrad and Kiev?
Leningrad and Kiev.
But Kiev would not.
That's what he mentioned to me.
I don't really give a damn.
It's perfectly all right.
Go ahead.
So then on the other one, it's done.
I don't want to argue about the plane.
This is a small thing compared to other things.
I've ridden in planes many times before.
But they may have no choice.
All right, I'm fine.
But you can't go to Moscow anyway if you've just been run out of Vietnam.
Sure.
So it's...
The point is, if we run out of Vietnam, we will then blockade...
This battle, it's taken four weeks to get them on tree.
I don't think they're going to get them.
Well, it doesn't say anything.
I'll think along.
Well, it's pretty good.
His basic point is...
The basic point is that these outing units are not cooperating among each other.
That what's happening in the country was a command collapse.
What does it say about the rest of the country?
The military...
I don't really give a damn.
It's perfectly all right.
Go ahead.
So then, on the other one, it's done now.
I don't want to argue about the plane.
This is a small thing compared to other things.
I've ridden airplanes many times before.
If you get the...
They don't want to cancel this song anymore.
I think that's why, that's why the Anaheim song thing has just got to be
But they may have no choice.
All right, fine.
But neither have each other.
I'm sure we'll have to cancel ourselves.
Well, you can't go to Moscow anyway if you've just been run out of Vietnam.
Sure.
So it's... Well, the point is that we run out of Vietnam.
We will then blockade North Vietnam to get our prisoner specimens.
We're not going to run on anything.
That's further down the road.
Hell, this battle, it's taken four weeks to get one tree.
I don't think they're going to get one.
We now have a neighbor who's just ruined it.
Well, it doesn't say anything.
I'll take the lockers.
Well, it's pretty good, isn't it?
His basic point... Is he discouraged?
Is he giving up?
His basic point is... His basic point is that these army units are not cooperating among each other.
That what's happening in the country was a command for that.
What does he say about the rest of the country?
Military reasons.
Does he get close to his final conclusion?
You say they're going to make it or not make it.
Does he still have confidence in his?
No.
All right.
In summary of all that has happened here since 3rd March, I must report that as the pressure has mounted and the battle has become brutal, the senior leadership has begun to bend and in some cases to break in adversities to the truth and its will.
Losing its will?
Its will.
And cannot...
be depended on to take the measures necessary to stand in flight.
The known exceptions to this now are General Pugh, 1st Division, and General Truong, 4th Commander.
In light of this, there's no basis of confidence that the way you'll come to them will be held.
And as for the bunker room, I will be not yet expressly above you.
There's an audience of President Pugh for 800 side-down time, 2 May.
I will report the above to President Pugh then.
In light of the work going on, I recommend another 5 grams.
then that would indicate that he thinks the whole incident collapsed.
Well, you remember when I came back from... No, what do you mean?
I think what is quite possible.
What I thought then, I still think that there is a point will be reached where they will have lost so many of their units that the rest won't have any summit provided.
And therefore...
The issue may not be how many provincial capitals we lose, but whether that Godhead army will come about.
That's the real thing.
But on the other hand, we have to remember he's probably under the impact of the disease.
U.S. Air Support, thank you very much.
in the country as a matter of first priority, or over areas, requirements in areas outside the battle zone.
Did you see that?
On balance, I believe that the GBN and our leaders can spark the necessary will to fight against the computer.
Now, if there is a contrapunt, it's maybe lost, but that's the way the talk began.
I don't know how to say it.
We can afford to lose, come to me.
Where it's lost, too, then it's a real death by death.
Because that would mean they would have lost one of their best civilians too.
Number of refugees since 30 March more than 300,000.
Since 30 March, enemy territory has been causing 140 village guards to come and operate.
Either half of these or... MR1.
Well...
The service of the Ministry of Information, via the Media Information Service, seems to be effective in keeping the good of the people aware of the extent of the events.
Indeed.
I must report that this is a pressure on the balance of approval.
Senior leadership would be much better, and in some cases, you're right, using my channel.
Diversity is inclusive as well.
Well, I certainly have something to say to her as well, but I'm not going to.
But Pollyannish is going to be damn tough on you.
I still would still make it.
I don't know why.
Because the other side must be very weak, too.
But I think the...
The Secretary of State says the Air Force is doing great.
What in the name of Christ are they doing great about?
