Conversation 790-007

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Well, we have to sit over here again, Mr. Lord Minister, for our usual picture.

Did I say in Russian?

Yes, you did.

I'm sorry.

Okay, Mike, thank you.

How many years will you stay here?

I came to Washington in November, end of November of 1949.

Thank you.

You won't get any of this from me.

Yes, not much, not much.

But then, then leave me alone.

What do you do when this happens in Moscow?

And of course, the MPFR.

The progress that we have made since we first sat here together seems like a generation ago.

No one would have predicted we would have done this well.

Our first match we called about a year and a half ago in this room.

And when we walked across the street to the field games,

And since then, in all of these fields, space, attorney, trade, health, arms control, European security.

Of course, we haven't solved everything.

We still have a few problems in Vietnam and others.

But if everything was solved in the variability, we would have .

I'm talking to you as you would have loved to have .

Mr. President, first of all, I would like to say hello to you and warm wishes from the people of the past, present and future generations.

Mr. President, I would like first of all to convey to you the greetings and warmest wishes of the General Secretary of the Brezhnev and Prime Minister Krusygin and President of the Presidium of the Government.

They will ask me to send their kind regards.

And I'd also like to say, in connection with your remarks, Mr. President, that the Soviet leadership at Hull was very pleased indeed with the results of the May meetings

and the documents that ensue their fraud.

It will happen.

And more than that, I've been waiting for you for two or three months.

Until we meet again.

I'll be waiting for you.

The meeting in May was indeed a very important event, and it did serve to raise our relations to a new level.

And you are quite right in saying that just one or two years ago, it would have been hard indeed to find any politician who could have believed or imagined that such results could be possible in relation between our two countries.

And I'd go even further and say even perhaps

a couple of months before the meeting earlier predicted the positive outcome that really, that we didn't achieve.

Your point of agreement on the court is correct.

We can only share our opinion with you.

Now we need to wait for the future.

The upcoming negotiations, maybe they will be more difficult, as you said, because, by the way,

As regards your assessment of the SALT agreements,

We certainly share them completely, and we do believe that we should now look towards the future, and perhaps the forthcoming SALT talks, the next round of SALT talks, will indeed be more difficult, as you said, sort of incidentally, but with due knowledge of state affairs.

But for our part, we certainly have the most serious intentions in connection with the forthcoming

On both sides, efforts should be made to ensure the success of this new round of talks, too.

You have already mentioned Europe, Mr. President.

There are also positive events in Europe, positive events.

Of course, in the first place, it is necessary to put an end to the negotiations.

Poland and the United States of America, they had a beneficial impact on the establishment.

We appreciate the fact that you, you know, it was done by your government in the direction of easing, finalization, I would say, the introduction to the end of these major activities.

Now there is a place for the promotion of the common goal of the General European Conference

You also mentioned European affairs.

Well, there too, in Europe, we too feel that certain positive phenomena have appeared, and perhaps the most important were the treaties signed by the Soviet Union and Poland with the Federal Republic of Germany.

We believe that they had a beneficial influence on the situation in Europe, and we certainly

all that was done in this respect by the United States government to facilitate and promote the finalization of these important steps.

Now certain steps have – are being taken towards convening the European Security Conference.

We have already had some discussion of these concrete steps with Dr. Kessinger in Moscow and with Secretary Rogers here in the United States.

in the pursuance of all that you discussed during your meetings in Moscow last May.

And we certainly express our gratification of what has been done to date on these matters.

And now we believe that work should be done to bring to fruition all of the discussed

to ensure that the conference is a success.

With regard to the soul, it's my understanding that, you see, our election is on the 7th, the 7th of November.

We need, and I would need, about 10 days to two weeks after that, where I've got to not only recover from the election, but do a lot of work, you know, and do administration and the rest.

I know that there's been discussions of the possibility of starting the assault, too, in the week of the 13th.

But I think the better time, I understand, in some discussions of this would be the next week.

So to have, say, the 21st, as I understand, that date has been discussed as to assault, too.

