Conversation 767-017

TapeTape 767StartFriday, August 11, 1972 at 10:36 AMEndFriday, August 11, 1972 at 11:08 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Flanigan, Peter M.;  Peterson, Peter G.;  Bull, Stephen B.Recording deviceOval Office

On August 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Peter M. Flanigan, Peter G. Peterson, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:36 am to 11:08 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 767-017 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 767-17

Date: August 11, 1972
Time: 10:36 am - 11:08 am
Location: Oval Office

Henry A. Kissinger met with Peter M. Flanigan and Peter G. Peterson; the White House
photographer and members of the press were present at the beginning of the meeting.

                                        (rev. Nov-03)

       Peterson’s schedule

       Photographs
            -Arrangements

The President entered at 10:36 am.

       [Photograph session]

       Tom Petit
           -Previous Los Angeles assignment

       Purpose of meeting
            -Publicity
            -Discussion of international trade

       Peterson's previous meetings with Soviet Union officials
             -Exports
                    -Soviet Union desire for Most Favored Nation [MFN] status
             -Proposed trade center facilities
                    -Drawings of the facilities
             -Hospitality
             -Soviet negotiating tactics
             -Accomplishments
             -Nikolai S. Patolichev
                    -Health
                    -Soviet minister of health [Boris V. Petrovsky]
                          -Politburo
             -Unemployment in US
             -1972 election
             -Political significance of meetings
             -Soviet desire for economic agreement
             -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                    -Desire for economic agreement
                          -Soviet domestic political situation
                          -Patolichev
                          -Previous meeting in Crimea with Peterson
             -US-Soviet Union trade
                    -Gas deal
                    -Lend-Lease
                          -Brezhnev’s comments to Peterson

                                 (rev. Nov-03)

               -Leningrad
               -US position
                      -Possible concession
                            -Congressional acceptance
     -Comprehensive trade agreement
         -MFN status for the Soviet Union
         -Arbitration
         -Bargaining advantage of US concession on Lend-Lease
               -Peterson’s view
         -Gas deal
               -Possible arbitration complications
         -Arbitration
               -Paul R. Porter
         -Harold J. Berman
               -Harvard University
         -Impact of US domestic situation
         -Appearance of concession to Brezhnev
               -Brezhnev’s domestic situation
                      -US interest in Brezhnev
                            -Soviet hardliners
                            -US-Soviet Union relations

US-Soviet Union relations
    -Kissinger's forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union
           -Confidentiality
                 -State Department
           -Discussions with Brezhnev
                 -Aleksei N. Kosygin
           -Preliminary work on trade
                 -Flanigan, Peterson
                 -Relationship to 1972 election
                 -Brezhnev's concerns
                        -Vietnam
                        -The People's Republic of China [PRC]
    -Trade
           -Importance to Soviets
           -Situation for US
                 -Lend-Lease
                        -Importance
                              -Congress
                              -Soviet Union purchases of grain

                                        (rev. Nov-03)

                  -Gas deal
                        -Political implications
                               -PRC
                               -Japan
                        -Soviet grain purchase
                        -Strategic value
                               -Enhancement of Soviet military capability
                               -Pipeline construction
                        -Possibility of US concessions
                               -Lend-Lease
                               -Pipeline
                        -US domestic energy prices
                        -Possible working group
                               -Peterson's proposal
                        -Brezhnev
                               -Need for appearance of Presidential interest
                                     -Development of options
                                     -Announcement
                               -Timing
                                     -Kissinger’s forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union
                                           -Submission of proposal to the Soviets
                                                 -Brezhnev
                                                 -Importance of notice to the Soviets
                                                       -Politburo
                        -The President’s forthcoming message to Brezhnev
                               -Problems
                                     -Brezhnev’s possible discussions with Kissinger
                                           -Pipeline
                                                 -Working group
                               -Need for action
             -Lend-Lease

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 10:36 am.

       The President's schedule
            -Meeting with George W. Romney
            -Size
            -Location
                  -Cabinet Room
                  -Oval Office
            -Press photograph

                                        (rev. Nov-03)

                  -Report on Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania

Bull left at an unknown time before 11:08 am.