Well, Mr. President, if the South Vietnamese are fighting as poorly as they seem to be in the Quang Tri area,
then they don't have to concentrate enough to present a good target.
And that's the problem.
But then there is a lack of cooperation among senior commanders.
This is an MR3.
Well, you see, that's one of the most...
When you get the daily briefings that I do...
It's seriously delaying mission accomplishment.
You see, you see the 25th division that's sitting about 10 miles away, and it's acting as a spectator to the operation.
It isn't doing a goddamn thing.
Uh-huh.
How these guys in Ann Locke had held out is beyond my... You know, conversely, if the people at Quantree had thought the way the people in Ann Locke are finding, we could have punished the patricians out at the other side.
This is the way the other side has planned the decision to attack, carry, and inherit, except that the forces of all may be extended to all.
The enemy's campaign has been marked by detailed planning and preparation, but are, with reason or offensive, misquanticated.
It is the end of the determination to carry this message.
Mr. President, we went through that at large last year.
These campaigns are being managed on a really effective, coordinated,
MR3 is a significant decrease in the capability of the reserve.
That would be to see my mom.
MR4 would be to see the rest.
The pressure and power tactics of the enemy will continue for several weeks.
Move.
He just doesn't know that.
He doesn't know the supply situation.
When does the goddamn weather circuit have to play a role?
Not until July.
Until July 1st.
Well, in military region three, fairly soon.
In military region two, first, middle of June.
Early, early middle of June.
In Hue, not at all until September.
You see, this is a really very good report.
He's being very honest.
He talks about the will to fight for the world, the will to fight among senior leaders, and him and him are one.
They're serious problems at the lower levels.
Command and control is becoming increasingly difficult.
That's where they have to sit, though.
Command and control problems are very serious.
This is before it was lost.
Maybe not.
It was lost.
They lost it.
It's my record.
I was wrong this morning.
MR2, the full display, will fight under the 27th Division.
We're sure it makes the defense enough to recover.
They are going to have a lot of oil in that lock.
That's going to be very, very strong.
We need to...
The second major factor influencing Arkin's capability to turn back the offensive is damage to the end of the avenue.
The extent of damage will not be known for several weeks or months once PW&I reports it for early success.
There is no doubt that the end has been badly hurt primarily by U.S. Air Force.
The extent of damage once at a time basis will remain one of the objectives.
The Army has 190 battalions, lost 16, 16 are infected, an additional 27 are only partially busted.
Well, that's not too bad.
Well, that's 20% of our service, 25% of it.
Well, you know, and... No, there may have been units that haven't even been in the battle yet.
What do you mean?
Where the hell are they sitting around?
Well, they've got two divisions for each corps, and particularly in Military Region 3, that's the 25th Division that's sitting around paying in.
It hasn't come over into antlark.
The 21st Division hasn't really fought a very... What is the reason here that...
You know, this business is about me and my having a Secretary of Defense request Abrams has got to stop.
God damn it.
Why isn't it?
Because why doesn't it?
That is not necessary, is it?
No.
I'd be glad if I could go directly to Abrams' business of having it come through Laird.
I mean, I don't understand.
The Laird was very good at the meeting today.
Well, he was good today on this subject, yeah.
But I don't understand.
On the soul, he was.
We had a great meeting on Seoul today.
Yeah, we sure did.
I thought you said General Lanz is a pretty good general.
I never said that, Chief.
He did.
I have never been impressed by Lanz.
He made a hash out of Laos last year.
He may be fairly good on the defense, if you listen to me on that.
When they had the north-west and east-south three weeks ago, they should have gone on the offensive.
And they had a great plan.
But if they moved 100 yards, it wasn't visible.
According to Nate, they had fought very well at Westone.
That's the first division.
But until they gave it up, they're not there yet.
No, no, the first division is fine.
But now it's...
If the militant group can't get reconstituted, that means the 1st Division has to defend an open-band area.
Our main concern in the way area is that the main enemy forces previously engaged in the Clown Tree move south and attack the way.
What's on our flight strike?
B-52.
What about Abrams' flight, though, that he's making here?
That, uh...
Taking assets?
The battle down there, may it lose the war?
Is he making it in those terms?
No.
I think that's a combination of psychological and military factors.
On purely military grounds, he's probably right.
But I think the shock effect that we produced, that the Hanoi has found, whatever the Jogis said, that it is a result of the Hanoi.