I was going to say, Mr. Beecher, we thought that.

We said it was, whatever, the 21st, you could be out.

That's two weeks after our election, which means I will have to... Of course, I'm not going to be there, but I have to... And I think that it would meet with your approval, because there will be speculation about it as soon as we set the date, that if we could announce it, say, about the 6th,

of when it begins.

Does that sound appropriate?

In other words, the 16th and the 21st, that's not the right thing to do.

No, that's quite true.

No problem about that.

The European security is... You're still... That's what I meant.

We couldn't decide that now because we had to talk to more people, I tell you.

Do you want them to make an announcement on the 30th of October?

we have an understanding with regard to European security and, of course, the MDFR can't worry about European security sometime this fall or... On that, I spoke with a few of our allies and the 22nd seems to be okay.

But we want...

That's the cost of salt.

Salt's coming along.

Well, actually, this is something we'll discuss later.

But what do you have in mind?

Mr. President, when you say that some should be left open and related to the conference, just the date.

Oh, the date.

The date.

We've been talking about November 22nd as the date of the conference.

Maybe we want to change it a few days, but not.

But that's something that you can all work out.

The date will have to be worked out mutually.

I'm sorry.

Mr. President, I can ask you, could you express your opinion?

Of course, we are interested.

Well, Mr. President, might I ask you if you could give me some of your evaluations of the present stage in the Paris talks on Vietnam, because that is something that would certainly be of interest to us.

Well, if you know, Mr. Foreign Minister,

uh, we, uh, we have been having some talks in Paris on which Dr. Dickey has participated, but we have told, uh, the, uh, uh, these talks have, uh, we meet at both sides and agree there will be no discussion on the substance of public opinion.

Uh, you are, I'm sure, aware of, uh, the general, uh, uh, the, uh,

state of those talks, I think perhaps I could say that we, that the two sides still have a very substantial difference, very far apart.

It would seem, I would say, from my analysis of the discussions that have taken place, and also

that there seems to be a more serious attitude on the part of the other side to attempt to reach an agreement than has previously been the case.

I cannot judge those beliefs, except that based on what I have seen in recent weeks, that is my conclusion.

I can say, too, that our attitude is also serious.

The one factor that I should mention, I think would be of interest to you as one who has

I should mention, I think would be of interest to you as one who has spent so much time in this country, and of course your ambassador to Britain, is the great difference in the situation now and the situation in 1968, when we also were having an election.

to make any kind of at any cost in order to give hope for peace.

The situation now is reversed.

We are not allowing electoral considerations to enter into our decision at all, if not, which is good.

This should not be decided on the basis of elections.

It should be decided on the basis of the long term

and whatever we agreed to.

We would like to settle at any time.

But as far as we're concerned, if the other side persists and trenches that attitude, we will wait.

And I

I would just leave it at this point in those general terms.

A lot depends, a lot depends really on whether the other side feels that they will have a stronger position after the election, which we hope to win, and in which the issue of Vietnam will definitely be before the American people, and in which the election will be a mandate

to an extent, to a great extent.

Or whether the other side would prefer to negotiate now.

It's up to them.

As far as we are concerned, we're very relaxed.

We are negotiating our agreement very reasonably.

As Bill and as Rogers has told you, and as Dr. Kissinger has told you, told the ambassador and the commissioner where we have tried to present

a number of alternative proposals which would allow both sides to come out of this with the position that it is defensible that you're sacrificing so much on both sides.

But the situation now is one where, putting it quite bluntly,

Time is not on the side of the end of North Vietnamese.

We have no pressure to settle in the time span.

And we would like to, because of our concern about the loss of life, not ours now, but the South Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese.

We would like to, too, for another reason, as I said,

I sat with the Secretary General of Russia, Xi Jinping, to say, as I said to you, we would like to get Vietnam off the international agenda.

Because while it has not, fortunately, obstructed these great steps, initiatives that we have undertaken between our two countries, nevertheless,

It is like a barn and a toad.

We can't walk quite as fast or quite as far to get there.

We get it out, we can take bigger steps.

