Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 719 › Conversation 719-022

Nixon, Haldeman & Ziegler on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

Thursday, May 4, 1972 · 1:24 PM–1:51 PM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Butterfield, Alexander P.; Ziegler, Ronald L.Conversation719-022 on Tape 719 (tape position 03:22:53–03:49:10)StartThursday, May 4, 1972 at 1:24 PMEndThursday, May 4, 1972 at 1:51 PMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 719-022 ↗

President Nixon consulted with H. R. Haldeman regarding strategic advice from John Connally concerning the escalating Vietnam War and the upcoming Soviet summit. Connally strongly urged the President to prioritize winning the war through intensified bombing and a potential blockade, while advising that the United States should not unilaterally cancel the summit, instead forcing the Soviet Union to take that responsibility. The participants discussed the political necessity of projecting strength and the minimal impact of public backlash, while also briefly reviewing the logistics and positive reception of President Nixon’s recent eulogy for J. Edgar Hoover.

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3:23:03I don't know.
3:23:05Okay.
3:24:18Check it out.
3:24:20Check it out.
3:24:22Check it out.
3:24:25Check it out.
3:24:51Yes, sir.
3:24:53Well, Connie, we went through the whole exercise.
3:25:05Henry went through his whole exercise.
3:25:10So it was a whole lot of strength.
3:25:16Yeah.
3:25:17No, no, no.
3:25:17Here's why.
3:25:18I'm sure he knows about this.
3:25:21I did at the end, but Conley said, his position is first of all, you gotta face one fact, you cannot lose the war in Vietnam.
3:25:46He said, you put that to end.
3:25:47He said, don't.
3:25:48Just, that's the first point.
3:25:50You've got to go in and bomb Hamlet, not bomb.
3:25:52And you've got to do anything else that's going to make a difference, including the blockade.
3:25:58Number two, you're absolutely wrong in your emptiness, in your position, that you should be the one to cancel the Soviet summit.
3:26:07If the Soviet summit is to be canceled, make the Soviets cancel it.
3:26:12Don't you do it.
3:26:13Because if the hope for peace is going to be shattered by anybody in this world, have it shattered by the other guy.
3:26:18Don't shatter it yourself.
3:26:20I hadn't thought of that, and he's absolutely right.
3:26:23And he said, absolutely.
3:26:24He said, your course, to him, your course is absolutely clear.
3:26:28You should move instantly to bomb Hanoi Nightfall.
3:26:32But not just a pop.
3:26:34A real, you know, whatever it takes.
3:26:37You should not blockade yet.
3:26:40Just the bombing.
3:26:41But bomb Hanoi.
3:26:43But for seriousness, not just for a signal, to knock out whatever the capabilities are, whatever the targets are there, because if you're ever in a complex, it's important to demolish it.
3:26:52The force is important to demolish it.
3:26:55Power plants, communication base, whatever there is.
3:26:58And don't worry about killing civilians.
3:27:00Go ahead and kill them.
3:27:03Because everybody would see, and I think he's right on this, an American public opinion, McCloskey's been running around for years saying you're killing civilians.
3:27:10Sure.
3:27:10So people think you are now.
3:27:12That's right.
3:27:13So go ahead and kill somebody.
3:27:14Sure.
3:27:14And Henry says, Jesus, you have all those pictures of dead bodies.
3:27:17A dead body is a dead body.
3:27:18There's pictures every night of dead bodies now.
3:27:20Nobody knows who the hell's body they are or who killed them.
3:27:23No, Henry is overreacting to these.
3:27:25So you can't worry about that.
3:27:26Because they're going to, they're charged with it anyway.
3:27:28But his, Connie's point is, in the first place, I don't think the Russians will cancel us on it.
3:27:33Because I think they want it.
3:27:36And I don't think they give a damn about what we do or don't do.
3:27:41Mr. H talked about having written that letter to them.
3:27:43We sort of forced them that they have to cancel it.
3:27:48I think you're wrong about that.
3:27:50Maybe.
3:27:50But that's done now.
3:27:51But Congress wants a lot of people.
3:27:52And then if they cancel the summit, haven't you bombed?
3:27:55Then you bomb all you want to bomb.
3:27:57You make your decision now, your command decision, which is the important thing.