Well, it also didn't have a good effect on Saigon.
It had a good effect on Saigon and a bad effect on Hanoi.
Saigon needs, she says, the will to fight is involved here.
Maybe that will help them a little.
I think we've got to give them a good shot.
See, I think it's a good question.
What is it going to be like, as I say, the Americans?
We need to give them a pop.
What we may consider is to split those two days.
into not having consecutive events, say, one Friday night and the other Sunday night, so that he can go back to the battlefield for a day.
All right.
I think we ought to have that flexibility in there, depending on what the military situation is.
One day and another day.
Right.
But I'll arrange a briefing for you on this.
I wonder if we don't have to really go to the blockade.
Not now, but I mean, if this thing collapses, what the hell else can you do?
If this thing collapses, we have no choice except to go to the blockade, say, on the Christmas, and Michael come back, and then blockade.
That would be the basis for our movement.
Yeah.
So we've got our prisoners back.
But then we're defeated, aren't we?
Yeah.
Then we have to tighten our belt.
Tighten our belt?
Then we should make a goddamn soldier.
Then we should make the Soviets pay for it.
Yeah.
That one should do it.
Oh, yes.
They made it possible.
No, I said we wouldn't have any bargaining positions with the Soviets.
No, no, pay for it.
I don't think you could go to the summit then.
Oh, sure, you could blockade and cancel the summit.
That's what I mean.
No, no, I mean pay for it.
Just try getting past it.
Well, you were starting to say something about the mail account.
The mail account.
The mail in front of the speech.
is 1,800, 400, 500 again, 561, yes.
Three of them.
Four?
Valuable, yeah.
Max Aptley, who is an old liberal, and a largely enthusiastic, he sent you one, too.
Did he?
Yeah, he sent me a copy of it.
And he said anything he can, he's going to give some money to you, can't pay.
Ah.
Well, we were started on that day, May 1, 1972, and this is the question of the day.
I mean, everybody puts too much in terms of this immediate thing.
It's about sort of a...
I think the Avery report is an honest report.
It's pretty goddamn sober.
Do you agree?
That's what's been worrying me for the last week to ten days.
Lots of the capitals we can handle.
If these units stay, stand and fight, we will finish, and the North Vietnamese will lose the war because there are too many capitals to live to take.
You know, we could hold them for three weeks at each capital.
What in the name of God do you think Bunker is saying to you about?
I didn't quite hear what I was saying.
Bunker always goes along with him when he sees you.
Bunker requests an appointment for him.
What would he be saying to you about what you've got?
I think Athens will talk to him about his situation.
What on the hell can she do about it?
She was ordering him to stand and fight, and they don't stand and fight.
Can't do a hell of a lot.
But the other side is also weak enough.
We got some reports that made that effect.
Yes, and they have to be wicked, Mr. President.
Even if we got no reports, it just cannot be true that when you put in, for example, they put in 38 B-52 strikes into this perimeter yesterday.
That's like a 1,500-plane B-52 raid, World War II raid.
On top of it, they put in 400, no,
That's 320 tactical air.
That's a third of the B-52.
That's another 4,000 plane raid of World War II.
Now, if they just close their eyes and drop the bombs within 10 miles of the front line, they've got to hit something.
Are you going to make the point, though, because the Iraqis are fighting too well, they haven't been too scared?
That's probably true, but...
They've still got to hit something.
This other side must have suffered very severe casualties.
Aren't you glad we ordered out those extra people?
Well, without them, we'd be dead.
And the additional attack air.
Yeah, that's got to be something.
You know, these rears beat the whole goddamn Arab world in a few pounds.
We got hundreds of them out there.
That's all our behavior.
We had 700 of them.
You know, our performance has been poor, but...
The other side must be running out of steam, and we keep forgetting that Dien Bien Phu, that he's doing essentially what he did at Dien Bien Phu, except on a large scale.
At Dien Bien Phu, we now know that if the French had held on three more months, two more months, he would have collapsed.
But he figures it doesn't make any difference how much you expend if you last a week longer than the enemy.
You've won the war.
They can't have nothing anymore that blows at them.
And how long the meeting takes, I'll leave right after the meeting, any time from 7 to 10.
Assuming I don't stay an extra day, but just...
When are you going to announce it?
At noon the next day, or at 10 the next day, I think the earlier the better.
We had a really disgusting meeting on this.