I would like to say also that we have appreciated the fact that the government, through the years and these past few months, particularly since our meeting, has been helpful

to some has been helpful also in our attempt to exploit this war issue here.

So I would like to be more specific, and perhaps at some later time I can be.

But that's the state of the play.

There's a chance.

Just to summarize, there is a chance, I think,

that they will see that their position for settlement is better now than it will be later.

But if they want to wait until after our election, we're perfectly relaxed about it.

That's the way to do it at this point.

Mr. President, you know the position.

Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to express my condolences to you.

I hope that you and the government will do everything to end this.

the information which you offered.

You are certainly aware of our position and attitude to this problem, so that makes it unnecessary for me to go into the repetition of what it is.

I would just express the hope that you and the American government will do what you can to bring about an end to this war.

And it does seem unnecessary to say

This war, of course, is poisoning the international atmosphere to a great extent.

This can be seen even in the work of the United Nations.

Although this is not a formal question.

But almost all those who speak on behalf of their government delegations emphasize the need and importance of the end of the war.

It is, of course, certain that that war is poisoning the international atmosphere.

And this can be seen, one of the things I...

of the United Nations, although the question does not formally appear in the agenda of the United Nations at the session.

But all those who take the roster do have something to say about the need to bring about an end to the war in Vietnam.

And I'm sorry to ask you, how do you assess the future development of Sargatit?

Well, I'll tell you right away that we have great concerns and concerns that the situation in this area is not improving.

We will probably not know what will happen the day after tomorrow.

We are here to assist in alleviating these problems.

I would like to draw your attention to the talks that took place in Moscow with you on the problems of the Far East.

There were cases, and there are also talks on the level between representatives of the Soviet Union

Do you have any suggestions about your goals, possible steps, possible perspectives?

And I'd also like to ask you, perhaps if you care to, to express your own assessments and tell me how you see the possible future development of the situation in the Middle East.

On our part, we certainly, we're certainly harboring feelings of great dissatisfaction and certainly apprehension at the fact that the situation

It's not only not been improving, but perhaps it has been growing even more complicated in that area.

And it is a fact that we've now reached a situation where today we cannot safely say what will happen tomorrow.

And unless certain steps are taken tomorrow, we will not be able to safely say what might happen today after tomorrow.

We are certainly, we stand in favor of making every effort to

and here I'd like to refer you to your own conversation on these subjects with the Soviet leaders in Moscow during the visit, and to various other exchanges of views and other levels that we've had in the time that's passed since then.

But regardless... From time to time.

But certainly, regardless of all these conversations, the matter is not but well-intentioned.

Now, that – we feel that the present situation makes it incumbent upon the – not only the big powers, but all nations within the limits of their capacities to try and promote the achievement of a settlement in the Middle East situation.

or assessments that you might care to share with us as to how you see the possible way out.

Now, Mr. Porter, Mr. Kerr, we know, the two of us, all of us in this room,

Difficult is Vietnam.

It's difficult in assault.

It's difficult under the insecurity.

It's the Mideast that's difficult.

Because we are, we have here hatreds that go back over a thousand years.

And we'll probably last for a few thousand more.

Now, I'll give you this.

That's part of it.

We all say $1,000 now because that's the common phrase used in this political camp.

$1,000, $1,000, $1,000 years.

So anyway... You know, he's going to open it up, especially if it's a movie.

Most of the freedom will tell you that that's a big word now.

In our country, we always say you're behind a man 1,000% you have to watch out.

That's right.

But anyway, what is happening here

Let me be very candid.

As you know, the Mideast problem in the United States is always complicated by political considerations.

It is particularly difficult during the election period.

I, perhaps more than most people who have occupied this office,

And we do, we have very strong domestic leaders.

This is a part of the leaders of Israel, the leaders of the government.

They're more reasonable than the rest of the people who are down at the desk.

And of course, our political opponents talk about the meetings.

They make it very difficult for our position to be, shall we say,

and all flexible are prepared for the election.