3:28:01You're going to win the war in Vietnam.
3:28:03Then you go do it.
3:28:06If the Russians don't like anything that you do in the process of that to the point where they decide to cancel the summit, let them cancel it.
3:28:13As soon as they do, you go on.
3:28:16Give the speech you were going to give anyway.
3:28:31I don't know about that.
3:28:32Why?
3:28:33It is going to be named, I think it's soon to be announced today, the J.W.
3:28:37Right.
3:28:37The main point is that I don't, rather than having the Congress do the seat, I just want to be sure that it's good.
3:28:45Okay.
3:28:45Good.
3:28:45Okay, fine.
3:28:46Then I guess I'll sign it.
3:28:48I guess I'll sign it and then we can deal with that one.
3:28:51Okay, great.
3:28:51I just want to speak, you know, you were a general counsel.
3:28:55It really was nice.
3:28:56Good, beautiful presentation.
3:29:06So they come out and they say we're canceling the summit.
3:29:10So you go on television and you go through the same, you make the same case that you would make if you were going to cancel the summit.
3:29:17And you say, you know, they've done this and that, and we've done this and that, and we've tried, we've gone the last mile, and then you cut all that case.
3:29:25And unfortunately, they cut this off.
3:29:28We regret that, but that doesn't deter us from our course at all.
3:29:32Then the next day, you blockade High Plum.
3:29:35You don't blockade until they cut off the summit because that's an overreact against them in the sense where the others aren't.
3:29:43That's a good thinking.
3:29:44And also the blockade gives you the chance to take another strong action after they cancel the summit.
3:29:51So you don't look like you're backing down or weakening after they cancel.
3:29:54You're taking a strong step again after they cancel.
3:29:59And put the goddamn squeeze on it.
3:30:00Then he says the other thing you should do, and he says don't worry about the commentary on it.
3:30:05Replace Abrams.
3:30:07If you can't get the stuff done with Abrams, get a man in there who's going to get it done.
3:30:12Give a man the assignment to win the war and put him in there.
3:30:16Well, I agree with that.
3:30:21probably getting it done.
3:30:23See, Henry implies a letter just calling Abrams on the phone, rescinding orders and all that, so John says, fine, then get rid of it.
3:30:30Let him do it.
3:30:32But his point is, you're in very good shape in the country right now.
3:30:35The people believe you're doing, first of all, the right thing on the war.
3:30:39You're responding to a massive invasion.
3:30:42You're not taking any overt action.
3:30:44You're reacting to it.
3:30:45What does he think about the bad news about the war?
3:30:48He says, that's a problem, but none of this is going to change that except make it better, maybe.
3:30:54Also, if the psychological problem of the South Vietnamese is a major factor, which Henry believes it is, the possibility of an argument collapse or something of that sort, what Abrams said in that memo the other day about their morale and holding power and all that, then you moving hard like this should improve that situation.
3:31:14Because, as Henry said, my going to Moscow hurt that.
3:31:18Because the North Vietnamese, I mean the South Vietnamese can't help but wonder what the hell I was doing in Moscow.
3:31:26The other thing, and then Henry said, well, you're asking the President then, if he does the bombing, to make the decision to risk the summit.
3:31:34And I said, that's ridiculous.
3:31:37It's already on.
3:31:38He's already canceled it, which is not even risky.
3:31:40It's certainly ending it.
3:31:41The other way, you're only running the chance of ending it.
3:31:45You don't know which way it's going to go.
3:31:47Henry comes off of that totally for it, if it's for real.
3:31:54Well, if we really bomb, rather than just sending one mission in or something, a symbolic bomb.
3:31:59And if we are prepared to move to the blockade,
3:32:03And the point that I make is, Henry, you see, I hope he is to that point.
3:32:07Well, he says he is, because I'll tell you why.
3:32:10That's the point I am to.
3:32:11I am to the point that I wrote out the blockade thing last night.
3:32:15And I know what happened this morning.
3:32:19Haig is against the blockade now.
3:32:22He's got that military for the show.
3:32:25And Haig is the best of them, but he's against it for the wrong reasons.
