Conversation 717-020

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Well, I think we ought to get a message to him because he's going to have a long flight.

He'll be here at 6 o'clock.

Yes, sir.

I think he should plan.

I will plan to have dinner with him tonight.

And you, if you want to get on.

As soon as he arrives.

Will he arrive at the White House or Andrews?

It'll be Andrews.

He'll be here.

I should think about it.

6.30, quarter to 7, please.

They hold their schedule.

Can you go back outside?

Yes, sir.

I'd like to take a helicopter down to the Navy Yard and go out to Sequoia, which is a discerning interview.

All right.

It's a pleasant place.

I'm giving a little relaxation.

The thing that I think we've gone through this often, tough, tough thought, too, is the summit thing.

You see, we only have about two weeks before we have to leave, right?

And also, I don't share Henry's judgment that the way battle is going to be 10 days before it develops.

I think it's going to develop very quickly.

You think it's going to have to battle for the way?

Yes, sir.

You think, well, it may be held, or it may be lost.

What do you think?

They have the horses to do it.

To hold it.

Well, to hold it.

I don't know if they have the will to hold it.

That's a big question.

If the enemy follows up very, very quickly, it puts a lot of pressure on them.

Well, it's about a league.

I know that it's a hell of a settlement because of the old capital and all that sort of thing.

We have to remember it.

that the damn place was half taken over in 68.

In other words, it's been fought over before, isn't it?

Oh, yes, it has.

I'm not trying to be a polyamorous shaman.

No, it wasn't there.

It wasn't there.

That's the piece.

I don't think it's a shaman.

What is really the place is the third, fourth floor.

But then you come to this.

How can you possibly, how can you possibly go to the problem again?

and toast Bresna and Kosygin and sign a salt agreement in the Great Hall of St. Peter when Russian tanks and guns are kicking the hell out of our allies in Vietnam.

Now, I ask you, how the hell can you do it?

It's impossible to do.

If there's that kind of decisive battle still underway,

I think we should tell Henry and I that I wanted to think about this way back.

But I have a view of the reaction he's had.

He will, of course, go forward with the strike.

It will be a two-day strike, however not, rather than one on Friday, rather than one on Monday.

that I think the tribe is necessary for three reasons.

The issue that I gave you earlier, the domestic opinion in the United States, to have to at least have some more bargaining position with the Vietnamese and the Western and the Soviet, and also for getting the South Vietnamese on the time when they're around, that's perfectly feasible.

However, the critical question that we must discuss tonight is,

my growing conviction, use those terms, that we should move to cancel the summit now.

I do not anticipate that there will be any significant change, any lead up in the enemy's activities before going to Moscow.

And while I recognize the argument that going to the summit keeps our critics off balance, and that canceling it will give them ammunition, on the other side of the coin, going to the summit, toasting the Russians, having signed an agreement with them,

at a time that their tanks and weapons are fueling a massive offensive against our allies.

I think it is something unthinkable.

I just wonder what you think.

I mean, I think what we have to realize is that Henry's judgment has been really fantastically good on so many things.

I mean, the China Initiative, the play of China against the Soviet Union, and so many other things.

But I think we have to realize that his judgment with regard to negotiations with the North Vietnamese has been halted throughout.

He's always been hopeful.

He's always read more into it than was there.

A lot of people have been wrong about it, but in any event, it's his fault.

Now, I don't think we have any good choice.

The only choice we've got is to see it through on the military side.

Now,

Of course, seeing it through the military side assumes, if we are to be successful with the South Vietnamese, we will not collapse.

But also, in order to, and that's a weak read, but on the other hand, what we do can perhaps make the difference in determining whether they do collapse or not, because the will

I really think that they're getting all the shot in the arm by our stronger position against the enemy and the enemy's heart attack.

And that brings me to the blockade thing.

I mean, blockade of sons of bitches.

And that'll be a terrible risk.

It's a terrible risk in two senses.

One is it's going to be a political price.

Sure.

And two is, is it going to be decisive?

Or two, will it work?

If it's not working, hell with the political price.

You know what I mean?

That's all it is.

If it isn't going to work,

That is, we're doing what we want, but if it's going to fail, that's what I mean.

Well, that's what I'm afraid of.

That's my major concern.

You mean your concern is that we'll fail not because we failed in our blockade, but because it's all the enemies will go out from under us today.

Well, a combination of two things.

One is that they have enough supplies there to keep them going for the critical period.

It may be necessary to get the sap there.

And that there are alternative means for them if the Chinese want to step in.

All right, that's the argument against the bombing.