Now, having said that, I do not want to suggest that once the election is over that the possibilities of a settlement become much better, but at least everybody concerned can be more reasonable.

We realize the present situation cannot continue like that.

There has been a truce.

There is one.

It's an uneasy truce.

We realize, however, that we are dealing in that part of the world with very unpredictable people, leaving out the Israelis for the moment, who are more predictable, who, because they're more intelligent than some of the other leaders that have been there recently.

But who knows what's serious?

Who knows?

They need to do very directional things.

And that's why you can't predict .

That's one of those because they can't predict what their neighbors will do.

So I'm not trying to assess .

Now, here's what it's like.

Therefore, it's to your interest and to ours to try to find a basis for settlement.

Our position has to be that the settlement must be one that

Now, the question is whether or not, on your part, you can influence those who feel close to you, and whether on our part, we can have some influence on those who are close to us, without ever getting to the point which, on both sides, is considered to be unacceptable, imposing, imposing, et cetera.

I would like to be more specific.

All that I can indicate, all that I will indicate to you, because I want to be totally honest, is this, that one, political considerations, either before or after the elections, will not influence what I do on this subject.

Because to me, the more important goal must be to reduce, and we hope remove, this

very cancerous situation that could spread and involve us all, potentially involve us all.

So we are working toward an end.

We have, as you have, friends that we support that are difficult

But we shall work toward that end.

And I would think that the possibility of making progress would be greater once we get past the political system.

And whether, Bill, you've already talked to Rogers, whether you wanted to add anything to that, I don't know.

But on the subject of design,

Because one, in addition to the political climate, which is a reality, the fact that we've had this experience in Munich and the retaliation of Lebanon makes it difficult for any progress in the next couple of months anyway.

So if we can get by the next couple of months with no serious ins and outs, then I think the climate will be pretty good.

It was interesting to me to notice that before Munich,

Several of the leaders in Israel made statements to the effect that they had to be more flexible and make public statements to that effect.

They said that they thought the interim solution to the opening of the canal withdrawal was possible.

They were anxious to have discussions with Egypt about it.

Both the line and IAN made statements to that effect.

So we think that after a couple of months is elapsed, if we have no further difficulty,

claim it will revert to what it was before, and that the chances are that we could, perhaps, negotiations die.

And when I talk about the interim settlement, I'm talking about just the first step in the implementation of 242.

We think that's a possibility, and we think it would serve everyone's best interest if we could, ultimately, now have a partial withdrawal and ceasefire.

Israel's interest.

to serve by bargaining now in a position of law, rather than waiting for flavors that inevitably would become weaker.

Also, Israel has the problem of continuing to have an enormous burden of arms, which they must, they have borne and will continue to bear, if necessary, on all of the people in their city.

Here again, we poisoned the situation as a result of any retaliation of these leaders with the chance for reasonable talks now.

We had that, of course, with the situation.

As far as the long term, when I say long term, I'm not referring

It's going to take 1,000 years in terms of hatreds in the last few months.

In terms of longer term years, speaking not in terms of years or months, we consider it the highest priority to attempt to get some movement towards settlement in this area.

And we will work toward that end.

But what can happen?

I cannot say.

very honest about it.

There's one other thing I think I should say, and that's this.

Israel points out it's difficult to deal with the Arabs because there's so many different Arabs and so many different points of view.

And what has happened in Munich has caused a great deal of concern because Egypt indicated its support for the terrorists.

So Israel has said, well, why should we deal with this?

This is a clear evidence that they don't want to live in peace with us.

They're supporting the United States.

And they're saying that they're both dissociating.

Well, they applauded it.

They thought it was a good idea.

And they applauded and goaded at the same time.

They really should.

That would be a big help if they could disassociate themselves.

I received a report that you do not see the possibility to change the situation.

Our policy remains the same as it was presented to you during the talks in Moscow.

We believe that this issue will not be resolved.

will remain dangerous, and all kinds of surprises from this end may be in relation to our relations as well.

It is quite clear that we need to develop together.

I would like to draw your attention to the Far East.

Well, Mr. President, may I say quite frankly that I am somewhat disappointed by what you say.