3:32:30The point is that
3:32:32I think we have to now decide to win the goddamn war.
3:32:35In other words, they can't get into the South, but we're going to crush them.
3:32:39I don't know why.
3:32:40And I mean crush them.
3:32:42And what that fellow said about taking out the goddamn Dykes.
3:32:45All right, we'll take out the goddamn Dykes.
3:32:48You see what I mean?
3:32:49Yep.
3:32:50That's what I mean.
3:32:51I don't mean to screw around.
3:32:55But, boys, Henry's with that.
3:32:57I'm for it all the way.
3:32:59All the way to, I don't know, he's through the dykes.
3:33:02You get a, no, no, no, no, no, no, no.
3:33:04I don't think he's through the dykes, but I met him.
3:33:07I heard the Connolly idea.
3:33:09I heard the Connolly idea because, and it's an idea to show you how you need sometimes to have another good mind working on something.
3:33:16It occurred to me that way.
3:33:17I had always assumed, don't let the Russians cancel.
3:33:23Because we remembered the U-2 when the Russians canceled.
3:33:26On the other hand, I didn't hurt.
3:33:27I was fine.
3:33:28Helped.
3:33:31But my point is, if the Russians cancel the summit, then they are in the blind for blocking peace.
3:33:37We regret this, but Cotney completely shares my view that I was talking about the other day.
3:33:43He says he's absolutely convinced this is right.
3:33:46And in the general mind of the American public, there are two totally separable matters here.
3:33:52One is the war in Vietnam, and the other is your summit meeting in Moscow.
3:33:56That's why they're bombing and the summit.
3:33:59That's right.
3:34:00Because they're two different things.
3:34:02Now, sure, they hope that maybe while you're at the summit you can do something about Vietnam like they hoped in China you could do something about Vietnam.
3:34:10But you didn't, and they didn't care.
3:34:13And if they cancel the summit, they don't like that either.
3:34:18You pick up a lot of marbles from that.
3:34:21We want to put an end to all that bad in the sense that we will then move to blockade, right?
3:34:27You've got that one, right?
3:34:29Blockade, I mean.
3:34:31The United States at least is going to go out and go down with both guns firing.
3:34:35Well, don't you think you convinced him?
3:34:42Yes.
3:34:42Well, Henry took the position that he was always convinced of this, that this is what he wants to do, but he didn't think we could.
3:34:51Because first of all, he was going on the premise that we had to cancel him.
3:34:57I must say that I said that.
3:35:00And so was he.
3:35:01Agreed.
3:35:02Yeah.
3:35:02That's what he said, that he felt that was sort of new and that he had been operating on that premise.
3:35:07But Conley just takes exactly the opposite premise.
3:35:10Canceling the summit, the act of canceling the summit is an act unfavorable to world peace.
3:35:16So why should you do it?
3:35:17Make them do it.
3:35:20That's right.
3:35:21That's right.
3:35:21Let them be the bad guys.
3:35:22Well, you've got to analyze this.
3:35:24If they cancel the summit as a result of our bombing, they'll say, we were responsible for canceling the summit.
3:35:31We go back and say, we weren't responsible for it.
3:35:35We were perfectly willing to try to do it.
3:35:37If they were bombing you, we were bombing the North Vietnamese, who you are a spy for, on an invasion that you supplied.
3:35:47Just what you would say if you cancel the summit.
3:35:49We can't go to a summit under that comment anyway.
3:35:58All right, let's go over to the blockade and the militaries.
3:36:03You see, the blockade of this problem won't work, because they can just sit there and squint and starve and say, screw you.
3:36:16And then the Democrats, you could say, and then say, as soon as a new candidate, if you've got a Democratic candidate elected, we'll settle a war with him and return him to the prisoners.
3:36:28Of course, that would be a, we could hammer them on that.
3:36:30Henry, are you going to blockade if it's a company who would have to quit bombing?
3:36:35Oh, shit, yeah.
3:36:35So that you do the bombing that has to get the bombs?
3:36:38They can't just sit there.
3:36:46I agree with Connery about civilians.
3:36:49I agree with Connery.
3:36:50I do, too.
3:36:51Obviously, you don't go for civilian targets, but you don't worry about SWAT folks.
3:37:03I'm not sure they do that.
3:37:04They make the Boulder Act and cancel it.