What is the argument against the bombing?

Not the same as... No, I don't have one there.

I think the bombing is...

It's not going to be decisive, but it plays another card in terms of Soviet risks and involvement, which they must take seriously.

And then we'll have to assess their reaction.

It's quite obvious that they've had no luck with Hanoi if they try.

And I'm not sure that they did.

You're really not sure?

I think that, as I said in that wire, I'll never forget what Roosevelt said to me 20 years ago when he said the Russians are the biggest liars, the best actors.

It's a simple calculus to me.

What is worth more to them?

To humiliate the United States?

To risk your reelection?

A man that they know is tough and is not going to be taken in by them.

Or to go on and quote, say, Bridget's policies for Eastern Europe and the Berlin Treaties and all that go with it.

Well, all those are basically intangibles, aren't they, comparatively?

Well, they're not necessarily sacrificed.

As a result, I'm going the route they're going.

They're all reconstructable in a two- or three-year period.

Somebody else.

Sure.

And much easier.

You know, quite frankly, if I were in Moscow and were driven by the convictions that I think they're driven by, I'd screw it.

I've judged them on the front line yet, but that's the inclination that I have.

I think that we've seen nothing to cause us to think otherwise.

I think we have to... Then you get another set of assessments that follow that.

Do we believe that the whole thing is that important to them, that they'll stand up and break the summit and try to sweep this other way in other places if we take a strong stand?

That's even a cloudier picture.

Do you mean like Berlin?

It's Berlin, Cuba, which they've already started.

What are they doing there?

They've got a nuclear-capable submarine in Cuban waters now.

They say they're getting here.

Of course, the other side of the final change we'll argue very strongly is that we should sink our whole foreign policy because of Vietnam.

Well, that's a good argument.

It's a good argument.

But how in the hell, how in the hell can you avoid it?

How in the hell can I?

The question is, what...

I don't see any way out.

Well, let's make it more decisive.

Yeah.

Yeah, but let's look at Vietnam in just a moment.

How in the hell, how do you see the other way out?

I don't see any solution, unfortunately.

If they hold the adamant position of overthrow to Senate 8, it just seems to me that that's one that would kill us here, domestically.

Forget about that domestic thing.

We'll handle that.

I mean, that is the most important thing anyway.

Internationally, what the hell would the United States be if we overthrew two instead of eight?

What if they were huge?

You know, if they trained about the dominoes, but Thailand would be gone in six months a year.

Cambodia, Laos.

Indonesia.

Indonesia would be next.

No question.

Singapore, Malaysia, the Straits.

Nothing wants to go.

We strike terror in the hearts of the Koreans.

And frankly, let's face it, in the East, it's a heat up.

Well, I think that's liable to happen in any event.

That's another thing we better keep our eye on.

And again, the kind of stand we take here is going to have an impact on that.

It certainly requires in the short term a strong, solid crack.

Yep.

Which may or may not be enough.

Yep, which may.

That's right.

Maybe not.

I think we'd be deluding ourselves if we think a two-day strike in Illinois and I-5 is going to change things.

Determination.

I agree.

On the other hand, it does, to a certain extent, help us in all these three areas that I mentioned.

It does.

And particularly on the bargaining position, if you've got none now, you might have some later.

I don't know.

That's the point, right?

Exactly right.

And you can't afford not to do it.

It will help, but it's not going to be decisive.

Now, it just might be that I, my judgment would be no.

Especially if they continue to maintain momentum here and knock off way.

If that happens, I'm more inclined to think they're going to keep trying to press at any cost while they've got the enemy there in the area, reeling the bit.

Right.

Well, I think the difference between the two armies is quite clear.

They're willing to

Whatever it means to sacrifice every goddamn word in Vietnamese.

And it's all Vietnamese if you don't want to pay the price.

You know, I think if they would just stand there and fight and bring this air, I know damn well they could hold.

I just know it.

They couldn't come out of there without their crushes and a lot of air.

They're recycling these things, two and a half sorties a day per airplane to get up to 1,200 sorties.

My God, an incredible amount of air power.

But the problem is it's not being put on the targets.

And that's where they're failing.

And it can't be put on the targets unless they stand.

Because otherwise the targets will drop.

If they can hold the way

Like they have an analogue.

And let them keep their braids against that thing for four or five days.

Here's a point Q made when Bunker and Abrams spoke to him.

He said, we can hold a cartoon and wait for four or five days.

We'll win.

That was the other day?

Yes.

And then Bunker said to him, well, you better know if this is a three or four week or five week bloody battle all out.

Well, it is.

They're both right.