Goddamn, very salty.
and the Board of Trustees.
The situation was this, Mr. President.
I wanted us, here we have a proposition from President, which in turn was an acceptance of your proposal
So it wasn't just something, as Raja said, that President made up to screw us.
It was our proposal.
As Muda pointed out, these were, it was an effective adaptation of what we had given them.
So I had asked Mr.
Draft a general acceptance, but it began with that shit-ass phrase, which you picked up just as well as I did, which said, while we cannot agree with your considerations put to Henry Kissinger, we nevertheless can agree.
accept the general approach.
I handed that to Dabri and he said, look, if I send this to Moscow, they'll think you're turning it down.
So I said, all right, take out that clause at the beginning and consider it simply as an oral comment that there are some parts of your memorandum we won't accept.
And for the rest of it, leave it as it is.
when you think of the meetings at which you had to help to defend the defense establishment against Smith for that facet, and Rogers to sit there and talk about defending equality for the United States when we couldn't build a submarine for the next five years if our life depended on it.
See, the Russian force...
It isn't.
Under the Russian proposal, the Russians can build nine submarines a year now.
That's their capacity.
They now have 41, so if there's no freeze, they will have at least 86.
By 1978, they had proposed to us that they'd start at 62, and that on top of that, they would trade in 209 of their old missiles, scrap those for the submarines.
So if we turn down their proposal, we are in effect giving them 86 submarines instead of, we are gaining 24 submarines as a result of this proposal.
For nothing, because we are not going to build any anyhow.
Because we don't have to get that.
You said Mora called Haig.
Mora called Haig.
He said he couldn't believe it.
He said he thought he was in a nut house.
He said that?
Yes.
Well, you heard Mora.
You were in the ridiculous position that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Admiral Mora were pushing for it.
And the Director of the Arms Control Agency and the Secretary of State were turning it down.
And the Secretary of State, six weeks ago when we met, you remember, said, any freeze, under any condition,
would be an improvement over an unchecked arm?
No, well, also, he was the one that said, because he thought at that point, and his memory was against, which he was, and so was I, including SLVM, because it would be too much of a price to pay to get it.
Uh...
Rogers said, we've got to have SLBMs.
And he kept coming back, we can't have it unless we have it.
And I asked you later, I said, what the hell is he trying to do to our people?
That's right.
You remember I already said that?
That's right.
I know what he was up to.
And Taylor probably doesn't know it himself, but you know, he just that way.
And by God, we got it here today, and I'll see you some of it.
But I think where I really, where I really creamed, at least to a man, and most of it, well, let's just clearly understand here.
You know, I got the part of it where I said, uh,
I said, I remember you called for four of the SOBs.
Now, are you saying today, let's turn this down like we won't have?
Let's not include SOBs?
But Roger said yes.
Huh.
He said, let's exclude them.
I'm making a deal with him.
I've made a change in his position 183 years.
How would you explain to Congress, and he says, how are you going to explain a disparity to Congress?
Well, how is that like speaking to the arms controllers?
All those shit-asses, for the wrong reasons, were violent.
We have to include SOB.
Of course.
That bunch and all that.
What the hell did Rogers mean?
Rogers, you see, was so, frankly, pissed off at Henry's language.
Right?
Well, he was pissed off at the fact that Bredner gave what, you see, he couldn't pretend that
It was obvious that what he had told you that weekend was baloney.
He didn't even pretend that the SLBM thing came through Smith.
So what he did with it is what he did.
It's what he did with the Berlin Agreement.
He pissed all over this one.
That's what he did with the Berlin Agreement.
He also found, remember he called you, he said, this will ruin us with McCloy and Clay, and he said he's protecting the president.
Yeah.
And what gets in to do this, what in the name of God does, because, so, I don't know.
But I have no, Mr. President, I have no conceivable interest in this God-banned agreement.
I mean, I have no interest in accepting that President's proposal.
You have.
You keep the argument on this.
Here, I'm good.
we may have to lose it anyway but anyway uh we'll know more when you get back tomorrow tomorrow they will certainly not make an acceptable trap but you're going to find out how they if they think they ever got the south vietnamese by the balls and you you know damn well they've got some heavily infiltrated if they think they've got enough balls they probably got getting
everything from our, a lot of our Americans over there as well, then they'll just be tough as hell and tell us to go to hell.