       US-Soviet Union relations
           -Lend-Lease
                  -Brezhnev
                  -Concessions
                  -The Administration’s possible meetings with Congress
                       -The President's view
                              -Senate
                              -Consultations
                       -Kissinger’s view
                              -State Department
                  -US deal with Great Britain
                       -Payment schedule
                              -Link to US-Soviet Union payment negotiations
                  -Appearance of optimism
                  -The Administration’s consultations with Congress
                       -Vietnam negotiations
                              -Contrasted with Lend-Lease negotiations
                       -Factor of Soviet losses in World War II
                       -Negotiations with Brezhnev

       US-Japan trade
            -Gas deal
                  -political aspects
                  -Economic significance
                         -California
                  -Shipments to Japan
                  -Japanese presence in Siberia
                  -Kakuei Tanaka

       Maritime issues
             -Shipping
                  -Cuba
                       -Timing vis-a-vis the 1972 elections

       Poland
            -Relations with US
                  -1972 election

                                         (rev. Nov-03)

                   -Bonds issue
                         -Forthcoming meeting between US and Polish officials
                   -Grain sales
                   -Compared to US relations with the Soviet Union
                   -Trade
                         -Terms of agreements
                               -Publicity
                   -Export-Import [Ex-Im] Bank
                         -Yugoslavia
                         -Romania
                               -Trade with US
                         -Polish bond payments to Polish Americans

       US-Soviet Union relations
           -Trade negotiations
                  -Report to Congress
                       -Administration goals
                              -Agreement
                                   -Timing