But what Q is thinking of is in terms of the kind of really crucial attrition that an all-out battle that fails means in a core area.

Given their conviction of pouring everything in, as they did at Anaheim.

Did they bore it all in there?

I think they did, sir.

I think they did.

I think they were blood-white there.

I think they've still got

clout, but it's managed from clout.

And this is what we've got to make them do in a way.

And if it's done, we've got to find Abrams.

I've had that boy up there running around boot and tail.

They just need to have a great sense of urgency to bolster these little guys up.

They need that bolstering.

Well, I still come back to the fact that this got them strangled up in that respect, too.

It will help.

I mean, their grandmas say it's a nasty strife in the north.

So it sure does.

You did the first one down there.

It was very evident to me.

Every place I went, they were right in the high end.

And it helped the central government, because Chew must now be at the point where he's going to start getting this unraveling.

Sure.

I think Henry does have to think about this very, very carefully.

I don't think we should do it precipitously, because I think it's only two days.

I didn't think about it, because we just can't...

If you do it, it ought to be in terms of just leveling Hanoi and Haifa, and not just stopping with two days.

Just continue it?

Well, yes.

Make an assessment of the two days and then start.

All right.

Just keep the heat on there as long as they keep the heat on, we keep it off.

Yeah.

That urge me to continue to hammer that arrow.

And if you ever make that decision, I think you have to have a concurrent decision with the summit at all.

Because I don't think they should take that either in terms of summit.

What can we do in terms of 105?

You're speaking basically of lovely military targets still.

But there are plenty of them out there.

There are plenty of them up there.

And you start cutting the lines on what are military targets.

You see, if you get the base started all out, shelling away, where there are thousands and thousands of finishing people, my god, they estimate 5,000 people were killed in analog from enemy artillery.

Let's get that out.

Are you sure that's 5,000 civilians?

Now, let's be sure to get that out, but you get that to the scally and get that punk out.

So if we're concerned about the civilians, we're going to kill them.

You see what I mean?

We've got to make the case out for our flopping over and frankly hitting some civilians.

I see friendship, of course.

I think the first strike killed 2,000 civilians.

In that long?

No.

An annoying typhoon.

But ours did.

I think it's rather probably true.

Probably true.

I'm sure they were working those docks and those warehouses.

Certainly around that DOL.

I also believe we saw the Soviet ship, but they've never pictured that.

Do you?

Because Abrams told me, he said, we put one down the hatch.

Not deliberately.

Not deliberately, but it happened.

We had a Polish attaché, I think, said that he was there.

Just went and disappeared.

So there is considerable Soviet restraint, fear of you.

care of what you might do.

I don't think he does.

I don't think they do not want him.

They've done things here and there.

Yeah, they've taken a lot from him.

They really have in the last few months.

He has hit them.

The fact that they're supplying him.

I hit him publicly.

The Canadian Congress and Parliament and a hell of a lot of other places, you know.

We had our speeches and Rogers, Laird and all the rest of them.

And they've been extremely restrained about building up international opinion against botany in the North.

They just haven't said very much.

So there's no question that that's where they're going and that's the way they'd like to go.

And we can't pick that lightly.

So I think we have to plan worst case, best case, median case, how we would go through it, assess this damn weekend thing very, very carefully, because that's where we may get some reaction there that will be indicative of what we should do next.

And the final analysis is from those little guys on the ground standing there fighting.

Always is.

Always that way.

We know that.

Well, as they get to the wall, their backs to the wall, I just think that they're going to face a hell of a choice themselves.

If they're fighting, they're going to be taken over.

There will be a hell of a lot of that, correct?

I don't think you understand that.

It started in every area they've taken over.

I see.

And they've been injured intentionally.

I'm pretty sure they've, you know, like, public officials, maybe police or RFP have formed these.

So... And that's the way they operate.

Well, they operate through terror.

All the communists do for Christ's sakes.

They've done it in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, right?

Goddamn, how the hell did these fascist thugs get in charge of the world?

Or the world they have?

The Chinese have done it.

It's brutality.

It's fear.

That's why it's watching online.

No, I don't know it.

Paul Henry made a powerful case, well, he just can't let Vietnam bring down the second president.

I don't know.

There are worse things.

There's worse things.

We have to do what does need it because there isn't very much worse at this given the options.

There is what?

There isn't much worse than that in this country.

Much worse what do you mean?

Than the thought of you are not being here.

You mean that's worse?

In fact, that to me is a vital national interest when you consider the alternative.

So you'd say that if you could find a graceful way to get out of Vietnam, only the election could do it.