And that is why, that is why we'll have to bomb Hanoi, Hanoi.
If they are taking that attitude, too, you've got to get right to the heart of it, right fast.
If, on the other hand, they're taking the attitude of Jerry Griffin and my man were trying to buy time, get by, bomb any of them.
Because we can't get to the heart of it.
But I think we can get to the time as long as we bomb them.
Oh, given the time, I meant they must not, they must not, by promising to discuss things, keep us involved.
Exactly.
Now, the other thing is, I think the only bombing that really seems to affect these sons of riches is the bombing of Anaheim.
That's correct.
And that's the only thing, the only thing, the thing I must warn you in all fairness is that it is very conceivable to me that the Russians will cancel the summit after your next bombing of Anaheim, I think.
I'm still in favor of doing it.
And then you will unleash, right now we are in the position, the reason we're doing not as badly in the treads as we might is because the pro-Soviet guys are utterly buffaloes by this, by the Moscow maneuver.
And that will be then unleashed.
I'm still strongly in favor of bombing Hanoi and Haifa.
And really racking it up.
They canceled it anyway.
I hope we can get a little advance information so we can cancel it first.
Is there any way we can?
How will they cancel it?
I can't say it under these conditions.
How will they cancel it?
I mean, is there any way we can... Yeah, we can buy it.
I mean, you've got to keep it very close touch with the greeners so you can sense it.
One word, I mean, if you ever, if you ever reach the subject of cancellation, just have Jigar go out and say the president has canceled the summit.
Let those sons of bitches say that they did.
Yeah.
Do you see my point?
Yeah.
We're not going to let them cancel first if we can possibly help them.
If they, you know, they might start a press campaign, and if they do, we can cancel it, and that would be a pretty good tip-off.
And, uh...
We may bring it all up, Mr. President.
We've gone through every period before we've sat in this office.
But this is rather, in a sense, because we represent, because all the chips are on the line.
They weren't in Cambodia, and they weren't in Laos.
But now, it's win-lose.
And frankly, it's better in a way.
It's better to get the war over.
In Cambodia, we were winning the war over.
In Cambodia, we were winning, and in Laos, we were losing.
This time, it's got to be over now by summer.
The war is going to be over.
By July, August.
It's going to be one way or the other now.
I mean, clearly, the South Vietnamese can't keep this up for another three months.
Well, that's the question.
I doubt it.
Oh, I don't think they can at all.
On the work that they could've done, they can't have that much equipment in there, Henry.
What was the catch this week?
Two.
Well, why a captain?
What about that helicopter?
They're counting it as missing.
Better if they count this down.
Two dead and 17 missing.
Well, basically, you're right about that.
But they're following the same procedures always.
Well, basically, they're missing in action.
That's right.
The 17 are pilots that are P.O.W.s.
Damn, damn, I wish there was, I wish there had been those sons of Richard's last week.
Well, maybe not.
That wouldn't have made any difference to this cycle, Mr. President.
I thought the psychology of the stocks, I don't know, maybe they just haven't got it.
No, they fought, though, for four weeks, and they must have been fighting.
Well, I've been wondering, though, I've been worried, Mr. President, they seem to be able to fight for three or four weeks, and that seems to be the limit of their endurance.
That's how it happened in Laos, and that seems to be happening again.
They can take the heat for four weeks, and then they crack.
But the North Vietnamese, I mean, if you read this account, they had the equivalent of two divisions of artillery in there.
Well, I think you have a good day.
See you later.
I'll, uh, see you later.
I'll get a message back from the client.
Yeah.
Uh, I walked through Rose to hear that.
Thank you.
If you have some, I have some on your wall.
It'll take very long.
You know, really though, I don't know.
Bill was saying, oh, I was trying to picture we can't freeze in a...
He was just nitpicking the Godhead thing.
We can't freeze in an inferior position.
Well, God damn it.
Everybody knows we're going to have an inferior position in some way.
No way.
We can't.
They're going to build it where we are.
Where it's going to be less inferior.
Well, the facts freeze in the inferior position no matter what you do.
That's the point.
So all you're doing is reducing your inferiority.
Now, you're so goddamn mad, how would you ever know that?
John's going to bring it up.
Is that it?
When he comes, I didn't ask him.
He had it packaged.
He said, no, don't give it to me.
All right, how do we go over it?
Thank you very much, sir.
They may have some problems.
They'll find out.