3:37:09I agree.
3:37:09Connery's got a very strong point there.
3:37:12I mean, all it does is show that, well,
3:37:19that you're hating men like what's going on at the bombing.
3:37:23You see what I mean?
3:37:26Yeah.
3:37:26And Henry's reaction about canceling is to a certain extent, because of his great irritation with the Soviet destroyers.
3:37:33He wants to show something to them.
3:37:36I think the bombing shows it more.
3:37:42Now, if you have a problem, if their letter comes back saying, if you do any further bombing of
3:37:48in order or something, we will cancel the summit.
3:37:51Then you probably wouldn't go out and cancel it.
3:37:53You'd use the letter as the device then.
3:37:59No, I think I'd just bomb and let them cancel.
3:38:02Let them cancel.
3:38:05You don't have to say that we bombed in spite of the warning.
3:38:08Chevrolet warned us, we did it.
3:38:09No, I wouldn't take this letter.
3:38:11Let them say it.
3:38:12It's their job.
3:38:16And we could say their response to that made it clear they were not going to take any further steps to help.
3:38:20And so we had nothing to gain from dealing with it.
3:38:22The county does the same thing as you do, though, by the, it says you cannot take the military to beat Vietnam.
3:38:35Yeah.
3:38:40Correct.
3:38:43The president is now in a good position in this country.
3:38:45He's got to have the guts to meet the problem, as it now exists.
3:38:48You've got to make it clear to the Russians that we aren't going to be defeated, that we're not going to surrender.
3:38:58And his argument is, once that's clear to them, because they're thugs, because they don't give a shit about anything, they won't cancel the summit.
3:39:06But go ahead with it.
3:39:07Then we raised the question, well, do you really want to go ahead with it?
3:39:09He said, hell yeah.
3:39:10He said, if you're taking the strong action on the other side, then it doesn't matter about sitting and talking to the president like we do in the trade deals.
3:39:19Does that everybody think you're going to talk about saying the Lord?
3:39:24We've got to act strongly.
3:39:25I've been pushing, you know, Henry is not...
3:39:28Being quite a candidate with regard to last weekend, I got this thing from him.
3:39:34It's funny, he told you that he was for bombing.
3:39:36I said, he was not.
3:39:38Henry, basically, was so passionately interested in the success of his meeting, Tom, he didn't want to bomb.
3:39:45You know that guy.
3:39:46But I said, god damn it, we better do it.
3:39:48I said, the situation needs it.
3:39:49Well, you were planning to bomb earlier last week.
3:39:51And then you said, Henry said, you know, we've got to hold up until after this, I think.
3:39:58And of course, you had Abel, which back then I loved, too.
3:40:32Roger, you know, just trying to take a clever, appear courageous when it's the important thing to be.
3:40:59One thing, the other side, I took that one on one of the poles.
3:41:03Did Percy live?
3:41:05Remember, because he had come out the wrong way, we're going to .
3:41:09Yep.
3:41:12If not, what?
3:41:13First of all, you said Nixon said he would continue bombing when the president makes it.
3:41:16Bombing the military targets not in the South, as long as they're invading and killing the South Vietnamese Americans.
3:41:20Percy feels that protecting withdrawn troops is only an excuse used by the administration to continue the bombing.
3:41:25Who do you agree with, Senator Percy or the president?
3:41:2843 with the president, 41 with Senator Percy.
3:41:31The question is, is it stated too well?
3:41:33Well, the second one.
3:41:34It makes it pretty strong, you know.
3:41:35During the past week, Senator Percy attacked the President's handling of the Vietnam War and called for the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. ground troops.
3:41:41Does Senator Percy's attack on the President's Vietnam policy make you more likely or less likely to vote for him as your candidate for Senator in the Illinois in the 72th election?
3:41:50More likely, 45.
3:41:51Less likely, 23.
3:41:53Percy feels we should withdraw all U.S. troops from Vietnam now, regardless of the consequences.
3:41:57Agree, 57.
3:42:06Well, I'll show you the other side.
3:42:07So he may have pulled before we did.
3:42:11Well, it's close, though.
3:42:12It's a close question.
3:42:14This is equipment very low.
3:42:16It may run a few times.
3:42:17That's all right.