That is to the effect that you do not, in the near immediate future, see any real possibilities for any substantial change in the situation in the area.

Now, you know our position on this problem.

was sent out to Moscow and remains as it was then.

We believe that if there is no settlement in the Middle East, the situation will remain very dangerous and fraught with the possibility, of course, of all sorts of further complications.

We therefore believe that if the United States and the Soviet Union, in such a form as is possible, used all the opportunities

they had to promote and facilitate a settlement.

And we, for our part, were certainly ready to make such efforts.

This would certainly serve the best interests of both our two nations and the interests of peace in general.

And that is something I was pushed to stress most emphatically.

And after that, I would like to turn to the situation in the Far East for, say, a couple of words.

Before you leave that, don't let me leave the impression

We both have difficult clients here.

You have and we have.

We certainly, I'm sure you did not approve of what happened in Munich.

And as far as we are concerned, I did not approve of the Israel's overreaction.

That's right.

Israel's reaction, overreaction, was a mistake.

We, in fact, urge very strongly they not do anything like that.

I think all that they gained is simply they lost by what they did.

But that's one part of the problem.

On the other hand, the thing that I wish to emphasize is that

agree with you about the seriousness of the problem.

Second, we are searching, just as you are, for the solution to the problem.

As Bill Rogers has pointed out, the next few weeks, in view of the Munich business and its reaction, and in view of the

situation here, it's not the best time to make any new moves.

But we intend to exert our best influence.

And this must be done.

This must be done in a credit way, our best influence.

As you, we know those of yours who trust me well toward attempting to find a solution.

I'm not as pessimistic about it as I sound, but I wanted to be perfectly pragmatic about it.

In Canada, it's difficult, but so is some of the other things we finally agreed to.

I think we will find a solution, because you want one and we want one.

And between the two of us, it seems to me, using our influence in an effective way,

that we can find some common ground.

Well, that is something that we feel should be done.

We, for our part, are prepared to make every effort and to work together with you to achieve those ends.

On the Far East, I noted this topic not because it causes us some kind of anxiety,

We do not have much information.

Maybe you have more information.

In this regard, there is a very large dose of sugar on one side and on the other.

On the contrary, I want to tell you that no matter what happens, it does not affect our politics.

and in relation to China.

In relation to Japan, we are ready to improve and develop relations.

In no case, we will interfere with our relations with these countries.

In relation to China, our policy course

We will investigate, and we will not let our legal interests be affected.

If it is not at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Union, you yourself better say that it is not at the expense of the interests of the third countries.

This is what I wanted to tell you.

If you are looking for an opportunity,

Now, I mentioned the Far Eastern area, not because any events take place in there, but

that provoked any particular concern on our part.

But we have noticed that during and after the meeting between the Chinese and the Japanese leaders, there have been very loud and very sugary statements about one another issued by both sides.

Now, I would just like to say that

to emphasize that whatever happens, whatever occurs in that area will not in any way affect our position of principle in respect of both China and Japan.

We are prepared and we will go on taking steps to develop and improve our relations with Japan, but that will not be to the detriment of the interests of any third countries.

to know that in respect of China, we pursue a very clear-cut and principled line.

We will not allow any harm to be caused to our interests, but we are naturally and will not depart one iota from our position as a principle, although we are, of course, the invader of the development of normal print division,

And I'd like also to voice the hope that neither China nor Japan intend to develop and improve their own relationships, which is only too normal, and two countries seek to improve their relations, but they will not seek to do so.

And no one actually could say anything against a desire to bring about...

out to the detriment of the interests of the Soviet Union.

And well, it is best for you to say what your attitude is in regard to the interests of the United States in that context.

But that is just, those are the remarks that I wish to make in respect to the situation in the Far East.

And if you would care to make any comments in return, I would be most happy to hear whatever you have to say.

Well, I think the position

We seek a more normal relationship with the King.

And of course, we have a treaty commitment with the Japanese.

We believe that this new development, the treaty

is one which can be constructive in reducing the possibility of conflict in the Far East.