That's what you're saying.

And live to fight another day.

That's true.

We can't find a graceful way out.

I don't know if the word is correct, but they're over there, and I told them to kiss our hands.

Kiss their hands, right?

After the Soviet...

And the importer should walk out thirsty.

That's the plan.

He just walks out.

He makes a blast.

And he's given him a couple points.

We've sent him to the department.

He doesn't need too much urgent anyhow.

He's very good.

He'll walk out on Friday afternoon.

It's good that we do it that way.

Otherwise, the roof would have floated if we had gone thirsty.

I saw it.

Must have been just there.

Well, I think if nothing else, I do think you ought to get the message there so he can be thankful that we're in this subject.

Don't you think so?

You and he and I will talk our way through it and have all of them come to us and give us a feel of the strategy and things.

I know it's been a tough situation.

There wouldn't be any doubt about the outcome.

Four years ago, we had Americans there.

No, I'm trying to... We had Americans there.

We say, God damn it, counterattack, have a landing up the way, kick the back.

You see, we don't want them.

Right now, we would have... We've gone our way.

We were right.

We had to do the Vietnamization.

We can't stay out there forever.

No, we couldn't... Because the American public opinion wouldn't stand for it.

But on the other hand... On the other hand, I believe there's got to be a lot of damage

I believe there is.

And I am sure if they can hold together, they will make it.

I do have a personal message to you.

Yes, sir, I do.

I'm going to bump into you at 7 o'clock tonight, aren't I?

Mm-hmm.

I'm going to give you both messages.

I think that's ideal.

Mr. Laird.

And about the strike.

You're talking about the strike, right?

Yes, he knows.

He doesn't know the date and the precise time, and I don't think we should get into that.

No, no, no, no.

You said Laird what?

Laird wanted me to send a message to you, an inspirational message.

Because he was concerned about the papers?

Well, you're triggered.

He's the one that triggered it.

I know that.

But he kind of saw the necessity of turning it around somehow.

Yeah, he wants to turn it around.

He got a little panicky yesterday, I think.

He was saying that he was quite upset about it.

On the contrary, he called last night and he said it would probably be good if he could send a message.

I said, I didn't think it would be very good to go in there and browbeat you.

At the time when he got to his ass and how he ate it.

And I could tell from his reaction that he had called, they had called him to do that.

Well, because a Jew is a strong man.

It only takes a bunch of Jews.

It only takes a bunch.

He is a strong man.

He's an ascetic.

He's got some.

I don't know.

It only takes one or two that would, you know.

In certain areas, like Antelope, they can hold it there.

And who it is, they can give him a hell of a battle letter.

Well, thank God we've got the best commander to have in this.

You got Lamb?

We've got Lamb and he's not.

That's us, but we've got True, who's the technical commander.

Good commander.

He's been proven.

He has proven all too well.

He's the one guy that held that thing together.

Thanks.

Here's sort of the yellow battle.

And it may break the back of me.

If they only can do it, I must go through the car.

I don't know.

But again, if they could just put a fight out, just be 52 to hurt them in there.

Yeah, in the gallery, that's what it's, that's what, yeah.

Yeah, I can't see.

I don't see why he's taking it to not get along with the bags.

For some reason, or did he stay over for lunch or something?

No, no, sir.

He met with Porter, uh, driving back from the meeting.

He didn't need to go anyplace.

I think he took off at about 2 o'clock.

And it's an Eric, you know, fat face.

What?

It was airborne.

By the way, I assume that he was there before 1.30.

What's that?

The meeting lasted until about 1.30 from my arrest.

Well, it's a short meeting.

God, who could you predict?

But they are moving on the ground.

Why in the hell do they want to talk?

Right?

Right.

No one did that.

Even if they're

As a matter of fact, he could draw some comforts.

Some what?

Some comforts.

Because I think the weaker they are, the tougher they are.

And that's been their style.

You think they may have sweetness?

Yes.

I think they're very nice floor boarders, and they're very good neighbors.

Keep it going.

Mm-hmm.

Could be.

And maybe it's obvious he's a crack before they do it.

That's again, I'd say, it's partly so strong that they're going to try it in the North.

That's going to have some effect.

But I don't want them to think that it has to be not.

What do you think?

I think it's better.

cost of war.

I'm sure not necessarily.

And it never probably is.

If it does continue, we're not sure.

It will not still cost the war.

That's the real problem.

Let me say, if I could continue and save the war, we would continue it.

There is no doubt it's the latter one that concerns me.

And you know, the worst of both worlds.

That's what concerns me.

Okay, last patch.