Nixon & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Accords

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I had lunch with Hedley Donovan and this girl.

What does the President feel about the political side of this?

I said, frankly, he never discussed the political side of the Vietnam War.

I said, I wouldn't say it's a question of public morality, whether if he had the choice and weren't under too violent attack, whether he should have settled it after the election rather than before.

I figured it's a great sound to leave in their minds.

Maybe we are holding settlements.

And so he's not saying that he's doing it at all.

But he's been announcing that.

Oh, yeah.

I didn't say we were going to do it.

Very quick.

And I figured we can be lucky and get one woman to answer this.

It doesn't make any sense.

What time is it?

Eight o'clock.

I was wondering, I said I had

he would have come a long time ago to check on politics.

Maybe you don't have to come.

I was thinking, maybe about 5 o'clock, that maybe you and David might talk a little more.

Good times.

Oh, yeah.

Good times.

Good.

I'd like to be maybe back in America.

I want to be sure Al has the feel of everything.

I've been talking to him for two months now.

But he should get it from you.

Well, I'll see if there's any questions.

No, I can just, you know, I give him the state of negotiations and so forth.

It's essential that he talk to you.

Well, I guess the real, the really, no, I think certainly we both have.

That's about doing something that's going to flush South Vietnam.

Not you, but South Vietnam.

On the resignation, Mr. President,

The way that would happen is, in a way, this is easier to handle than the other one, because he wouldn't have to resign unless he were satisfied with the military conditions.

What we would table as a formal proposal doesn't include his resignation.

I suppose I believe it would be.

And if they do, we can deny it.

Well, it isn't just that.

It's the fact of the matter.

If we can get their forces out of Laos, or substantially at least out of southern Laos, if we can get them out of Cambodia, if we can get them to reduce to the south right now, yes.

What about that?

Plantation.

Actually, they have to be put all .

Yeah.

Well, .

Yeah, it's interesting that the French raise this point .

And we're just not going to do it.

In fact, they're very sensitive about it.

That's why I keep the heat on that.

I know it's a 30.

It's come up a little bit.

They're a little bit higher.

Oh, yeah.

Oh, yeah. 326.

If we could get an agreement in principle, we might step on the note of the 20.

Oh, sure.

But we're not there yet.

What do you anticipate then at your meeting?

If you had a comment, that would be one hell of a signal.

Well, it depends what you're saying.

Well, hey, President, if the negotiations get serious about the military conditions, I'd have somebody there who knows what he's talking about.

And also, frankly, I'm looking at it with some fear to keep Hanoi getting a little longer.

And if it gets really serious, my dressing assistants are very good at sort of nitpicking the things when they don't have the strategic.

Right.

I'd have somebody to talk to.

Yeah, well, I think you need somebody to talk to.

Particularly, you know, when it's one day, I can think it out ahead of time.

Sure.

But when it's two days, I'd like to talk to somebody.

In between.

And I can't put it all in a cable to use.

You don't think you can use a telephone?

Yeah.

That's that.

Yeah, I can do it.

I can do it without any, if you have any doubts about it.

No.

Hell, raise the expectations.

He's got every right to come there.

I think what we should position his trip as is, one, look over the military situation.

Well, it's already been announced.

We just say it were for consultation with General Tew, to work with President Tew about the whole complex of the issue.

I see.

That's all right.

What's the lead in the military, then?

I have told him.

He shouldn't see Tew without Congress and without Tuesdays.

You think what he does is just to take him on the mountaintop and say, well, here we are?

Well, he has two problems.

First of all, he has to send out a proposal to him, which is already enough to drive him up the wall, because that abolishes the existing Constitution itself.

He's now going to create a new Constitution.

I mean, we are already a constituent assembly.

And he hasn't proved that yet?

No.

You didn't discuss that with him?

on what I discussed with him on two presidential elections within the present Constitution.

Well, I suppose that would be, that would be, it may just be breakdown right there.

I'd just say that if he can't rid that goddamn Constitution of itself, then he hasn't got control of his government.

Because he'd remain in control of his area.

I mean, the CVM would be in control of his area.

Is that a key point?

Well, we can go back.

We can go to the country, to the election.

But I mean, I was just asking, if he doesn't take it, then we have to go back to the election, right?

Or we present it without him.

Yeah, so should be in position if it goes public, we present something.

They won't accept it without him.

In other words, if he doesn't accept that, he might resign.

Well, he's already agreed in our proposal that after the presidential election, there'd be a review of the Constitution.

I think this present proposal is simpler than the other one.

The other one provides first the presidential election, then for national assembly elections, then for a review of the Constitution.

This one?

Just no presidential election, no other elections, just the Constitutional Assembly, which creates a new government.

We'll have a hearing today.

It's too late.

It's a good one to go.

Well, we can't.

Because we absolutely refuse to serve.

And you have to make the decision whether you want to go back to what is already accepted, namely presidential election.

And national assembly election.

But we would still have expanded functions for the Committee of National Reconciliation.

Would you offer that already?

Yes, I do.

There's no question that the constituent assembly, plus the Committee, would have a sex appeal.

The elections would be run by a committee, or in their case, by a government of national

There'll never be an electoral law.

They'll never agree on an electoral law on the basis of unanimity.

Therefore, there'll never be elections.

In either case, this is their pay-saving way.

We've always said, will they ever separate military from political issues?

They've said so often that they won't separate them.

The practical consequence of their proposal, 9 out of 10, is that there'll never be elections in the C-suite.

Yeah.

That's what Hague talked about, frankly, with Q, for sure.

Because Q doesn't want a C-suite.

And he doesn't want a ballot.

I mean, that's right.

He wants us to stay.

I guess that's it.

The real point is...

Our interests in this are not ours.

We want our prisoners.

He wants us each one.

He wants us in.

He thinks he's winning.

And he wants us to continue bombing.

For another two, three years.

For as long as needed.

That's right.

But I saw it again with these timelines.

If we don't settle it now, we've got to keep going.

But I've now found out that Laird has screwed us in a way that is not to be believed.

He's not the Vietnamese Air Force.

They've got propellers in different planes.

The others have high-performance jets.

It's an unholy alliance of the Navy, the Air Force, and Laird.

The Air Force and Navy wanted to hold on to carriers.

The Air Force wanted to hold on to spaces.

And Laird wanted to save money.

So that in the end, you know, if the war continues, the very first thing we have to do is to give them high performance aircraft.

And force feed it in there, and then I think that by next summer we just have to get out completely.

Oh, shoot.

Well, I said it to Jesus, I understand.

I used to announce it and get it done, but I didn't get on that.

You just get the air out to them.

choice.

That's why I'm so much interested in pushing you.

And you know, next to you, I feel the hardest guy in Vietnam.

I know.

Probably not.

We just know how much it's safe.

You're not doing something.

But we can't have a communist government.

You want to talk about the shot?

Is there anything you want me to talk about in the papers?

I want to talk to you about British politics a little.

I figured, you know.

Nixon & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Accords

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on September 29, 1972

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