3:42:19I don't think it would even lock to pull at the present time.
3:42:31I was wondering about that.
3:42:33No, it doesn't.
3:42:33We have to do it anyway.
3:42:36We can do it.
3:42:36No, because we're not going to make a speech.
3:42:38I don't need it.
3:42:38I'm not going to make it at the present time.
3:42:48The Illinois people just want to get out of the war.
3:42:50That's one thing.
3:42:51On the other hand, when it comes to the questions of, as you put it, in terms of the bombing and so forth, it's a wash, right?
3:43:02You'll have trouble with it, in my view.
3:43:05That's how he presents it.
3:43:14We all know they want to get out of the war.
3:43:20But we all know that the country can't stand to lose the war.
3:43:23That's our problem.
3:43:25And that's God's plan here.
3:43:26But if Collider's standing, oh well, everything goes down the line.
3:43:36No graceful way to do it.
3:43:37And the cancer of the sonar, I just don't think it's a big thing.
3:43:45I mean, Henry's always so amused with the idea of getting signals.
3:43:49Screw the signals.
3:43:52I mean, the bombing will be a signal.
3:43:53The bombing will be a signal, but also it'll be an act that may do some good.
3:44:18You know, Henry's pretty good at his music.
3:44:22And then about, you know, he said, maybe we should have told him to stop it, because that way we could avoid having him play these things.
3:44:31I said, Henry, for Christ's sake, we don't care about that.
3:44:34And I said, second, let's have that played rather than ever getting the shit checked out of us.
3:44:38Yeah, right.
3:44:39It's, in the name of music, though, that it's a, he just, he really is about, I guess, everybody.
3:44:44Yeah.
3:44:51People would feel a hell of a lot better if they thought you were doing something effective than if you're just sitting there getting kicked around.
3:44:57And I don't know.
3:45:09And I guess what he says, Vogt says we're creating a lot of, I mean, unbelievable damage, but, but what Vogt says, General Vogt says that we're,
3:45:21doing incredible damage to our Vietnamese.
3:45:22They were just killed by the carbines.
3:45:23Well.
3:45:51I like that eulogy when you screwed me up.
3:45:53It was a pretty good one.
3:45:56It was good.
3:45:57And it did not lose by reading.
3:46:00I'm awful glad you decided to read it.
3:46:03It would not have been worth the effort.
3:46:05The difference wouldn't have mattered that much.
3:46:08It was, really, it was appropriate to read.
3:46:10You're standing electric anyway.
3:46:18And you're standing before the casket.
3:46:21I told the jackass I was going to do it.
3:46:24I figured that I could see you were talking to him.
3:46:26Staying here a long time was going to make people sit and think it would be a picture.
3:46:33It would be the best picture you want, other than, of course, that asshole standing with me.
3:46:41Sorry, this is back, which is fine.
3:46:42Although, it won't be Nelson.
3:46:44It'll be a clergyman.
3:46:49ministering his roles.
3:46:50I'll use the picture of the President's Bank tribute.
3:46:53That's a much better picture than our rioting, our, I don't know.
3:46:58I think those, I would think so.
3:47:02It has to be that they sure were looking at it when you stood there.
3:47:14You can also see the giving of making it short.
3:47:17I had to add about 50 to 100 words at the end, because I had to add that on the end a little bit.
3:47:27But it was only 700 words long.
3:47:30It would take about 70 minutes.
3:47:31You get something below 10 minutes.
3:47:37It was just right.
3:47:37You said all that needed to be said, and you made the point on law.
3:47:43And William Hoover, of course.
3:47:46Patriotism sent to critics.
3:47:59It's a good Bible quote.
3:48:02But it's a perfect quote.
3:48:05I've never heard it before.
3:48:23Love belongs to God and you love belongs to God.
3:48:24That was good heavy hat.
3:48:43Line up with cops on the under guard thing on the way in.
3:48:47Oh, that was great.
3:48:49We did.
3:48:49Bill Radigan in our place took that over and did a superb job.
3:48:53We had to turn the military district loose on them.
3:48:56You know, so we had the under guards.
3:48:58The Army Corps was superb in there.
3:49:00Great.
3:49:00Some damn church choir.
3:49:01Great.
3:49:01They used the under guard up at the Capitol.
3:49:05Did all of them.
3:49:05Boy, we did this one well.
3:49:08Paul Bearers and all that.