Kissinger, Flanigan and Peterson left at 11:08 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I think I'll be the president.
Yes, sir.
On their way.
In order to.
If you'd like to take the chair.
President's right.
Action.
There we go.
You're going to be on the box, aren't you?
Well, let me say the main purpose of this meeting is to recognize
just so that once you get to here, you feel things that you may want.
I'm sure you've gotten reports on beatings and stuff.
Yes.
You're all being rigid.
Yeah.
They even dictate.
Mr. Hartford.
Very hospitable.
Your arms.
But I mean, in such a...
We also got a fair amount of the stuff for about a week.
I thought they were going to solve our unemployment problem.
Yeah, we answered that very well.
God, we hit that real hard.
Yeah, they were doing just a great job.
They win the election for you.
You'll have to decide on this.
All this is politically.
I think about half of it.
It's just the way they negotiate.
Up to their own.
Economically, Mr. President, I'm convinced
his own reasons, politically.
I had a sense that he's got a great commitment to his relationship with you, to the summit.
And when Patel, Jeff, and the others felt a little bit of steel, you know, that we could just walk away and take months and not have another
Yeah, I think that two high and hard issues here, really.
Planned Lease, or if you've never had me, pulled me aside privately on a special message.
My own feeling is we've got to posture now way above that number, you know, four and a half plus.
I think if you decide to go and make a concession on that lease, it'll make President look pretty good.
Six, eight months from now, if we get enough money, something to figure is respectable, you know, $750, $800, $900, whatever the number is, it's going to be a big number.
And if you wish...
You know, one sticky one.
I would hope on the trade-off, though, if you decide to come down some more than a half, you hang in there on a comprehensive trade agreement.
The reason I say that is a lot of sticky issues here, aside from most favorite nations and business facilities.
As a lawyer, arbitration, for example, they continue with us.
that if you decide to come down a little on my lease, it's probably good to hang in there while you've got the bargaining chip.
I'll be back soon.
Until you get a pretty complete package out of these guys, we can try and bring it to them certainly, far less than yours.
But if you ever lose bargaining chips with these guys, you know how long it can go on.
If you decide to
going to work a little longer.
And he's going to work on arbitration.
He's coming up with some confidences that he thinks would be acceptable.
You're very good at that.
Follow me on Berman.
You know Berman at our department.
He's kind of a Russian expert.
We put a little team together.
Good.
So I think why don't we start with issue number one.
And I would guess you could give some on that.
Still be a hero back home.
And look as though you've made a big concession
Your analysis, I think, is correct.
Do you have problems with these?
Are there any questions whether or not we can move towards this?
I don't know about that.
So therefore, we hope that you will ask more than that.
Well, that's it.
Also, we have an interstitial because we now have a relationship with them, which is considered very important.
Question, please.
There are many levels of these.
Number one, we consider it to be that we have
That's right.
And whatever is re-abused, any opposition could be.
Could have to crystallize on what had been identified.
That's the issue.
Now, let me, let me, let me say this.
I don't want any notes made on this.
I don't want you to forget that it's been heard.
I implied this.
but I must stop him.
I'm sorry that I did not anticipate.
I think what would be helpful would be to have, based on what you've seen, your feelings as to what we ought to, our options, Jeremy could agree to, would we not?
And before I even go as to why I did it, I actually,
This will be a time of strife.
Also, Henry, in the meantime, we have a flying condition.
Nobody is aware of it.
I wouldn't be surprised if I got on.
All of it's related very frankly to our situation.
hey, help us out.
We want to get something back.
It's got a peer group.
I'm not as concerned about the land use.
It has nothing to do with economics.
All of a sudden, I know it's not to do with the fact that the Russians are now buying.
Whether they are or not, people think
that has enormous, enormous political implications for the Chinese.
I was thinking of even building the pipeline.
Well, anything that's connected to the economy in that way,
That's the next move in the whole checker game, right?
So what do you suggest on that?
What would you like to do?
On the gas scene, you know, of course, the substantive problem, Mr. President, we have the problem of our domestic energy policy and, you know, prices here and all that sort of thing.
My feeling is, and I have committed to us to do this, we ought to set up a very visible work group that really moves
But I think we are going to want to do more.
Hey.
Starting to take the pipeline is a lot of work, but we can't control it, Mr. President.
It's not like Lend-Lease works for you.
That's entirely up to you.
Our experience is, it never pays to tell them what won't happen.
The best thing is to tell them this is what we're doing, and let them worry about it.
Then if he needs something, they make a letter to the right person.
I said I discussed a number of problems.
One that was high on the agenda was the
there.
No, it means a lot to know that the time has come for action, not words at the end.
And can you use the word big steps as he points out?
Yes, sir.
I totally agree with what he had expressed.
Big and unconventional steps, but that we haven't gotten prepared away at the time.
We're working very hard in our organization.
concrete steps.
That'll be getting the whole subject in the right way to prepare that for my signature, but not for distribution.
Mr. President, can I get your counsel on one more point on how you'd like to be positioned?
Let me make a suggestion and see how it goes with you.
Suppose I'm kind of the guy
I keep setting this up as a tough issue that has to be resolved at the highest levels and all the signals coming back.
I like the idea of keeping the heavy, you know, say, four and a half.
Yeah.
But only in the case of bureaucracy.
As long as they keep state, right, if they live in a four and a half, they can't do anything about it.
Right.
But how about Congress?
Can I make this specific?
So as I said to them, we're hanging in there for a deal that pays out at the same time the British deal pays out, you know, which is 30 years from now.
Mr. President, you know and I know we've already got that.
It sounds like a fairly tough position, you know, with the Soviets.
And why should we give the Soviets extra time, you know, since they should have been paying over the last 20 years?
We've already got that on the table, so you don't have to worry about whether we can deliver it.
That's the kind of thing I'm thinking about.
Nothing that embarrasses
of other countries and so forth, but that we are still quite a bit apart and that we're working on the thing.
That's a very honest way to put the thing, but don't appear too hopeless.
I think you've got to appear hopeful.
You're afraid of him saying that, but that's fine.
I kind of like it.
I just feel it.
I just feel that we mustn't give these impressions to him.
We have to tell the Congress not to come out of Vietnam for reasons that you're well aware of.
When I say not, we can't do it, or we're not going to have a negotiation together.
In this area, if it won't screw up, then tell them something.
You know, give them a few grounds.
I don't know how long it's going to take.
I think if you discuss it with the Congress, they respond to the discretionary.
All they have to do is 20 minutes.
They have to do money for all right.
I think what you're going to want to do is drive us out of this area.
and I should have, and they're very tough, so that when you do it, it's something substantial.
But if the Congress does yell at us with a lower percentage to go to the President, I think it's better for us with original to have it in our position.
It's four and a half percent is the maximum.
You do know on gas, do you, about Japan?
And Henry and I had chatted before our last meeting about how a deal with the Japanese might have major political aspects for you.
It's also got a lot of economic aspects.
I think we can get the Japanese
I voted me in to do it with Ken, but I think what he would do.
Two more quickies.
On maritime, I think we've got this very difficult Cuba problem that you may be aware of on ships, but pretty well under control, so it's after the election.
So I won't get involved with all the details, but that was three points.
Oh, yes, yes.
You want to be damn nice to the polls.
And their feelings are very warm.
Here's where we are now.
You've got all the options you need for election.
You've got the Polish bond situation, remember, that you've got to set up now so that they're coming over here in September.
But we're positioned now so if you want
I don't think you know of any of the deals, not just some of the bonds, but the holds and other deals.
You remember that longer, doesn't it?
I don't know.
I haven't met a lot of you.
Yeah, haven't we?
No, sir.
But it's long.
President, do you want the country to still be positive?
That is, we're still expecting a deal by the year end.
No, let me say, yes, yes, we are.
And I would say that there, I don't want this, this is a business deal.
Both sides are a very big problem.
It takes time.
Our goal is to have a deal.