We all know, historically, that China and Japan have been enemies more often

And even though Japan has no significant military capability at the present time, its enormous economic potential is a base for developing capacity on the military side.

Should the Defense Forces of Japan move in that direction,

We watched the situation closely.

We had an even-handed attitude toward it.

We met with Tanaka and we did not encourage or discourage him in any of the

This policy must be determined by its own interest as it works and as it negotiates with Japan.

I think that's an inclusion, I believe, that the Soviet Union and the United States both happen to be Pacific and Asian powers.

But we have an interest, both of us, in Japan and China.

our relationship as the foreign minister does not revolve into a

And even the Middle East, where there's both our Middle East in terms of its economic potential and the fact that it could bring the great powers into conflict, is more dangerous than Vietnam.

But on the other hand, the foreign minister very properly has brought the Far East, even though it isn't

Third, after the Soviet Union, the United States economic power, and China, which is the most populous nation in the world today.

What they do with each other has got to affect your future and ours.

And right now, we're watching it like you are, closer, without taking sides, without attempting to influence its direction, but provided no action is taken about them.

Thank you, Mr. President, for your conclusion.

Since our discussion has come to an end, I would like to make a brief remark about the conclusion.

In general, we do not have any particular comments.

Well, the evaluation from your side, the official one, from other officials, the result of the Moscow negotiations, some of them, who have political life in the United States, have nothing to do with foreign policy, we think that it causes

I don't know.

to study the course that was assigned to them.

And sometimes they used the appropriate political instruments to manage this course.

In a word, in order to firmly follow the path that was planned for our countries.

From this point of view, I would like to say that the assessment of this trial

Mr. President, thank you very much for your remarks.

Now, our conversation is drawing to a close.

May I just say that we have no particular comments to make on the assessment that has been made public in this country by yourself and by other government personalities about the results of the Moscow talks.

some certain count on this country relating to the foreign policy field.

Or the political scene.

To the political scene, because we do evoke several questions in our mind.

But you know, for instance, our attitude to the so-called Jackson Amendment.

But we believe that, as a matter of principle, the two powers should keep their, the two governments should keep their hands firmly

and steer along the course that was charted by the May meeting.

And whenever necessary, certain instruments should be used in order, where necessary, perhaps to correct.

with what was decided on at the meeting in Moscow in May.

And in this respect, I wish to say that the evaluation of the results of that meeting, given in the statement made by Secretary Rogers of the United Nations, is certainly something that coincides in general with our own assessment of the situation.

And we, in our statement at the UN, we gave our evaluation.

As I see it, it runs along the same lines as yours does.

I wish to thank you very much, Mr. President, for the opportunity to see me.

Let me respond.

First, tonight we will have the only 12, just a small group, so we can continue to talk.

We can talk in that group just as we've talked here.

We are very pleased with the way we have moved forward with the constructability of the initiatives begun.

And we are looking forward to letting the groundwork for a visit on the part of

particularly want you to convey to the appreciation for the fact that we have had the opportunity to be in contact by correspondence and otherwise, and also that we are looking forward to preparing the meeting.

And he visits the United States so that it can be, as the second step, as significant as the meeting

That's our goal.

But for it, for that to happen, that's why what we do on Sunday

One humorous side issue.

As the ambassador has probably told you, we are catching hell on the grain hill.

And it was interesting to note that an article in the New York Times, the fact that the Soviet leaders, the Soviet government misled us.

because the communists were acting like capitalists.

You were criticized.

I would have done, if I were in this room, I would say exactly the same thing.

If I were going to die,

We are.

responsible I don't ask you to respond on it.

I know what your views are.

But I do think it's important .

There is one that I don't know if Bill Rogers has discussed, but I thought I should just mention over here. .

Well, just in response to that, to the last remarks, Mr. President, I just wish to say one phrase consisting of, I've just counted in my head, about six words.

The significance of that question is being quite unfoundedly blown up.

It is more than six words.

It was six words.

What do you say?

Well, we'll see you later.

Oh, this way.