On May 4, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Alexander P. Butterfield, and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 1:24 pm to 1:51 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 719-022 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 719-22

Date: May 4, 1972
Time: 1:24-1:51 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     President's meeting with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
          -President's report

     Haldeman's meeting with John B. Connally and Henry A. Kissinger

Alexander P. Butterfield entered at an unknown time after 1:24 pm.

     Ronald L. Ziegler
         -Meeting with the President

Butterfield left at an unknown time before 1:27 pm.

     Meeting with Connally
          -Haldeman's discussion
               -Connally's discussion
               -Polls

     Vietnam
          -Connally's advice
               -Necessity of victory
                     -Kissinger
                     -Military action
                           -Bombing
                           -Blockade
               -Soviet Summit
                     -Cancellation
                           -Responsibility
                                 -Soviet Union
               -Kissinger
               -Bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong
                     -Intensity
                     -Targets
                     -Civilian casualties
                           -Paul N. McCloskey's charges
                           -Press coverage
                           -Kissinger's position
               -Soviet Summit
                     -Soviet intentions
                     -Cancellation
                     -Kissinger's position
               -Bombing
                     -President's decision
                           -President's speech

Ziegler entered at 1:27 pm.

     J. Edgar Hoover building

           -Announcement
               -Release

     President's eulogy
          -Ziegler's opinion

Ziegler left at 1:31 pm.

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnam offensive
               -Soviet summit
                     -Possible cancellation
                           -President’s response
               -Blockade
                     -Timing with summit
                     -Advantages
                           -Cancellation of summit
               -Connally’s advice
                     -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                     -Kissinger
                     -Melvin R. Laird
               -President’s policies
                     -Public support
               -South Vietnam performance
                     -Morale
                           -Kissinger’s opinion
                           -Abrams’s opinion
                     -Improvements
                     -Effect of Kissinger’s trip to Moscow
               -Bombing
                     -Risks to summit
                           -Kissinger’s view
               -Blockade
                     -Kissinger’s position
                     -President’s position
                     -Alexander M. Haig, Jr’s position
                           -The President’s view
               -Bombing
                     -Impact on North Vietnam
                     -North Vietnam dikes
                     -Kissinger’s opinion
               -Soviet summit

     -Possible cancellation
           -Connally’s advice
                 -President’s opinion
           -Comparison to U-2 incident
                 -Effect on Dwight D. Eisenhower
           -Connally’s view of public opinion
                 -On Vietnam
                 -On summit cancellation
                 -On People's Republic of China [PRC] visit
     -President’s military response
     -Kissinger’s position on cancellation
     -Connally’s position on cancellation
           -Soviet initiative
                 -US military action
-Blockade
     -Support from Kissinger, military
     -Problems
           -Future North Vietnam negotiations with Democratic President
           -Kissinger’s position
-Bombing
     -Civilian casualties
           -President’s assessment of Connally’s advice
-Soviet summit
     -Possible cancellation
           -Connally’s position
           -Kissinger’s position
           -Bombing
                 -Effect on summit
           -Responsibility
-US military defeat
     -Political impact
           -Connally’s assessment of President's position
     -President’s standing with public
-Soviet summit
     -Possible cancellation
-US response
     -Bombing
           -Kissinger’s position
           -President’s attitude
           -Abrams
                 -Position
           -Connally’s advice

                           -Compared with Laird and William P. Rogers
          -Polls
                -Charles H. Percy's polls in Illinois
                       -Statements on bombing
                -Necessity of blockade
                -Illinois attitudes
                -Effect of polls
          -US military defeat
          -Soviet summit
                -Possible cancellation
                       -Kissinger’s position
          -Bombing
                -Advantages
                -Timing
                       -Kissinger’s advice
                             -The President’s view
                -Public opinion
                       -Support for the president's actions
                -Damage
                       -Gen. John W. Vogt's report

Hoover funeral
    -President's eulogy
          -Reception
          -Delivery
                -President's conversation with Rev. Edward L.R. Elson
    -Photographs
          -Elson
          -President's arrival
    -President's eulogy
          -Length
                -Number of words
                -Time
          -References
                -Law and order
                -Patriotism
                -Critics
          -Biblical quotation
                      -John K. Andrews, Jr.
    -Honor guard
          -William F. Rhatican's idea
    -US Army chorus

          -Pallbearers
          -Press reaction
                -The President’s view

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnam offensive
               -Bombing
                     -Public reaction
                           -Poll results
               -Initiation
               -Public reaction
                     -Relation to Soviet Summit
                           -Connally's views
                           -Possible cancellation
                                 -Kissinger's view

The President and Haldeman left at 1:51 pm.
  • 719-019 12:56 PM · 26 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Frank E. Fitzsimmons, Raymond Schoessling, Joseph Trerotola, William J. McCarthy, Welon L. Mathis, Charles W. Colson, White House photographer, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:56 pm to 1:21 pm.
  • 719-020 1:21 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:21 pm and 1:24 pm.
  • 719-021 1:21 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:21 pm and 1:24 pm.
  • 719-023 1:51 PM · 1 min — United States Secret Service agents met in the Oval Office of the White House on an unknown date, sometime between 1:51 pm on May 4, 1972 and 8:44 am on May 5, 1972.
  • 023-151 1:52 PM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 1:52 pm and 2:51 pm.
  • 334-037 1:52 PM · 3 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 1:52 pm and 2:51 pm.
  • 334-038 1:52 PM · 19 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 1:52 pm and 2:51 pm.
  • 334-039 1:52 PM · 14 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 1:52 pm and 2:51 pm.

Conversation 719-022, May 4, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/719-022 (accessed October 9, 2026).